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1978 DIGILAW 189 (KER)

MAMMU v. ALI

1978-07-27

G.VISWANATHA.IYER

body1978
Judgment :- 1. These revision petitions were heard together and are disposed of by a common order as the parties are the same and the question that arises for decision is also the same in both. CRP. 1781 is filed under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act by the applicant before the Land Tribunal claiming himself to be a kudikidappukaran entitled to purchase a kudikidappu. He was found to be a kudikidappukaran by the Land Tribunal, but found otherwise by the Appellate Authority and hence he has come to this Court in revision. He and his wife are the petitioners in CRP. 1784. That is against an order of the District Court to the effect that the landlord of the building, which is claimed as a kudikidappu, is entitled to evict the petitioners under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. To allow the application of the landlord the District Court relied on the decision of the Appellate Authority in the appeal filed by the landlord under the Land Reforms Act against the order of the Land Tribunal. According to the revision petitioners they are kudikidappukars and if that is found the landlord is not entitled to evict them under the Rent Control Act. So the question for decision is whether the decision of the Appellate Authority in the appeal under the Land Reforms Act is correct. Under S.2 (25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act a person who has been permitted to occupy a but belonging to the land owner will be a kudikidappukaran if he satisfies the other conditions mentioned in the definition. A but is defined in Explanation II to S.2(25) to mean any dwelling house constructed by a person other than the person permitted to occupy it at a cost at the time of construction not exceeding Rs 750/- or which could have at the time of construction yielded a monthly rent not exceeding Rs. 5/-. According to the petitioner the value of the dwelling house at the time of original construction alone should be looked into irrespective of the fact whether that structure bad undergone alteration or addition subsequently and in support of this contention he relies on the decision of this Court in Lakshmi v Kunhipperachan (1978 KLT.122). 5/-. According to the petitioner the value of the dwelling house at the time of original construction alone should be looked into irrespective of the fact whether that structure bad undergone alteration or addition subsequently and in support of this contention he relies on the decision of this Court in Lakshmi v Kunhipperachan (1978 KLT.122). No doubt in that case it was held that subsequent additions and alterations should be taken only as items of improvements and the landlord paid compensation for them. It is not necessary in this case to consider whether that decision is open to doubt. I understand that decision to mean that it, after a person has been permitted to occupy a dwelling house, there has been additions or alterations effected by the landlord that should be ignored in finding out the value at the time of construction. There are cases where to the dwelling house originally constructed additions or alterations are made before that is permitted to be occupied by another. In such a case the value of such construction existing at the time when the dwelling house was permitted to be occupied will have to be taken into account. This is clear from the definition itself S.2(25)(b) provides that a person who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of a land to occupy, with or without the obligation to pay rent, a but belonging to such person will be a kudikidappukaran if he has no land of his own as provided for in the main part of S.2(25). The but there must be understood to be the but permitted to be occupied and this can be understood only to mean the structure as it is at the time of permission. If the structure at the time of permission is not a but as per the definition of the word 'hut' in Explanation II it is not possible to take a part of structure alone into consideration in finding out whether it is a but or not. Even in cases where additions and alterations are made subsequent to the permission to and occupation by another if such alterations and additions have been made by the landlord for the use of the occupier this will really be a case of occupation of these additions on permission. Even in cases where additions and alterations are made subsequent to the permission to and occupation by another if such alterations and additions have been made by the landlord for the use of the occupier this will really be a case of occupation of these additions on permission. They being part of the dwelling house the cast of their construction may have to be taken into account in finding out whether the dwelling house is a but or not. As this case does not involve such a question I do not think that I should refer this case for decision by a larger Bench. In this case there is no satisfactory proof to show that any additions or alterations were made to the original structure after the permission to and occupation by the petitioner. The landlord has no case also to that effect. Going by the Commissioner's report relied on by the Appellate Authority, the building at the time of construction would have cost more than Rs. 750/-. The Revenue Inspector deputed by the Land Tribunal also found that the cost of construction will be more than Rs 750/-. Hence going by the cost of construction alone the dwelling house in occupation of the petitioner will not be a hut. But Explanation II to S.2 (25) provides an alternate approach to find out whether this dwelling house will be a hut. If the rent that could have been obtained at the time of construction will be only less than Rs. 5/-then also the dwelling house will be a hut. Here the Revenue Inspector and the Commissioner deputed in the appeal have found that the rent will be only less than Rs. 5/-at the time of construction. No doubt to a large extent their conclusion is only a surmise But in this case there is one important evidence which has not been adverted to by the Appellate Authority, that is. the extract of the Tellicherry Municipal Register for this building for the year 1936. As per that the annual rental is only Rs. 36/-. The construction was long before 1936 as per the evidence. So it is difficult to find that the rent will exceed Rs 5/- at the time of construction. That is enough to make this building a hut. 2. As per that the annual rental is only Rs. 36/-. The construction was long before 1936 as per the evidence. So it is difficult to find that the rent will exceed Rs 5/- at the time of construction. That is enough to make this building a hut. 2. The Appellate Authority under the Land Reforms Act has refused to accept the rent as found by the Commissioner only on the basis that the scheme of the Act and its subsequent amendments will indicate that a building whose value will be above Rs. 750/- would have fetched a rental of Rs. 5/-. There is no basis for this and hence the Appellate Authority's conclusion that the rent will be above Rs. 5/ is incorrect. 3. It follows that the building is a but coming within the purview of the definition in S 2(25) of the Land Reforms Act. There is no case that the petitioner does not satisfy the other requirements of the definition to make him a kudikidappukaran. I find that he is a kudikidappukaran entitled to purchase the kudikidappu. The order of the Appellate Authority challenged in revision in CRP. 781 is set aside and that of the Land Tribunal restored. From this it follows that the landlord is not entitled to claim eviction of the petitioners from the building Hence CRP, 1784 is allowed, the order of the District Judge challenged in revision is set aside and the rent control petition dismissed. Thus both the revisions are allowed. I make no order as to costs. Allowed.