ORDER.-This revision is directed against the orders of the Appellate Authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Certain material facts have got to be stated so that the questions involved in the case may be appreciated and considered in the proper light. One S. P. Periasami Nadar was the owner of the property concerned. He leased out the property concerned to A. K. A. Khaja Mohideen Sahib and A. K. A. Mohammed Ismail Sahib, the respondents in this revision. According to the said Periasami Nadar, respondents 1 and 2 herein committed default in the payment of the rents, they sublet portions of the property to Chelladurai Nadar and Jaya Pandia Nadar without his written consent and he required the property for demolition and reconstruction. On these grounds, the said Periasami Nadar instituted proceedings for eviction under the Act in H.R.C.O.P. No. 43 of 1973 on the file of the Principal District Munsif (Rent Controller), Tirunelveli. Respondents 1 and 2 herein contested the petition for eviction and their main contention was that the property demised to them is not a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act and the proceedings instituted under the Act were wholly incompetent. Chelladurai Nadar and Jaya Pandia Nadar, who were arrayed as respondents 3 and 4 before the Rent Controller, were content to plead that they had been in possession of the concerned portions for the last six years to the knowledge of Periasami Nadar and it is not tenable for him to make subletting a ground for evicting the respondents. During the pendency of H.R. C.O.P. No. 43 of 1973, Periasami Nadar died and his legal representatives were brought on record. Chelladurai Nadar, the third respondent before the Rent Controller also died and his legal representatives were brought on record. On an appraisal of the materials on record, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that respondents 1 and 2 herein took on lease only a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act, that the requirement of the landlords of the building for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction is bona fide and that the sub-letting is without the written consent of the landlords. However, the Rent Controller held against the landlords on the question of wilful default. However, the Rent Controller held against the landlords on the question of wilful default. On the basis of the findings rendered by him, the Rent Controller ordered eviction of the respondents before him. 2. A. K. A. Khaja Mohideen Sahib and A. K. A. Mohammed Ismail Sahib, respondents 1 and 2 before the Rent Controller, chose to file an appeal, C.M.A. No. 7 of 1974 to the Appellate Authority (Principal Subordinate Judge), Tirunelveli, against the orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority considered the questions involved after allowing an application, I.A. No. 45 of 1974 whereby an unregistered lease document was sought to be admitted as additional evidence. The said document was admitted and marked as Exhibit B-14. The Appellate Authority mooted out the main question for consideration as to whether the subject-matter of demise between the parties is a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act and found the case in favour of the tenants. All the other questions involved, viz., with regard to the requirement of the premises for demolition and reconstruction practically lost their significance because the grounds for eviction could be urged only if the property demised is a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act. However, the Appellate Authority found the points against the landlords. The present revision is filed against the orders of the Appellate Authority. 3. Mr. K. Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners landlords, submits that the property demised in the present case would come within the definition of ‘building’ under the Act. Though it was pleaded earlier that covered structures were leased out to the tenants for the purpose of conducting a timber shop therein and that subsequently, at the request of the tenants, the roof was removed for the purpose of raising the walls and putting up a new roof by them to suit the convenience of the tenants, it has been now conceded that what was demised was a site with a structure 24’ x 12½ x 9’ of only walls and certain windows and a door and there was no roof over such structures . According to Mr. K. Parasaran, learned counsel for the petitioner, considering the purpose of the demise, these structures would constitute a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act. Learned counsel would rely on the dictum of the Supreme Court in Ghanshiam Das v. Debt Prasad1. According to Mr. K. Parasaran, learned counsel for the petitioner, considering the purpose of the demise, these structures would constitute a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act. Learned counsel would rely on the dictum of the Supreme Court in Ghanshiam Das v. Debt Prasad1. In that case, the Court was concerned with the provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and it was held that a brick kiln with no walls and no roof, but a mere pit dug in the ground with some bricks by its sides is not a ‘building’ within the meaning of section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The discussion of the Court on the question will be better appreciated if the relevant passage is extracted: “The word ‘building’ has not been defined in the Act and must, therefore, be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense unless there is something in the context or object of the statute to show that it is used in a special sense different from its ordinary grammatical sense. In the Webster’s New International Dictionary the word ‘building’ has been defined as follows:” That which is built special: (a) as now generally used as fabric or edifice, framed or constructed, designed to stand more or less permanently and covering a space of land for use as a dwelling, store-house, factory, shelter for beasts or some other useful purpose. Building in this sense does not include a mere wall, fence, monument, hoarding or similar structure though designed for permanent use where it stands, nor a steamboat, ship or other vessel of navigation.