JUDGMENT - R.M. KANTAWALA, J.:---These cross Revision Applications arise out of the judgment and order of the learned District Judge, Aurangabad whereby he dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant Ramgopal and confirmed the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller only on the ground that landlord Rikhabchand was entitled to possession of the suit premises under section 15(3)(a)(iv) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He directed that the tenant should be given three months time to vacate the premises. He also directed that on completion of the construction work the landlord shall offer to the tenant occupation of the premises constructed or such part thereof as the tenant may in writing communicate. He directed the tenant to pay subject to the determination of reasonable rent an amount by way of rent not less than 6 per cent on the investment of the plaintiff in respect of the premises before to be occupied by him. These two Revision Applications arise out of an application made by the landlord for eviction of the tenant on four grounds, viz. (1) that the landlord required the possession of the house for his own occupation, (2) that the tenant had denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and such denial of claim was not bona fide, (3) that the tenant had secured alternative house, and (4) that the landlord desires to carry out essential repairs or alterations to the house which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house, that the landlord bona fide required the house for the purpose of building or rebuilding and that the landlord bona fide required the house for making substantial additions which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house. Landlord is the owner of a house bearing Municipal No. 3-3-10 situate at Sarafa, Aurangabad. According to him, Ramgopal is the tenant of the said house on a monthly rent of Rs. 250/-. On March 2, 1971, he filed an application against the tenant for his eviction on the aforesaid four grounds. The written statement of the tenant is somewhat unhappily worded. In paragraph 1 of the written statement the tenant denied the ownership of the landlord in respect of the suit house. However, in the subsequent paragraphs he has been described as a landlord. The written statement of the tenant is somewhat unhappily worded. In paragraph 1 of the written statement the tenant denied the ownership of the landlord in respect of the suit house. However, in the subsequent paragraphs he has been described as a landlord. In paragraph (e) of the Additional written statement (which is in fact part of the original written statement filed by the tenant), he has stated that he spent a sum of about Rs. 10,000/- with full knowledge of the then landlord to bring the house suitable for the boarding and lodging as the premises were taken on Rent permanently. The Additional Rent Controller before his whom the application came up for hearing held that the suit house was in a dilapidated condition and the landlord required the same for construction purpose, that the landlord required the suit house for personal use bona fide that the tenant secured alternative accommodation and that the landlord had terminated the tenancy of the tenant by issuing a notice. An additional issue was framed upon the application of the landlord whereby in view of the contentions raised by the tenant in his additional written statement pertaining to the tenant being a permanent tenant of the suit house. Though in answer to the issues given by the Addition Rent Controller this issue has been regarded as proved, but what he really wanted to convey was that the taking of such a plea entitled the landlord to evict the tenant. In view of these findings, the tenant was directed to vacate the suit house and hand over possession of the same to the landlord within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. It may be stated that the issues were framed by Additional Rent Controller on November 30, 1971, and the additional issue as regard the tenant claiming permanent tenancy was raised on July 11, 1972. After the evidence of both the parties was closed on September 18, 1973, an application was mad by the tenant for amendment of the written statement whereby he wanted two amendments to be effected. The first amendment was pertaining to an averment made in the written statement whereby the title of the landlord was denied. By the amendment he wanted to allege that he accepted the title of the landlord. The first amendment was pertaining to an averment made in the written statement whereby the title of the landlord was denied. By the amendment he wanted to allege that he accepted the title of the landlord. By the second amendment, he wanted to delete the word permanently from the original written statement wherein a claim of permanent tenancy was made. After this application was made by the tenant on October 2, 1973, the landlord made his application for amendment of the claim whereby he wanted to contend that in view of the plea as to permanent tenancy made by the tenant in his written statement, he was entitled inter alia to a decree for eviction. Both these applications made by the tenant and the landlord were disposed of by a common order by the Additional Rent Controller passed on August 6, 1974. He rejected the application of the tenant for amendment. He stated in his order that the tenant had not raised any objection when the additional issue was raised. He also observed that both the parties led