Judgment :- 1. The Managing Director of the Emerald Valley Estates Limited has come up to this Court with this petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for quashing Ext. P-1 award dated 29-12-1975 passed by the second respondent, Industrial Tribunal, Calicut, in T. D. No. 25 of 1971, in so far as it relates to the finding on Issue No.1 (Victimisation meted out to K. J George, Assistant Conductor). The First respondent is the Secretary for Kerala, the Estates and Staffs' Union of South India, and the third respondent is the State of Kerala. 2. Shri. M N. Sukumaran Nayar, the counsel for the petitioner, attacked Ext. P-1 award on two grounds: (i) the 3rd respondent, the State of Kerala, had no jurisdiction to make the reference under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and, in any event, the 2nd respondent Tribunal bad no jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it; and (ii) on merits of the case the Tribunal was in error in giving a verdict in favour of the 1st respondent. 3. The petitioner's case briefly stated is as follows. The petitioner at the time of filing this writ petition was the Managing Director of Emerald Valley Estates Ltd., Badaguli, Chamarajanagar, Mysore (Karnataka) State, having establishments both in Karnataka and Kerala States. The estate owned by the company in the Kerala State was known as Miraflores Estate, and the estate owned by the company in Karnataka was known as Badaguli Estate. One Sri K J. George was an employee in the Miraflores Estate as an Assistant Conductor. While so, he was transferred to Badaguli Estate, and was relieved from the Miraflores Estate on 9 61970 Pursuant to the order of transfer, on his being relieved from Miraflores Estate as above, the said George reported for duty in Badaguli Estate on 10 61970. He, however, thereafter met the petitioner and expressed his unwillingness to continue his work in Badaguli Estate as he was not interested in continuing in service under the management unless he was transferred back to Miraflores Estate. The petitioner hiving insisted that he should work in Badaguli Estate itself since his services were required there, he tendered his resignation in the presence of the senior members of the staff of the Estate. The petitioner accepted his resignation and relieved him from service. The petitioner hiving insisted that he should work in Badaguli Estate itself since his services were required there, he tendered his resignation in the presence of the senior members of the staff of the Estate. The petitioner accepted his resignation and relieved him from service. He was given all emoluments payable to him till that day, obtaining proper acquittance for the payment. Nearly a week after he left the service of the Estate, he wrote a letter to the petitioner stating that be was not in his normal state, and was broken-hearted when he reported for duty at Badaguli Estate, that he was threatened by the petitioner by pointing a pistol at him, and that he was forced to sign the resignation letter and other papers against his will. Some time later, the first respondent Union raised an Industrial Dispute sponsoring the cause of himself and that of his brother Joseph who was dismissed from service pursuant to disciplinary proceedings initiated against him by the management. The 3rd respondent as per G.O Rt. 675/71/LSWD dated 6-4-1971 referred the following issues to the 2nd respondent Tribunal for adjudication: (i) Victimisation meted out to Sri K. J. George, Assistant Conductor. (ii) Dismissal of Sri K. J. Joseph, Assistant Conductor. 4. It may be noted at the outset that in this writ petition we are concerned with Ext. P-1 award in so far as it relates to the first issue only, namely, victimisation alleged to have been meted out to K. J. George, Assistant Conductor, the finding on Issue No. 2 upholding the dismissal of Sri. K J. Joseph, not being the subject-matter of this writ petition. 5. Reverting to the question to be decided in the writ petition, the first thing that arises for consideration is the question whether the Government of Kerala had the necessary jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication to the 2nd respondent Industrial Tribunal under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is not disputed that the dispute related to a matter specified in clause (d) of sub-section(i) of S.10 of the Act. It is not disputed that the dispute related to a matter specified in clause (d) of sub-section(i) of S.10 of the Act. The submission of Sri M.N. Sukumaran Nair the counsel for the petitioner, is that in as much as the occurrence or incident which ultimately led to the dispute arose in a place in the State of Karnataka, if at all, it is the Government of that State, that has the competence and jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication under S.10 of the Act. Reliance is placed by him on the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. & another v. Sri Rangavilas Mottors (P) Ltd. & another (1967 (2) LLJ.12 = AIR. 1967 SC. 1040): "The dispute in the instant case arose at Bangalore where the concerned employee was working at the time of his transfer. There should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. Ordinarily if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. In the instant case, the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arose within the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government." The facts of the case were