“ "From this definition it does not appear that the existence of a roof is always necessary for a structure to be regarded as a building. Residential buildings ordinarily have roofs but there can be a non-residential building for which a roof is not necessary. A large stadium or an open-air swimming pool constructed at a considerable expense would be a building as it is a permanent structure and designed for a useful purpose." 4. It is quite clear from the above that the stress is on the purpose for which the structures are put and demised. A large stadium or an open-air swimming pool constructed at a considerable expense would be a building as it is a permanent structure and designed for a useful purpose." 4. It is quite clear from the above that the stress is on the purpose for which the structures are put and demised. If the structures put up and demised will serve a useful purpose and they were, in fact, demised to serve that purpose, it may be possible to hold that the structures demised could come within the meaning of ‘building’ under the Act. 5. The question as to what would constitute a ‘building’ under special statutes has been considered in the past in a number of judicial precedents, in proceedings under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946). A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Raghava Rao, JJ., in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar1, had to consider a case where the subject-matter of the lease consisted of (1) the site underneath the actual building known as” Gaiety Theatre “ which belonged to the lessee: (2) the small sheds at one end of the premises and (3) all the vacant space within, exclusive of the theatre and the sheds and the question arose as to whether what was let out is a ‘building’ within the definition of the statute. Satyanarayana Rao, J., considered the question as follows: ”A ‘building’ is defined in the Act as meaning ‘any building or hut or part of a building or hut let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes: (a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut, (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut’. This definition is not very helpful in arriving at the meaning of the word ‘building’ as it states that a building means any building. But, what is a building? If we take the derivative meaning of the word ‘building’, it means that which is built. It may be a wall ; it may be a structure not fit for human habitation; it may be anything and not necessarily a house. But, what is a building? If we take the derivative meaning of the word ‘building’, it means that which is built. It may be a wall ; it may be a structure not fit for human habitation; it may be anything and not necessarily a house. The legislature could not have intended to use the word in its derivative sense as it is clear from the object of the Act, which was to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants from residential and non-residential buildings and to control the rents. The inclusion of a hut in the definition and the other indications in sub-clauses (a) and (b) point to the ‘fact that the word is used to denote a structure of the nature of a house intended for human habitation or for using it for non-residential purposes such as carrying on a business. The word ‘building’ is used in several Acts, English and Indian, enacted for different objects and the learned counsel on both sides drew our attention to some of the decisions. Lord Esher, M.R. gives the definition of a building as an ‘inclosure of brick or stone work covered in by a roof. Having regard to the Indian conditions, the inclosure need not necessarily be of brick or stone work. It may consist of mud walls ; but, it must, I think be covered in by a roof. I think this definition accords with the ordinary conception of a building. ...... Dealing with the same word under the Calcutta Municipal Act, section 151, the Calcutta High Court held in Corporation of Calcutta v. Binoy Krishna Bose2, that a boundary or compound wall as not a ‘building’ and that the word was not used in the Act and should not be interpreted in its derivative sense." (Page 717) Raghava Rao, J., dealt with the question by a separate judgment and the approach of the learned Judge on the question involved is better appreciated if the relevant passage in his judgment is extracted. "In my opinion the word ‘building’ is a more generic word than house. A building need have no roof while a house must have. A house is, according to Tomlin’s Law Dictionary, a place of dwelling or habitation which means ordinarily that there must be a roof for it which provides shelter. Of course neither building nor house need be of brick or stone as I have already remarked. A building need have no roof while a house must have. A house is, according to Tomlin’s Law Dictionary, a place of dwelling or habitation which means ordinarily that there must be a roof for it which provides shelter. Of course neither building nor house need be of brick or stone as I have already remarked. It seems to me that even if ‘building’ generally indicated a structure of brick or stone and with a roof as defined by Lord Esher M.R., it may be that definitions under special Acts contemplate a building without a roof and a building not made of brick or stone............ ‘Building’ in the etymological sense means ‘anything built, ‘and there is no reason why if that is the intendment of the legislature in connection with a particular enactment, compound walls with the space inside may not be regarded as a building." ( Pages 727-728) 6. In Official Trustee of Madras v. United Commercial Syndicate1, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamannar, CJ., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., was concerned with a property which consisted of a site enclosed by compound walls on all the four sides with two latrines. The question arose as to whether the property will constitute a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The learned Judges followed the dictum of the earlier Bench in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar2, referred to above and held that mere compound walls enclosing a space cannot in any view of the accepted interpretation of the word ‘building’ be considered as a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act. The learned Judges held that even if the walls and the latrines were included within the scope of the lease, the requirements of the provisions of the Act would not be satisfied. 