JUDGMENT Chittatosh Mookerji, J. 1. This Revisional Application arises out of a proceeding under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. One Surya Kanta Haldar (since deceased) was a raiyat in respect of the lands recorded in C.S. Khatian No. 1333 (corresponding to R.S. Khatian No. 1824), Mouza Matla, within P.S. Canning, district 24 Parganas. According to the petitioner, on 31.7.1961 one Charu Chandra Karmakar by purchasing about 05 acres of land in R.S. Dag No. 3720/5693 and 3720/5729 appertaining to the aforesaid jama from some of the heirs of Surya Kanta Haldar had become a co-sharer. On 3.9.1971 the petitioner had purchased the said 05 decimals of land from Hazari Karmakar & other who were successors-in-interest of Charu Chandra Karmakar and he had become a co-sharer tenant in respect of the said R.S. Khatian No. 1824 of Mouza Matla. On 18.7.1973 the proforma-opposite parties No.2 to 5 who were the daughters of deceased Surya Kanta Haldar executed a kabala transferring 62½ acres of laud (including 19½ acres of land in the aforesaid Dag No. 3720/5729) in favour of the opposite party No.1. 2. On 30.8.1974, the present petitioner filed an application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, inter alia, praying for pre-emption in respect of the said 19½ acres of land in R.S. Khatian No. 1824 out of the property transferred by the proforma-opposite parties No.2 to 5 to opposite party No.1. The present petitioner alleged that he was a co-share tenet and secondly he was an owner of the lands adjoining to the transferred lands. The opposite party No.1 and the proforma-opposite parties No.2 to 5 had contested the said case. 3. The learned Munsif, 1st Additional Court, Baruipore, dismissed the said application of the petitioner under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The learned Munsif found that his application for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage was barred by limitation. Secondly, the disputed land was a homestead find therefore it was not a raiyati holding and the petitioner was not a co-sharer tenant. Thirdly, the transfer in question not being for monetary consideration, the same was not liable to be pre-empted under Section 8(1), of the Act. The petitioner being aggrieved, by the said decision, preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge, 6th Court, Alipore, dismissed the said appeal. Thirdly, the transfer in question not being for monetary consideration, the same was not liable to be pre-empted under Section 8(1), of the Act. The petitioner being aggrieved, by the said decision, preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge, 6th Court, Alipore, dismissed the said appeal. The learned Additional District Judge help that the present petitioner was a co-sharer and he had not been served with any notice of the transfer and, therefore, his pre-emption application which was made within three years from the date of transfer was not barred by limitation. The learned Additional District Judge further held that the holding in question was a raiyati holding and the present petitioner had become a co-sharer raiyat by his aforesaid purchase and his right of pre-emption was not otherwise barred. The learned Additional District Judge, however, found that the petitioner's application for pre-emption was bound to fail on the ground that the transfer in favour of the opposite party No.1 was not for monetary consideration. According to the learned Additional District Judge only transfers for money consideration were subject to preemption under Section 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Thereafter, the petitioner obtained this present Rule. 4. The point for consideration in this Rule is whether or not the petitioner as a co-sharer tenant was entitled to pre-empt the transfer effected by the deed dated 18.6.1973 by the opposite parties No.2 to 5 in favour of the opposite party No.1. In other words, whether or not the aforesaid transfer dated 18.6.1973 was subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. 5. Mr. B.C. Banerjee, learned advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the aforesaid document (Ext.1) properly construed was for a money consideration because the document mentioned the money value of each item of the properly comprised in the said sale deed. The court in a pre-emption proceeding, according to Mr. Banerjee, need not look beyond the document in question. Therefore, the court cannot examine whether the consideration mentioned in the sale deed had actually passed or not. The document in the instant case being a transfer for money consideration, the petitioner as a co-sharer tenant was entitled to apply for pre-emption. Therefore, the purchase of the opposite party No.1 was subject to right of pre-emption under Section 8 of the Act. 6. The document in the instant case being a transfer for money consideration, the petitioner as a co-sharer tenant was entitled to apply for pre-emption. Therefore, the purchase of the opposite party No.1 was subject to right of pre-emption under Section 8 of the Act. 6. Section 8(1) has conferred right of purchase by co-sharers and contiguous tenants not in respect of all but some kinds of transfer of a portion or share of a holding of a raiyat. Sub-section (2) of section 8 has expressly provided that nothing in Section 8 shall apply to, (a) an exchange or partition, (b) bequest or gift or hiba-bil-ewaj, (c) mortgage mentioned in Section 7 and (d) transfer for exclusively charitable or religious purposes or both. A reading of sub-section (1) of Section 8 and sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act would clearly indicate that only a transfer in favour of a stranger of a portion or a share of a holding of a raiyat and for which consideration is .money could be the