evidence on the issue and it was merely at the stage of final arguments that an application for amendment of the written statement was made. On this ground he rejected the application of the tenant for amendment of the written statement. So far as the application of the landlord for amendment of the plaint was concerned, he also rejected the same though in the order he stated that on July 11, 1972 an additional issue as regards permanent tenancy was raised and both the parties led evidence on the said issue. According for him, this evidence covers the plaintiffs case in relation to the issue as to the permanent tenancy. After making these observations in the order, he, however, stated that at the stage of arguments plaintiff cannot be allowed to amend the plaint. It may be stated that against this Order passed by the additional Rent Controller on August 6, 1974, an appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge, Aurangabad. However, by his order dated September 7, 1974, he rejected the same on the ground that it was not maintainable. It may be stated that against this Order passed by the additional Rent Controller on August 6, 1974, an appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge, Aurangabad. However, by his order dated September 7, 1974, he rejected the same on the ground that it was not maintainable. Thereafter on September 30, `1974, the tenant made a Revision Application to the High Court being Civil Revision Application No. 884 of 1974, both against the order of the learned District Judge, Aurangabad dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was not maintainable as well as against the order of the Additional Rent Controller whereby he rejected the tenants application for amendment. In Revision application notice before admission was directed to be given to the landlord and after hearing the Advocates of the tenant as well as the landlord, Joshi, J. by his order dated October 31, 1974, rejected the said Revision Application and vacated the interim stay that was granted pending admission. 2. Against the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller on August 13, 1975, an appeal being rent appeal No. 16 of 1975, was preferred by the tenant which was disposed of by the learned Assistant Judge, Aurangabad by his order dated April 30, 1976, and he remanded the matter back to the Rent Controller. Against the said order passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Special Civil Application being Special Civil Application No. 3583 of 1976 was filed before the High Court. On July 2, 1976, by consent of the parties, the order passed by the learned Assistant Judge was set aside and the matter was sent back to the learned District Judge, Aurangabad, for disposal in accordance with law. It was thereafter that the original appeal filed by the tenant was disposed of by the learned District Judge, Aurangabad by his order dated November 19,1976. The learned District Judge, Aurangabad rejected all the contentions of the landlord except one. He held that the landlord was entitled to possession of the suit house under the provisions of section 15, sub-section (3)(a)(iv) of the Act and gave the directions as indicated earlier. It is against this order passed by the learned District Judge that the two Revision Applications have been filed. Civil Revision Application No. 124 of 1977 is filed by the tenant, while Civil Revision Application No. 349 of 1977 is filed by the landlord. 3. Mr. It is against this order passed by the learned District Judge that the two Revision Applications have been filed. Civil Revision Application No. 124 of 1977 is filed by the tenant, while Civil Revision Application No. 349 of 1977 is filed by the landlord. 3. Mr. Agrawal on behalf of the landlord not only supported the order that was passed by the learned District Judge but he also contended that the order of eviction passed by the Additional Rent Controller ought to have been restored on all the four grounds that were urged by the landlord before him. He submitted that the landlord required the suit house for his bona fide personal occupation and the learned District Judge was in error in rejecting the said contention. He also urged that by his written statement the tenant had made a claim of permanent tenancy and in his deposition before the Additional Rent Controller he clearly admitted that such a claim was made with a mala fide intention of claiming permanent tenancy. He submitted that in view of such a claim the landlord was entitled to evict the tenant having regard to the provision of section 15(2)(vi) of the Act. In relation to this contention, he submitted that even though an application of the tenant for amendment of his written statement inter alia in respect of deletion of his plea of permanent tenancy was rejected by the Additional Rent Controller and the said order was in effect confirmed by the High Court when it rejected the Civil Revision Application filed by the tenant, still the learned District Judge in his judgment allowed amendment to be effected to the same effect. His submission was that having regard to the past history in relation to the application for amendment of the written statement it was not permissible to the learned District Judge to adopt such a course. He also tried to support the order passed by the learned District Judge for eviction having regard to the provisions of section 15(3)(iv) of the Act and lastly he submitted that as the tenant had acquired alternate accommodation in the City, the landlord was