Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1978 DIGILAW 188 (MAD)

Panper Rangaswami Reddi, who is of un-sound mind represented by next friend and father Krishna Reddiar v. Gopalaswami Reddiar and others

1978-03-06

M.M.ISMAIL, S.NAINAR SUNDARAM

body1978
Ismail, J.-The plaintiff in O.S. No. 119 of 1966 on the file of the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore is the appellant herein. He represented by his father as next friend on the allegation that he was a person of unsound mind, instituted the suit in forma pauperis for possession of the suit properties, after setting aside several alienations and the mortgage executed in favour of the second defendant, and for future mesne profits. 2. He represented by his father as next friend on the allegation that he was a person of unsound mind, instituted the suit in forma pauperis for possession of the suit properties, after setting aside several alienations and the mortgage executed in favour of the second defendant, and for future mesne profits. 2. The claim of the plaintiff-appellant was that the appellant is one of the two sons of Krishna Reddiar who had four daughters and the family owned extensive properties; the appellant became mentally unsound in or about 1956 and used to behave in an unnatural manner and used to talk incoherently; his father and his elder brother Ramaswami Reddiar got him treated for his illness and for some time he was treated by various local native physicians and also at Salem, and finding that he did not improve, he was taken to Vellore and there he was treated at a hospital (Bahayam Mental Hospital) undertaking treatment only for mentally unsound people and he was there for about 1½ months during which period he even attempted to commit suicide; thereafter at the suggestion of that hospital authorities, the appellant was taken to the Mental Hospital at Kilpauk, Madras where he was kept for five or six months and he underwent treatment there ; though he appeared to have become better after his stay at the Mental Hospital at Kilpauk, there was in reality no improvement at all and after he was taken away from the Mental Hospital at Kilpauk, he was taken to Courtallam where he was treated by native doctors and where he had his bath at the falls and all these happened "between 1956 or 1957 and 1960; after the appellant returned from Courtallam, he appeared to be a little better and thereafter he suggested to his father that he would like to have his properties divided and allotted to him and that he would attend to cultivation; believing that by effecting a partition of the family properties and giving the appellant his share of the properties, he would improve further and get into normal ways, a partition was effected between the appellant his father and his elder brother evidenced by a registered deed dated 30th November, 1961 marked as Exhibit B-3 in the present proceedings ; under the said partition, the properties set out in the schedule to the plaint were allotted to the appellant’s share and the house alone was left in common amongst the parties; though the partition was effected with the best of intentions, namely, that the appellant would improve and would come to his normal ways, the appellant’s father and brother were thoroughly disappointed because the appellant did not improve at all and his unsoundness of mind became worse and continued to be so since then. 3. The plaint thereafter narrates several alienations effected by the appellant herein and alleges that those alienations were not valid because they were executed by the appellant when he was not in a sound state of mind and the alienations were not supported by any consideration also. The plaint also put forward a contention that the defendants in the suit took advantage of the appellant’s mental state and got several transfers from him, none of which was supported by consideration and the documents were also obtained by undue influence. It was under these circumstances that the appellant’s father purported to institute the suit as his next friend for the reliefs referred to above and the plaint itself stated that the appellant was willing to pay such amounts as the vendees or the mortgages have actually paid for the necessities of the appellant. 4. Separate written statements were filed by defendants 1, 2 and 3. Each one of them contended that the suit as framed was not maintainable and the appellant was not a person of unsound mind and the suit by the next friend was unsustainable in law and on facts; apart from this, the alienations were true and were effected by the appellant with the full knowledge of the nature of the transaction and they were fully supported by consideration. They also denied the allegations contained in the plaint that the properties were very valuable and they had been purchased for a comparatively very small amount and according to them the properties were only Karambu and therefore they paid the proper price for the properties and only after purchase they levelled the land by the use of bull-dozer and also spent considerable amount of money by employing labour and bringing the land to cultivation and only because of the increase in the value of the land due to the defendants levelling the land and bringing the land into cultivation by incurring heavy expenditure, the appellant’s next friend had come forward with the suit. 5. On the basis of the various allegations contained in the pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is a person of unsound mind as contended in the plaint during the various periods? 2. Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable? 3. 5. On the basis of the various allegations contained in the pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is a person of unsound mind as contended in the plaint during the various periods? 2. Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable? 3. Whether the sale deed dated 10th September, 1962 in respect of item 4 to first defendant is true valid and supported by consideration ? 4. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? On 13th August, 1968, an additional issue was framed to the following effect:- Whether the mortgage deed in favour of the second defendant is true, valid, supported by consideration and binding on the plaintiff? Again on 10th July 1972, yet another additional issue was framed to the following effect:- 6. Whether the impugned sales and mortgage were vitiated by reason of the unsoundness of mind of the plaintiff and by reason of undue influence practised’ upon him? The learned Additional Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore by his Judgment and decree dated 31st July, 1972, held that the appellant was not proved to be of unsound mind on the various dates when he executed the documents in question and he was also not proved to be of unsound mind at the time when the suit was instituted. He also held the transactions to be true and supported by consideration, binding on the appellant. In view of this conclusion he dismissed the suit instituted by the appellant herein and directed the appellant to pay the Court-fee due to the Government. It is against this judgment and decree the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 7. From what we have stated above,, only two points arise for determination in this appeal. They are: 1. Whether the appellant was a person of unsound mind on the date of the suit so that the suit could be instituted in his name represented by his father as next friend, and whether the suit was maintainable as instituted? 2. Whether the appellant was of unsound mind on the various dates when the alienations have been effected by him and the documents were executed ? 8. 2. Whether the appellant was of unsound mind on the various dates when the alienations have been effected by him and the documents were executed ? 8. Before we consider the two points set out above we shall refer to the principal alienations which are the subject-matter of controversy and the following table will show the extent of the land, the document under which it was dealt with and the consideration recited therein and the person in whose favour the transactions were entered into. 1 2 3 4 5 6 2. 3 17 15-5-1964 A.3=B.5. page 10 sale D.3. Aunt’s son Rs. 2,000 Rs. 4,755 portion ofitem 1 100 A.4. 9.7.1864 page 13 sale D.4. Brother-in-law Rs. 1,000 &151; 5. Undivided house A.5 9-7-1964 page17 D.5 mother Rs. 500 Rs. 3,000 Items 1and 3 16 00 A.8 13-7-1964 page 19 D.6 (Agreement) Rs. 19,000 Rs. 30,250 1 5 75 half share in well etc. A.9 D.7 Rs. 10,000 Rs. 20,230 for the entire 6.75 acres Total extentof item 1 in 6.75 acres 11-8-1964 3 1 26 A.6 22-8-1964 page 23 sale D.7 brother’s son of next friend Rs. 7,000 Rs. 10,000 6 5 00 A.5=B. 1324-6-1964 page 25 D.1 paternal uncle’s son Rs. 2,000 &151; 9. The plea that was put forward on behalf of the appellant before us, from the very nature of the transactions as well as the number of transactions and the time within which they took place, was that unless the appellant had been of unsound mind he would not have alienated the properties in the manner in which he has done and that too in favour of his close relations who took advantage of his mental condition. This was a general plea without reference to any particular evidence on record put forward on the basis of the nature and the number of transactions and the persons in whose favour the said transactions were entered into. However, we shall consider this plea also in the context of the other materials present in the case. 10. This was a general plea without reference to any particular evidence on record put forward on the basis of the nature and the number of transactions and the persons in whose favour the said transactions were entered into. However, we shall consider this plea also in the context of the other materials present in the case. 10. As far as the first point is concerned, Mr.M.R. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the appellant contended that once the Court had permitted the next friend to institute the suit on behalf of the appellant herein it was not open to the Court to frame an issue on the unsoundness of the mind or otherwise of the appellant herein on the date of the suit for the purpose of being represented by a next friend. The argument of the learned counsel is that on the analogy of a person being permitted to sue as pauper, all that the defendant can do is to file a petition to depauperise the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff was a pauper or not cannot be the subject-matter of enquiry in the form of an issue in the suit itself. Having regard to the facts of the present case, we are unable to accept this argument of the learned counsel. Originally the suit was filed in the form of an original petition praying for the permission of the Court to sue in forma pauperis and also to be represented by a next friend for the purpose of instituting the suit on the allegation that the appellant was of unsound mind. It is not in dispute that the relevant statutory provision in this behalf is Order 32, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 32 of the Code deals with suits by or against minors and persons of unsound mind. Rules 1 to 14 deal with the case of minors. It is not in dispute that the relevant statutory provision in this behalf is Order 32, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 32 of the Code deals with suits by or against minors and persons of unsound mind. Rules 1 to 14 deal with the case of minors. Rule 15 states as follows:- “ The provisions contained in rules 1 to 14, so far as they are applicable shall extend to persons adjudged to be of unsound