JUDGMENT K. N. Seth, J. In exercise of the powers of requisition under Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) conferred on him the District Magistrate, Nainital, by an order dated August, 25, 1964, requisitioned plot No. 226M, measuring 100 Bighas 9 Biswas, situate, in village Tanakpur, Tehsil Khatema, District Nainital, including a passage 40 feet wide towards east of the plot in between plot Nos. 226M and 232, for erection of a bus station, goods shed, running room and running shed etc., to operate Government's nationalised transport services on the Tanakpur Dharchula route in order to maintain supplies for the army stationed in the border areas. Possession of the land was taken by the U. P. Government Roadways Department on August 28, 1964. Respondent No 3 in Writ Petition No. 6804 of 1974 made an application to the District Land Acquisition Officer, Nainital, claiming a compensation of Rs. 99,800/ for the use and occupation and damages for the land requisitioned till April, 1967 and thereafter a sum at the rate of Rs. 2,600/ per month till possession over the land was restored to him, the U. P. Government Roadways filed an objection to the claim preferred by respondent No. 3. Subsequently a notification dated August 23, 1972, was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act acquiring the land in question. A notification under Section 6 in respect of the said land was issued on October 15,1973. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Nainita), by his order dated June 28, 1974, determined the compensation payable to the claimant at Rs. 2,02,873.82 for use and occupation of the land from the date of his dispossession to August 23, 1972, the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It was further directed that if the amount was not deposited or paid within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, interest at the rate of Rs. 6/ per cent shall be charged on the total amount. The State of Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred by Siction3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, constituted the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) with effect from June 1, 1972, in place of the U.P. Government Roadways. 6/ per cent shall be charged on the total amount. The State of Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred by Siction3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, constituted the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) with effect from June 1, 1972, in place of the U.P. Government Roadways. By a notification dated June 30, 1972, all assets and liabilities of the State of Uttar Pradesh relating to the erstwhile U. P. Government Roadways were transfened to the Corporation, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 6804 of 1974. In this petition a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari has been prayed for quashing the order of the District Land Acquisition Officer dated June 28, 1974. A writ in the nature of mandamus has further been prayed for commanding the respondents not to give effect to the impugned order. In the connected petition, Civil Misc. Writ No. 9046 of 1975, the claimant has prayed for quashing that portion of the order by which his claim for compensation in respect of 5 Bighas 5 Biswas additional land illegally taken possession of under the order of requisition and interest claimed has been refused. Sri S. C. Khare, learned counsel for the Corporation, challenged the validity of the order on the ground that adequate opportunity was not afforded to the Corporation in the quasi judicial proceedings relating to the determination of the compensation payable to the claimant and that the District Land Acquisition Officer, ignoring the principles laid down in Section 30 of the Act, adopted a wrong basis in determining the amount of compensation. In support of the contention that adequate opportunity was not afforded to the Corporation reference was made to the applications dated March 29 and 30, 1974, made by the Corporation and to the ordersheet of the case. We, howe\er, are not inclined to enter into the controversy whether the proceeding before the Land Acquisition Officer is a quasi judicial proceeding and whether adequate opportunity was afforded to the Corporation or whether the District Land Acquisition Officer adopted a wrong basis in determining the amount of compensation as, in our opinion, the Corporation is not entitled to maintain the present petition. The legal character of the order determining compensation under Section 30 of the Act is exactly the same as the award made by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act Under both the Acts the authorities concerned are enpiaed to determine the amount of compensation on the principles set out in ths Acts after miking an enquiry iuto the valae of the land and into the respective rights and interest of the persons claiming compensation. Dealing with the Lgal character of the award under the Land Acquisition Act the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another ( A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500.), observed; "In a sense it is decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the a.vard cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition, if the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer Section 18 gives him the statutory right.of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance." The Supreme Court referred with approval the following observation in Ezra v. Secretary of State(I.L.R. 30 Cal. 36 at p. 86.): "the meaning to be attached to the word "award" under Section 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the examination of the provisions of the law relating to the Collector's proceedings culminating in the award. 