JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal under Section 100, CPC read with Section 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, against the judgment and decree dated 3.7.1978 passed the learned Addl. Civil Judge, Bharatpur. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for ejectment against the defendant-appellant with respect to a shop situated in Mandi Bazar, Kama. It was contended by the appellant that the shop in question has been on rent with him for the last 40 years at the rate of Rs. 6/- p.m. The plaintiff's suit was decreed by Munsiff on 8.12.1973. The defendant went up in appeal, which was heard by the learned Addl. Civil Judge, Bharatpur. During the pendency of the appeal, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 was amended and consequently the appellate Court framed an issue with regard to comparative hardship and remanded the case to the Munsiff vide his judgment dated 26.11.1976. On remand, additional evidence was led by both the parties. The issue of comparative hardship was, however, decided in favour of the plaintiff by the Munsiff on 11.4.1977. The Munsiff had recorded a finding that the financial condition of the plaintiff was much better than that of the defendant. The defendant filed objections against the finding dated 11.4.1977 before the learned Addl. Civil Judge, Bharatpur. The appeal was, however, dismissed by the learned Addl. Civil Judge, Bharatpur on 3.7.1979. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the learned Addl. Civil Judge, Bharatpur, this second appeal has been filed. 3. The defendant has contended that he had led cogent evidence to prove that he would suffer greater hardship than the plaintiff, if the decree of eviction is passed against him, yet the Courts below have wrongly decided against the evidence on record that greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiff if the decree of eviction is not passed against the defendant. It was also contended that the plaintiff is financially very well off and he can procure some other suitable accommodation. On the other hand, the defendant is a poor person and is earning his livelihood from the business he is doing in the shop for the last 40 years. 4. The matter came up before the learned Single Judge for admission. On the other hand, the defendant is a poor person and is earning his livelihood from the business he is doing in the shop for the last 40 years. 4. The matter came up before the learned Single Judge for admission. In the opinion of the learned Single Judge the financial position of the landlord and the tenant could be considered as one out of the many factors to be considered while deciding the question of comparative hardship, but as there was a decision of a Single Bench taking a different view, the learned Single Judge thought it proper to refer the case to a Division Bench. Hence, this second appeal was heard by the Division Bench on the question whether the appeal should be admitted or not. 5. Section 100, CPC has been amended, and now unless a substantial question of law is involved in the second appeal, as envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 103, CPC a second appeal is not maintainable. 6. In Indermal v. Ratan Lal, 1977 WLN (UC) 256 , it was held that in judging the question of comparative hardship for the purpose of passing a decree for eviction, it is wholly irrelevant to look into the comparative financial position of the landlord and tenant. Gujarat High Court has taken a different view in Kasturbhai and others v. Firm Mohanlal, AIR 1969 Gujarat 110 , placing reliance in Chandler v. Strevatt, 1947-1 All England Reporter 164 and Kelley v. Goowin, 1947-1 All England Reporter 210 , the Gujarat High Court held that the Court would have to put in the scale other circumstances which would title the balance of hardship on either side, including the financial position, both of the landlord and the tenant the financial means available to them for securing alternative accommodation either by purchase or by hiring one, the nature and the extent of the business or their requirement of residential accommodation as the case may be, the hardship that would be caused not only to the landlord and the tenant personally but to their family members, dependents or persons residing with them as one unit, so that the hardship of those persons would really amount to the hardship of the landlord or the tenant. The whole process of weighing the hardship in a delicate process where various factors have to be thrown into the scales and the Court has to examine how each factor tilts the balance on either side and therefore it has to find out the final balance of hardship. