JUDGMENT-The petitioner is partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 carrying on the business of selling cloth. It is occupying Block No.2 which is on the ground floor of the whole-sale cloth market in Gandhibagh at Nagpur. This shop admittedly belonged to one Holaram and was leased out to the petitioner at a monthly rental of Rs. 350. Holaram filed an application before the Rent Controller at Nagpur for permission to serve quit notice on the petitioner on the ground that he needed the said premises for his personal use and occupation and that the petitioner had secured alternate accommodation. The petitioner contested the claim of Holaram on several grounds. It denied that Holaram needed the premises for opening a cloth shop as alleged by him. It also denied that it had secured alternate accommodation as alleged by Holaram. The Rent Controller, by his order dated 18th June 1975, rejected the application of Holaram on both counts. Being aggrieved by this order Holaram preferred an appeal before the Deputy Collector at Nagpur. The latter rejected the contention of Holaram that the petitioner had secured an alternate accommodation and did not reasonably require the premises let out to it. However, the Deputy Collector did not agree with the finding of the Rent Controller to the effect that Holaram required the premises for his personal use and occupation for opening a cloth shop. The Deputy Collector held that Holaram had established his case in so far as this ground was concerned and hence by his order dated 24th November 1975 the Deputy Collector granted permission to Holaram to serve a quit notice on the petitioner under clause 13 (3) (vi) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order'). 2. After securing permission from the appellate authority Holaram served the quit notice on the petitioner on or about 1st December 1975. Thereafter Holaram expired on 5th February 1976 leaving behind him his legal representatives who are impleaded as respondents Nos. 3 to 6 in this petition which has been filed by the petitioner on 18th of February 1976 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the said order of the Deputy Collector in an appeal. 3. Mr. De, the learned counsel for the petitioner, advanced a two fold argument in support of the petition. 3 to 6 in this petition which has been filed by the petitioner on 18th of February 1976 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the said order of the Deputy Collector in an appeal. 3. Mr. De, the learned counsel for the petitioner, advanced a two fold argument in support of the petition. He firstly contended that on the death of Holaram after the appellate order passed on 24th November 1975, that the order came to an end inasmuch as Holaram had sought permission to terminate the tenancy of the petitioner on the ground that he himself needed the premises for his occupation to start the business of cloth. In other words, it was the contention of Mr. De that after the death of Holaram the ground on which permission was sought, did not subsist and hence the order passed by the Deputy Collector in the appeal could not be sustained if the ground on which permission had been given itself became non-existent. Secondly Mr. De contended that the Deputy Collector had not properly considered the evidence on record with regard to the requirement of Holaram and had not taken into consideration the fact that a shop on the first floor belonging to Holaram had fallen vacant and Holaram had let it to somebody else. According to Mr. De, if in fact Holaram was in dire need of the premises for opening a shop, he would not have left this opportunity to slip his hand and would have opened the shop there. Hence, according to Mr. De, the fact that Holaram let out the shop which had fallen vacant and did not make use of it for starting his business would itself show that he was not in need of the premises in question and that Holaram had started the proceedings against the petitioner merely with a view of getting the rent enhanced. 4. It is not disputed on the part of respondents Nos. 3 to 6, who are the only contesting respondents in this petition, that Holaram died on 5th February 1976. It is, however, contended by Mr. Manohar on their behalf that the fact of the death of Holaram after the decision of appeal by the Deputy Collector cannot be taken into consideration for deciding whether the order passed by him in appeal was valid or not In other words it is contended by Mr. It is, however, contended by Mr. Manohar on their behalf that the fact of the death of Holaram after the decision of appeal by the Deputy Collector cannot be taken into consideration for deciding whether the order passed by him in appeal was valid or not In other words it is contended by Mr. Manohar that the death of Holaram is subsequent event which cannot be taken into account for deciding the validity or otherwise of the order passed by the Deputy Collector in appeal. According to Mr. Manohar, the same will have to be considered on the facts and the law obtaining at the time of the order passed by the Deputy Collector. With regard to the second contention of Mr. De, it is contended by Mr. Manohar that while passing the impugned order the Deputy Collector had taken all the factors into consideration and particularly the fact that the shop on the first floor had fallen vacant and had been let out by Holaram. Mr. Manohar submitted that the question whether Holaram needed the premises bona-fide for his personal use and occupation being a question of fact and this question having been decided by the appellate authority, it would not be open to this Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to go into the evidence or re-appreciate it and find out if the conclusion to which the appellate authority had arrived was correct or not. 5. In so far as the first point urged by