JUDGMENT V. Mishra, J. This judgment will govern Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3642 of 1975 and Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4295 of 1976 as the same point is involved in both the cases. Both the petitions are under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Code'). 2. In Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3642 of 1976, petitioner no. I is Shri Nand lal Poddar of Rohtas Industries Ltd., Dalmianagar and petitioner no. 2 is Shri D.V. Singh, the Factory Manager of the said Rohtas Industries Both of them have been prosecuted under section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 on the basis of a complaint filed by Shri S. B. Jha, Inspector of Factories. This case was registered as Case No. 91 (0) of 1976 in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram. After taking cognizance, the case was transferred by the Chief Judicial Magistrate to the file of Shri B. K. P. Kashyap, Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Sasaram, for disposal. In his court, it was numbered as Case No. 91 (0)/950 of 1917 (State Vrs. N. L. Poddar and another). They have been prosecuted for a technical offence under section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948, which prescribes a penalty of imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to live hundred rupees or with both. Obviously, therefore, it is a summons case. On the 2nd of July, 1976, an application was filed by the petitioners who were accused in that case before Shri B. K. P. Kashyap for permitting them to appear through their lawyer under sections 205 and 317 of the Code. Two petitions have been filed separately on behalf of the two petitioners, which are annexures 2 and 2/a to the application in this Court. Both of them had appeared even before summons was received by them. So far petitioner no. 1 is concerned, his plea was that he did not ordinarily reside at Dalmianagar and in course of business he had to be in Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and other places as also some times a broad. He had given a list of the firms of which he was Director or Partner or share-holder. He, therefore, prayed for representation through lawyer, of course, undertaking to be personally present in the Court whenever required. He had given a list of the firms of which he was Director or Partner or share-holder. He, therefore, prayed for representation through lawyer, of course, undertaking to be personally present in the Court whenever required. Shri D. V. Singh in his petition also disclosed that be was connected with a number of concerns and was also working as the Chief Personnel Manager and Factory Manager of Rohtas Industries Ltd. and he also was required to visit Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay and other places in course of his business. While praying for exemption from personal appearance and representation through lawyer, the also undertook to be personally present in court as and when directed. Both these petitions were filed on 22.7.1976 but were rejected by the same order on 22.7.1976 itself.Tbe main ground for refusal were that their remaining busy with other works could not be a ground for exemption, that they resided very close to the court and that they bad sufficient transport facilities to appear in the court. Against that order, the petitioners have preferred this case under section 482 of the Code. 2. In Criminal Miscellaneous No, 4295 of 1976 the petitioner is Shri J. P. Saxena, Nominated Owner. Baulia Lime Stone Mine of M/s Sone Valley Portland Cement Co, Ltd. Dalmianagar. He along with three others were prosecuted at the instance of the Joint Director of Mines Safety, Kodarma Region, district Hazaribagh, for contravention of certain provisions of the Mines Act, 1952. The petition of complaint was filed in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram, on 10.6.1976 and was numbered as Criminal Case No. 89 (0) of 1976, The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance under section 22 (3) of the Mines Act, 1952, which is punishable under section 72 B of the Mines Act and transferred the case to the file of Shri B.K.P. Kashyap, Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Sasaram, for disposal on 21.6.1976. In the transferee court, It was numbered as Case No. 89 (0) of 19761 TR/No/949/(0)/1976. The punishment provided under section 72 B of the Mines Act is imprisonment which may extend to two years and fine up to five thousand rupees. Obviously, therefore, it is also a summons case. In the transferee court, It was numbered as Case No. 89 (0) of 19761 TR/No/949/(0)/1976. The punishment provided under section 72 B of the Mines Act is imprisonment which may extend to two years and fine up to five thousand rupees. Obviously, therefore, it is also a summons case. On 21.7.1976 itself, a petition was filed on behalf of t be principal accused, Shri J. P. Saxena (who is petitioner in this case) under sections 205 and 317 of the Code for permission to appear through a lawyer during the course of the trial. A true copy of that petition is Annexure-2 to the application in this Court, The grounds are that he is also the Executive President of M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. and he is al ways busy with the affairs of the industries within the entire complex of at Dalmianagar. He is also required to go to Patna, Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay and some times abroad even. He has given the list of the concerns of which be is Director, President or Member or Shareholder. In view of his various engagements, he therefore, prayed for exemption from personal appearance and representation through lawyer of course undertaking to appear personally, if and when required. This petition was also rejected on 21.7.1976 on the grounds similar to those in the Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3642 of 1976. The copy of the order of the Judicial Magistrate has been annexed marked as Annexure-3 to this application. Against this order, this application under section 482 of the Code has been preferred. 