subject-matter of a proceeding under Section 8(1). The deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of 10% of that amount is an essential condition for making an application under Section 8(1). Similarly, Section 9(1) provides that on the deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of 10% of that amount, the Munsif shall give notice of the application to the transferee. On such notice being served the transferee or any person interested may appear and prove the consideration money paid for the transfer and other sums, if any, properly paid by him including the sums paid for annulling encumbrances and rent and revenue, cases or taxes. Thereupon, the Munsif after an enquiry may direct the applicant to deposit a further sum. On such sum being deposited the Munsif is enjoined to make order that the amount of the consideration money together with the additional amount ordered to be deposited for being paid to the transferee. When a transfer of a share or part of a raiyati holding is made without money consideration, an applicant under Section 8(1) cannot satisfy this requirement of the said sub-section (1) of Section 8 and the sub-section (1) of Section 9 cannot be applied. When a transfer of a share or part of a raiyati holding is made without money consideration, an applicant under Section 8(1) cannot satisfy this requirement of the said sub-section (1) of Section 8 and the sub-section (1) of Section 9 cannot be applied. Both voluntary and involuntary transfers for money consideration of a share or a portion of a raiyati holding in favour of a stranger may give rise to exercise of the rights of pre-emption by the co-sharer tenants and the owners of adjoining lands. But, the legislature in enacting Section 8(1) has clearly confined the exercise of right of pre-emption only to transfers of portion or share of a holding in lieu of money. The expression consideration money appearing in section 8(1) and 9(1) is synonymous with the word price in its ordinary sense. In other words, the consideration money in Section 8 has the same meaning as price. Thus, the right of pre-emption under Section 8 is exercisable when there is transfer of portion or share of raiyati holding for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Motor & General Stores Pvt. Ltd., 1967 (3) SCR 876 , held that though price is not defined in the Transfer of Property Act it is used in the same sense as in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and means the money consideration for the sale of goods. The presence of a money consideration is an essential element in a transaction of sale, and if the consideration is not money, but some other valuable consideration, it may be exchange or barter, but not a sale, See also State of Madras vs. Ganon Dunkerley & Company (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 560 : 1959 SCR 379 , quoted in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition, Page 301. 7. The nature and character of the consideration for the impugned transfer in favour of the opposite party No.1 has some similarity with the consideration in case of a transfer which came up for determination in Ghulam Muhammad vs. Tek Chand & others, AIR 1921 Lahore 82. 7. The nature and character of the consideration for the impugned transfer in favour of the opposite party No.1 has some similarity with the consideration in case of a transfer which came up for determination in Ghulam Muhammad vs. Tek Chand & others, AIR 1921 Lahore 82. The said case arose out of a pre-emption suit in connection with an adhlapi transaction under which an owner of the land agreed to allow one Ghulam Muhammad to sink a well and clear the land attached to it within a period of 4 years and on his carrying out his undertaking Ghulam Muhammad was to get possession of 1/3rd of the land as proprietor. He appeared to have carried his part of the undertaking and his name was entered in the mutation register as the owner of 1/3rd of the entire land attached to the well. Both the trial court and the lower appellate court had held that the above transaction was a sale and as such liable to pre-emption by the plaintiff. A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that for exercising right of pre-emption the passing of some monetary consideration was essential and in the said case no money had passed at all. Therefore, the case did not amount to a sale which was liable to be pre-empted. 8. Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. in Kutubuddin Ahammed & others vs. Kashim Ali & another, 76 CWN 57, held that when land is transferred for consideration of a copy of holy Koran under a deed described as hiba-bil-ewaj, the same amounted to an exchange and was within the exception provided in sub-section (2a) of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The learned Judge at page 60, second column observed that the word transfer occurred in Section 8(1) of the Act must be a transfer for consideration of money and not a transfer for any other consideration. In this connection, he had referred to the above decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Motor & General Stores Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 200 . It may be pointed out that now the sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act has been amended by expressly inserting hiba-bil-ewaj in clause (b) of the said sub-section (2) of Section 8. 9. The right of pre-emption has been sometimes characterized as a weak right. It may be pointed out that now the sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act has been amended by expressly inserting hiba-bil-ewaj in clause (b) of the said sub-section (2) of Section 8. 