Order.- The two petitioners Veeranna and Annappa have filed this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (shortly called the ‘Code’) for quashing the order dated 11th February, 1975 made by the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gokak in C.C.No.350 of 1975 directing issue of summons to them for various offences including one under section 302, Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this petition may be stated as under: One Nagappa, son of the 1st respondent Nagawwa, died as a result of an assault on him on 19th July, 1973. On the first information lodged by the police patil of Benchinamaradi village of Gokak Taluk, where the occurrence took place, the police registered a case against 8 accused persons. The 1st respondent filed a private complaint on 4th October, 1973 against not only the 8 accused against whom the police have registered a case on the basis of the first information received from the police patil but also against these two petitioners. The said complaint was taken on the file of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gokak, in C.C.No. 350 of 1975. After taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate decided to hold an enquiry under section 202 of the Code before issuing process to the accused. Six witnesses were examined on behalf of the complainant and the case was posted for arguments. At that stage, the Magistrate was transferred. His successor took up the matter, heard the complainant and then directed that further enquiry may be made by the Superintendent of Police, Belgaum as per his order dated 3rd December, 1973. Respondent No. 1 filed a revision petition before this Court against the order of the Magistrate referring the matter to the Superintendent of Police, Belgaum, for enquiry and report in Cr. R.P. No. 665 of 1973. The revision petition was allowed as per the order of this Court dated 16th December,1974, the impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh disposal in the light of the observations contained in the said order. After the matter was received back, the Magistrate, after hearing the parties, passed the order dated 11th February, 1975 directing issue of summons to the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the order of issue of summons in separate petitions in Cr.P. No. 50 of 1975 and Cr. After the matter was received back, the Magistrate, after hearing the parties, passed the order dated 11th February, 1975 directing issue of summons to the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the order of issue of summons in separate petitions in Cr.P. No. 50 of 1975 and Cr. P. No. 51 of 1975 in this Court. Both the petitions were allowed and the order directing issue of summons was set aside. Against the said order of this Court, the 1st respondent filed an appeal before the Supreme Court in Cr.A. No. 99 of 1976. The appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court as per its judgment dated 23rd April, 1976. By the said judgment the Supreme Court has set aside the order of this Court made in Cr.Ps.Nos. 50 and 51 of 1975 and restored the order of the Magistrate issuing process against the petitioners. 3. In the meanwhile, the police who had investigated the case against 8 accused persons, placed a charge-sheet before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gokak which has resulted in an order of commitment to the Court of Sessions at Belgaum in which it was registered as S.C.No.30 of 1974-75. While granting the Special Leave Petition of the 1st respondent, the Supreme Court stayed the pronouncement of the judgment in the above sessions case. While disposing the appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the stay granted in the sessions ease and directed the Sessions Judge to dispose of the case. The 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum, disposed of the sessions case acquitting all the 8 accused persons as per his judgment dated 7th May, 1976 Thereupon, the petitioners once again filed Cr. P.No. 581 of 1976 for quashing the order dated 11th February, 1975 which had gone up to the Supreme Court earlier and confirmed by the Supreme Court in Cr.A. No. 99 of 1976. The said criminal petition was dismissed by this Court on 17th January, 1977. Thereafter, the petitioners have filed the present petition for the very same relief viz., to quash the order dated 11th February, 1975. 4. Shri B.K. Ramachandra Rao, learned Advocate for the petitioners, presented two arguments before me. His first argument was that there is no prohibition in law to maintain a second petition under section 482 of the Code in the same matter for the same relief. 4. Shri B.K. Ramachandra Rao, learned Advocate for the petitioners, presented two arguments before me. His first argument was that there is no prohibition in law to maintain a second petition under section 482 of the Code in the same matter for the same relief. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and others1. In that case, the main question debated before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make the order dated 7th April, 1970, quashing the proceedings against respondents 1, 2 and 3 when, on an earlier application made by the 1st respondent, the High Court, by its order dated 12th December, 1968, refused to quash the proceedings. Holding that the High Court was competent to make such an order, the Supreme Court observed thus: "The earlier application which was rejected by the High Court was an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash the proceeding and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and half years without any progress at all and it was in these circumstances that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstance entitled to entertain the subsequent application of respondents Nos. The High Court was in the circumstance entitled to entertain the subsequent application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one and a half years. It was for this reason that, despite the earlier order dated 12th December, 1968, the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application for respondents 1 and 2 for the purpose of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A. This the High Court was perfectly entitled to do and we do not sec any jurisdictional infirmity in the order of the High Court." 5. The above decision of the Supreme Court lends support to the first argument advanced by Shri B.K. Ramachandra Rao that in law, there is no prohibition for entertaining a second petition under section 482 of the Code when an earlier application in the same matter for the same relief had been rejected. 6. The second argument of Shri Ramachandra Rao was that in view of the change of circumstances brought about by the acquittal of the remaining 8 accused by the Sessions Judge, Belgaum, interference by this Court by exercising its wholesome powers under section 482 of the Code is absolutely necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise secure the ends of justice in quashing the impugned order. 