as follows: A workman working at the Bangalore branch office of a company having its head office at Krishnagiri (Madras State) was transferred by the orders of the head office. His dispute was taken by fellow-workmen who met at Krishnagiri and passed a resolution espousing his cause. Subsequently he was removed from service for disobeying the order of transfer. The order of reference made by the State of Mysore, inter alia, related to dispute as to whether the transfer was unjustified, and if so, whether the workman was entitled to reinstatement at Bangalore with benefits of back-wages. The Labour Court found that the transfer was unjustified as it was in breach of the agreement not to transfer the concerned employee from'Bangalore for a stated period, and, therefore, directed his reinstatement at Bangalore with back-wages. The Labour Court found that the transfer was unjustified as it was in breach of the agreement not to transfer the concerned employee from'Bangalore for a stated period, and, therefore, directed his reinstatement at Bangalore with back-wages. The High Court quashed the award, inter alia, on the ground that the dispute in regard to the removal from service was not referred for adjudication, and the only dispute which was referred for adjudication related to the transfer of the concerned worker. The High Court also found that the State of Mysore was the appropriate Government for making the reference as part of the cause of action arose at Bangalore where the employee at the time of his transfer was working. In the appeal by special leave preferred by the Union it was held that the order of reference did include in its ambit and scope the dispute in regard to the removal from service of the concerned employee, and that the dispute arose at Bangalore where the concerned employee was working at the time of his transfer. 6. It is the contention of Sri Sukumaran Nair that the facts of the case in the Supreme Court decision cited above are almost identical to those of the case on hand, and applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court, it has to be held that the Government of Karnataka alone had jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication in as much as the workman's resignation was tendered from a place in that State, and that is at the bottom of the dispute. 7. Sri M. M. Cherian, the counsel for the first respondent Union, on the other hand, submitted that the true test in determining jurisdiction is as to where the dispute actually arose; and that has to be decided with reference to the place where the cause of action substantially arises or where the workman involved ordinarily resides. In this connection the ruling given by Chagla C. J. in a Division Bench case of the Bombay High Court in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills, Ltd. v. Vin. (D. M.) and others (1956 (1) LLJ. 557) was relied on by him. In this connection the ruling given by Chagla C. J. in a Division Bench case of the Bombay High Court in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills, Ltd. v. Vin. (D. M.) and others (1956 (1) LLJ. 557) was relied on by him. After noticing the provisions of S.78 and sub-s. (4) of S.42, and the proviso thereto, of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, what has been laid down by Chagla C. J„ at page 558, reads as follows: "Now, the Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction upon the labour court. But applying the well-known tests of jurisdiction, a court or tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction. And therefore the correct approach to this question is to ask ourselves where did this dispute substantially arise and in our opinion the only answer to that question can be that the dispute substantially arose in Bombay and not in Ahmedabad. What is the dispute? The dispute is not as to whether the employee approached the employer in Ahmedabad and no agreement was arrived at. The dispute is whether the employer was justified in dismissing the employee, and in as much as the employment was in Bombay, and the dismissal was in Bombay, it is difficult to understand how it can possibly be urged that the dispute did not substantially arise in Bombay." Another decision relied on by Sri Cherian is the one reported in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1962(1) LLJ. 409 in which the Supreme Court held as follows: "The Act contains no provisions bearing on this question, which must, consequently, be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain actions or proceedings." In the decision cited by Sukumaran Nair, (1967(2) LLJ 12) at page 17, the Supreme Court has quoted its earlier decision rendered in 1962, quoted above, and has also approved the principles laid down by the Bombay High Court in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills, Ltd v. Vin (D. M) and others (1956 (1) LLJ.. 557) for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under S 10 of the Act. 557) for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under S 10 of the Act. What has been stressed by the Supreme Court in that case is that there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. 