Pritam Singh v. Asstt. Director Of Consolidation — 1978 DIGILAW 2 (ALL)

JUDGMENT 1. BY the Court:-A learned Judge of this Court has referred this writ petition for decision to a larger Bench as he felt that the single Judge pronouncement made in Trivent Singh v. State of U. P., 1961 RD 58, might require reconsideration and as he also felt that the controversy involved in this petition 'is of considerable importance and is likely to occur frequently.' 2. THE facts, in brief, are these. In the basic year the land in dispute stood recorded in the names of the petitioners. It may be stated that the basic year was 1969 as the notification Trivent Singh v. State of U. P., 1961 RD 58 58 of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) was issued on May 17, 1969. The petitioners were recorded as Bhumidhars of the plot in question. An objection was filed by the Gaon Sabha, respondent no. 4, before us, claiming that the land constituted Gaon Sabha property and the petitioners' names were wrongly recorded as the Bhumidhars of the land. Contest was joined by the petitioners who claimed to have purchased the land in dispute by a sale deed which was executed in their favour on 1-5-1956 by Gur Bux Singh and Har Bhajan Singh who were alleged to have acquired sirdari rights by adverse possession and who, after having acquired sirdari rights, deposited ten times rental and became Bhumidhars of the land in dispute and thereafter executed the aforesaid sale deed dated 1-5-1959. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objection of the Gaon Sabha on 21-2-70. An appeal was filed against the said order by the petitioners before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The said appellate authority came to the conclusion by order dated 22-8-70 that the land had vested in the Gaon Sabha as the recorded tenants had abandoned the same as was evident from the extract of 1359F. He, however, remanded the case in order to give the petitioners a further opportunity for producing evidence to prove that their vendors, Gur Bux Singh and Bhajan Singh, had acquired sirdari rights on account of their adverse possession. He, however, remanded the case in order to give the petitioners a further opportunity for producing evidence to prove that their vendors, Gur Bux Singh and Bhajan Singh, had acquired sirdari rights on account of their adverse possession. In the order of remand the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) not only recorded a categorical finding that the recorded tenants had abandoned the land in dispute and that it had vested in the Gaon Sabha, but also made a direction to the Consolipation Officer to decide the case after remand strictly in the light of the observations made by him. The observations made by him were that in case the petitioners failed to prove that their vendors had acquired sirdari rights before they deposited ten times rent, their claim would be liable to be dismissed inasmuch as in that event no title would accrue to them on the basis of the afore-mentioned sale deed. The petitioners did not file any revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation against the said remand order dated 22-8-70 passed by the appellate authority. After remand the Consolidation Officer re-heard the matter. He held by his order dated 30-1-71 that Gur Bux Singh and Har Bhajan Singh had been in possession over the land in dispute only for two years i.e. for 1365F. and 1366F. and that they had not acquired sirdarf rights. The Consolidation Officer did not permit the petitioners to question the finding earlier recorded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, as the appellate authority to the effect that the recorded tenants had abandoned the land in dispute and due to such abandonment, the said land stood vested in the Gaon Sabha. The petitioners filed an appeal against the said order passed by the Consolidation Officer after remand. The appeal was dismissed and thereafter the petitioners went in revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation but the revision was also dismissed. Before the revisional authority it was urged on behalf of the .petitioners that there was no evidence as to how the land vested in the Gaon Sabha and further there was no evidence regarding the abandonment of the land by the recorded tenants. Before the revisional authority it was urged on behalf of the .petitioners that there was no evidence as to how the land vested in the Gaon Sabha and further there was no evidence regarding the abandonment of the land by the recorded tenants. With reference to this plea the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Lucknow, who disposed of the said revision observed : "The earlier recorded tenants are not contesting the case and the learned lower courts have held that they have since abandoned the land in dispute. The possession of Gur Bux Singh and Bhajan Singh was only that of trespassers but they did not complete their adverse possession of more than twelve years..................At the most the possession of Gur Bux Singh and Bhajan. Singh started in 1365F". 3. IT may be stated here that there are certain Annexures to the writ petition. Their details are these. Annexure I is a true copy of the objections which were filed by the Gaon Sabha to the land being recorded in the names of the petitioners. Annexure If is a true copy of the order dated 30th January, 1971 which was passed by the Consolidation Officer when he re-heard the case after the same was remanded to him by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal. Annexure HI is the true copy of the order dated 20th March, 1971 which was passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in the appeal against the said order dated 30th January, 1971 passed by the Consolidation Officer. Annexure IV is the true copy of the order dated 23rd December, 1971 passed in revision against the said order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 30-3-1971. There is no other Annexure to the writ petition and it will be seen that the petitioners have not placed Before the court a true copy of the earlier order dated 21-2-70 which was passed by the Consolidation Officer allowing the objection of the Gaon Sabha. They also have not filed a true copy of the earlier order dated 22-8-70 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in the appeal wherein he remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer. Further, nothing has been brought on record to show as to what evidence was led by the parties on the question of abandonment of the land by the recorded tenants. Further, nothing has been brought on record to show as to what evidence was led by the parties on the question of abandonment of the land by the recorded tenants. One gets some in pling about the aforesaid orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlerrent Officer (Consolidation) and about the nature of evidence from an allusion to these made in the subsequent orders passed by the consolidation authorities after the remand of the case. 4. ON behalf of the petitioners the orders passed by the consolidation authorities have been attacked before us on two main grounds: (1) It is contended that as there were no pleadings regarding abandonment and no issue was struck on the said question, therefore, the finding recorded by the consolidation authorities that the land in dispute was abandoned by the recorded tenants should be held to be a nullity. (2) It is contended that the consolidation authorities were wrong in holding that the petitioners could not question the finding regarding abandonment on the ground that they had not earlier filed a revision against the remand order dated 22-8-70 which was passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) when he heard the appeal against the first order dated 21-2-70 passed by the Consolidation Officer. Counsel's contention is that even though no revision had been filed earlier against the said remand order, still, the petitioners were not debarred from questioning the finding regarding abandonment recorded by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in his remand order. It was claimed that it was open to the petitioners to question the said findings before the Consolidation Officer when he re-heard the case after remand and, in any case, the petitioners could question the said finding in the revision which was ultimately filed by them before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The said authorities erred in law in not entertaining the said objection. Sri K. B. Garg, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4, contended that the petitioners were bound to file a revision against the remand order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Such a revision would have been competent. Counsel emphasised the use of the expression 'decision' in Section 11 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and submitted that the order of remand amounted to a "decision" under the said section and was, therefore, revisable. Such a revision would have been competent. Counsel emphasised the use of the expression 'decision' in Section 11 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and submitted that the order of remand amounted to a "decision" under the said section and was, therefore, revisable. In view of the failure of the petitioner to file such a revision, the appellate order became final under Section 11 of the said Act and the same could not be questioned at any later stage of the proceedings. Thus even though Section 105, sub-section (2 , CPC does not apply to the consolidation proceedings, still, the result was the same in the said proceedings also in view of the provision about finality contained in Section 11 of the said Act. Counsel further argued that the general doctrine of res judicata applied to the subsequent stages of the litigation and in view of the said principle, the petitioners could not question the remand order in the subsequent stages of the consolidation proceedings. * 5. COUNSEL for both the sides cited a good volume of case law and the same wi!! be noticed at the appropriated place hereafter. However, before examining these rival contentions, it is necessary that the relevant provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act be reproduced below. It may be stated here that the said statute underwent extensive amendments in 1963 by the U. P. Act no. 8 of amended law which came into existence in 1963 by the said amending Act. 6. However, before examining these rival contentions, it is necessary that the relevant provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act be reproduced below. It may be stated here that the said statute underwent extensive amendments in 1963 by the U. P. Act no. 8 of amended law which came into existence in 1963 by the said amending Act. 6. SECTION 9, sub-section (2) lays down as follows : "(2) Any person to whom a notice under sub-section (I) has been sent, or any other person interested may, within 21 days of the receipt of notice or of the publication under sub-section (1), as the case may be, file before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, objections in respect the roof disputing the correctness or nature of the enteris in the records or in the extracts furnished therefrom, or in the Statement of Principles, or the need for partition." SECTION 9-A, sub-sections (2) and (3), are as follows : "(2) All cases which are not disposed of by the Assistant Consolidation Officer under sub-section (1), all cases relating to valuation of plots and all cases relating to valuation of trees, wells or other improvements, for calculating compensation therefor, and its apportionment amongst co-owners, if there be more owners than one, shall be forwarded by the Assistant Consolidation Officer to the Consolidation Officer, who shall dispose of the same in the manner prescribed. (3) The Assistant Consolidation Officer, while acting under sub-section (1) and the Consolidation Officer, while acting under sub-section (2), shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force notwithstanding." SECTION 11 is as follows : "(1) Any party to the proceedings under SECTION 9-A, aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer under that section, may, within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who shall, after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, give his decision thereon which, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final and not be questioned in any court of law. (2) The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, hearing an appeal under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force notwithstanding." SECTION 11-A lays down as follows: "11-A. Bar on objections-No question in respect of- (i) claims to land, (ii) partition of joint holdings, and (iii) valuation of plots, trees, wells and other improvements, where the question is sought to be raised by a tenure-holder of the plot or the owner of the tree, well or other improvements recorded in the annual register under SECTION 10, relating to the consolidation area, which has been raised under SECTION 9 or which might or ought to have been raised under that 'SECTION, but has not been so raised, shall be raised, or beard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeings." SECTION 11-C, which was inserted by SECTION 22 of the U. P. Land Laws Amendment Act, 1974, is as follows : "In the course of hearing of an objection under SECTION 9-A or an appeal under SECTION 11, or in proceedings under SECTION 48, the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or the Director of Consolidation, as the case may be, may direct that any land which vests is the State Government or the Gaon Sabha or any other local body or authority may be recorded in its name, even though no objection, appeal or revision has been filed by such Government, Gaon Sabha, body or authority.'' SECTION 48 lays down as follows : "Revision and reference.-(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satis fying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings ; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceeds ings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub - section (3). (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub - section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under subsection (1). Explanation :-For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Rule 26, sub-rule (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, lays down as follows : "(2) On the date fixed under sub-rule (2) of Rule 26-A, or on any subsequent date fixed for the purpose, the Consolidation Officer shall here the parties, frame issues on the point in dispute, take evidence, both oral and documentary, and decide the objections." Rule 111 of the said rules lays down as follows : "An application under SECTION 48 of the Act shall be presented by the applicant or his duly authorised agent to the District Deputy Director of Consolidation within 30 days of the order against which the application is directed. It shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and order in respect of which the application is preferred. Copies of judgment and orders, if any, of other subordinate authorities in respect of the dispute shall also be filed along with the application." SECTION 105, sub-section (2), CPC is as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained In sub-section (1) where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness. Many of the case which have been cited are not of help in deciding the controversy at hand, e. g. Secy, of State v. Jatindranath, AIR 1924 PC 175, Secy, of State v. Mask andCo.,' AIR 1940 PC 105, Abdul Majid v. P. R. Nayak, AIR 1951 Bom. 440 , Jadeja Danubha v. State, AIR 1952 Saurashtra 1, Abdulla v. Union of India, AIR 1964 Bom. 241 and R. Swarup v. S. Chand, 1966 AWR 77 SC are cases which deal with the question of the ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction. We are not concerned with the said controversy in the instant case. 7. 440 , Jadeja Danubha v. State, AIR 1952 Saurashtra 1, Abdulla v. Union of India, AIR 1964 Bom. 241 and R. Swarup v. S. Chand, 1966 AWR 77 SC are cases which deal with the question of the ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction. We are not concerned with the said controversy in the instant case. 7. COMING to the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, we find no force in the same. Both the parties are agreed that the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to the adjudication of disputes by the consolidation authorities. In B. N. Sinha v. State of U. P., 1969 AWR 482 a Full Bench of this Court laid down that the authorities constituted under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act can neither be held to be the courts of civil jurisdiction nor are they governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the provisions contained in Order 14 CPC relating to the framing of issues and other relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable here. However, Rule 26 of the rules framed under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does provide for the framing of issues in consolidation proceedings. 8. COUNSEL has contended that in the objections of the Gaon Sabha (a true copy whereof is Annexure I to the writ petition) it was not specifically stated that the recorded tenants had abandoned the land in question. Annexure II, which is a copy of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer after remand, discloses the issues which were framed in the case and there is no specific issue dealing with the alleged abandonment by the recorded tenants. On these grounds it was contended that the finding of abandonment recorded by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in the remand order should be treated to be a nullity. It is difficult to accept this contention. On the said grounds an order may be a wrong one but it is not a nullity. COUNSEL placed reliance on the following cases. In Mohd. It is difficult to accept this contention. On the said grounds an order may be a wrong one but it is not a nullity. COUNSEL placed reliance on the following cases. In Mohd. Mustafa v. Abu Bakar, AIR 1971 SC 361 , adverting to the finding recorded by the High Court, it was observed : "This finding having been reached without proper pleadings and necessary issues, the same cannot bind any of the parties to the suit though it does indicate the serious injustice that is likely to happen to the appellant because of his defective pleadings." These observations were made in an appeal which was taken out to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court. What was meant to be emphasised was that it was open to the parties to contend in the appeal in the Supreme Court that the High Court's decision was erroneous and not binding on the parties in the appeal inasmuch as there were no proper pleadings and no necessary issues framed. However, the said observations do not lay down that even if no appeal were filed against the High Court's judgment, the same could be treated to be a nullity. In Siddik Mahomad Shah v. Mt. Saran, AIR 1930 PC 57, it was laid down that where a claim was never made in the defence presented, no amount of evidence could be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. This case again does not say that a judgment or a rinding recorded therein can be treated to be a nullity on the ground of the absence of the pleadings or the non framing of the necessary issues. 