7. It seems to me that the petitioners have more than one obstacles in their way to secure the relief sought for. In the first place, the petitioners had once before challenged the very same order dated 11th February, 1975 issuing process against them before this Court in Cr. Ps. Nos. 50 and 51 of 1975 and obtained a favourable order. It seems to me that the petitioners have more than one obstacles in their way to secure the relief sought for. In the first place, the petitioners had once before challenged the very same order dated 11th February, 1975 issuing process against them before this Court in Cr. Ps. Nos. 50 and 51 of 1975 and obtained a favourable order. The said order was set at naught by the Supreme Court in Cr.A.No. 99 of 1976 and the order of the Magistrate issuing process to the petitioners was restored with the following observations: "At the time of granting the special leave, we had directed the Sessions Judge who was trying the criminal case resulting from the F.I.R. lodged before the police to stay proceedings to the extent that the judgment was not to be pronounced until this appeal was disposed of. We understand that sessions case is now concluded before the learned Sessions Judge and arguments have also been heard. In view of the order of the Magistrate issuing process against respondents 1 and 2 which has been confirmed by us, the respondents will have to face a supplementary trial and it is not conducive in the interests of justice to allow the other trial to be stayed any further. The Sessions Judge is therefore, directed to dispose of the Sessions Case and the stay granted by this Court earlier is vacated." 8. It is clear from the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above, that the Supreme Court had in their mind the sessions case that was pending trial against the remaining 8 accused and also the stage at which it was pending then, by virtue of the stay granted by it. The stage at which the sessions case was pending then was only to pronounce the judgment. In that situation, their Lordships of the Supreme Court vacated the stay and directed the Sessions Judge to dispose of the sessions case with the observation that the respondents who are the petitioners herein would have to face a supplementary trial in view of the confirmation of the order of the Magistrate issuing process against them and it was not conducive in the interests of justice to allow the trial of the sessions case to be stayed any further. Thus it is seen from the decision of the Supreme Court in Cr.A. No.99 of 1976 that the proceedings against the petitioners herein should proceed according to law irrespective of the decision in the sessions case against the remaining accused. 9. The second obstacle in the way of the petitioners is that the validity of the order dated 11th February, 1975 directing issue of process against them has not been affected in any way in view of the acquittal of the other accused by the Sessions Judge, Belgaum. The case against them will have to be proceeded according to law without being influenced by the judgment of the Sessions Court acquitting the other accused as the evidence recorded in that case and the judgment of acquittal are not admissible documents in the case against the petitioners. The case against the petitioner will have to be decided on the evidence to be adduced in the case. 10. It is well settled that the evidence recorded in one criminal case cannot be treated as evidence in another criminal case. (See Mitthulal and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh1 and Gavisiddayya v. State of Karnataka2). Merely because the other accused have been acquitted by the Sessions Court and the State did not prefer any appeal against the said acquittal and the revision petition filed by the first respondent against the acquittal was dismissed at the admission stage by themselves would not be sufficient to hold that there is no prima facie case against the petitioners and as such issue of process against them and proceeding with the case would result in the abuse of the process of the Court. However, it is open to the Sessions Judge on the scrutiny of the material produced in this case, if he comes to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners, he can discharge them. At any rate, the proceedings under section 482 of the Code is not called for at this stage on the ground that the other accused were acquitted. 11. The last hurdle, in my view in the way of the petitioners is the order of this Court in Cr.P.No. 581 of 1976. That was a petition filed by the very same petitioners for quashing the very same order on the very same grounds which were considered and rejected by this Court on 17th January, 1977. 11. The last hurdle, in my view in the way of the petitioners is the order of this Court in Cr.P.No. 581 of 1976. That was a petition filed by the very same petitioners for quashing the very same order on the very same grounds which were considered and rejected by this Court on 17th January, 1977. By the time the said order was made, the order of acquittal of the other accused persons was already made by the Sessions Judge, Belgaum. No new grounds have been urged in the present petition except contending that the dismissal of Cr. P.No. 581 of 1976 was on the basis of wrong and erroneous understanding of the facts of the case subsequent to the judgment of the Supreme Court as this Court proceeded on the assumption that the petitioners had already been committed to take trial in the Sessions Court and that the trial was to take place. 12. I have perused the order of this Court in Cr.P.No.581 of 1976. After going through the said order, I am unable to persuade myself to read the order that the order in question was made on the basis that the accused were already committed to take trial in the Sessions Court. The order in question specifically refers to the prayer made in the petition that it was to set aside the order dated 11th February, 1975 passed by the Additional Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gokak, in C.C. No.350 of 1975 and to quash the proceedings. It also refers to the proceedings in Cr.P.Nos. 50 and 51 of 1975 initiated by the petitioners against the very same order and their disposal by this Court on 16th December, 1975. It further shows that the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court and the order of the Magistrate issuing process against the petitioners was maintained by the Supreme Court. Having regard to these matters, this Court observed that as a result of the finality of the order passed by the Magistrate, the petitioners were issued process and they have appeared before the Sessions Judge, instead of stating that they appeared before the Magistrate. Having regard to these matters, this Court observed that as a result of the finality of the order passed by the Magistrate, the petitioners were issued process and they have appeared before the Sessions Judge, instead of stating that they appeared before the Magistrate. The further observation in the order that the case of the petitioners would be considered by the Sessions Judge on merits under section 227 and if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against them, the Sessions Judge would discharge them was made in the context of the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the other 8 accused persons were already acquitted by the Sessions Judge and not on the belief that the petitioners were already committed to the Court of Sessions. 13. The petitioners have not shown that the facts and circumstances now prevailing are different from the facts and circumstances that were prevailing at the time of passing the order in Cr.P.No. 581 of 1976 on 17th January, 1977 so as to enable this Court to exercise its wholesome powers under section 482 of the Code. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Mohan Singh1 will not help the petitioners to seek the relief sought for though they could maintain this petition despite the rejection of their petition in Cr.P.No. 581 of 1976 as the facts of this case are quite different from the facts of the above case. 14. In the result for the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and the same is dismissed.