8. In this case if as a matter of fact no cause of action arose in the Kerala State, the decision in Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd & another v. Sri Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd. & another (1967(2) LLJ. 12 = AIR. 1967 SC. 1040), relied on by Sri Sukumaran Nair, would have been of some help to the petitioner. But the fact does not appear to be so. The workmen concerned were all along working in the State of Kerala and they were also residing in that State. The transfer of Sri George (with whom alone we are concerned in this petition) was from a place in Kerala to a place in Karnataka State. In fact, the crux of the issue is whether the order transferring him from Mir-aflores Estate in Kerala to Badaguli Estate in Karnataka amounts to an act of victimisation; that is the subject-matter of the dispute. The case of the first respondent Union is that the transfer order Ext. W-2 dated 24-5-1970 was motivated and was intended to harass the employee because of his Trade Union activities. It would be wrong to construe that, because the workman concerned in pursuance of the notice, went over to the place in Karnataka State to join duty in the Estate in that State, the cause of action has arisen exclusively and wholly in that place, and therefore the Kerala Government would not constitute the appropriate Government as stated in S 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It might also be noticed that to confer jurisdiction for reference on the State Government concerned, it is not absolutely necessary that the cause of action wholly or exclusively should arise in that State. There may be cases where part of the cause of action arose in two or more States. In such cases, two or more States may have concurrent jurisdiction. There may be cases where part of the cause of action arose in two or more States. In such cases, two or more States may have concurrent jurisdiction. When the question regarding the territorial jurisdiction crops up, what is to be asked and answered is whether the cause of action substantially arose in the State, the Government of which referred the dispute for adjudication. Once it is found that the cause of action substantially arose in the Kerala State, the Government of which referred the dispute for adjudication, it is not quite necessary or relevant now for us to consider the hypothetical question as to whether it would have been within the competence of the Government of Karnataka State also to refer the dispute for adjudication in exercise of its powers under S.10 of the Act if an application in that behalf was made to that Government. I have, therefore, following the two decisions stated above and distinguishing the decision in Workman of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd & another v. Sri Rangavilas Motors (P) & another (1967 (2) LLJ.12 = AIR. 1967 SC. 1040), no hesitation to hold that on the tacts of the present case the Government of Kerala was competent to refer the dispute to the second respondent, the Tribunal The Tribunal was competent to adjudicate the matter particularly in view of the specific issue as to whether the transfer was justified, having been raised before it. The Tribunal certainly has the jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether it has the territorial jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it. This is so because the notice of transfer was served on the workman in the State of Kerala and the order relieving him from duty also was given in the State of Kerala. The transfer order and the relieving order are under challenge in the writ petition, if not directly, at least collaterally. Considering all these aspects of the matter,1 am of the view that the third respondent was competent to refer the matter to the second respondent Tribunal for adjudication, and that the second respondent Tribunal had the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, including the question relating to its territorial jurisdiction 1 therefore reject the first contention pertaining to the jurisdiction of respondents 2 and 3 raised by the counsel for the petitioner. 9. 9. We now proceed to consider the case on merits, which should rest on the finding on the question as to whether the first respondent Union was able to make out a case of victimisation before the second respondent, Tribunal. In this case it has not been disputed that George and bis brother Joseph were active workers of the Union and they were responsible for organising labour movement in the establishment and for securing to them benefits, guaranteed bylaw, but denied by the management. In recognition of his ability and service to the cause of the labour he was made the President of the Nelliyampathi Unit of ESUSI. in 1969. This statement has not been contradicted by the petitioner. Victimisation has to be inferred where the workman concerned is innocent, yet he is being punished for no fault of his by the management resorting to unfair labour practices. Whether there was actual victimisation or not is a question of fact. This aspect has been considered elaborately by the Tribunal in Para.17 to 24 of Ext. P-1 award. The evidence of Mw.1 and the evidence of Mw.1 and Mw. 2 and the documents placed before the Tribunal have been discussed. It is not a case where there is complete lack of legal evidence to support the conclusion reached by the Tribunal. This being the position, I do not think that there is any justification for this Court to interfere with Ext. P-1 award passed by the second respondent, the Industrial Tribunal, particularly in the light of the fact that no reinstatement, but only payment of compensation has been ordered. The result is that the writ petition fails, and has only to be dismissed; and I do so with costs. Dismissed.