9. IN Shri Ram Sakal Singh v. Dy. Dir. of Consolidation, 1968 RD 456, M. H. Beg, J. (as he then was) observed as follows : "Errors of the type noticed above occur in the decisions of the consolidation authorities as issues are often not framed, it is true that the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code has not been applied to the consolidation proceedings. Nevertheless, there was a provision in the rules before the amendment of 1963 that matters of dispute between contending parties should be stated as points for decision. The new rules now provide for framing of issues. Nevertheless, there was a provision in the rules before the amendment of 1963 that matters of dispute between contending parties should be stated as points for decision. The new rules now provide for framing of issues. .It is desirable that issues should be framed and tried in order to avoid patent confusion and omission of the kind pointed out above." This case lays down the desirability of framing issues but it does not say that the non-framing of issues will render a finding to be treated as a nullity. 10. ON the other hand there are authorities which lay down that even if a specific issue is not framed, still, the finding recorded by a court is not bad provided no prejudice has been caused to the parties by the non framing of the issue concerned. In Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 the Supreme Court laid down that the absence of specific pleadings and the non framing of specific issue would be a mere irregularity where the parties have not been taken by surprise and no prejudice has been caused to them. In Durga Thathera v. Narain Thathera, AIR 1931 All. 597 FB it was laid down that a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is sufficient and if there is strict compliance with the said provisions, the same amounts to a mere irregularity. Order 41 Rule 31 provides for the contents of an appellate judgment. In V. Venkataswami v. G. Venkataswami, AIR 1954 Madras 9, also a liberal interpretation was placed on the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. The High Court refused to interfere in a second appeal even though the judgment of the lower appellate court was not strictly in conformity with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. In the facts of the instant case, in its objections the Gaon Sabha claimed the land to belong to it as it was banjar. We have no idea as to what defences were taken by the parties before the Consolidation Officer as the copies of the written statements have not been filed. We do not know whether counsel for the parties made any statement when the issues were framed. Issue no. 7 was a very comprehensive issue and it was as follows : "What are the rights and title of the recorded tenants to khata no. We do not know whether counsel for the parties made any statement when the issues were framed. Issue no. 7 was a very comprehensive issue and it was as follows : "What are the rights and title of the recorded tenants to khata no. 3". In these circumstances, it is difficult to take any exception to the non-framing of a specific issue on the question of abandonment. It may be stated here that this particular objection regarding the absence of the necessary pleadings and the non-framing of the necessary issues was never taken at any stage of the litigation. The petitioners have not filed the copies of the memoranda of appeals which they filed before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). A copy of the memorandum of revision which was filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation has also not been filed in this writ petition. However, from the orders passed by the said authorities, whose copies have been brought on record, it is clear that the said objection was never taken. In the writ petition itself even though a ground has been taken that there was no evidence on record proving abandonment by the previous recorded tenants, no point was taken that the necessary pleading was not there and that the necessary issue regarding abandonment was not framed by the Consolidation Officer. It will thus be seen that the said contention is sought to be raised for the first time at the stage of the arguments and the petitioners cannot be allowed to do so. Moreover, as we have held above, it is impossible to accept the contention that a finding recorded by a Court or a Consolidation Officer should be treated to be a nullity merely on the ground of the absence of the pleadings and the necessary issues. The first contention is accordingly rejected. 11. WE now consider the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Counsel's contention is that an order of remand is an interlocutory order and is not a final order. Against an inter-locutory order a party is not bound to file an appeal and its correctness can be subsequently questioned in an appeal or revision against the final order which is ultimately passed. Counsel's contention is that an order of remand is an interlocutory order and is not a final order. Against an inter-locutory order a party is not bound to file an appeal and its correctness can be subsequently questioned in an appeal or revision against the final order which is ultimately passed. Reliance has been placed on the following cases for the said contention : In Satyadhyan v. Deorajin Devi, AIR 1960 SC 941 the Supreme Court Considered this question in reference to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The Calcutta High Court had remanded a case to the Munsif's court for disposal in accordance with law. No appeal was filed against the remand order either before a larger Bench of the same Court or in the Supreme Court. After the case was decided by the Munsif remand, a question arose whether the High Court's remand order could be questioned in the Supreme Court. On the basis of the principle of res judicata it was argued that the correctness of the remand order could not be questioned at the subsequent stage before the supreme Court. The Supreme Court emphasised that : "This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; but even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation.'' It was further emphasised ; "The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal had been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again?" The Supreme Court answered the said question in the following words : "It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challanged in an appeal from the final decree or order. A special provision was made as regards orders of remand and that was to the effect that it" an appeal lay and still the appeal was not taken the correctness of the order of remand could not later be challenged in an appeal from the final decision. If however an appeal did not lie from the order of remand the correctness thereof could be challenged by an appeal from the final decision as in the cases of other inter-locutory orders. The second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, one reason being that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or lies to the Supreme Court against an order of remand. There appears to be no reason therefore why the appellant should be precluded from raising before this court the question about the applicability of Section 28 merely because he had not appealed from the High Court's order of remand, taking the view against him that the section was applicable." 12. THE view laid down in Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Devi, AIR 1960 SO 941 was affirmed in Ganapathi Thevar v. S.N. Devasthanam, AIR 1969 SC 764 . In Dewaji v. Ganpatlal, AIR 1969 SC 560 it was again emphasised that the inter-locutory orders can be considered in an appeal against the judgment which is finally pronounced. 13. IN U. P. E. Supply Co. v. T. N. Chattarjee, AIR 1972 SC 1201 the Supreme Court relied on its aforesaid earlier decision reported in AIR 1960 SC 941 while dealing with the controversy in relation to the award of an industrial Tribunal. 13. IN U. P. E. Supply Co. v. T. N. Chattarjee, AIR 1972 SC 1201 the Supreme Court relied on its aforesaid earlier decision reported in AIR 1960 SC 941 while dealing with the controversy in relation to the award of an industrial Tribunal. It was held that where the High Court allowed a writ petition and quashed the award and remanded the case to the Industrial Tribunal, then such an order of remand was an interlocutory one and not a final order and, therefore, the same could not be treated to res judicata so as to disentitle the Supreme Court from considering the correctness of the remand order. 