entitled to evict of the tenant under the provisions of section 15(2)(v) of the Act. He also tried to support the order passed by the learned District Judge for eviction having regard to the provisions of section 15(3)(iv) of the Act and lastly he submitted that as the tenant had acquired alternate accommodation in the City, the landlord was entitled to evict of the tenant under the provisions of section 15(2)(v) of the Act. In short, his submission was that the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller ought to have been confirmed by the learned District Judge and the order of eviction should not have been restricted to the mere ground contained in section 15(3)(iv) of the Act. Mr. Savant, on the other hand, on behalf of the tenant submitted that having regard to the provisions of the Act, the mere fact that the landlord required the premises bona fide for his personal residence was not a sufficient ground to enable the landlord to evict the tenant. As regards the plea of permanent tenancy, he submitted that the learned District Judge was right in allowing the application for amendment of the written statement made by the tenant where by the plea as regards claim to permanent tenancy was deleted by the tenant and the tenant accepted the ownership of the landlord in respect of the suit house. He, therefore, submitted that once the amendment application was dealt with by the learned District Judge, it is not permissible to a landlord to ask for eviction of the tenant merely on the ground that initially in his written statement the tenant had put in a plea of permanent tenancy. He also submitted that when the plaint was filed, such a plea was not to be found and merely an additional issue was sought to be raised at a late stage on July 11, 1972, in relation to the plea as to permanent tenancy. In the absence of a plea in the plaint his submission was that the landlord ought not to have been permitted to raise such an issue and the learned District Judge was, therefore, justified even at the stage of appeal to allow the amendment application in respect of the written statement. In the absence of a plea in the plaint his submission was that the landlord ought not to have been permitted to raise such an issue and the learned District Judge was, therefore, justified even at the stage of appeal to allow the amendment application in respect of the written statement. So far as the landlords plea in relation to the tenant having alternate accommodation was concerned, he urged that the house in question was used by the tenant as a Boarding and Lodging house, while the house which was admittedly acquired by his wife was unsuitable for such purpose. Merely because the tenants wife acquired a house, it cannot be stated that such house is automatically fit for conducting the business of Lodging and Boarding House and the landlord was not entitled to evict the tenant on the ground that his tenant has secured alternate house or accommodation. Lastly, he submitted that the learned District Judge was in error in confirming the order of eviction on the ground that the landlord desired to carry out the essential repairs or alterations to the house which could not be made without the tenant vacating the house or that the landlord bona fide required the house for the purpose of building or rebuilding or that the landlord bona fide required the house for making substantial additions which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house. In short, his submission was that the confirmation of the order of eviction by the learned District Judge on the above ground was unjustified and he ought to have dismissed the application that was made by the landlord for the tenants eviction. 4. It is on four district grounds that the Landlord has made an application for eviction of the tenant. The house in question as indicated by the map drawn by the Commissioner, who was directed to draw the same, consists of several scattered structures. This map, however, has not been marked as a separate exhibit but has been admitted to be true by both the parties. As indicated in this map, there is a structure towards the south abutting on service lane. It consists of kitchen, hall, cabin and verandah. To the west towards the south there are two bathrooms and the urinal. In the centre of the entire house there is a verandah admeasuring 38 x 13. As indicated in this map, there is a structure towards the south abutting on service lane. It consists of kitchen, hall, cabin and verandah. To the west towards the south there are two bathrooms and the urinal. In the centre of the entire house there is a verandah admeasuring 38 x 13. To the west of this verandah there are five rooms which, I am informed, have been newly constructed. To the north there is a structure which consists of a tinshed and another building consisting of four halls and three rooms. It appears that the landlord was thinking of demolishing the structure which was towards the sought abutting service lane. In its place he wanted to construct a new structure which is shown in the map which is marked as document No. 1 on behalf of the plaintiff. It appears from this map that for the construction of the proposed structure the original structure towards the south was to be demolished and a portion of the verandah in the centre was to be taken up for construction of this building. However, five rooms that were existing towards, the west as well as the northern structures are not to be demolished. It is in this background that we have to consider the application of the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the grounds abovementioned. 