mind and to persons who though not so adjudged are found by the Court on enquiry, by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity, to be incapable of protecting their interests when suing or being sued.” Consequently, under this Rule, the Court is directed to make an enquiry for the purpose of finding out whether the person concerned, by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity is incapable of protecting his interest when suing or being sued. However such enquiry is dispensed with in the case where the person is already adjudged a lunatic or of unsound mind, obviously under the provisions of the Lunacy Act. In this particular case it is not the case of anyone that the appellant was already adjudged to be a person of unsound mind. Consequently, he is a person who had not been adjudged to be a person of unsound mind and therefore with reference to him the Court had to conduct an enquiry for the purpose of finding out whether he is incapable of protecting his interest when suing or being sued by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity. It is settled by a series of decisions of this Court as well as other Courts that the responsibility cast upon the Court under the provisions of the Code referred to above is very serious because the person concerned is denied his liberty to take action in his own way and some other person is imposed or foisted on him to take action purporting to be on his behalf. From one point of view, if the person is not unsound mind allowing another person to sue as a next friend on his behalf will be a total deprivation of the liberty of the person concerned to take care of his own interest and foisting on him another person to pursue a litigation which he himself might not have liked. From one point of view, if the person is not unsound mind allowing another person to sue as a next friend on his behalf will be a total deprivation of the liberty of the person concerned to take care of his own interest and foisting on him another person to pursue a litigation which he himself might not have liked. On the other hand, if the person happens to be of unsound mind to deprive him of the opportunity of enforcing his remedies available under law by the interposition of a next friend will cause serious prejudice to his interest and may even deny him and deprive him of the means of livelihood or his source of income. Having regard to all these serious consequences which may flow in this behalf, the Court owes a duty to the person concerned to conduct an enquiry for the purpose of satisfying itself whether the person is incapable of protecting his interest when suing or being sued by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity or not. In Balakrishnan v. Balachandran and another1, Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., pointed out that Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, is intended to ensure that no man is adjudged a lunatic without proper enquiry. The learned Judge proceeded to state that the Court should hold a judicial enquiry as was held in Ramanathan v. Somasundaram2 and it must seek the assistance of medical experts as was held in Shaik Muhammad Ibrahim v. Shaik Muhammad3. The learned Judge observed as follows: “Indeed a man must never be declared with certainty to be conclusively a lunatic, or to be of unsound mind, as contended by Mr. Raghavan but still reasonable certainly is possible by such tests. Experience has shown the danger of holding a man to be lunatic on a mere enquiry by a learned Judge in Court unsupported by the opinion of experts trained in such matters. But even that elementary enquiry, contemplated by Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, namely by a Court questioning the alleged lunatic to find out whether he is lunatic or not and getting a certificate from a competent doctor who has kept him under observation for a few days was not observed in this case.” Ramaprasada Rao, J., had occasion to consider this question in Chattanatha Karayalar v. Vaikuntarama Karayalar4and another. 1The learned Judge referred to the statutory provision extracted above, and the earlier decisions of this Court and other Courts and observed as follows: "Appointing of guardian or next friend to a person who is incapable of managing his affairs is a serious inroad upon the litigant’s right to carry on his suit. Such wedging of personal right in a party cannot be deduced, inferred or even taken for granted because the other parties to the lis have no objection to such an appointment. The Court has a primary duty to perform in such circumstances. It has to judicially enquire whether it is necessary in the interests of justice. Mere and sole reliance upon the wishes and sentiments expressed by the other parties to the suit would neither be a guide nor a safe guide." The learned Judge referred to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Duvouri Rami Reddy v. Devouri Papi Reddi and others2, and after extracting a passage from the said judgment observed that he adopted with respect such guides as laid down by the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to above, Venkatesam, J., considered very elaborately the scope of Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, and the nature of the obligation imposed on the Court under that provision. After elaborately considering the entire question the learned Judge stated as follows:- " From these decisions, the following principles emerge: 1.Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, places persons of unsound mind or persons so adjudged in the same position as minors for purposes of rules 1 to 14. 2. Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, applies not only to a person adjudged to be of unsound mind, as under the old Code, but also to a person of weak mind. 3. Where it is alleged that a party to thesuit is of unsound mind, and the other party denies it, the Court must hold a judicial enquiry and come to a definite conclusion as to whether by reason of the unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity, he is incapable of protecting his interests in the suit. 4. Mental infirmity may even be due to physical defects, if it renders him incapable of receiving any commuication or of communicating his wishes or thoughts to others. 5. 4. Mental infirmity may even be due to physical defects, if it renders him incapable of receiving any commuication or of communicating his wishes or thoughts to others. 5. Whether a person is of unsound mind or mentally infirm for the purpose of the rule and the extent of the infirmity has to be found by the Court on enquiry. 6. Whether the question of unsoundness of mind arises not only under Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, but is also one of the issues in the suit, the Court has ample jurisdiction to enquire into that question and for that purpose seek medical opinion. 7. The enquiry should consist not only of the examination of the witnesses produced by either party, but also of the examination of the alleged lunatic by the judge, either in open Court or in chambers and as Courts are generally presided over by lay-men, as a matter of precaution, the evidence of medical expert should be taken. 8. Of course, the opinion of a doctor as is the opinion of any other expert, under section 45 of the Evidence act is only a relevant piece of evidence. 9. The Court may also compel the attendance of the alleged lunatic before it, and to submit himself for medical examination. If the alleged lunatic is in custody, the Court may direct the next friend or any other person having custody to produce him before the medical expert for examination. 10. Where the precaution of judicial enquiry is not observed the person cannot be declared lunatic, and a guardian cannot be appointed for him. 11.When a person is adjudged a lunatic irregularly and improperly, and notice was not served on him, and a guardian alone was allowed to appear and defend the suit and decree was passed owing to the guardian not putting up a proper defence the alleged lunatic can treat the decree against him as an ex parte decree and have it set aside under Order 9, rule 13, Civil Procedure Code." With respect we approve of the above conclusions arrived at by the learned Judge after elaborately considering the statutory provisions in this behalf as well as the authorities bearing on the same. Against the background of such legal position, we, have now to consider the first question. 11. Mr. Against the background of such legal position, we, have now to consider the first question. 11. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy as we pointed out already contended that the learned trial Judge has passed an order permitting the next friend to institute the suit on behalf of the appellant herein and that order was conclusive and the defendant could not seek to raise that question in the form of an issue in the suit itself and all that they could do was to file an independent application to cancel the permission already granted on the ground that the plaintiff-appellant was not of unsound mind on the date when the suit was instituted. In view of this plea put forward by the learned counsel we sent for the records of the lower Court to find out whether the learned Subordinate Judge has conducted any enquiry and as a result of the enquiry found that the appellant was of unsound mind and therefore his father should represent him as the next friend and institute the suit. The records do not show that any enquiry whatever was conducted by the learned Subordinate Judge or any finding was arrived at by him. As a matter of fact the pleading papers filed before this Court show that the defendants 1 to 3 on 21st October,1965 filed objections before the Court to the next friend instituting the suit putting forward the -contention that the appellant had always behaved and acted as a sane person with normal mental capacity and the suit had been instituted only at the instigation of the appellant’s father and elder brother to coerce the defendants 1 to 3 and others to come to terms and therefore the suit itself was not maintainable. They went to the extent of stating that the next friend was personally liable to; pay the costs to them. They also contended that if the Court directed the next friend to produce the appellant before the Court, it would be clearly established that the appellant was not a person of unsound mind. Notwithstanding this specific stand taken by the defendants even before the suit was numbered there does not appear to be any enquiry by the learned Subordinate Judge even to satisfy prima facie that the appellant herein was a person of unsound mind and was not capable of looking after his interests. Notwithstanding this specific stand taken by the defendants even before the suit was numbered there does not appear to be any enquiry by the learned Subordinate Judge even to satisfy prima facie that the appellant herein was a person of unsound mind and was not capable of looking after his interests. Once no such enquiry was conducted by the Court and no finding as a result of the enquiry had been given, it is certainly open to the defendants in the suit to raise the contention that the suit was not maintainable because the appellant was not of unsound mind and therefore the question of the suit being instituted by his next friend did not arise. 