14. IN Kesho Ram v. Board of Revenue, U. P. AIR 1972 All. 360 a Division Bench of this court observed as follows; "Section 105 (2) CPC provides a complete answer to this submission. Under this provision, a party aggrieved by an order ot remand, from which an appeal lies, does not appeal therefrom, is thereafter precluded from disputing its correctness. Obviously, if no appeal lies from a remand order, its correctness can be disputed in the same suit subsequently." Counsel also referred to Huzur Ara Begam v. Deputy Commr. Gonda, AIR 1936 Oudh 205, Ramanathan v. Palaniappa, AIR 1939 Madras 697, Aidal Singh v. Mata Prasad, AIR 1941 Allahabad 333, Narain Das v. Alia Uddin, AIR 1945 Allahabad 401 and Abdul Rahman v. Cassim and Sons, AIR 1933 PC 58 where it has been laid down that remand orders were not final orders under Section 109 CPC could not be granted entitling the party to appeal to the Privy Council. In Chandra Singh v. Midnapora Zamindary Co., AIR 1951 Calcutta 800 the aforesaid view was followed in reference to the interpretation of the expression 'final order' occurring in Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India. 15. COUNSEL referred to certain other rulings where the scope of Order 41 Rule 23 and Order 41 Rule 26 CPC has been examined. In Chandra Singh v. Midnapora Zamindary Co., AIR 1951 Calcutta 800 the aforesaid view was followed in reference to the interpretation of the expression 'final order' occurring in Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India. 15. COUNSEL referred to certain other rulings where the scope of Order 41 Rule 23 and Order 41 Rule 26 CPC has been examined. In G. Gurumurthy v. K. Ayyappa, AIR 1974 SC 1702 it was laid down that when certain issues were framed and remitted by the High Court for findings to the court of first instance under Order 41 Rule 25 CPC, then after the findings were received the High Court should have heard the whole appeal and not confined the hearing merely to the points on which the finding was called for. To the same effect is Mt. Chauli v. Mt. Mehoo, AIR 1945 Allahabad 268 FB and Laxmi Co. v. I. T. Commr., AIR 1960 Allahabad 278 DB. In M. K. Rapai v. John, AIR 1965 Kerala 203 it was laid down that if no appeal was filed against the remand order then the same could not be subsequently questioned. In K. Mudaliar v. K. Pillai, AIR 1970 Madras 328 a learned single judge held that it is not open to the lower court, when an appellate court remands the case to it, to do anything but to carry out the terms of the remand even if it considers that the order of remand was not in accordance with law. It cannot apply what it might consider the correct position of the law. It was further held that when a case comes back to the High Court after disposal by the lower appellate court after remand, the High Court cannot take into consideration a later decision of the Supreme Court and go back on its own earlier order of remand passed by it on a view that was dissented from by the Supreme Court in a different case. The decision of the High Court in the order of remand operates as constructive res judicate. The decision of the High Court in the order of remand operates as constructive res judicate. In Kalika Prasad v. Ajudhia Prasad, AIR 1929 Allahabad 421 a Division Bench laid down that the High Court can, under its inherent powers, to prevent an obvious injustice, ref use to be bound by a finding in a remand order of a Subordinate Court even though neither party can question it, not having appealed from the remand order." 16. IT was next submitted that the petitioners in their first appeal against the Consolidation Officers' order before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had been successful inasmuch as the order of the Consolidation Officer was set aside and the case was remanded to the said officer for fresh decision. IT was contended that a finding recorded against a successful party, in other words an adverse finding against such party, cannot be res judicata against such party because on account of his success the party cannot file an appeal or revision as no appeal or revision can be filed against a mere finding. An appeal can be filed only against a decree and judgment but not against a mere finding recorded in the judgment. In this connection a reference was made to the following cases : Bankey Behari v. Brij Rani, AIR 1944 Oudh 314, Chikkamma v. Kempegowda, AIR 1953 Mysore 38, Peary Lal v. J ado Ram, AIR 1923 Allahabad 15, Mar. kahda Mahapatra v. Kameshwar Rao, AIR 1949 Patna 197, Midnapur Zamindary v. Naresh, AIR 1922 PC 241, Abhey Ram v. Jhanda, AIR 1929 All. 910 and Tara Singh v. Shakuntal, AIR 1974 (?). A reference was made to the well-known decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Hazari Lal v. I. T. Officer, AIR 1960 Allahabad 97 where the Bench interpreted the word 'finding' with reference to the second proviso to Section 34 sub-section (3) of the repealed Income-tax Act, 1922. It was observed : "The word 'finding' in law has a definite meaning and that is indicated by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure where it is indicated that a finding is a decision of a court on material questions in issue. Issues are framed on material questions of fact or law and the decision of the court recorded on such issues has been called a 'finding'. Issues are framed on material questions of fact or law and the decision of the court recorded on such issues has been called a 'finding'. We do not think that there is any other wider meaning of the word 'finding' in common use which can be applied to this word as used in the proviso to Section 34 (3). The word 'finding' cannot be interpreted so as to include within it any statement of fact contained in a decision irrespective of whether that fact was or was not material to the decision and whether the court or the tribunal, when recording the decision, had any occasion to hear parties on that question of fact and to record a decision on it instead of merely reciting it as a statement of fact. The word 'finding', interpreted in the sense indicated by us above, will only cover material questions which arise in a particular case for decision by the authority hearing the case or the appeal which, being necessary for passing the final order or giving the final decision in the appeal has been the subject of controversy between the interested parties on which the parties concerned have been given a hearing." 17. IT may be observed that this decision was approved by the Supreme Court in I. T. O. v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das, 52 ITR 335. 18. IN this connection counsels referred to Ruber Singh v. Digvijai Singh, AIR 1968 Allahabad 126 where D. S. Mathur, J. (as he then was) laid down that in a remand order "all the observations made in a case cannot be placed in the same category as a finding, decision or direction. It very often happens that the remand of the case may be necessary not on the ground but on many, and for purposes of remand the party may raise only one point raised cannot, therefore, be interpreted to mean that the other points were given up for ever, or cannot be raised during the re-hearing after remand." Counsel referred to some cases where the provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act before their extensive amendment in 1963 fell for consideration. In Bhikku v. Dy. In Bhikku v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1960 RD 189 D.S. Mathur, J. (as he then was) held that Sections 7 and 8 of the said Act as they then stood contemplated steps merely to correct the village records on the basis of possession. The question of title was wot meant to be examined at the said stage. Therefore, finality of the order under Section 8 could relate only to the quest ion of possession and not to the question of title or right of the parties. If any observation was, therefore, made at the said stage with regard to the title of the tenure-holders, such an observation would be obiter dictum, not binding on the parties in the subsequent proceedings. The question of title was meant to be raised at the stage of Section 12 (as it then stood) and a person interested in disputing the accuracy or nature of an entry in the statement published under Section 11 (as it then stood) could raise the question of title. The order passed at the stage of Section 8 could not stop a party from raising a similar objection at the Stage of Section 12. In Ganga Singh v, Dy, Dir. of Consolidation, 1962 AWR 450, a learned single Judge laid down that it would not be correct to say either that the decision under Section 12 in favour of the petitioners had become final and the same point could not be raised in the objection under Section 20 and that if the objection was raised it should be decided in accordance with the decision of the Consolidation Officer under Section 12. As the earlier decision had not become final and had been stayed in view of clause (2) of Section 22, the matter should be raised again and decided in the objection under Section 20. 