3. No counter-affidavit has been filed by the State of Bihar, though the petitions have been vehemently opposed at the time of hearing. 4. The admitted position in both the cases, therefore, is that the petitioners are persons, who are very much involved in industries and are often required to be at different places in course of their business. There is no dispute on the point that the petitioners of both the cases here are liable, if at all, only for technical offences. Further admitted position is that both the cases were summons cases and the petitions in question for exemption were on similar grounds and the reasons for rejection were also the same. Thus, the only point for consideration here is whether it is a fit case for interference by this Court under section 482 of the Code or not. Further admitted position is that both the cases were summons cases and the petitions in question for exemption were on similar grounds and the reasons for rejection were also the same. Thus, the only point for consideration here is whether it is a fit case for interference by this Court under section 482 of the Code or not. The main objection raised on behalf of the State is that the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate were interlocutory orders and, as such, even a revision against the same was barred under section 397 (2) of the Code and, as such, the powers under section 482 of the Code could not be invoked. On behalf of the petitioners of both the applications, it has been submitted that so far the petitioners are concerned, the orders passed are final orders and not interlocutory orders and, as such the bar of section 397 (2) of the Code would not stand in the way of this Court in interfering with the impugned orders, which, according to them clearly show abuse of power. 5. I would therefore, first consider if the orders in question are interlocutory or final orders. Petitions for exemption from personal attendance were filed under section 205 and 317 of the Code. For proper appreciation, I would quote below both the sections viz. 205 and 317 of t he Code. “205.(1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons he may if he sees reasons so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. (2) But the Magistrate Inquiring into or trying the case may in his discretion at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and, if necessary enforce such attendance in the manner herein before provided. XX XX XX 317. (1) At any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded that the personal attendance of the accused before the Court is not necessary in the interest of justice, or that the accused persistently disturbs the proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may, if the accused is represented by a pleader, dispense with his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings direct the personal attendance of such accused. (2) If the accused in any such case is not represented by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers his personal attendance necessary, he may, if he thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of such accused be taken up or tried separately.” Subsection (l) of section 205 clearly gives power to the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. If such a permission is given, it is not final, because subsection (2) of section 205 itself shows that whenever the Magistrate thinks necessary, he can ask; the accused to appear in person. Thus, the order of exemption passed under sub-section (1) of section 205 of the Code cannot be said to be final. If that had been final the Magistrate could not have been given the authority to require the personal attendance of the accused thereafter. But, that is not the position. If, however, under sub-section (1) of section 205, the Magistrate refuses the prayer i.e. if he does not permit the accused to be represented by a lawyer and compels his attendance on every date, then sub-section (2) of section 205 does not authorize him to permit the accused to be absent on any date. A question, therefore, arises if refusal of the permission under subsection (1) of section 205 is final or not. Here, I may refer to section 317 quoted above. In that section, if at any stage of the trial, the Magistrate is satisfied for reasons to be recorded that the personal attendance of the accused is not necessary in the interest of justice, he may dispense with his attendance, if he is represented by a pleader and proceed with the trial. Section 317 lays down some other conditions also under which the presence of the accused can be dispensed with even though he is present in Court. Section 317 lays down some other conditions also under which the presence of the accused can be dispensed with even though he is present in Court. Thus the legal position, taking sections 205 and 317 of the Code, together is that if a Magistrate dispenses with the personal attendance and allows him to be represented by a lawyer, he can subsequently require his personal attendance if and when necessary and if the Magistrate refuses the prayer of the accused for exemption from personal attendance and representation through the lawyer, he at a subsequent stage, if thought necessary, may dispense with his personal attendance and permit representation through a pleader. In this view of the matter, whatever order is passed, whether the Magistrate allows a petition under section 205 (1), he has himself the power to rescind it at a subsequent stage. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the Magistrate under section 205 (1) cannot but be said to be an interlocutory order. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Code does not define ‘interlocutory order’ and invited my attention to the observations made in the case of Mohan lal Maganlal Thakkar vs. The State of Gujrat wherein it has been observed that ‘interlocutory order’ though not conclusive of main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals and it may, therefore, be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made. But, as I have shown above, the matter was not conclusive even with reference to the stage at which the petitions were filed. As has been shown above, the Magistrate himself has the authority to rescind it at a subsequent is no doubt left that the are interlocutory orders stage. Thus, there orders in question 7. It has to be remembered that in both the cases, it is the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 of the Code which has been invoked. Section 482 of the Code runs as follows- “482. Thus, there orders in question 7. It has to be remembered that in both the cases, it is the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 of the Code which has been invoked. Section 482 of the Code runs as follows- “482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” Obviously, the powers are very very wide and any abuse of the process or power of the Court can be rectified by this Court. But when powers are very wide, the restrictions are also too many. Such powers can be exercised only in rare and exceptional cases. On behalf of the State as also on behalf of the petitioners, reliance has been placed on the decision of Madhu Limaye V. Stale of Maharashtra. In this authority, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the bar put by section 397 (2) of the Code and its effect in the exercise of the powers under section 482 by the High Court. In the Old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the restriction imposed by Section 397 (2) of the New Code (of 1973) in the exercise of revisional power was not there. Under this new provision [Section 397 (2)] of the Code, the powers of revision cannot be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. In Madhu Limaye's case, the Supreme Court has tried to harmonise the exercise of revisional powers vis-a-vis the inherent powers. The principles that have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably barring a few exceptions, have been mentioned in Madhu Limaye's case as follows- “(1). That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the aggrieved party. (2). That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. (3). That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the aggrieved party. (2). That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. (3). That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.” On behalf of the State, it has been argued that this case comes under the third category said above because of the specific bar engrafted in section 397 (2) of the Code, and, as such, this is not a case in which the inherent power of the Court can be exercised. On behalf of the petitioners however, stress is laid on the principle saying that it is such an abuse of the process of the Court that the power should be exercised and it should be exercised even otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court itself has resolved this tangle in the very same authority (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47 at page 50) as follows- “But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of those problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But In case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly.” In view of the Supreme Court decision, a further point that arises now is whether the impugned orders passed by the Magistrate are an abuse of the process of the court and if so, are they such an abuse that in spite of the bar put by section 397 (2), this Court should interfere its inherent powers. As I have already shown above, the Magistrate while passing the impugned orders gave his own reasoning’s. The reasoning’s may be correct or may not be correct, the matter is, no doubt, a discretionary one and the Magistrate has exercised his discretion. The order passed by the Magistrate cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. In that sense, it cannot be said to be an abuse of the process of the Court. But the propriety of the order is also a point to be considered, and it may be relevant if not to core an abuse of the process, at least to secure ends of justice. There is no dispute on the point that the petitioners are accused of technical offences all summons cases all are busy industrialists. The time that a criminal case ordinarily takes is also well known. For paucity of hands, even small cases take years to be disposed of and the accused persons are greatly harassed in corning to courts and going back on all the dates. After all, the provision of sections 205 and 317 of the Code have been made for convenience of the accused persons. The general provisions that an accused should attend the whole of the trial is more for the advantage of the ace• used than for any body else. After all, the provision of sections 205 and 317 of the Code have been made for convenience of the accused persons. The general provisions that an accused should attend the whole of the trial is more for the advantage of the ace• used than for any body else. When an accused, therefore prays for permission to be represented through a lawyer, it is he who takes the responsibility upon him. Of course, it is for the court also to guard his interest and, therefore, the court has been given the power to require his presence whenever it thinks necessary obviously in the interest of justice. For example, when a charge is