5. The first ground that has been urged by Mr. Agrawal in support of the claim of the landlord is that the landlord requires the house for his own occupation. It appears from the map document No. 1 that what is intended to be done by the landlord is to demolish a part of the structure that was let out to the tenant and to reconstruct a portion thereof as indicated in this document. I will assume without going into the details thereof that after reconstructing the landlord wanted to occupy a house that was to be constructed. However, if regard be had to the provisions of the Act, such a requirement does not entitled the landlord to evict the tenant. In support of this plea, reliance was placed by Mr. Agrawal upon the provisions of section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Act. However, if regard be had to the provisions of the Act, such a requirement does not entitled the landlord to evict the tenant. In support of this plea, reliance was placed by Mr. Agrawal upon the provisions of section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The said provisions read as under :--- "15(3)(a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of Clause (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house. (i) in case it is a residential house, if the landlord required it for his own occupation and if he is not occupying a residential house of his own in the city, town or village concerned." 6. It is not disputed that in the whole of the structure taken on rent by the tenant, he is conducting the business of Boarding and Lodging House. It is, however, the plea of the landlord that in a portion of the house the tenant is residing. In which portion of the house the tenant is residing is not, however, made clear on the record. There is no specific evidence as regards the specific requirement of the members of the family of the landlord. There is no evidence even as regards the number of the members which comprise the landlords family. If essentially the rented house was used for a Boarding and Lodging House, then they are business premises and it will not be possible to consider whether it is a mere residential house which is a case covered by section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Act. Even apart from that, the intention of the landlord is to demolish the portion of this house as indicated earlier and to reconstruct a new structure to the south while he wants to retain a port of the rest of the structure. When such is a case, it cannot be said that the house from which the tenant is to be evicted is required by the landlord for his own occupation. In the absence of detailed particulars, one can assume or proceed on the footing that the house which is proposed to be newly constructed was intended to be occupied by the landlord after it was constructed. Even if this was the intention of the landlord, such a case is not covered by the provisions of section 15(a)(i) of the Act. In the absence of detailed particulars, one can assume or proceed on the footing that the house which is proposed to be newly constructed was intended to be occupied by the landlord after it was constructed. Even if this was the intention of the landlord, such a case is not covered by the provisions of section 15(a)(i) of the Act. The provisions of this sub-clause will apply in those cases where the entire house or a specific part thereof is required in its existing condition for his own occupation. That, however, does not appear to be there case and the landlord will not be justified in asking the eviction of the tenant on the footing of the provisions of section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Act because the house is used as business premises and no existing part of the house is intended to be used by the landlord for his own occupation. 7. I will then deal with the question whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant on the ground that the tenant has secured alternate house. It is the case of Mr. Agrawal that in the name of his wife the tenant has acquired a house in the city which consists of ground and one upper storey. He also alleged that in the vicinity of this house which has been acquired in the name of the wife there are Boarding and Lodging Houses. He, therefore, submitted that acquisition of such a house in the name of the wife shows that the tenant has secured alternative house and on that footing the landlord will be entitled to evict the tenant in view of the provisions of section 15(2)(v). The aid section provides as under :--- "15(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied--- (v) that the tenant has secured alternative house or ceased to occupy the house for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause..............the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order, rejecting the application." 8. I will proceed on the assumption that the house that has been acquired in the name of the wife of the tenant is so acquired by the tenant himself. However, I have to consider whether mere acquisition of such a house will entitle the landlord to evict the tenant. It should not be overload that the house from which the eviction of the tenant is sought consists of several buildings in which the tenant is carrying on the business of a Boarding and Lodging House. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the house which has been acquired in the name of the wife is suitable for carrying on the business of a Boarding a Lodging House. I do not think that it is the intention of the provisions of section 15(2)(v) that acquisition of any alternative premise by itself is a sufficient ground to evict a tenant. The alternative premises acquired by the tenant must be such which can reasonably be used for the same purpose for which the tenanted premises from which eviction is sought are used. On an inquiry made by me Mr. Agrawal fairly told me that there are no detailed particulars as regards the measurement of the various rooms in the house that has been acquired in the name of the wife, and that except what is stated by the Additional Rent Controller while dealing with the case there is no other information on record. There is no material to show that the business of Boarding and Lodging House on the scale in which it was carried on by the tenant in the suit house could be carried on by him in the house taken up by the wife. There is no specific material showing the sizes of the various rooms. The mere fact that in the locality of this house there are Boarding and Lodging Houses will not by itself be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the house that has been acquired in the name of the wife is suitable for conducting the business of a Boarding and Lodging house. The intention of the legislature is that the alternative house that may be acquired by the tenant must be such where the tenant could reasonably carry on the same business which he has been doing in the suit house from which he is sought to be evicted. The intention of the legislature is that the alternative house that may be acquired by the tenant must be such where the tenant could reasonably carry on the same business which he has been doing in the suit house from which he is sought to be evicted. On the material on record it is not possible to uphold the contention of the landlord as it would not be permissible to the Court to pass an eviction decree against the tenant on the mere ground that some other house has been acquired in the name of the wife. 9. That takes me to the contention of Mr. Agrawal that since the tenant in his written statement claimed permanent tenancy and since such claim was not bona fide it was obligatory upon the Controller to pass an order for eviction of the tenant. In connection with this contention I have indicated that a specific issue as regards this ground of eviction on the basis of the plea of permanent tenancy was raised at the instance of the landlord on July 11, 1972 and evidence was led by the parties on June 6, 1973, on that footing. It was thereafter that applications were made by the tenant as well as the landlord for amendment respectively of the written statement and the plaint. These applications were disposed of by a common order passed by the Additional Rent Controller on August 6, 1974. By this order he unequivocally rejected the application of the tenant for the amendment of the written statement. So far as the application of the landlord was concerned, he undoubtedly rejected the same, but while giving the reasons he indicated that a specific issue on that footing has been raised and that issue is wide enough to cover the case supposed to be pleaded by the plaintiff-landlord by this amendment. The effect of this Order is that the amendment that was sought to be made by the tenant was not allowed. However, he considered it necessary to answer the issue as regards permanent tenancy which was raised at the instance of the landlord. An appeal preferred by the tenant against this order was dismissed by the learned District Judge on the ground that the same was not maintainable. However, he considered it necessary to answer the issue as regards permanent tenancy which was raised at the instance of the landlord. An appeal preferred by the tenant against this order was dismissed by the learned District Judge on the ground that the same was not maintainable. A Revision Application preferred by the tenant against the said Order of the learned District Judge as well as against the original order of the Additional Rent Controller on the application for amendment was rejected by the High Court after notice was given to the landlord. It may be stated that no reasons are given by the learned Judge while disposing of this Civil Revision Application. It was sought to be urged by Mr. Savant that there may be variety of reasons that might have persuaded the learned Judge to reject the application and it would not be proper to infer that the Revision Application was rejected on the ground of the merits of allowing or disallowing of an application for amendment of the written statement. It is undoubtedly true that the learned Judge while disposing of this Revision Application has not given any reason, but the very fact that before rejecting the same notice was directed to be given to the landlord and after hearing the Counsel for the landlord as well as the tenant the learned Judge rejected the Revision Application indicates that it will be proper to infer that the said application was rejected on merits because the learned Judge must have felt that by the impugned order passed by the Additional Rent Controller on the amendment application by the tenant the same was rightly rejected. Placed in such a situation, reliance was sought to be placed by Mr. Savant upon the order passed by the learned District Judge while disposing of the appeal wherein he granted the application for amendment of the written statement. In my opinion, the course that