19. COUNSEL further contended that the powers conferred on the Director of Consolidation under Section 48 are very wide after the amendment of the said section in 1963. The section does not lay down that such powers are to be exercised at any particular stage and they can be exercised even suo motu by the said authority. He can exercise the same on a reference being made to him under sub-section (3) of the said section. The section does not lay down that such powers are to be exercised at any particular stage and they can be exercised even suo motu by the said authority. He can exercise the same on a reference being made to him under sub-section (3) of the said section. Therefore, even if the said authority did not interfere with the remand order at the stage when it was passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), there was nothing to prevent him from interfering with the same at the subsequent stage when the revision was filed before him after the final adjudication of the dispute between the parties by the consolidation authorities. Reliance was placed on Smt. Tulsa v. Distt. Director, 1964 AWR 716, where it was laid down that in view of the amendment in Section 48 brought about by the U. P. Act 8 of 1963, the powers of revision have been widened in such a manner that even concurrent findings of fact recorded by the authorities below can be interferred with. In Mst. Kailashi v. D. D. Consolidation, 1972 ALJ 29, the Consolidation Officer had condoned the delay in filing an objection under Section 9 of the Act. The other side feeling aggrieved filed a revision and the Deputy Director went into the merits and held that there was no sufficient explanation for the delay. On this ground he allowed the revision and set aside the order condoning the delay. A writ petition was filed questioning the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director to set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer. The Division Bench upheld the order passed by the Deputy Director in revision and observed : "Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act confers powers upon the Deputy Director to reach on facts and law of every kind of order passed by a subordinate consolidation authority. The order condoning the delay was subject to the revisional power under Section 48 of the Act." 20. LASTLY, counsel contended that taking into consideration the purpose and object of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and looking to the provisions contained in Sections 4, 5, 9 and 9-A the finality under Section 11 should be deemed to be only in regard to the entries to be made in the revenue records and not regarding other matters. LASTLY, counsel contended that taking into consideration the purpose and object of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and looking to the provisions contained in Sections 4, 5, 9 and 9-A the finality under Section 11 should be deemed to be only in regard to the entries to be made in the revenue records and not regarding other matters. In this connection a reference was made to Attar Singh v. State of U. P., 1959 AWR 300 SC, where the validity of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was upheld after examining its purpose and object and the various provisions contained in it to achieve the said purpose and object. Sri K. B. Garg, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, rebutted the aforesaid contentions and sought to distinguish the aforesaid case law. He emphasised that the word used in Section 11 is 'decision' and the same is an expression of wide connotation. Therefore, remand order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) amounted to a decision of the appeal and a revision lay against the said decision under Section 48 of the said Act. Counsel placed reliance on the following cases where the word 'decision' has been interpreted. In Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas, AIR 1950 SC 222 Fazal Ali, J. observed : "For prompt action, the executive authorities have often to take quick decisions and it will be going too far to say that in doing so they are discharging any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The word 'decision' in common parlance is more or less a "neutral" expression and it can be used with reference to purely executive acts as well as judicial orders. The mere fact that an executive authority has to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the real test is : Is there any duty to decide judicially ?" These observations were made in the said case in connection with the question whether the Provincial Government while seeking to requisition any land for a public purpose under Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance No. V of 1947, was required to act or decide the matter judicially. In P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India, 1967 SC 908 the Supreme Court relied on the said observations of Fazal Ali, J. and observed : "The question then is : what precisely does the word 'decide' in Rule 30-A mean ? It is no doubt a popular and not a technical word." A reference was also made to the dictionary meaning of the said expression. In Banarsi Das v. Cane Commr., AIR 1956 Allahabad 725 it was held that under the U. P. Sugar Factories Control Act of 1938 and the rules framed thereunder the decision of a Cane Commissioner or the award of an arbitrator was one and the same thing the words are interchangeable. In Bala Nand v. Devki Nand, AIR 1963 Himachal Pradesh 30 the word 'decision' was examined in reference to Order 17 Rule 3 CPC. It was held that in the said rule the expression to decide the suit meant a decision on merits. The learned Judicial Commissioner observed : "The word 'decision' according to Wharton's Law Lexicon Fourteenth Edition (P. 305) means a judgment. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary Third Edition Vol. I (P. 743) it has been stated that 'decision' is a popular and not a technical word and means little more than a concluded opinion. It does not, by itself, amount to judgment or order. According to the Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language Second Edition 1961 decision' inter alia means act of settling or terminating as a controversy by giving judgment on the matter ; also a determination or result arrived at after consideration, as of a question ; settlement. 21. IN Shri Jagat Dhis v. Gur char an Singh, AIR 1952 Punjab 49 the word 'decision' was interpreted as occurring in Section 75 sub-section (1) of the Provincial insolvency Act and it was held that the said expression would be applicable to orders whether they were final or not. Counsel also referred to Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 26, Part 1 page 41 (1956 Edn) where the word' decision' has been interpreted thus : "A popular and not a technical or legal word, and a very comprehensive term, having no fixed, legal meaning. Counsel also referred to Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 26, Part 1 page 41 (1956 Edn) where the word' decision' has been interpreted thus : "A popular and not a technical or legal word, and a very comprehensive term, having no fixed, legal meaning. It has been said that a decision necessarily involves a dispute, actual or potential, and the reaching of a conclusion, and it implies the power to say 'Yes' or 'No'." A reference was also made to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition, Volume I, where the Said expression has been explained. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary has been referred to by the learned Judicial Commissioner in Bala Nand v. Devki Nand, AIR 1963 Himanchal Pradesh 30. Hence it is not necessary to again reproduce from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary. 22. SRI Garg contended that the general doctrine of res judicata applies to the subsequent stages of the litigation. He referred to the following cases. In Y. B. Patil v. Y. L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 392 the Supreme Court had to consider the legal effect of no appeal having being filed against the decision of the High Court in a writ petition. The controversy arose under the Bombay Hereditary Officers Act. The Tribunal in revision had set aside the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner at the trial stage and the Deputy Commissioner in appeal. The order of the Tribunal was challenged by means of a writ petition. The petition was allowed by the High Court and it was held that it was not open to the Tribunal to reopen and set aside findings of fact in a revision petition. The case was accordingly remanded to the Tribunal for fresh decision in the light of the observations of the High Court. Subsequently the Tribunal decided the case and upheld the findings of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The other side thereafter filed a writ petition in the High Court against the decision of the Tribunal. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and then the matter travelled to the Supreme Court. In this context Khanna, J. observed : "The High Court at the time of the decision of the earlier writ petition on December 18, 1964 recorded a finding and gave directions to the Tribunal not to reopen the questions of fact in revision. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and then the matter travelled to the Supreme Court. In this context Khanna, J. observed : "The High Court at the time of the decision of the earlier writ petition on December 18, 1964 recorded a finding and gave directions to the Tribunal not to reopen the questions of fact in revision. The Tribunal while passing the order dated September 12, 1967 complied v ith those directions of the High Court. The appellants are bound by the judgment of the High Court and it is not open to them to go behind that judgment in this appeal. No appeal was filed against that judgment and it has become final. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoiced not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the -course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding.'' In Bhagwan Das v. Ganga Sah, AIR 1967 Patna 254 the Head Note B is as follows : "In a case where as a result of proceedings initiated under Section 145 CrPC, the aggrieved party files a suit to establish his title and possession in which suit he succeeds in both the Trial and First Appellate Court and on the contention of the defendant as appellant in the Second Appeal, the High Court rules that where both the parties fail to establish their title, the party who proves to have had possession prior to the initiation of the case under Section 145 CrPC, should succeed, such a ruling operates as res judicata in subsequent stages of the same proceeding when the suit is heaid again by the First Appellate Court upon remand to it on certain other points and when the matter again comes before the High Court in further second appeal." 