Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the first defendant in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession with arrears of rent. The suit was decreed and the decree was confirmed in appeal. 2. The appellant (the "defendant") was the respondent in an by the present respondent (the "plaintiff under S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the "Rent Control Act"). The application was resisted by the defendant on the ground that he disputed the title of the plaintiff. The Rent Control Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to establish his title by means of a suit as mentioned in the second proviso to S.11(1). A suit was accordingly filed by the plaintiff claiming recovery of possession on the basis of title in respect of items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule together with arrears of rent. In decreeing the suit the learned Munsiff directed the plaintiff to approach the Rent Control Court for relief under S.11 of the Rent Control Act. Against that decree an appeal was filed by the defendant and a cross-appeal by the plaintiff It was contended by the plaintiff that the direction to approach the Rent Control Court for relief under S.11 was unsustainable as the civil court bad jurisdiction to grant the relief in terms of that section. The lower appellate court dismissed the defendant's appeal and allowed the plaintiff's cross-appeal. 3. Item 1 of the plaint schedule property is 22 cents of land with a building thereon. It is in respect of that building that the plaintiff seeks eviction of the defendant on the ground of arrears of rent under S.11(2) of the Rent Control Act. There is no building in item 2 of the plaint schedule property. 4. Both the courts having concurrently found, on the basis of correctly appreciated evidence, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the land on the strength of title, I see no ground to interfere with that finding in this second appeal. As far as the building is concerned, the finding that the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant in terms of S. II (2) is also unassailable as both the courts have held that the plaintiff is the landlord of the defendant in respect of the building and that the rents have fallen into arrears. As far as the building is concerned, the finding that the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant in terms of S. II (2) is also unassailable as both the courts have held that the plaintiff is the landlord of the defendant in respect of the building and that the rents have fallen into arrears. Accordingly I confirm the finding under S.11(2) of the Rent Control Act. 5. I shall now deal with an interesting question raised by plaintiff's counsel Sri Subramani. He says that this Court having confirmed the finding of the courts below that the rent has fallan into arrears and that the defendant is liable to be evicted for the reason mentioned under S.11(2), the defendant cannot evade eviction by recourse to the protection mentioned under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of S.11. That protection, according to counsel, is available only when eviction is ordered in proceedings under the Rent Control Act and not when a civil court as in the present case deals with the question in accordance with the second proviso to S 11 (1). 6. I shall read clause (c) of S.11 (2) of the Rent Control Act. "The order of the Rent Control Court directing a tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its direction allow; and if the tenant deposits the arrears of the rent with interest and cost of proceedings within the said period of one month or such further period, as the case may be, it shall vacate that order." The protection of this clause is available wherever eviction is ordered on the ground mentioned under sub-section (2), viz., arrears of rent. 7. A Civil Court has no jurisdiction to order eviction unless it is moved in terms of the second proviso to S.11 (1) or as provided under S.18 (5) read with S.20. 7. A Civil Court has no jurisdiction to order eviction unless it is moved in terms of the second proviso to S.11 (1) or as provided under S.18 (5) read with S.20. The second proviso to S.11 (1) of the Rent Control Act is as follows: "Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim in bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and such Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial docs not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claims unfounded." (italics supplied) 8. In respect of buildings to which the Act applies, the Rent Control Court fully deals with an application for eviction by a landlord whose title is not denied; but where his title is denied, the Act provides for a prima facie finding by the Rent Control Court as to the bona fide nature of the denial of title by a tenant, and if the court comes to the conclusion that the denial is bona fide, the jurisdiction to proceed with the question of eviction is then by the statute conferred upon the civil court. In other words, the civil court, whose jurisdiction was carved out by the statute and conferred upon the Rent Control authorities in respect of matters remitted to them, is re-invested with jurisdiction to the extent mentioned under the second proviso to S.11 (1). 9. In other words, the civil court, whose jurisdiction was carved out by the statute and conferred upon the Rent Control authorities in respect of matters remitted to them, is re-invested with jurisdiction to the extent mentioned under the second proviso to S.11 (1). 9. Plaintiff's counsel contends that the second proviso to S.11 (1) implies that the landlord, the denial of whose title by the tenant is found to be bona fide, is entitled to seek eviction not only on the grounds specified under S.11 of the Rent Control Act, but also on those mentioned under S.111 of the T. P. Act, as well as in cases where the title of the landlord is denied, but the denial does not amount to a forfeiture within the meaning of S.111(g) of the T. P. Act Relying on the last part of the second proviso which says "...notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease...", counsel contends that, where the title of the landlord is denied by a tenant, the jurisdiction of the civil court is revived in its original form and the restraints of the Rent Control Act or of S 111(8) of the T.P. Act are removed. I do not agree for a moment. Any such interpretation, if accepted, would lead to anomalies and defeat the very mischief which the Act is designed to combat. It would result in inequality between a tenant who questions the landlord's title while resisting eviction, and another who resists eviction without questioning the title. In the case of the former, eviction becomes irresistable. If two interpretations of the statute are possible, the one that produces inequality or anomaly must be avoided. 10. The intention of the legislature, as expressed in the second proviso to S.11(1) of the Rent Control Act, is to provide an effective forum for the determination of bona fide disputes as to title arising in proceedings for eviction of a tenant. The provisions of a statute have to be construed according to the legislative intent. The preamble of the Rent Control Act shows that the legislative intent is to regulate the leasing of buildings to which the Act applies. S.11, which con tains a non-obstante clause, says that a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The preamble of the Rent Control Act shows that the legislative intent is to regulate the leasing of buildings to which the Act applies. S.11, which con tains a non-obstante clause, says that a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The second proviso to S.11(1) says that a civil court may, in the circumstances mentioned therein, pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in that section. The civil court in such circumstances assumes jurisdiction even if the denial of title by the tenant does not involve forfeiture of the lease as contemplated in S.111(g) of the T P. Act. But the powers of the civil court are confined strictly to the grounds mentioned in S.11 for the purpose of allowing eviction. The operation of the second proviso only revives the jurisdiction of the civil court, but the law which the court has to apply is strictly the Rent Control Act and not the T. P. Act or any other law. 11. It was not the intention of the legislature by enacting the Rent Control Act to enlarge or widen the rights of the landlord, but to restrict them. It was certainly not intended that the vast right of eviction enjoyed by the landlord under the T. P. Act should either be preserved or widened by the Rent Control Act. It was the vastness of this right under the former Act which was the mischief that was intended to be redressed by the latter Act. 12. It has been found that the plaintiff is the landlord and the defendant is the tenant, and the rent has fallen into arrears. That is a ground for eviction under S.11 (2) of the Rent Control Act, undoubtedly; but only in terms of that sub-section One of the terms is clause (c), the operation of which cannot be avoided by the landlord merely because of the forum in which he has established bis rights. The law applicable for the purpose of establishing title is the general law and that for the purpose of eviction is the Rent Control Act, although the forum for establishing title, and grounds for eviction in cases of bona fide denial of title, is the civil court Once the title is established, eviction can follow only in terms of S.11 of the Rent Control Act. That being the position I am of the view that the tenant is entitled to the protection of clause (c) which allows him time for one month from the date of the order, or such further period as the court may in its discretion allow, to clear the arrears and continue in possession of the building in terms of the lease. The period of one month begins to run from the date on which the order for eviction was made or is confirmed in appeal or revision: 1976 KLT. 911. I make it clear that the appellant tenant shall have one month from the date hereof for payment of the arrears if he wants to avoid eviction. Subject to this, the appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. Dismissed.