Short Note : 1. The respondent No.2 M/s Enamelling Works, Industrial Estate, Ujjain was a partnership firm of which respondent No.3 Kailash Chandra and appellant No.1 Narayan Singh Sisodia were the partners. The respondent No. 1 Bank had advanced loan to the respondent No.2 firm in order to develop and promote the small scale industries. The respondent No.4, Kalyanmal and appellant No.2. Mohanlal stood as guarantors of respondent No.2 firm and its partners respondent No. 3 Kailash Chandra and appellant No. 1 Narayan Singh Sisodia. The respondent No.1 Bank filed the suit for the recovery of Rs. 47,152.90 p. through its Regional Manager, Shantilal Mehta, who also held power of attorney duly executed in his favour. The appellants resisted the claim inter alia on the ground that the Branch Manager, of respondent No. 1 Bank, by name Shah, had proposed that in case the appellants paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards the loan transaction, they will be discharged fully of their liability to repay the rest of the loan amount, which was advanced to the partnership concern. On this proposal the appellant No.1, Narayan Singh Sisodia, arranged the said amount from appellant No.2 Monanlal and tendered the amount to the Branch Manager, along with a letter laying down the specific condition that the Bank shall accept the money in full satisfaction of its claim against the appellants and in case the said condition was not agreeable to the Bank, the amount of Rs. 15,000/- so tendered shall be returned. It was further averred to at the then Branch Manger, in this way, recovered the amount of Rs. 15,000/- from the appellants, fraduently and appropriated it in part payment of the suit amount. It was, therefore, averred that respondent No.1 Bank was estopped from claiming the suit amount from these appellants. The trial court repelled the above plea of the appellants and herd that the respondent No. 1 Bank did not accept the amount of Rs. 15.000/- on the condition that the appellants shall be absolved of their entire liability to repay the suit amount and as such the appellants were equally liable to pay the suit amount along with respondent Nos. 2 to 4. Consequently, the respondent No.1's suit for the entire amount of Rs. 47,152.90 p. was decreed with costs against the appellants and respondent Nos. 2 to 4. An appeal was preferred. 2 to 4. Consequently, the respondent No.1's suit for the entire amount of Rs. 47,152.90 p. was decreed with costs against the appellants and respondent Nos. 2 to 4. An appeal was preferred. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that encashrnent of the cheque in the light of conditions laid down by the appellant No. 1 in his letter Ex. P-20 was conclusive proof in law that the appellant No. 1 was fully absolved from his liability to repay the balance of the suit amount and consequently, the liability of appellant No, 2, who was the guarantor was also discharged. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellants relied on section 63 of the Contract Act with particular reference to illustration (c) of the said Act. In order to bring his case within the purview of section 63, illustration (c) of the Contract Act, the learned counsel for the appellants pressed into service section 8 of the Contract Act. Held : After giving anxious thoughts, to the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants, this Court is of the view, that section 8 of the Contract Act cannot be pressed Into service for bringing the case tinder S. 63 of the Contract Act. According to the scheme of the Contract Act. S.8 is enacted under Chapter 1, which relates to communication, acceptance and revocation of proposals. S.2 of the Contract Act defines proposals, acceptance, promise and agreement. When a debtor offers to pay the debt in a smaller sum, he does not make a proposal to arrive at any agreement with the creditor within the definition of section 2 of the Contract Act. The learned counsel for the appellants conceded that a creditor is not bound to accept less than his whole debt and there can be no valid tender of part of an entire debt. Though a tender of a smaller amount than that of which an indivisible and entire claim consists, will be invalid as a tender, there is nothing to prevent the creditor from accepting the amount tendered in part payment; and his doing so will not preclude him from afterwards claiming the residue of his account, provided that the debtor did not make it a condition of his tender that it be accepted in discharge of the whole. It is thus clear that the acceptance of an invalid tender of a smaller amount with a condition that it will discharge the whole debt would not amount to acceptance of the smaller sum towards the full satisfaction of the entire debt under section 8 of the Contract Act. In the opinion of this Court, such an acceptance, if proved as a fact, would exclusively come within the domain of section 63 of-the Contract Act. Biharilal Bishwas v. Nasimannessa Bibi, AIR 1953 Cal 527; Union of India v. Messrs Babulal Uttamchand Bhandari, AIR 1968 Bombay 294; Davis v. Chandaswami, Mudaliar, ILR Mad. 398; Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act by Pollock and Mulla, (9th Edition) relied on, Ishaq Abdul Karim v. Madanlal, AIR 1965 All. 34 ; distinguished. 2. Now, the question which arises for consideration, is whether the encashment of the cheques by the Branch Manager which were sent along with the letter Ex. P-20 incorporating-the condition that the money should-either be accepted in full satisfaction of the entire debt, or it should be returned, is a conclusive proof in law, that the money was agreed to be accepted on the condition offered. The facts would indicate that respondent No. 1 Bank was not prepared at any time to discharge the liability of appellant No. 1 as well as that of the guarantors by accepting a smaller sum. There is, therefore, nothing on record to prove that the respondent No.1 Bank accepted the conditions of the letter. Ex. P-20 and encashcd the cheques. This Court is therefore, clearly of the view that the appellants failed to prove the fact that there was accord and satisfaction in the sense of bilateral consesus of intention which was the necessity for the discharge of the obligation of re-payment under section 63, illustration (c) of the Contract Act. Under these circumstances, the trial Court was right in passing the decree with respect to the suit amount against the appellants as well, and hence there is no ground to make any interference by this Court in appeal. Firm Basdeo v. Firm Dilsukhra; Sewakram, AIR 1922 All 461; Day v. Melea, Q.B.D.610, Lala Kapur Chand Godha v. Mir Nawab Himayatalikhan, AIR 1961 SC 250; Messrs Amar Nath Chand Prakash v. Messrs Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., AIR 1972 All. 176 relied on Appeal dismissed.