23. COUNSEL next placed reliance on Tribeni Singh v. State of U. P., 1961 RD 58 to contend that a remand order against which no appeal or revision is filed becomes final and it is not open to the Deputy Director of Consolidation in a subsequent revision to interfere with the remand order which has earlier become final. COUNSEL next placed reliance on Tribeni Singh v. State of U. P., 1961 RD 58 to contend that a remand order against which no appeal or revision is filed becomes final and it is not open to the Deputy Director of Consolidation in a subsequent revision to interfere with the remand order which has earlier become final. This is a single Judge pronouncement of this court and directly supports the contention raised on behalf of the reference to a larger Bench. 24. IN Roop Narain v. State, 1962 AWR 72 a Division Bench examined certain provision of the said Act before its amendment in 1963. The question before the Bench was whether the objections under Section 20, sub-section (2), to the statement of proposals could also raise disputes in respect of matters which earlier become final under certain other provisions of the said Act. It was held that an objection under Section 20, subsection (2), was confined to new matters included in the statements of proposals but no objection could be filed against an entry in a statement of proposal if there existed previously a right to object to such an entry contained in another statement prepared earlier. The words 'any person' were wide enough, but their width was controlled by the scope of the objection permitted under Section 20 (2). If the objection was of the nature contemplated by sub-section (2) it could be raised by 'any person'. Certain observations of A. P. Srivastava, J. made in Ganga Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1962 AWR 450 were criticised. The Division Bench further observed : "Coming to the revisional powers of the Deputy Director, we agree with the learned single Judge that, though the powers may be wide they are discretionary and that the Deputy Director was not bound to interfere with every incorrect order." It will be advantageous if, in brief, the effect of the aforesaid case law is summarised. The propositions which can be culled from the aforementioned decided cases are these : 1. The consolidation authorities under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are not courts and Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to them. They are governed by the provisions contained in the said Act and the rules framed thereunder. 2. The propositions which can be culled from the aforementioned decided cases are these : 1. The consolidation authorities under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are not courts and Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to them. They are governed by the provisions contained in the said Act and the rules framed thereunder. 2. A remand order passed in an appeal arising out of a suit is an interlocutory order as the suit is not finally disposed of. 3. By virtue of Section 105, subsection (2), remand orders passed in appeal arising out of suits will become final in case such orders are appelable and no appeal or revision is filed against them. If, however, no appeal lies from the remand order then the correctness of the said order can be questioned at the subsequent stages of the litigation as the same is an inter locutory order. 4. In proceedings other than those arising out of suits, in case the High Court while deciding a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution remands a case or remits a matter to the Tribunal below, then can the High Court's decision be questioned in subsequent proceedings which arise out of the final decision of the Tribunal given after the remand of the case ? With deep respect we feel that the two authorities of the Supreme Court, which has been cited before us, namely, AIR 1972 SC 1201 and AIR 1977 SC 392 , are difficult to reconcile. In the earlier case which arose out of the proceedings relating to an industrial award, Grover J. emphasised the interlocutory nature of the order of remand passed by the High Court while disposing of the writ petition and on the basis of AIR 1960 SC 941 (supra) it was held that it was open to the aggrieved party to question the correctness of the said decision of the High Court in the appeal before the Supreme Court which was taken out against the final order which was passed by the Tribunal. In the latter case however, which arose out of the proceedings under the Bombay Hereditary Officers Act, Khanna, J. held on the basis of the general doctrine of res judicata that a party who had not filed an appeal against the decision of the High Court could not subsequently question its correctness. In the latter case however, which arose out of the proceedings under the Bombay Hereditary Officers Act, Khanna, J. held on the basis of the general doctrine of res judicata that a party who had not filed an appeal against the decision of the High Court could not subsequently question its correctness. It will be seen that in this case also, to use the words of the Supreme Court, the case was accordingly remitted to the Tribunal for fresh decision in the light of the observations of the High Court. However, for the purposes of deciding the instant case nothing hinges on the aforesaid divergence of judicial opinion. 5. Remand orders are not final orders under Section 109 CPC or Article 133 of the Constitution of India. 6. In case certain issues are remitted under Order 41 Rule 25 CPC then when the findings are received back from the courts below, the Bench hearing the appeal is not bound by the observations made or findings recorded by the earlier Bench which remitted the issues to the court below. The subsequent Bench is entitled to hear the whole appeal. 7. So far as the court passing the remand order is concerned, it cannot question it at any subsequent stage and similarly the court below to whom the case has been remanded is bound to carry out the remand order and cannot allow it to be questioned. The remand order can be questioned only in a court higher than the court which passed the remand order. 8. Even if a remand order is binding on the parties, the higher court in its inherent jurisdiction and suo motu and interfere with such order in the ends of justice. 9. There is no res judicata in respect of adverse findings recorded against a successful party when such party cannot go up in appeal as the decree is in his favour. 10. No appeal can be filed against a mere finding, it is filed against a decree or against an order which is appealable. 11. The word 'finding' means the decision of the court on a material question in issue between the parties and the observations made in a judgment cannot be deemed to be the findings of the court. 12. The word 'decision' is an expression of wide import and is not restricted in its meaning to final orders or judgments only. 13. 11. The word 'finding' means the decision of the court on a material question in issue between the parties and the observations made in a judgment cannot be deemed to be the findings of the court. 12. The word 'decision' is an expression of wide import and is not restricted in its meaning to final orders or judgments only. 13. The general doctrine of res judicata is wider than Section 11 CPC and will be applicable to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities. 14. Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act after its amendment is very wide and revisions can be preferred even against interlocutory orders passed by the authorities below. 25. WE would like to make it clear that in the instant case we are not called upon to decide the extent of the powers which the Director of Consolidation (including the Deputy Director and the Assistant Director) can exercise suo motu under Section. 