12. Even assuming for a moment that there had been an enquiry and a finding that the appellant was of unsound mind and as a result of the enquiry and finding alone the appellant was allowed to be represented by his next friend, the father, Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy conceded that it was open to the defendants thereafter to file an independent application to cancel that permission on the ground that the appellant was not of unsound mind. As a matter of fact, I.A.No. 693 of 1968 had been filed by the first defendant in the suit on 28th October, 1968 under Order 32, rule 15 and section 151, Civil Procedure Code. The prayer in this application was that the appellant herein should be sent to the District Medical Officer for observation. This application was resisted by the appellant’s next friend who contended that the report of the District Medical Officer may not be useful to find out whether the appellant was of unsound mind at the time when he executed the sale, deeds, and hence no useful purpose would be served by sending him for observation by the medical expert at that stage. Apart from this, it was categorically asserted that the appellant was unwilling to go to the District Medical Officer then. The learned Subordinate Judge after considering the rival contentions of the parties, on 6th November, 1968 passed an order directing the appellant herein to appear before the District Medical Officer for observation within a fortnight from the date of the order. Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the District Medical Officer for examination as directed by the Court. Consequently we have the following situation as regards the facts:- "1. Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the District Medical Officer for examination as directed by the Court. Consequently we have the following situation as regards the facts:- "1. There was no enquiry, much less an enquiry in the presence of the defendants in the suit as to the mental condition of the appellant by the Court as contemplated in Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, as interpreted by the Courts in the decisions referred to above, 2. Even assuming that there was any such enquiry and a finding, there was an application filed by the first defendant in the suit, namely, I.A. No. 693 of 1968 for directing the appellant to submit to medical examination by the District Medical Officer. 3. That application was opposed by the appellant herein and overruling the objection, the Court directed the appellant to appear before the District Medical Officer for medical examination. 4. The appellant pursuant to the order of the Sub Court did not appear before the District Medical Officer.“ 13. The question for consideration is what is the inference to be drawn on the above facts. We have no doubt whatever in our mind that against the background of the above facts, the only inference possible is that the appellant was not of unsound mind as provided for in Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, and that inference must be readily drawn when the appellant notwithstanding the direction by the Court did not appear before the District Medical Officer and as a matter of fact even before the Court passed the order, expressed his unwillingness to go before the District Medical Officer. The only inference possible is that if the appellant had appeared before the District Medical Officer, it would have been found out that he was not of unsound mind and that was the reason for the deliberate act of the appellant is not appearing before the District Medical Officer. 14. The only inference possible is that if the appellant had appeared before the District Medical Officer, it would have been found out that he was not of unsound mind and that was the reason for the deliberate act of the appellant is not appearing before the District Medical Officer. 14. Even from the point of view of the position of law, a Bench of this Court in Chapalawadigy Govindayya and another v. Suddapalli Ramamurthi and others1has observed as follows: ”What is contemplated is that the plaint must be filed by a next friend and the Court, before admitting the plaint, should satisfy itself on enquiry that the person on whose behalf the plaint is presented was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of protecting his interests and should be represented by a next friend. Ordinarily the next friend ought to file an application supported by an affidavit along with the plaint and the judge should pass an order thereon. That the section does contemplate an enquiry there can be no doubt, but the nature of the enquiry is not indicated. It seems to us that if the affidavit in support of the request to permit a person to sue as a next friend discloses all the facts which would satisfy the Court that the person on whose behalf the plaint is presented is by reason of unsound mind or mental infirmity incapable of protecting his interests, without any further enquiry the Court can permit the next friend to sue On his behalf or if the allegations in the affidavit are not convincing, it is open to the Court to direct the next friend to produce witnesses before it in order that it may satisfy itself as to the mental capacity of the person on whose behalf the plaint is presented. All that is needed is that there should be some prima facie proof such as to satisfy the Court that the person was by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity incapable of protecting his interests, because an order permitting the next friend to represent such a person is not final. It is always open to the defendant to take out an independent application to have the said order revoked when the Court can go fully into the matter. It is always open to the defendant to take out an independent application to have the said order revoked when the Court can go fully into the matter. But when once the Court permits the next friend to sue on behalf of such a person, it is not open to the Court to raise an independent issue in the trial as to the competency of the next friend to represent him in the suit." As we have already