Mr. De is concerned, the question which falls for consideration is whether in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution for deciding the legality or otherwise of the order passed by an inferior Tribunal this Court can take into account a subsequent event. It is now well settled that proceedings under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution are not continuation of the proceedings before an inferior Tribunal and therefore, correctness of decision of the Tribunal has to be decided on the basis of the law in force on the date of the decision. Any subsequent change in the law can have no relevance in determining whether the decision is right or wrong and the High Court will not interfere with the decision merely on the ground of subsequent change of law. Any subsequent change in the law can have no relevance in determining whether the decision is right or wrong and the High Court will not interfere with the decision merely on the ground of subsequent change of law. In Azam Shah v. M. R. Tribunal1, this Court has taken the view that the fact that by a subsequent amendment the law itself is changed cannot possibly be a ground justifying interference with the final orders of the authority which were not challengeable on any valid ground according to law then prevailing. In this case the Division Bench observed that the High Court itself has put limits on its powers under Articles 226 and 227 and the limit is to confine the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court to cases where the order of the inferior Tribunal is shown to suffer from any of the known vices i. e. acting in excess of jurisdiction or refusing to exercise jurisdiction or acting with such illegality or irregularity in procedure which vitiate the orders or acting beyond the scope of authority or in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench further observed that if the final order cannot be challenged on any of these grounds, in its opinion, the subsequent change in law will not justify interference with such order. In short, therefore, ill Azam Shah's case this Court has taken the view that a subsequent change in law cannot be a ground justifying interference with the final orders of the authority which were not challengeable on any of the grounds according to law then prevailing. In this connection reference may also be had to the decision of a Division Bench of the erst-while Nagpur High Court in Narayanrao v. Mst. B. D. Swame2. This was a case under the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The petition had been filed by the landlord for permission to serve quit notice under clause 13(3)(vi) of the Order. His application was rejected by the authorities below and he filed a petition to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. When the petition was pending in the High Court, the said clause of the 'Order was amended and the provisions under which the landlord sought permission to serve notice was itself deleted from this clause. His application was rejected by the authorities below and he filed a petition to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. When the petition was pending in the High Court, the said clause of the 'Order was amended and the provisions under which the landlord sought permission to serve notice was itself deleted from this clause. The question then arose if any relief could be given to the landlord in the writ petition in view of the fact that the clause on which he had relied had itself undergone a change and had been deleted. It was contended on behalf of the tenant in that petition that in view of the change of the law the petitioner i.e. the landlord was not entitled to obtain the permission of the Rent Controller to terminate the tenancy and hence no relief could be given in the writ petition to the landlord even if it was found that he was entitled to the permission sought by him. While rejecting this contention on behalf of the tenant, the Court observed as follows: “In this jurisdiction what we have to ascertain is whether the inferior tribunal (here, the appellate authority) did apply the law which was in force when it decided the matter before it. If we find that it did apply the law, the matter would end there. If, however, we find that it did not apply the law, we would interfere. But in deciding whether to interfere or not we would be guided by the law in force at the time of the appellate decision. The change which the law underwent after the decision of the appellate authority can have no relevance in determining whether the decision of the appellate authority was right or wrong." 6. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab High Court in Vir Bhan v. Union of India3. A learned Single Judge of that Court observed that in writ proceedings the High Court has only to see whether the impugned order passed by the authorities concerned was in accordance with law or not on the date when it was actually passed. It would thus appear that it is now well settled that a change in law sub-sequent to the passing of the impugned order would not entitle the High Court to interfere with the order on that ground alone. It would thus appear that it is now well settled that a change in law sub-sequent to the passing of the impugned order would not entitle the High Court to interfere with the order on that ground alone. In other words, the High Court has to apply the law as it stood at the time when the impugned order was passed, and cannot take note of the subsequent change in law in order to determine the correctness or otherwise of the order passed on the basis of the law then prevailing. Now what applies to the change in law subsequently will apply with equal force to the change of facts or change in the circumstances of the case. It is need- less to say that while exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the