48 of the said Act. WE are concerned with the right of the petitioners to seek the interference of the revisional court in a revision which arose out of the final order passed by the Consolidation Officer (Consolidation). It must be emphasised that the two situations are not identical-a situation where a party seeks relief in a revision and a situation where the revising authority suo motu seeks to interfere with an order passed by the subordinate authority. The party may have no right or the right might have been lost yet the revising authority suo motu may still act in revision. Since in the facts of the instant case the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not acting suo motu, therefore, it will not be proper for us to express any opinion on a hypothetical situation where the revising authority acts suo motu. 26. WE feel that even though the apparent width of Section 48 is very wide, still, in view of certain other provisions contained in the said Act and the rules framed thereunder, the right of a party to seek relief in revision is not unlimited. In Swastic Oil Mills v. H. B. Munshi, AIR 1968 SC 843 the court was concerned with the suo motu exercise of revisional powers by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax under the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. In Swastic Oil Mills v. H. B. Munshi, AIR 1968 SC 843 the court was concerned with the suo motu exercise of revisional powers by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax under the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier pronouncement reported in State of Kerala v. K. M. Cheria Abdulla and Co., AIR 1965 SC 1985 where while explaining the scope of the revisional powers it was laid down as under : "It would not invest the revising authority with power to launch upon enquiries at large so as either to trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Act or by the rules to other authorities or to ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers. For instance, the power to reassess escaped turnover is primarily vested by Rule 17 in the assessing officer and is to be exercised subject to certain limitations, and the revising authority will not be competent to make an enquiry for reassessing a tax payer. Similarly, the power to make a best judgment assessment is vested by Sec. 9 (2) (b) in the assessing authority and has to be exercised in the manner provided. It would not be open to the revising authority to assume that power." These two authorities have been followed in Changu Lal v. Dy. Dir. of Consolidation, 1972 RD 43 where it has been laid down that in the exercise of suo motu power under Section 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act a Deputy Director of Consolidation could not set aside an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer. Of course we are not concerned here with the suo motu exercise of powers by the revising authority under Section 48 but even in respect of such exercise there are limitations as has been emphasised by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases. 27. IT seems to us that it is not material that remand orders are considered to be interlocutory orders under the Civil Procedure Code or that they are not deemed to be final orders under Section 109 CPC or under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. In Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the word 'order' has been used and not the final order and, therefore, it has been laid down vide Mst. In Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the word 'order' has been used and not the final order and, therefore, it has been laid down vide Mst. Kailashi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1972 ALJ 29 that a revision lies even against interlocutory orders. There can be no doubt that it was open to the petitioner to have filed a revision against the earlier remand order which was passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. IT was a decision in the appeal which had been filed by the petitioners against the first order passed by the Consolidation Officer. In Section 11 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the expression used is 'give his decision thereon'. The remand order amounted to a decision of the appeal. IT is not laid down in the section that by the decision of the appeal the rights of the parties should stand finally adjudicated. The appeal itself stands decided irrespective of whether it results in a remand order or in final disposal of the rights of the parties. We agree with Sri Garg that the word 'decide' is an expression of the widest amplitude and there is no justification for interpreting the said expression in Section 11 as meaning a final adjudication of the rights of the parties. If that interpretation were to be accepted then it will have to be held that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) could not remand the case and was bound to dispose of the appeal in one manner only, namely, by finally deciding the rights of the parties. However, it is not the case of the petitioners that under Section 11 the appellate authority while deciding an appeal cannot remand a case to the Consolidation Officer. Such a contention even if raised would be wholly untenable. IT is well known that every court or Tribunal has an inherent power to remand the matter to the court or authority below. See Anwar Hussain and others v. S. L. Franklin and others, AIR 1958 All. 562 ; Mst. Umme Khair v. Aziz Ali, AIR 1922 Allahabad 47. 28. THEREFORE, when the remand order was passed, the appeal stood decided and a revision lay under Section 48. It was a case decided as the said expression has been used in Section 48. See Anwar Hussain and others v. S. L. Franklin and others, AIR 1958 All. 562 ; Mst. Umme Khair v. Aziz Ali, AIR 1922 Allahabad 47. 28. THEREFORE, when the remand order was passed, the appeal stood decided and a revision lay under Section 48. It was a case decided as the said expression has been used in Section 48. Even if for the sake of argument it be held that the remand order cannot amount to a case decided on the ground that the rights of the parties were not finally adjudicated still, in Section 48 the expression 'any order' has also been used which might have been passed by the subordinate authority in the case or proceeding. It cannot be denied that the remand order was an order which was passed In the case or proceeding. Therefore, whatever view may be taken of the nature of the remand order, there can be no doubt that a revision lay against the said order under Section 48. We are not impressed by the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as his clients were successful, therefore, there was no necessity for them to go up in revision even if the same was maintainable. When a remand order is passed it is true that the order of the court or authority below is set aside but that does not mean that the appellant can be treated to be such a successful party as has no status or locus standi to file an appeal against the remand order. An appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (u) CPC will He against a remand order passed under Order 41 Rule 23 or Rule 23-A and such an appeal will lie at the instance of either party. In a remand order passed by an appellate court while the respondent may feel aggrieved with the fact that the trial court's decree in his favour has been set aside, the appellant may have a grievance against the findings recorded or directions given in the remand order. The court below is bound by the findings recorded by the appellate court in the remand order and is bound to carry out the directions given in the said order. The court below is bound by the findings recorded by the appellate court in the remand order and is bound to carry out the directions given in the said order. An appellant, therefore, is bound to file an appeal against a remand order if he desires that the findings recorded in such order or directions given therein should not become final and binding. The analogy which the learned counsel for the petitioners sought to draw from a situation where an appeal is allowed and the case is finally decided by the appellate court in favour of one or the other party is misconceived. In a case where the appellate court passes a decree in favour of a party then obviously such a party cannot file a further appeal against any adverse finding, recorded in the judgment which, despite such adverse finding, is finally in his favour. A remand order, however, stands on a different footing. It does not amount to a decree and in a case of remand, the appellant cannot be deemed to be treated as a decree-holder who succeeds in an appeal which is disposed of in a final manner resulting in the passing of a decree. Under law no appeal lies against a decree at the instance of the decree holder for the simple reason that the decree is in his favour. He cannot file an appeal against an adverse finding recorded in the judgment and this is the reason why such a finding is not treated as res judicata in any subsequent litigation between the parties. Those considerations are not present in an order of remand which is appealable at the instance of either party and, indeed, which under the provisions of Section 105, sub-section (2), CPC becomes final between the parties if no appeal is preferred against such order. 29. IN the facts of the instant case we are also clear that it cannot be held that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in his remand order merely made certain stray observations not amounting to a finding. We have observed above that the petitioners did not care to place a true copy of the said order before us in the writ petition. They cannot be any better off on that ground. We have observed above that the petitioners did not care to place a true copy of the said order before us in the writ petition. They cannot be any better off on that ground. However, from the extract of the said order which has been reproduced in Annexure II to the writ petition it is obvious that a clear finding was given by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) to the effect that the land in question had vested in the Gaon Sabha on account of its being abandoned by the former recorded tenants. The objection of the Gaon Sabha and its claim to the land in dispute was upheld on the said ground, and, therefore, it was finding recorded by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and it was not a mere stray or unnecessary observation. Further, a clear direction was given to the Consolidation Officer to dispose of the case on the basis that in case the petitioners failed to produce necessary evidence to prove the possession of their vendors during the statutory period, then their claim should be rejected. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) concluded by the direction : "It is further ordered that the case is remanded to C. O. Khutar for fresh decision strictly in the light of the above observations". 30. THEREFORE, the petitioners cannot derive any advantage from their reliance on Hazari Lal v. I. T. Commr., AIR 1960 Allahabad 97 and Kuber Singh v. Digvi jai Singh, AIR 1968 Allahabad 126. There are three main aspects of the matter which seem to us germane in deciding the controversy which has been raised in the instant petition. The first aspect is that we are concerned with the right of a party in a revision and not in an appeal. The second aspect is that in the instant case the petitioners could file a revision against the remand order but they did not do so and the period of limitation prescribed in rule 111 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules 1953 is thirty days of the order against which the revision is directed. The third aspect is that under Section 11 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act the remand order became final when no revision was filed against it. 31. The third aspect is that under Section 11 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act the remand order became final when no revision was filed against it. 31. WE should like here to emphasise a basic difference between the true nature and significance of a remand order passed in proceedings arising out of a suit and the one which is passed in other proceedings such as in the instant case under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In a suit when in interlocutory order is passed, it is not necessary to file an appeal against it because either no appeal lies or even if it lies the party chooses not to go in appeal because it is open to a party to question its correctness in an appeal against the decree which is finally passed. A party has a right to file an appeal against a decree and therein the correctness of the interlocutory order can be Questioned as of rights This is what has been laid down in Section 105, subsection (1), CPC, which is as follows : "(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal." This aspect has been very significantly emphasised in Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Devi, AIR 1960 SC 941 . The Supreme Court emphasised that if a party were free to go up in appeal against every interlocutory order then it will lead to much delay and cause suffering to the parties. In this connection it was observed : "It is in recognition of the importance of preventing this mischief that the Legislature included in the Code of Civil Procedure from the very beginning a provision that in an appeal from a decree it will be open to a party to challenge the correctness of any interlocutory order which had not been appealed from but which has affected the decision of the case.'' A reference was made to Section 363 of the Act of 1859 and to Section 591 of the Act of 1877. It was then observed : "The position remained the same in the Code of 1882. It was then observed : "The position remained the same in the Code of 1882. The present Code in its 105th Section uses practically the same phraseology except that the word 'any such order' has been substituted by 'any order' and an additional provision has been made in the second sub-section in respect of orders of remand." Then it was emphasised : "It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order." It will be seen that the aforesaid considerations are not present in the case of the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. There is no suit pending before the consolidation authorities which may give rise to any decree. The order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) cannot be deemed to be a decree from which an appeal would, as of right, lie to the Director of Consolidation. A revision is provided in Section 48 but the exercise of the revisional powers is in the discretion of the revising authority and the appellant in the revision is not in the position of an appellant in an appeal against a decree. In an appeal against a decree the appellant can seek the intervention of the appellate court as of right but an applicant cannot seek the intervention of a revisional court as of right. In Section 48 the expression used is 'may'. Further, there is no provision in the Consolidation of Holdings Act analogous to Section 105, subsection (1) CPC, which has been reproduced above It has not been laid down that in a revision under Section 48 any error, defect or irregularity in any order affecting the decision of the case may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of revision. These basic differences in the provisions of the CPC and those of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act must be kept in view and, therefore, the case law with reference to Section 105 CPC should not be allowed to affect or mould our decision in the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 32. THE second aspect of the matter which has been emphasised above is equally important. 32. THE second aspect of the matter which has been emphasised above is equally important. Even if for the sake of argument it be forgotten that Section 48 provides a revisional jurisdiction where the intervention of the revising authority cannot be claimed as a matter of right it has to be seen that when an order is revisable within a particular period of limitation, then the party should be deemed to have lost the right, if any, to seek intervention of the revising authority in a revision after the expiry of the period of limitation. In the facts of the instant case, the petitioners could have filed a revision against a remand order within thirty days of the passing of the said order. They failed to do so. Can they in the subsequent revision insist that the correctness of the remand order should be considered even though they had failed to file a revision against the said order within the period of limitation ? In our opinion the petitioners cannot be granted any such right. Even if for the sake of argument it be held that the petitioners had a right to seek the intervention of the revising authority in respect of the remand order, they had such a right only by filing a revision within thirty days of the passing of the said order. Having not done so they lost such right, if any. We would again like to emphasise here that we are not called upon to consider the right of the revising authority to act suo motu. There is obviously no rule of limitation prescribed against the Director of Consolidation acting suo motu, under Section 48 but so far as a party is concerned, the rule of limitation is very much there in Rule 111 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules. Now coming to the third aspect of the matter, it is clear that Section 11, sub-section (2), clearly lays down that the decision of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in the appeal shall be final. It is true that the said finality in the section is subject to 'except as otherwise provided by or under this Act'. It is obvious that this exception refers to a revision under Section 48. In other words, the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, in the appeal shall be final subject to its being revised under Section 48. It is true that the said finality in the section is subject to 'except as otherwise provided by or under this Act'. It is obvious that this exception refers to a revision under Section 48. In other words, the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, in the appeal shall be final subject to its being revised under Section 48. The remand order was, therefore, final subject to its being revised but the revision had to be preferred within the period of limitation against the order of remand itself. We have emphasised above that the order of remand was certainly revisable under Section 48. However, no such revision was filed against the said order and, therefore, the same became final. We apprehend that even though Section 105, sub-section (2), CPC does not apply to these proceedings, still, an identical position in law exists. As a remand order under Section 105, sub-section (2), CPC becomes final if the said order is appealable and no appeal is preferred against the same, in the same manner if a remand order is passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the same being revisable and no revision is preferred against the same, the remand order becomes final in terms of Section 11 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. We think that the law was correctly laid down by the learned single Judge in Triveni Singh v. State of U. P., 1961 RD 58 even though the said case was decided before the amendment of the Act in 1953. The amendments did not in any manner affect the correctness of the ratio laid down in the said case. Similarly, we hold that another learned single Judge correctly laid down the law in Sri Ram Sakal Singh v. Dy. Dir. of Consolidation, 1968 RD 369. It was held in the said case that if no appeal is filed, against an order of the Consolidation Officer nor any cross objection preferred in the appeal filed by the other party before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), then no revision lies at the instance of such a party. 33. THEREFORE, we hold that the impugned orders do not suffer from any want of jurisdiction or any illegality and, therefore, this petition is liable to be dismissed and we hereby dismiss it but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.