pointed out, there was no enquiry and no order by the Court in the first instance and therefore the first defendant was justified in filing the application in I.A.No. 693 of 1968. When the Court passed an order on that application directing the appellant to appear before the District Medical Officer, the appellant refused to appear before the District Medical Officer and under those circumstance the Court was justified in raising an issue for the purpose of finding out whether the suit was maintainable or not. In view of this position and the facts which we have referred to and the inference we have drawn, it must be held that the appellant was not shown to be a person of the nature contemplated in Order 32, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, on the date when he instituted the suit and therefore he could not be represented by a next friend and consequently the suit itself was not maintainable. 15. As far as the second question is concerned, we have gone through the entire oral evidence in this case. Having so gone through the oral evidence, we are not satisfied that the evidence of anyone of these witnesses P.Ws. 1 to 9 and D.Ws. 1 to 7 is entitled to unreserved acceptance at our hands. Everyone of them had freely mixed falsehood with truth and as a matter of fact it has become very difficult to pick out the truth from the falsehood uttered by them. Under these circumstances, we have necessarily to proceed on the probabilities of the case as well as the burden of proof which the law has imposed on the parties. 16. As we pointed out already, it was the plaintiff-appellant who came forward with the case that on the date when the documents in question were executed, he was of unsound mind and therefore the burden was on him to prove the same. 16. As we pointed out already, it was the plaintiff-appellant who came forward with the case that on the date when the documents in question were executed, he was of unsound mind and therefore the burden was on him to prove the same. The learned Subordinate Judge in paragraph 20 of his judgment has observed as follows: — " Regarding the oral evidence, I am not at all impressed with the self-interested testimony of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 9 and the evidence of P.Ws. 3 to 8 and the so-called independent witness for their evidence is so artificial that they are so very obliging witnesses that their evidence cannot be true." Having gone through the evidence, we are not prepared to differ from the learned Subordinate Judge on this aspect of the evidence of the witnesses on the plaintiff’s side. The burden being on the appellant to prove that the transactions were entered into at a time when the appellant was of unsound mind and once he failed to discharge this burden, necessarily the suit must fail. 17. Apart from this, we are of opinion that there are certain other aspects admittedly present in the case which will disprove the claim of the appellant. We have already referred to the general plea put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant based on the number of alienations as well as the period during which the alienations were effected for the purpose of putting forward the contention that if the appellant had been a person of sound mind, he would not have disposed of the properties in such rapidity and that too in favour of his close relations. We may also point out certain perplexing situations arising in the present case which will clearly establish the falsity of the appellant’s claim. The table which we have already furnished with regard to the alienations will show that one alienation, namely, Exhibit A-5 dated 9th July, 1964 is in favour of the fifth defendant, the appelant’s mother. If we trace the pleadings as well as the evidence in respect of this transaction, they will clearly establish the falisity of the case of the appellant herein. If we trace the pleadings as well as the evidence in respect of this transaction, they will clearly establish the falisity of the case of the appellant herein. In paragraph 6 of the plaint it is stated that finding that the appellant was throwing away his properties and finding that he is likely to sell away even his undivided share in the family house, his mother, the fifth defendant took a safe of his share in the family house for Rs. 500, and even that share would be worth much more. Now let us see the evidence with regard to this transaction. P.W. 1 in his evidence stated that he did not know why the appellant executed the sale deed in favour of his mother, the fifth defendant in the suit. The fifth defendant herself giving evidence as P.W. 2 stated that she knew about the sale deed in her abour two or three years after the document and P.W. 1 told her about the same and P. W. 1 stated that the plaintiff-appellant executed the document and put it there and P.W. 1 had not handed over the document to her and she herself after coming to know of the contents put it away in Patharampallam itself. This piece of evidence is sufficient to disprove the claim put forward by the appellant. There is another aspect in relation to a transaction that took place between the appellant and P.W. 9 and the sale of the property by the appellant Exhibit B-5 dated 15th April; 1964 is a sale deed executed by the appellant. in favour of the third defendant and Exhibit B-6, of the same date is a sale deed executed by P.W.9, the elder brother of the appellant in favour of the appellant himself. Exhibits E-5 and B-6 were registered on the same day and Exhibit B-5 has been attested by P.W. 9 himself. The recital in Exhibit B-6 is that P.W. 9 was selling the property to the appellant herein for a cons-deration of Rs.1,000. The recital in Exhibit B-5 is that the appellant wanted money for the purpose of purchasing the land from his brother P.W. 9 and that was why