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on Banurao Rajaram Wajkar v. Babulal, 1974 RCJ 459 wherein it has been held that in coming to a conclusion on the question of the balance of hardship or convenience it is necessary to enumerate the items of hardship and their degrees on each side and then see who suffers more hardship. Reliance was placed on Narendra Kumar Jain v. State of U.P., 1976 RCJ 178 , wherein it was held that on the one hand the landlord merely wants to set up a new business in order to augment his income, on the other hand, the petitioner (tenant) will be completely out of business, he has no alternative shop where he can set it up, nor has it been held that with reasonable efforts the petitioner can acquire an alternative accommodation. With these facts no reasonable man would come to the conclusion that the need of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant. 8. On behalf of the respondent great emphasis has been laid that the question of comparative hardship of landlord and tenant is a finding of fact and the High Court cannot disturb it in second appeal. Reliance has been placed on Ganga Ram v. Smt. Gurkirtan Kaur, 1978(2) Rent Control Reporter 235 : 1978 RLW 167. Reliance was also placed on Munilal v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29, wherein it was held that finding on the question of comparative hardship of landlord and tenant is a finding of fact. High Court cannot disturb the same in writ proceeding. High Court cannot reappraise evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that of the Courts below. 9. In Kelley v. Goodwin (supra) , it was held that although the landlord only required part of the premises for accommodation, the country Court judge was justified in finding on the evidence that "the dwelling-house (was) reasonably required by the landlord...... High Court cannot reappraise evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that of the Courts below. 9. In Kelley v. Goodwin (supra) , it was held that although the landlord only required part of the premises for accommodation, the country Court judge was justified in finding on the evidence that "the dwelling-house (was) reasonably required by the landlord...... for occupation as a residence or (herself)", and, on the question of hardship, he was entitled to have regard to the financial means of the tenant by reason of which was in a position to obtain accommodation, not merely by renting a house, but by buying one, and also to the fact that the tenant had taken no real steps to provide himself with alternative accommodation. This view finds support in the case of Chandler v. Strevatt (supra) . It is on the basis of these two rulings that the Gujarat High Court took the aforesaid view. The learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court took the view that the financial position of the landlord and the tenant is irrelevant for determining the question of comparative hardship between the landlord and the tenant.The learned Single Judge referred the following question of law for the consideration of this Court : "Whether the circumstance that one of the parties in an ejectment suit filed on the ground of bonafide and reasonable necessity, has got better financial resources to procure accommodation by hire or purchase or construction, is a relevant fact and circumstance to be taken into consideration for the purpose of Section 14(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 ?" 10. We have given our most anxious consideration to the question of law referred to us by the learned Single Judge. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Kasturbhai & Bors. v. Firm Mohanlal . This view also finds support in Chandler v. Surevatt and Kellev v. Goodwin. The amendment in Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, has brought a sea change in its conception. The phrase "all other circumstances" would definitely include the financial position of the landlord and the tenant for the purpose of determination to the question of comparative hardship. The amendment in Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, has brought a sea change in its conception. The phrase "all other circumstances" would definitely include the financial position of the landlord and the tenant for the purpose of determination to the question of comparative hardship. Thus, a very heavy burden has been cast upon the Courts to decide in each case this delicate question of comparative hardship. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. Each case shall have to be decided on its own merits. 11. The learned Munsiff while deciding the question of comparative hardship took into consideration the financial position of the landlord and the tenant. He also considered that the shop which is in occupation of the plaintiff has to be vacated by him because his landlord is pressing for vacation. The other alternative site on which the plaintiff could build another shop is not in the main Bazar, but is in the side-lane. The learned Munsiff has also taken into consideration that the defendant is employed in a temple and that the running of the shop is not his sole source of livelihood. These findings of fact have been upheld in appeal by the learned Addl. Civil Judge. In the present case, it cannot be said that while deciding the question of comparative hardship the financial position of the plaintiff and the landlord was not taken into consideration. As a matter of fact, this aspect of the case was considered and the two lower Courts have come to the concurrent finding of fact that the comparative hardship would be caused to the plaintiff if the decree of eviction is not passed against the tenant. In Munilal v. Prescribed Authority (supra) it has been held that the finding on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant is a finding of fact, and cannot be assailed in second appeal, before the High Court. 12. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed in limine. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition dismissed. *******