Judgment :- 1. The petitioner during the material time was a Subject Matter Specialist (Agronomy). He and a colleague of his, Sri Bhaskara Kurup, were placed under suspension by G O E T No.1059/73/AD. dated 5 5 1973. This was followed by Ext. P-1 memorandum of charges dated 7 91973 with the statement of allegations attached thereto. Ext. P-2 is the copy of the answer to the memorandum of charges and statement of allegations, submitted by the petitioner on 3-1-1974 to the second respondent, the Director of Agriculture, Trivandrum. The second respondent accepting the finding of the Joint Director of Agriculture, Trivandrum, who enquired into the charges levelled against the petitioner, passed Ext. P3 order dated 7-12-1974 stopping the next increment of the petitioner for one year with cumulative effect. Ext P-4 is the copy of the memorandum of appeal filed by the petitioner on 5-2-1975; and Ext. P-5 is order No. G.O. Rt. 3128/75/Ad dated 11-11-1975 passed by the first respondent, the Government of Kerala, disposing of Ext. P-4 appeal, confirming Ext. P-3 order passed by the second respondent. It is aggrieved by Exts. P-3 and P-5 orders that this writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution has been filed by the petitioner. 2. Sri C. M. Kuruvilla, the counsel for the petitioner, attacked Ext. P-3 order on two grounds: (i) the petitioner's request for allowing him to engage a lawyer at the enquiry was rejected by the enquiry officer without applying his mind as to whether he should or he should not exercise the discretion vested in him in that regard; and (2) a copy of the enquiry report was not furnished by the second respondent to the petitioner before the passing of Ext. P-3 order. 3. As for the first contention is concerned, Sri Kuruvilla placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in C L. Subramaniam's case (AIR 1972 SC 2P8). It is submitted by the counsel that the scope of the enquiry and the extent of punishment 'hat could have been imposed as a result of the finding at the enquiry are almost identical both in the Supreme Court case and the case on hand. The Government Pleader has made available to me the Government file relating to the case. It is submitted by the counsel that the scope of the enquiry and the extent of punishment 'hat could have been imposed as a result of the finding at the enquiry are almost identical both in the Supreme Court case and the case on hand. The Government Pleader has made available to me the Government file relating to the case. In the enquiry report, at page 107 of the file, it is seen that the enquiry officer has stated as follows: "The accused officer had requested for permission for engaging a legal practitioner. This was not permitted as the Department also was not engaging a counsel." It is also seen that on 1-1-1974 the petitioner had written with reference to the office memorandum dated 5-6-1974 to the Joint Director of Agriculture, Trivandrum, the Inquiring Authority, to accord permission for engaging a lawyer at the enquiry, and that by bis letter dated 2-7-1974 he bad informed the petitioner as follows: - "This is to inform you that since the Department is not engaging a legal adviser it is not possible to permit you to engage a legal practitioner. Hence the enquiry is posted to 3-9-1974 itself." (emphasis supplied) Sri Kuruvilla argued that the enquiry officer would appear to have refused the permission to the petitioner to engage a lawyer to defend him on the assumption that he was helpless in the matter, as the Department did not engage a legal adviser. R.15(6) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, reads as follows: "The Disciplinary Authority if it is not the Inquiring Authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the Inquiring Authority. The Government servant may present his case with the assistance of any other Government servant approved by the Inquiring Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the person nominated by the Disciplinary Authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless the Inquiring Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits." I find force in this argument advanced by Sri Kuruvilla. The Inquiring Authority can and may allow the Government servant to present his case with the assistance of a legal practitioner provided he, having regard to the circumstances of the case, permits him to do so. The Inquiring Authority can and may allow the Government servant to present his case with the assistance of a legal practitioner provided he, having regard to the circumstances of the case, permits him to do so. It would mean that when a request for permission to engage a lawyer is is received from the Government servant facing the enquiry the Inquiring Authority should consider the merit of the request and pass appropriate orders without mechanically rejecting the request as though the case was not worth considering or he had no locus standi to seek permission to have the assistance of a legal practitioner unless the person nominated by the Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of presenting the case is a legal practitioner. The rule making authority in its wisdom, by way of caution, has added the following words towards the end of the sub-rule: "unless the Inquiring Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits." in order to meet peculiar circumstances and do justice in deserving cases. If the Inquiring Authority had objectively considered the petitioner's request for permission to engage a legal practitioner giving due regard to the circumstances of the case, and rejected it on having found that there was no case for exercising the discretion vested in him in his favour, that would have been a different matter altogether; however, to say that the Disciplinary Authority did not nominate a legal practitioner to present his case, and therefore the petitioner's request for permission to engage a lawyer cannot be permitted tantamounts to failure to discharge the statutory duty cast on him. I am, therefore, of the view that the Enquiry Officer ought not to have summarily rejected the request of the petitioner for permission to be represented by a lawyer without applying his mind to the merits of the case. In the above circumstances, the writ petition has to be allowed. 4. I now turn to the second contention raised by Sir Kuruvilla which relates to the claim for furnishing a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer to the petitioner. In the above circumstances, the writ petition has to be allowed. 4. I now turn to the second contention raised by Sir Kuruvilla which relates to the claim for furnishing a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer to the petitioner. Withholding of increment, which falls within item (iii) of R.11(i) of the Rules is a penalty that could be imposed by following the procedure laid down in R.16 of the Rules; nowhere in that Rule it is seen that a copy of the enquiry report is to be furnished to the Government servant. Even in cases where the procedure laid down in R.15 of the Rules is applicable or followed, by virtue of the provisions contained in R.15(12)(i)(a) it is only if the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in items (v) to (ix) of R.11(i) should be imposed it is bound to furnish to the Government servant a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer. The provisions of that sub-rule evidently have no application to the present case in as much as, as noticed earlier, the penalty imposed is one which falls within the ambit of item (iii) of R.11(i) of the Rules. I have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the petitioner that he ought to have been furnished with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer. For the foregoing reasons the writ petition is allowed; the impugned orders, Exts. P 3 and P 5, are quashed The Disciplinary Authority will cause the enquiry to go into the charges levelled against the petitioner to be held afresh; and the Enquiry Officer or the Inquiring Authority appointed shall, before the enquiry begins, objectively consider and dispose of on its merits the application of the petitioner seeking permission to have the assistance of a lawyer at the enquiry. I make it clear that I have not said anything as to whether the Enquiry Officer or the Inquiring Authority is bound to give permission or not to the petitioner to engage a lawyer at the enquiry, as it is for him to exercise the discretion vested in him in accordance with law as laid down in R.15(6) of the Rules. All that is done is to quash the proceedings for the reasons stated above and to indicate the procedure to be adopted by the Enquiry Officer or the Inquiring Authority if and when a fresh enquiry becomes necessary. There will be no order as to costs. Carbon copy of this judgment will be granted to the Government Pleader free of charge and to the counsel for the petitioner on usual terms if applied for in that behalf.