read out to the accused, a court may, in some cases, think that the accused must hear the same personally and give his reply. When statements of accused are recorded, the Magistrate may think his presence essential. It cannot be possible to give a list of cases in which the Court must require the presence of the accused. It all depends upon the nature of the case and the circumstances in which the accused persons are placed. In re. Narayana Aiyar, it has been observed that in summons case a Magistrate is not justified in refusing the application of the accused for dispensing with his personal appearance without giving proper reasons for the same. In Bhagwan Das and others V. State also it has been observed that in a case where the accused himself applies to the court to be exempted from personal appearance, then a court should grant the request unless it is of opinion that in the interest of justice, it is necessary that the accused should be present throughout the course of the trial, or unless there are some good reasons for directing the presence of the accused. In 1973 Criminal Law Journal 262 (a case of the Kerala High Court) also, it has been held that in all trivial and technical cases not involving moral turpitude whether the accused are ladies old and sickly persons, factory workers, labourers busy business people and industrialists, the court should invariably exempt such persons from personal attendance. The ratio in this case is very much applicable to the cases before me, but it is important to remember that this order was passed in exercise of revisional powers and not in exercise of in he rent powers. The ratio in this case is very much applicable to the cases before me, but it is important to remember that this order was passed in exercise of revisional powers and not in exercise of in he rent powers. It was a case under the Old Code in which there was no provision corresponding to section 397 (2) of the New Code. So far the propriety of the order is concerned, it is clear that the Magistrate, in the instant cases should have been well advised to allow their prayers and require their presence only when essential. A court should not forget the harassment caused to an accused person in coming to and going from the court without getting any work done and that also in course of years which take for disposal of any case. When the accused are persons of eminence and persons who are required to do responsible duties in their own sphere, proper consideration must be given to them. After-all, It is a nation's work which is being attended to by persons like the petitioners. If they unnecessarily come and go that would mean waste of their time and loss of the nation's work in one field or the other. Of course, if the Magistrate thinks that the presence of any of the petitioners would be necessary on any particular date, there can be nothing to stop the Magistrate from calling any of them on the date fixed. But, in such case, it should be the duty of the Magistrate also to see that the work for which they are called is done on that date and they do not merely come file Hazris and go back. This, in my opinion should be the proper approach in disposal of such applications. 8. Reverting now to the question whether it is a case in which powers under section 482 of the Code should be exercised or not, I would again refer to the Madhu Lemaye's case (at page 51). This, in my opinion should be the proper approach in disposal of such applications. 8. Reverting now to the question whether it is a case in which powers under section 482 of the Code should be exercised or not, I would again refer to the Madhu Lemaye's case (at page 51). After saying that the High Court must exercise the inherent powers very sparingly, the Supreme Court also gave some examples in which such powers could be exercised, I would with advantage quote the same below- “One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction than the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although work shall presently show that it is not so, that In such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition tiled by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers.” I am afraid, the case before me does not at all compare with the illustrations given by the Supreme Court. The matter here is very very simple. If for such petty matters, the High court exercises its Inherent powers, there wilt be no end to it. It is with some purpose that the Legislature has given finality to certain matters at certain stage. Be it a civil or criminal matter, if everything is allowed to go to the High Court or the Supreme Court, dispensation of justice will be more delayed than at present. It is with some purpose that the Legislature has given finality to certain matters at certain stage. Be it a civil or criminal matter, if everything is allowed to go to the High Court or the Supreme Court, dispensation of justice will be more delayed than at present. It is in this scheme of things that for petty matters a revision has been barred in the present Code, against interlocutory orders and hence, if the High Court entertains all those application under its inherent powers, the very purpose of legislature in imposing the restriction under section 397 (2) of the Code would become nugatory. I am, therefore, of opinion that the instant cases are not those cases in which inherent power of the High Court under section 482 of the Code should be invoked. But at the same time, I must observe that the petitions hereafter filed by these petitioners or for the matter of fact, in any case by any accused under sections 205 and 317 of the Code, they should be disposed of in the light of observations made in paragraph 7 of this judgment. 9. With the observations made above, both the applications are dismissed. Application dismissed.