order passed by the inferior tribunal. It may be that in an appeal the appellate Court could take note of the subsequent event and in order to do justice between the parties and avoid multifarious litigation it may pass appropriate orders taking into consideration the changed circumstances. But proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution not being continuation of the proceedings before the inferior tribunal and the High Court not sitting in appeal over the order passed by the inferior tribunal and its jurisdiction being limited only to see if the impugned order satisfied the test of law and facts obtaining on the date when it was passed, it would not be open to the High Court to interfere with the impugned order simply because after it had been passed the circumstances bad changed which in all probability would disentitle the party in whose favour the order is passed to have such an order. In this connection reference may be had to the decision of the Patna High Court in Qamru Zaman Khan v. Sarju Hajam4. In this connection reference may be had to the decision of the Patna High Court in Qamru Zaman Khan v. Sarju Hajam4. In that case the Division Bench observed that as a general rule a Court of appeal, in considering the correctness of the judgment of the Court below, will confine itself to the State of the case at the time such judgment was rendered and see whether that judgment was right when it was given, and will not take any notice of any facts which may have arisen subsequently, but the Court will, in exceptional cases, depart from this rule, especially where, by so doing it can shorten litigation and best attain the ends of justice and in such cases, it is not only competent to a Court of appeal, but it may be its duty to take notice of events which have happened subsequently to the passing of the decree or order appealed against. The Division Bench further observed that these principles, however, do not apply to the powers of the High Court under Article 226 because that power is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal, and, examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned. Lastly the Division Bench observed that the High Court in writ jurisdiction is concerned only with the validity of the order complained of when it was actually passed and no subsequent event or devolution of interest, can affect this question; because to give effect to these, should justice require it, would be the function of a Court of appeal, but not the function of the High Court on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In my opinion, therefore, this being a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution the only thing which I am required to see is whether the impugned order passed by the Deputy Collector in appeal could be legally sustained on the basis of the facts and the law obtaining on the day when the order was passed. Admittedly Holaram was alive on the day when the order was passed and the Deputy Collector considered the question whether he bona fide required the premises in question for opening his cloth shop. Holding that he did require the premises for this purpose, he gave permission to Holaram under clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Order. Admittedly Holaram was alive on the day when the order was passed and the Deputy Collector considered the question whether he bona fide required the premises in question for opening his cloth shop. Holding that he did require the premises for this purpose, he gave permission to Holaram under clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Order. Now the fact that Holaram died thereafter by itself could not empower me to interfere with the order passed by the Deputy Collector as it is a subsequent event which cannot be taken into account in order to determine the validity or otherwise of the impugned order. In my opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the first contention raised by Mr. De. 7. In so far as the second contention is concerned a perusal of the impugned order would at once indicate that the Deputy Collector had taken into consideration all the relevant factors which are required to be considered for granting permission to serve quit notice on the ground that the landlord requires the tenanted premises for his personal use and occupation. After duly considering the facts and circumstances of the case he differed from the finding of the Rent Controller and granted permission. The Deputy Collector has given his anxious thought to the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the requirement of Holaram was not genuine inasmuch as be did not avail of the shop on the first floor which had fallen vacant for starting his cloth business. The Deputy Collector has taken note of the fact that on the first floor the rooms are occupied by professionals and in h is opinion the premises on the first floor were not suitable for starting a shop for which the premises on the ground floor were only suited. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Deputy Collector has not taken this aspect of the case into consideration while deciding upon the need of Holaram to occupy the premises in question. It is not, therefore, possible to say that the Deputy Collector bad failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him when be arrived at the finding that Holaram bona fide required the premises in question. It is not, therefore, possible to interfere with the impugned order on this count also. 8. In the result, therefore, there is no substance in this petition and it is hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged. It is not, therefore, possible to interfere with the impugned order on this count also. 8. In the result, therefore, there is no substance in this petition and it is hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.