has been adopted by the learned District Judge suffers from more than one infirmities. If at the earliest stage the High Court rejected the application filed by the tenant, then it was improper for the learned District Judge to grant the amendment. Even otherwise, the order that has been passed by the learned District Judge on the plea of amendment of the written statement suffers from a very serious infirmity. If at the earliest stage the High Court rejected the application filed by the tenant, then it was improper for the learned District Judge to grant the amendment. Even otherwise, the order that has been passed by the learned District Judge on the plea of amendment of the written statement suffers from a very serious infirmity. Before this amendment application was made on behalf of the tenant, evidence was already led before the Additional Rent Controller on June 20, 1973. In his evidence, the tenant had distinctly admitted that in the additional written statement it was stated that the "Premises was taken on rent permanently". That plea was taken with a mala fide intention. If such was the evidence given by the tenant himself, before the application for amendment of the written statement was made, then it was improper on the part of the learned District Judge to grant an application for amendment at the stage of appeal. In his deposition the tenant has in relation to the plea of permanent tenancy stated as under : "I have given my written statement with a mala fide intention two years back." 10. From this admission of the tenant, it is quite clear that it was not inadvertently at the instance of the Advocate who drafted the written statement the plea as to permanent tenancy was taken up. The tenant himself had in cross-examination to admit that such a plea was taken by him in the written statement with a mala fide intention. If that was so, then it is inconceivable how the learned District Judge was persuaded to take the view that the amendment application though made at a late stage, viz., at the stage of arguments, ought to have been allowed by the Additional Rent Controller even though such a plea was sought to be raised after the evidence was taken, the very admission of the tenant in his deposition clearly goes to show that when the written statement was signed by him he was conscious of the plea and with full knowledge of what was pleaded therein it was filed in Court. This is not a case where through in advertance a plea has been taken by an Advocate and the client without realising the full effect thereof merely signed the written statement. This is not a case where through in advertance a plea has been taken by an Advocate and the client without realising the full effect thereof merely signed the written statement. The evidence of the tenant clearly shows that he was fully aware of the nature of the plea as regards permanent tenancy that was taken in the written statement and his specific case was that the plea was so taken with a mala fide intention. When such is a case, a tenant cannot be permitted to amend his written statement more so at a stage of arguments. In my opinion, even if inspite of the order of the High Court rejecting Civil Revision Application of the tenant it was open to the learned District Judge to go into the question of the order of the Additional Rent Controller refusing to allow an application of the tenant to amend the written statement, still the learned District Judge was not justified in granting the plea more so having regard to the circumstances I have indicated earlier. Under the circumstances, I have to consider the rights of the landlord on the footing that the tenant has taken up a plea that he was a permanent tenant. Undoubtedly, such a plea was taken in the written statement with a view to justify his claim that an amount of Rs. 10,000/- was spent by him for carrying on repairs. However, that would make no difference to the issue that has to be decided. With full consciousness, while filing his written statement the tenant pleaded that he was a permanent tenant in respect of the suit premises. 11. Section 15(2)(vi) inter alia provides as under :--- "If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that the tenant has claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such claim was not bona fide the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house." 12. In the present case on the very admission of the tenant in his deposition that a plea as regards permanent tenancy was taken up mala fide by him when he filed his written statement such a plea, in my opinion, is sufficient to entitle a landlord to evict the tenant in view of the provisions of section 15(2)(vi) of the Act. Only two requirements are to be fulfilled for the purpose of sub-clause (vi) : (1) a right of permanent tenancy ought to be claimed by the tenant and (2) such claim was not bona fide. Having regard to the plea in the written statement and the deposition of the tenant it is quite evident that both these conditions are fulfilled and, in my opinion, such a plea by itself, in conjunction with the evidence given by the tenant, will entitle the landlord to have a decree for eviction in his favour, because both the requirements of Clause (vi) are fulfilled and when such is a condition it is obligatory on the part of the Controller to pass an order of eviction against the tenant. In such a case no discretion is left with the Controller. 