JUDGMENT - S.C. PRATAP, J.:---The plaintiff has come to this Court in its revisional jurisdiction challenging the Order of summary dismissal of his appeal by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay which appeal the plaintiff had preferred from the Order dated 5th October, 1976 passed by the trial Court below Interim Notice No. 4035 of 1976 in the plaintiffs declaratory Suit No. 3611 of 1976. 2. In the said declaratory suit the plaintiff took out the aforesaid interim notice for two reliefs: (1) interim injunction pending the suit against the defendants not to disturb the plaintiffs possession of the suit premises till the hearing and final disposal of the said suit and (2) fixation of ad interim rent at the rate, of Rs. 500- per month pending the hearing and final disposal of the said suit. On the said application the trial Court by its order dated 17th July, 1976 issued ad interim injunction in terms of prayer (a) returnable on 26th August 1976 and the trial Court also "Allowed" the plaintiff to deposit at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month from January 76. When the said interim notice came up for final hearing a statement was made before the Court by the learned Advocate on behalf of the defendants to the effect that the defendants would not disturb the plaintiffs possession nor do they intend to do it. In view of the said statement which was recorded, the trial Court discharged the interim notice relating to interim injunction. On the question of fixation of ad interim rent, the trial Court directed the plaintiff to file. "separate application for fixation of rates if necessary." Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the plaintiff preferred an appeal which was, as stated hereinabove summarily dismissed by the Appellate Court. 3. Mr. Morje, the learned Advocate, who appears in support of this petition did not challenge the discharge of the interim notice in so far as it related to the relief of interim injunction pending the suit, particularly in view of the recorded statement before the trial Court of the Advocate on behalf of the defendant. Mr. Morje, however, very strenuously contended that the second part of the trial Courts order was unsustainable and the Appellate Court erred in summarily dismissing the plaintiffs appeal therefrom. 4. Mr. Morje, however, very strenuously contended that the second part of the trial Courts order was unsustainable and the Appellate Court erred in summarily dismissing the plaintiffs appeal therefrom. 4. When I asked the learned Advocate as to under which provision of law the trial Court could be said to have jurisdiction to fix ad interim rent in a suit as of the present nature filed by the plaintiff, Mr. Morje conceded that section 11 of the Bombay Rent Act would have no application to the present proceedings but he referred me to section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act as also to the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Now, it is difficult to understand as to how these legal provisions can be invoked in the present case and or/in what way they afford any answer to the query aforesaid. There cannot be any dispute that the jurisdiction of the Court under section 28 relating to premises covered by the Rent Act is exclusive. There can also be no dispute that under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 the plaintiff would be liable to include in his suit the whole of the claim which he is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action or would be entitled to relinquish part of the claim with consequent bar to sue on such relinquished claim or be prevented, except with Courts leave, from subsequently asking for a particular relief which he could have asked earlier. It is difficult to appreciate as to how these provisions have any application to the present case. It is nobodys case that it was not open to the plaintiff to make an application as of the interim notice nature in the present proceedings with more than one prayer or relief. It was also nobodys case that it is some other Court and not the Court of Small Causes at Bombay which has got jurisdiction to entertain and decide suits and proceedings as of the present nature instituted by the plaintiff. The contention based on section 28 of the Rent Act and/or Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, fails. 5. Mr. The contention based on section 28 of the Rent Act and/or Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, fails. 5. Mr. Morje however, strongly relied upon yet another provision of law in support of his contention that the trial Court had jurisdiction to pass an order for fixing ad interim rent and that provision was section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Now, section 151 is a residuary provision in the Code of Civil Procedure to be invoked in rare cases for the purposes of doing justice by virtue of the exercises of inherent powers of the Court. Such a residuary provisions cannot be resorted to as a foundation for making an application as of the instant nature which is not shown to be maintainable under any other substantive provision of law. The contention based upon section 151 must, therefore, also fails. 6. Mr. Morje, further contend that as no reply was filed to the plaintiffs affidavit in support of the interim notice the trial Court had no jurisdiction to review the order passed by it at the ex parte state. Now, when a question of inherent jurisdiction arises and want of jurisdiction is discovered, absence of affidavit by one or the other party cannot debar a Court from deciding the question of its own jurisdiction. Jurisdiction cannot be created by either filing or not filing an affidavit. Affidavits can neither confer nor take away inherent jurisdictions. A Courts inherent jurisdiction has to be created or taken away by law. Therefore, whether a reply is filed or not cannot have no bearing on the question whether the trial Court had or had not inherent jurisdiction to fix ad interim rent in a proceeding as of the present nature. This last contention also, therefore, fails. 7. Apart from this position, it is really very difficult to appreciate the plaintiff approaching this High Court and invoking its revisional jurisdiction particularly when the plaintiff could as well have filed an application before the trial Court itself in pursuance of its own order dated 5th October, 1976 and raised all question of law and jurisdiction before that Court. The present order passed by the trial Court cannot be said to be vitiated by any of the Clauses of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present order passed by the trial Court cannot be said to be vitiated by any of the Clauses of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not possible to hold that the impugned order is without jurisdiction or passed with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction. 8. Though I am not really concerned at this stage and in these proceedings with the question whether the Court under the Bombay Rent Act has or has not jurisdiction to fix ad interim rent in a suit as of the present nature, I had to deal with the contentions in that behalf because these were raised with some emphasis and argued at some length by the learned Advocate Mr. Morje. However, observations made in this judgment would not bar any such appropriate proceedings as the plaintiff may initiate for the fixation of ad interim rent. If the plaintiff does take any such proceedings the concerned Court will decide the matter including its jurisdiction or want of it to fix such ad interim rent on its own merit and in accordance with law and untrammelled by the observations in this judgment. But so far as this revision application is concerned, I fined no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. 9. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged with costs. -----