36 at p. 86.): "the meaning to be attached to the word "award" under Section 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the examination of the provisions of the law relating to the Collector's proceedings culminating in the award. The consideration to which we have referred satisfy, us that the Collector acts in the matter oi the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Government and not as a judicial officer and that consequently, although the Government is bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded." The High Court then added that such tender once made is binding on the Government and the Government cannot require that the value fixed by its own officer acting on its behalf should be open to question at its own instance before the civil court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council approved the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ezra v. Secretary of State(I.L.R. 32Cal. 605 (P.C.).). In the present case the land was requisitioned by the U. P. State Government for one of its department, namely, the U. P. Government Roadways. During the pendency of the proceeding for determination of compensation the Corporation was constituted with effect from June 1, 1972, in place of the U. P. Government Roadways under the U. P. Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. As mentioned earlier, by notification dated June 30, 1972, all assets and liabilities of the State of Uttar Pradesh relating to the erstwhile U. P. Government Roadwajs have been transferred to the Corporation. The Corporation is as much bound by the decision of the District Land Acquisition Officer made under Section 30 of the Act as it would have bound the State of Uttar Pradesh. Sri Khare contended that the principle laid down in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh's case (supra) is no longer valid as Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, which conferred the right of asking for a reference to the Court against the award of the Collector on the person interested, has been extended to the Land Reforms Commissioner of the State by U. P. Act No. XXII of 1952 which added subsections (3) and (4) to Section 18. In view of the aforesaid amendment the legal character of the award made by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act has undergone a significant change. Shri Khare maintained that it can no longer be treated as a tender or offer n ade by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance and that the same principle should hold good in respect of the determination of compensation made under Section 30 of the Act. We are not impressed by the argument for the simple reason that no change has bfen introduced in Section 30 of the Act and it remains as it was at the relevant time. The declaration of law made by the Supreme Court with regard to the nature of the award made under the Land Acquisition Act, uneffected by the amendment made by the State of U. P., applies squarely to the determination of compensation under Section 30 of the Act. Shri Khare next contended that even if it be assumed lhat the impugned order was binding on the State Government it could not be described as a tender or offer made on behalf of the Corporation which was a distinct legal entity created under a statute. The reasoning is fallacious and wholly untenable. Having succeeded to the assets and liabilities of the State Government during the pendency of the proceedings it is not open to the Corporation to take a different statd from a stand that was open to the State Government. The Corporation is not entitled to raise any new plea which was not available to the State Government. It is as much bound by the Decision of the District Land Acquisition Officei as the State Government would have been if the Corporation had not taken over the assets and liabilities of the State Government. It must, therefore, be held that the Corporation is not entitled to challenge the validity of the impugned order. The maintainability of the petition by the Corporation was also challenged on the ground that the Corporation had a right to apply for referring the matter to an Arbitrator as provided for in the first proviso to Section 30 of the Act. The argument is untenable. The maintainability of the petition by the Corporation was also challenged on the ground that the Corporation had a right to apply for referring the matter to an Arbitrator as provided for in the first proviso to Section 30 of the Act. The argument is untenable. Under the proviso the right to apply for referring the matter to an Arbitrator is conferred only on the person interested in the amount of compensation determined under Section 30. That, right, not being available to the Corporation, the petition could not be thrown out on that ground. The claimant Is also not entitled to any relief in the connected writ petition. Although there appears to be no dispute that only 100 Bighas and 9 Biswas land of plot No. 226M was requisitioned under the order dated August 25. 1964 possession was illegally taken over on an additional 5 Bighas and 5 Biswas. The proceeding in which the impugned order was passed related to compensation of land requisitioned under the Act. The District Land Acquisition Officer was not competent to any compensation for the land which was not the subjectmatter of the order of the icquisition. If the claimant was aggrieved by any illegal Act, his remedy lay before an appropriate Court. The grievance of the claimant with regard to the interest is baseless. The Act does not provide for grant of interest on the amount of compensation determined under Section 30. As regards interest on the failure of the Corporation to deposit or pay the amourt to the claimant within the specified date the District Land Acquisition Officer has already held the claimant entitled to interest at the rate of Rs. 6/ per cent on the tolal amount of compensation determined and no further relief is called for. In the result both the petitions are dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.