JUDGMENT - R.M. KANTAWALA, C.J.:---Mrs. Radhadevi Rathi, the decree-holder, has filed this applications against an order passed by both the courts to the effect that the debt of respondent Shankar Falle under the decree dated August 25, 1975, stood discharged in view of the provisions of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 (Maharashtra Act No. III of 1976) hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. In regular Civil Suit No. 81 of 1974, filed by plaintiff Mrs. Radhadevi Rathi against respondent Shankar Falle, she obtained a decree of August 25, 1975. The decree was to the following effect : "The defendant do pay the suit amount of Rs. 8,400/- by yearly instalments of Rs. 700/- with first instalment payable on 1-11-1975 and subsequent instalment on 1st November of succeeding calendar years. On defendants failure to give three consecutive instalments, the plaintiff shall recover the suit amount in lumpsum". On February 12, 1976, judgment- debtor Shankar Falle, made an application to the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Islampur, under Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating that as he was debtor within the meaning of the Act, the debt due under the decree was discharged as he had obtained a certificate from the authorised officer. That application of his was opposed by decree-holder Mrs. Radhadevi Rathi. However, the petition of the judgments- debtor was granted by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Islampur, and in the appeal filed by Mrs. Radhadevi Rathi in the District Court, the learned District Judge confirmed the order that was passed by the learned trial Judge, with the result that in the opinion of the two courts the amount payable by the judgment-debtor to decree- holder Mrs. Radhadevi Rathi stood discharged in view of the provisions of the Act. It is against the concurrent order passed by both the courts that the present appeal is filed by decree- holder Mrs. Radhadevi Rathi. 3. Mr. Hombalkar, on behalf of the decree- holder, submitted that both the courts were in error in taking the view that the debt due to his client stood discharged in view of the provisions of the Act. He submitted that on behalf of the judgment-debtor, Shankar Falle, reliance was sought to be placed upon a certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Walva, dated October 3, 1975. He submitted that on behalf of the judgment-debtor, Shankar Falle, reliance was sought to be placed upon a certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Walva, dated October 3, 1975. His contention was that this certificate was issued by the Tahsildar ex parte without any notice to Mrs. Radhadevi Rathi or without giving her any opportunity to show cause why judgment-debtor Shankar Falle should not be declared to be a debtor within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act. 4. Mr. Rane, on behalf of the judgment-debtor, submitted that neither the order of the trial Court nor the Appellant Court indicates that no notice was given to the decree- holder before the judgment- debtor was declared a debtor within the meaning of the Act by the Tahsildar, Walva. 5. On August 22, 1975, Maharashtra Ordinance No. VIII of 1975 was promulgated. Section 3 of this ordinance inter alia provide--- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any other instrument having force by virtue of any such law, and save as otherwise expressly provided in this ordinance, every debt outstanding on the appointed day, including the amount of interest, if any payable by a debtor to a creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged and the consequence as hereinafter set forth shall, with effect from the appointed day, ensue". "Appointed day" within the meaning of section was August 22, 1975, being the day on which the ordinance came into force. The word "debtor" was defined in section 2(f) as under :--- "In this ordinance, unless the context requires otherwise, debtor means a marginal farmer, rural labourer, rural artisan or a worker who is in debt and the income of such farmer, labourer and artisan does not exceed two thousands and four hundred rupees per annum; but does not include a small farmer". Sub-section (2) of section 2 of the ordinance provided that if a question arises whether a person is a marginal or small farmer, or a rural labourer, or rural artisan, or a worker, the question shall be referred to an officer not below the rank of a tahsildar duly appointed by the State Government in that behalf, and the decision of such officer on the question shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any Civil Court, provided that no such question shall be decided unless an opportunity has been given to such person to be heard. 6. While the ordinance was in force, by an order dated October 3, 1975 Tahsildar Walva, decided that judgment-debtor Shankar Falle who was the applicant before him was a debtor as defined under section 2(f) of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Ordinance, 1975. The provisions of the above Ordinance were repealed by the Act, which was given retrospective effect from August 22, 1975, being the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated. By section 23 thereof, Maharashtra Debt Relief Ordinance, 1975, was repealed. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that-- "Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken (including any appointment made or any order of notification issued) under the Ordinance so repealed shall, unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done, taken, made or issued, as the case may be, under the corresponding provisions of this Act." 7. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, there is nothing inconsistent between the provisions of the Ordinance and of the Act, and hence the action taken under the Ordinance, in view of the provisions of section 23(2) of the Act, will be regarded to have been taken under the provisions thereof. The question that however, remains for considerations is whether the order that has been passed by the Tahsildar is in violation of the principles of natural justice. It may be said that the language of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Ordinance is not happily worded. The question that however, remains for considerations is whether the order that has been passed by the Tahsildar is in violation of the principles of natural justice. It may be said that the language of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Ordinance is not happily worded. However, it is a well settled position in law that no order affecting the rights of a person or prejudicial to him can be passed by any authority vested with quasi judicial powers or even administrative powers, which are likely to affect such person, without an opportunity being given to him to be heard. In the present case, when the Tahsildar considered the contention of the debtor no opportunity whatsoever was given to the creditor to show-cause before a finding on the plea of the debtor was given. In cannot be again said that in view of the provisions of the Ordinance and the Act, a finding that a particular person is debtor is seriously affecting the rights of the creditor, because the provisions thereof ultimately result in debts being wiped off. If that was so, it was obligatory on the part of the Tahsildar before he passed the order upon the application of the debtor to give an opportunity to the creditor to be heard. It is not, however, very clear from the record whether such opportunity was given to the creditor before the Tahsildar passed the order dated October 3, 1975. It is, therefore, necessary for the trial Court to inquire into this question and decide the same. If the trial Court, after making inquiries and hearing both the parties and their respective Advocates, comes to the conclusion that the order dated October 3, 1975, was passed by the Tahsildar Walva, after notice to the creditor, then the order passed by him will be binding on both the parties. If, however, such an order was passed by him without notice to the creditor or without he being given an opportunity to be heard, then the order passed by the Tahsildar suffers from a serious infirmity, viz. violation of the principles of natural justice, and on the ground it has to be regarded as null and void. 8. If, however, such an order was passed by him without notice to the creditor or without he being given an opportunity to be heard, then the order passed by the Tahsildar suffers from a serious infirmity, viz. violation of the principles of natural justice, and on the ground it has to be regarded as null and void. 8. Accordingly, the civil revision application is allowed, the orders passed by the trial Court on June 22, 1976, and the learned District Judge on July 4, 1977, are set aside, and the trial Court is directed to make an inquiry to find out whether the order of Tahsildar Walva dated October 3, 1975, was passed by him after giving an opportunity to the creditor to be heard or not. If no inquiry the trial Court finds that the order was passed by the Tahsildar, Walva, without giving an opportunity to the creditor to be heard, then he will reject the application of the judgment-debtor. If, however he finds that the said order of the Tahsildar was passed by him after giving on opportunity to the creditor to be heard, then he will confirm the earlier order that was passed by him. Any aggrieved party will be at liberty to adopt such proceedings as may be permissible to him under the law. The costs of this revision application will be costs in the proceedings before the trial Court. -----