7. The learned Judges held that even if the walls and the latrines were included within the scope of the lease, the requirements of the provisions of the Act would not be satisfied. 7. A similar question arose for consideration by Jaganmohan Reddy, J., under the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act (XXVI of 1948), in V. Chandramani v. Collector of Visakhapatnam3, and the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, after referring to the ratio decidendi of the Bench of this Court in Irani v. Chidambaram Chettiar2, observed as follows: "From the various authorities cited therein it appears to me that any superstructure which is intended for the use and occupation as a habitation or for purposes of trade, manufacture or commerce or some other structure constituting a fabric or edifice will be deemed to be a building. A mere wall or a fence or a gate enclosing lands certainly cannot come under that definition. From this point of view the market has not only a compound wall enclosing a site but it has structures which can be utilised for commercial purposes via., market. Therefore it comes within the definition of building under section 18 (5) of the Estates Land Act." (Page 869) 8. Ismail, J., in Abdul Azeez and Sons v. Mavali Rajan4, was concerned with a case arising under section 30 of the Act. In that particular case, after surrender of possession of the two halls concerned, the tiled roofing was removed and after the tiled roofing was removed, admittedly what stood were only the walls. The learned Judge, while considering as to whether those walls could not be said to constitute ‘building’ observed as follows: “From the extract given above, it is clear that those walls standing alone would not have constituted a building for human habitation or for non-residential purposes such as carrying on business. Therefore they could not have constituted a ‘building’ as defined in the Act.” I am in respectful agreement with the proposition of law laid down and clarified by the learned Judge. 9. In my opinion, one cannot avoid taking note of the way of modern living. Days have come when entertainment in open-air threatres is conceived and given. It will not be a surprise if man finds a comfortable and healthy living in open air structures, without roofing. 9. In my opinion, one cannot avoid taking note of the way of modern living. Days have come when entertainment in open-air threatres is conceived and given. It will not be a surprise if man finds a comfortable and healthy living in open air structures, without roofing. We could conceive of cases of structures of exemplary architecture and utility without roofing, which could be put to use for very many purposes of utility, both residential and non-residential. Hence to tie down the definition of ‘building’ to only structures having roofings may not be in consonance with the modern notions of living and carrying on trade. That was why the Supreme Court in Ghanshiam Das v. Debi Prasad1 was prepared to consider a large stadium or an open-air swimming pool, which are designed for a useful purpose as a ‘building’, of course within the meaning of section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 10. The real test would be how one party intended to give and how the other party intended to take the structures. If the structures, as they stood and demised, though not with a roofing were so demised to serve a useful purpose, residential or non-residential, as they stood, they may come within the meaning of ‘building’ under the Act. If the structures, as they stood and demised are capable of occupation as falling within the residential class or within the class connected with commercial industry in some way or other, they may come within the definition of ‘building’. If, however, the structures which could not fit with the conventional meaning of a ‘building’ were demised and they could not be occupied and utilised for residential or non-residential purposes as they stood and were demised, they cannot come within the definition of ‘building’ under the Act. Hence, not only the nature of the structures, but also the manner and the purpose for which they were let out and the user for which they were let out as they stood and demised will be the deciding factors depending upon the facts of each case. 11. Now, coming to the facts of the present case, admittedly the structures as they stood and were demised to respondents 1 and 2 herein did not have a roofing. The property consisted of a site with walls of the measurements stated above with certain windows and a door. 11. Now, coming to the facts of the present case, admittedly the structures as they stood and were demised to respondents 1 and 2 herein did not have a roofing. The property consisted of a site with walls of the measurements stated above with certain windows and a door. Equally so, they were not straightway utilised for the purpose for which the lease was taken. It has been brought out in evidence that the tenants made suitable alterations, covered the structures with roofing and made the property fit for occupation for the non-residential purpose for which they took the property on lease. Hence obviously the structures, as they stood and as they were demised, could not serve any useful purpose either residential or non-residential. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-landlords could not point out any material on record which would show that the structures, as they stood and were demised, were taken as they were by the tenants to be utilised straightway for any non-residential purpose. In the present case, the intention of the parties could never be that the demise of the site and structures was as a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act. 12. In view of the well laid down principles of this Court as well as the Supreme Court reference to above, it is very difficult to bring the property which is the subject-matter of the lease in the present case as a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Act. In this view, I have to concur with the finding of the Appellate Authority and discountenance the case of the petitioners-landlords. Hence this revision is dismissed. But, there will be no order as to costs.