he was selling the property for Rs.2,000 in favour of the third defendant. It is this document which has been attested by P.W.9. The recital in Exhibit B-5 is that the appellant wanted money for the purpose of purchasing the land from his brother P.W. 9 and that was why he was selling the property for Rs.2,000 in favour of the third defendant. It is this document which has been attested by P.W.9. It passes one’s comprehension as to bow P.W. 1 can contend that the sale deed executed by the appellant under Exhibit B-5 in favour of the third defendant was not supported by consideration when it has been attested by P.W.9. himself and when it recites that the appellant was selling the property for the purpose of purchasing the property from P.W. 9 and has actually purchased the property from P.W.9. This again is a circumstances to show the falsity of the case of the appellant. Yet another fact is that the land sold under Exhibit B-5 for Rs. 2,000 by the appellant in favour of the third defendant is the land purchased by P.W. 1 the appellant’s father under Exhibit B-1 on 22nd November, 1960 for a consideration of Rs. 300. This will show that the claim of the appellant that the sale deed was for an inadequate price was a false one. 18. We have already referred to the fact that with regard to everyone of these alienations, the plaint put forward the contention that they were not supported by consideration. We shall refer to Exhibit A-2 dated 5th February, 1964 a mortgage executed by the appellant in favour of the second defendant. In paragraph 6 of the plaint, it is stated as follows: — “While in that state of mind, he again executed a mortgage dated 5th February, 1964 in favour of the second respondent for a sum of Rs. 3,000. Even under that mortgage, he did not receive the entire consideration but he appears to have received only Rs. 400 and also a motor cycle. That mortgage is not supported by consideration to any extent.” It passes one’s comprehension how the plaint can state in one breath that the appellant received Rs. 400 and also a motor cycle as consideration and in the next sentence can state that the mortgage was not supported by consideration to any extent. In fact, the evidence clearly establishes that the appellant purchased the motor cycle from the second defendant herein and used it for some time and thereafter sold the same. 400 and also a motor cycle as consideration and in the next sentence can state that the mortgage was not supported by consideration to any extent. In fact, the evidence clearly establishes that the appellant purchased the motor cycle from the second defendant herein and used it for some time and thereafter sold the same. We are referring to these aspects only for the purposes of showing to what extent the appellant and his advisers were prepared to go by putting forward this false claim after having alienated the properties with the full knowledge of the nature of the transaction the appellant was entering into. 19. Even with regard to the general plea of unsoundness of mind, the learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to certain evidence available in the case to show that the appellant underwent treatment for mental disease in Vellore as well as in the Mental Hospital at Kilpauk, Madras. Exhibit A-18 is the letter stated to have been given by the doctor in Vellore to the Mental Hospital at Kilpauk recommending the admission of the appellant. In that letter which is dated 23rd December, 1958 it is stated that the appellant was suffering from schizophrenia with numerous paranoid idea. Exhibit A-20 is a letter dated 6th March, 1959 written by the Superintendent, Government Mental Hospital, Madras to P.W. 9 about the mental condition of the appellant herein. That letter stated that the appellant was completely cured and P.W. 9 could call at the office between the hours 8 and 10 A.m. on any working day for the purpose of taking the appellant away from the hospital. It is not in dispute that pursuant to Exhibit A-20, P.W. 9 went to Madras and got the appellant discharged and took him back home. The prima facie inference to be drawn from Exhibit A-20 is that by about 6th March, 1959 the appellant was completely cured of the mental disease, schizophrenia, from which he was suffering and therefore if the appellant wanted to contend that all the transactions which took place later were entered into at a time when he was not of sound mind, it was for him to prove with reference to the dates of the transactions, that he was of unsound mind. There is absolutely no evidence in this behalf. There is absolutely no evidence in this behalf. In fact, as we pointed out already the partition deed between the appellant, his father, the next friend and his elder brother P.W. 9 came into existence on 30th November, 1961. Therefore the Court should proceed on the basis that even on 30th November, 1961, the appellant was mentally sound as otherwise the partition deed could not have been brought into existence. With regard to this aspect also, the appellant must prove that subsequent to this date, namely, 30th November, 1961 he became a person of unsound mind and continued to be so on the relevant dates on which the transactions came into existence. Admittedly there is no documentary evidence to show any such state of mind on the part of the appellant, apart from the interested unreliable testimony of the witnesses. Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation whatever in agreeing with the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge. The appeal accordingly fails and the same is dismissed. The respondents 1 to 3 will have their costs from the next friend of the appellant. Since the appeal was filed in forma pauperis and since the appellant has failed, he will have to pay the Court-fee due to the Government on the Memorandum of Appeal.