9. The right of pre-emption has been sometimes characterized as a weak right. In interpreting the above provision we may bear in our mind that there are no equities hi favour of pre-emptor whose object is to disturb a valid transaction by virtue of rights created in his favour by a statute. To defeat the law of pre-emption by any legitimate means is not a fraud on the part of either the vendor or the vendee vide Radhakrishna Laxminarayan Toshniwal vs. Sridhar Ramchandra Alshi & others, AIR 1960 SC 1368 . See also Bishnu Singh & others vs. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 838 . 10. For all these reasons, I conclude that the provisions of Section 8(1) should be strictly construed. Therefore, the right of pre-emption under Section 8(1) is available to the two classes of persons mentioned in the said Section only in case of a transfer for money consideration subject to the exceptions laid down in sub-section (2) of Section 8. 11. I may now proceed to examine the nature of the document (Ext.1). The said deed, inter alia, recited that on 15.11.1957 Surya Haldar died leaving the vendors and others as his heirs. It was furthers stated that their brothers in collusion with the others had attempted to deprive them of their shares. In order to recover their shares of parental properties the vendors had entered into an agreement with the vendee, that in case they were able to recover their parental properties with the help of the vendee, they would give up reconvey 1/4th share of each of the vendors in favour of the vendee. The said deed further recited that the vendors had been very much satisfied and benefited on account of the earnest efforts, labour and wiseness of the vendee. The vendors further stated that neither themselves nor their successors would be entitled to claim any interest or right in the conveyed property and if any such claim made, the same would stand rejected. The vendors further stated that neither themselves nor their successors would be entitled to claim any interest or right in the conveyed property and if any such claim made, the same would stand rejected. All their right, title and interest in the properties described in the schedule to the kobala would devolve and vest upon the vendee and from the date of the execution of the kobala, the vendee would become the absolute owner of the suit property and would be entitled to enjoy and possess the same by Inter alia paying rent to the State and by mutating her name. The deed further recited that the terms of the agreement shall be treated as a part of the consideration for the said deed (Ext.1). The said agreement referred to in the aforesaid kobala (Ext.1), however, was not produced and exhibited either in the trial court or in the lower appellate court. 12. Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate for the petitioner, in order to steer clear of the above difficulty in the way of his client pre-empting the transaction submitted that in substance the transaction was for money consideration and therefore a sale. He referred to the fact that the deed dated 18.6.1973 (Ext.1) mentioned the value of each item of property described in the schedule. Secondly, the document was affixed with stamp under Schedule 1(a), Item No.23 of the Indian Stamp Act as amended in 1964. I am unable to agree with this interpretation of the deed put by Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate for the petitioner. In order to consider the real nature of the transaction the document should be considered as a whole and due regard should be paid to the recitals and the operative part of the document. I have already mentioned that the vendors conveyed the property as a reward or remuneration of the vendee who had legitimately rendered assistance to the vendors in the matter of recovery of their shares of the ancestral properties from their brothers. The document clearly stipulated that the vendors were conveying and/or relinquishing the properties in question and not for any money consideration. Therefore, the same cannot give rise to a right of pre-emption. The Stamp Act is a fiscal statute. Item 23, Schedule 1(a) mentions conveyance of property. The document clearly stipulated that the vendors were conveying and/or relinquishing the properties in question and not for any money consideration. Therefore, the same cannot give rise to a right of pre-emption. The Stamp Act is a fiscal statute. Item 23, Schedule 1(a) mentions conveyance of property. The term conveyance in Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property whether movable or immovable is transferred intervivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule 1. Thus, the definition in Section 2(10) is not an exhaustive one and secondly the said definition is not confined only to a conveyance on sale. But every instrument by which property is transferred intervivos and which is not otherwise provided is included in the said definition. In the instant case, the document (Ext.1) was a transfer deed but the consideration for the transfer was not money but services rendered by the vendee in the matter of recovering the share of the vendors in their parental property. Therefore, I conclude that the lower appellate court has correctly held that the transaction not being for money consideration the instant application under Section 8(1) by the petitioner was not maintainable in law. 13. In the above view it is not necessary for me to consider whether or not the petitioner already possessed raiyati lands up to the ceiling prescribed by Section 14M of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and was not eligible to obtain an order of pre-emption. For the same reason I need not dial with the effect of the insertion of the words subject to Section 14M by Section 7(ii)(a) of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972. For the foregoing reasons, I discharge this Rule. There will be no order as to costs.