13. That this is a correct construction of the provisions of section 15(2)(vi) is quite evident, if regard be had to the two Single Judges decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to which my attention has been invited by Mr. Agrawal. The corresponding provision is contained in section 10(2)(vi) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The relevant part of this section provides that if the Controller after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied that the tenant has claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such claim was not bona fide the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. In substance, the provision is identical. This provision came up for consideration in two cases before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In the case of (Machavaram Venkata Narayan Rao v. Saryapalli Narrayana Rao Sarda)1, 1978(1) R.C.J. 308(A.P.) (Civil Revision Petition No. 2651 of 1977, decided on November 23, 1977)2, an identical plea was accepted by the Court even though such a plea was taken up only in the written statement. It may be stated that in that case the plea related to the denial of the title of the landlord. It may be stated that in that case the plea related to the denial of the title of the landlord. However, it is quite clear from the provisions of section 15(2)(vi) of the Act that a case of a denial of title of the landlord by the tenant and claim of a right of permanent tenancy by the tenant stand on an identical footing and either of them is sufficient to entitle the Controller to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. Thus, under an identical provision a Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view which supports the contention that has been taken up by Mr. Agrawal. 14. Even apart from this decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, similar view was taken by another Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of (Subbayya v. Narayan Swami)3, 1972 R.C.J. 601 (A.P.). That was also a case of denial of title of the landlord by the tenant. The learned Judge held that the provisions of section 10(2)(vi) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, are mandatory. The Rent Controller has no option but to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the section in the case of denial of title of the landlord by the tenant. If the tenant denies the title of the landlord, or claims permanent tenancy, then the Rent Controller has to determine the bona fides of that plea raised by the tenant. If he is of the opinion that the denial of the landlords title by the tenant is bona fide then he shall dismiss the eviction petition filed by the landlord. If, on the other hand, he is not satisfied about the bona fides of the denial of title raised by the tenant, then he shall order the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Thus, in respect of an identical provision in the two cases, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken a view which supports the contention that has been urged by Mr. Agrawal. In the case before me, by way of justification for the alleged incurring of expenditure of Rs. 10,000 for repairs, the tenant in his written statement has put forward a plea that the premises were taken on lease permanently. Agrawal. In the case before me, by way of justification for the alleged incurring of expenditure of Rs. 10,000 for repairs, the tenant in his written statement has put forward a plea that the premises were taken on lease permanently. In his deposition before the Rent Controller the tenant has candidly admitted that such a plea was taken in the written statement with a mala fide intention. Thus, the requirements of the section are fulfilled and on this ground alone the landlord will be entitled to evict the tenant. As I have indicated earlier, the learned District Judge was in error in the course of appeal in permitting the tenant to amend the written statement, the effect of which will be to deprive the rights of the landlord for a decree for eviction. Such action of allowing the amendment at the stage of appeal was, in my opinion, the roughly unsupportable and as I have indicated earlier, such a view ought not to have been taken by him. 15. In the view that I have taken above, strictly speaking, it may not be necessary for me to go into the fourth plea that has been urged on behalf of the landlord. However, since the matter has been argued before me, I will consider that question. There is a concurrent finding of the Additional Rent Controller as well as the learned District Judge that in view of the provisions of section 15(3)(a)(iv) of the Act, the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant. Provisions of sub-clause (iv) are attracted if any one of the following three conditions are fulfilled, viz. (1) the landlord desires to carry out essential repairs or alternations to the house, which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house, (2) landlord bona fide requires the house for the purpose of building or rebuilding; and (3) the landlord bona fide requires the house for making substantial additions which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house. The learned District Judge in his judgment has upheld the order of eviction on the basis of these provisions. However, he has restricted the order on the ground that the entire property occupied by the tenant was bona fide required by the landlords for the purposes of building. Such a view taken by the learned Judge is inconsistent with the map document No. 1 produced on behalf of the plaintiff-landlord. However, he has restricted the order on the ground that the entire property occupied by the tenant was bona fide required by the landlords for the purposes of building. Such a view taken by the learned Judge is inconsistent with the map document No. 1 produced on behalf of the plaintiff-landlord. As I have indicated while narrating the facts, this map clearly shows what building was proposed to be constructed by the landlord. The proposed new building was only towards the south on the portion abutting the land and it was only likely to effect the structures on the southern side as well as a southern portion of the central Verandah admeasuring 38 x 13. The rest of the structures as existing on the date of the institution of the suit were not to be disturbed and in respect thereof no building was intended to be constructed. Under the Act, there is no specific or express provision which will permit a landlord to evict a tenant from a part of the premises or house occupied by him as a tenant indeed in the definition of the word "house" given in section 2(b) of the Act, house includes any building or hut or part of building and/or hut let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes. The above structure which is likely to be demolished for the construction of a purpose new building though it may be regarded as a part of the building, there is no evidence before me that it has been let separately either for residential or non-residential purposes. It may, however, be stated that in the third proviso to section 15(3)(a) of the Act, it is provided that where a landlord has obtained possession of a house under sub-clause (iv), he shall on the completion of the work of repairs, alterations, building rebuilding or making additions give the tenant the first preference for occupying the house on such terms as may be settled by the Controller. Thus, without going into the question whether under the provisions of the Act a tenant can be evicted from a part of the premises occupied by him in that capacity and on the assumption that it can be done, the learned Judge ought not to have passed a blanket order directing the tenant to vacate the whole of the premises or building occupied by him, but he merely ought to have directed the tenant to vacate so much of the southern portion of the premises occupied by him as would be necessary for the purposes of proposed new construction of the building. Even such order of eviction has to be made subject to the condition that on completion of work of building the landlord shall give the tenant the first preference for occupying the house on such terms as may be settled by the Controller. Thus, having regard to the facts of the present case, on the basis of the grounds pleaded by the landlord that bona fide required the house for the purpose of building or rebuilding, the eviction order ought to have been restricted only in respect of the southern portion where the new construction was proposed to be erected and not in respect of the entire house occupied by the tenant. Such order will be subject to the condition that on reconstruction of the new building the landlord will make available to the tenant in view of his first preferential right to occupy such portion of the newly constructed house as was initially in the tenants possession and the terms in respect of such occupation will have to be settled by the Controller. However, it is unnecessary to pass separate order in view of the ground put forward by the landlord which falls within the ambit of section 15(3)(a)(iv) of the Act, and as I have taken the view that by reason of a mala fide claim of a right of permanent tenancy by the tenant he is liable to be evicted. 16. In the result, Civil Revision Application No. 349 of 1977 preferred by the landlord is allowed on the ground that the tenant claimed a right of permanent tenancy and such claim was not bona fide. On the basis of this plea, the respondent-tenant in this Revision Application is directed to hand over possession of the entire house in his possession to the landlord. Mr. On the basis of this plea, the respondent-tenant in this Revision Application is directed to hand over possession of the entire house in his possession to the landlord. Mr. Sawant on behalf of the tenant applied for time to vacate the house. He says that he will advise his client to give an undertaking to the Court to hand over possession of the house on the expiry of the period that may be permitted by the Court. If within fortnight from today the tenant either personally or through his Counsel or Advocate gives an undertaking to the Court that he will vacate and hand over possession of the suit house to the landlord, on the expiry of the period mentioned hereinafter, the tenant is given three months time to vacate the house. If, however, no such undertaking is given within a period of a fortnight from today, the decree or order for eviction becomes enforceable, forthwith. 17. In view of the Order that has been passed in the landlords Civil Revision Application No. 349 of 1977, Civil Revision Application No. 124 of 1977 preferred by the tenant is dismissed. However, I have indicated in may judgment that if this was the only Revision Application to be considered by the Court, what would have been the modifications required to be made in the order that was passed by the learned District Judge. 18. The tenant will pay the costs of the landlord in Civil Revision Application No. 349 of 1977. While each party will bear its own costs in Civil Revision Application No. 124 of 1977. -----