JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer dated 15th June, 1977. 2. Brief facts which are relevant for the disposal of this writ petition, are that Prabbati filed a suit against Babu Lal in the court of the Assistant Collector, Lachmangarh, district Alwar, for a permanent injunction with regard to the land in dispute. The contention of the plaintiff was that he has been in peaceful cultivatory possession of the suit land and that the defendant Babu Lal be restrained from interfering with his possession. This suit was filed of 21st December, 1974. An application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was also filed praying that the defendant be restrained from interfering with possession of the plaintiff. An interim injunction was issued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant of 28th December, 1974. The defendant put in appearance and opposed the ex parte injunction order. The Assistant Collector vacated the interim injunction order of 19th February, 1975. The plaintiff feeling aggrieved against the order of the Assistant Collector, dated 19th February, 1975, filed an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar. An application was also moved before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority praying that the operation of the order dated 19th February, 1975 be stayed. On 6th March, 1976, an application for appointment of a receiver was moved before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority. Alwar under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. An ex parte receiver was appointed. The defendant-respondent opposed the ex parte appointment of the receiver. After hearing the parties, the order appointing receiver was vacated of 31st March, 1976, and the appeal which was filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. Prabhati plaintiff filed a revision petition of 7th April, 1976 under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar dated 31st March, 1976. Along with the revision petition an application for stay was also moved, praying that the operation of the order dated 31st March, 1976 be stayed. The revision petition was listed before the learned Single Member of 8th April, 1976 for admission and stay. Arguments were heard and judgment was reserved. On 20th April, 1976, the revision petition was dismissed in limine. The revision petition was listed before the learned Single Member of 8th April, 1976 for admission and stay. Arguments were heard and judgment was reserved. On 20th April, 1976, the revision petition was dismissed in limine. Feeling aggrieved against this order of the Board of Revenue, Prabhati filed a review petition on 23rd June, 1976. The review was admitted for hearing of the 19th August, 1976. Notice was ordered to be issued to the other side. The review petition was allowed on the 15th June, 1977. It is against this order of the Board of Revenue that the present writ petition is directed. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent Prabhati has contended that the writ petition is not maintainable against an interlocutory order. He has placed reliance of B.S. Prakasa Rao v. Govt. of A.P. (A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 15) Deoria Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of U.P. (A.I.R. 1954 All. 497) , and Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398). In Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division , it has been observed that:- "Although ordinarily the Supreme Court would not entertain an appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the High Court in the writ proceedings pending before it yet it would interfere with such orders when exceptional and unusual features in the case presented before it warrant such interference." 4. It has also been observed in the above ruling that:- "One of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the High Court of certiorari may be invoked is an error of law apparent of the face of the record and not every error either of law of fact, which can be corrected by superior court, in exercise of its statutory powers as a court of appeal or revision." 5. In Deoria Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of U.P. (A.I.R. 1954 All. 497), it has been observed that:- "Merely because a decision may be incorrect of the ground that the inferior court wrongly interpreted some provisions of law, or, has wrongly applied some provision of law which was not applicable, in arriving at its decision, it cannot be said that the court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, or, has committed an error apparent on the face of the record of proceeding which justify interference by issue of a writ of certiorari." 6. The view taken in B.S. Prakasa Rao v. Govt. The view taken in B.S. Prakasa Rao v. Govt. of A.P. (A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 15) , is in no way different from what has been expressed in the above rulings. 7. In reply to this preliminary objection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order of the Board of Revenue is patently erroneous and the error is apparent on the face of the record. It was also contended that the Board of Revenue has acted illegally in adopting a procedure which was not warranted by law. Reliance was placed of N. Marulappa v. State, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 46 It was also contented that a review petition has three stages, and the learned Member of the Board of Revenue did not follow the procedure laid down in O.47, CPC. Reliance was placed on Maji Mohan Kanwar v. State, A.I.R. 1967 Raj 264 8. Respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have been considered and the record of the case carefully perused. 9. The Assistant Collector, Laxmangath, vacated the ex parte injunction order on 19th February, 1975, holding that the defendant is in possession of the land in dispute. On appeal, the Revenue Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 31st March, 1976 and directed the receiver to hand over the possession of the suit land to the defendant. The revision petition filed before the Board of Revenue under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was dismissed in limine of 20th April, 1976. As the revision petition was dismissed in limine there was no occasion for calling for the record of the lower courts. The review petition was admitted of 19th August, 1976. A notice was directed to be issued to the other side, but the record of the lower court was not called for. The review petition was accepted of 15th June, 1977 and the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority was set aside and the receiver was directed to continue of the suit land As the revision was dismissed in limine, the order accepting the review could normally have been the admission of the revision petition. The revision petition itself had to be heard with notice to the parties and to be decided of merits. The revision petition itself had to be heard with notice to the parties and to be decided of merits. In the instant case the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority has been set aside on the review side without hearing the parties on merits and without examining the record. The order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue, is patently erroneous on the face of the record, because both the lower courts had held the defendant to be in possession of the land in dispute, and an order appointing a receiver under the provisions of Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act had to record reasons as to why receiver has to be appointed. Without reversing the decision of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority a receiver could not have been appointed unless the pre-requisites laid down in Section 212, Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 are satisfied. The appointment of a receiver under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is solely governed by Section 212 of the Act and is different from the appointment of receiver under O. 40, R. 1, CPC. 10. In N. Marulappa v. State (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 46) , the following observations have been made : "The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the sole ground that it is against an interim order. Even an interim order of injunction must be in accordance with law, particularly when the Chairman of the Tribunal assigns reasons for holding that it is not a fit case for granting an interim order. In the instant case, the majority decision is not a speaking of and, therefore, void. It is not only void but also perverse because the Statutory presumption is in favour of the land holder. This is one of the innumerable illustrative cases to demonstrate that a Tribunal consisting of Members who are incompetent to understand the law and the facts, is in no way different from a Tribunal composed of Members who are based against one of the parties. " 11. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the learned Member, Board of Revenue exercised the jurisdiction under O.47, R.8, CPC, in the instant case. Firstly, the revision had to be admitted and Secondly, the parties to be heard on the revisional side with reference to the record of the learned lower courts. This has not been done in the present case at all. Firstly, the revision had to be admitted and Secondly, the parties to be heard on the revisional side with reference to the record of the learned lower courts. This has not been done in the present case at all. We are constrained to observe that the procedure adopted by the learned Member, Board of Revenue is in flagrant violation of the mandatory provisions of O.47, Rules 4, 7 and 8 CPC. As the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue is manifestly erroneous and the error is apparent on the face of the record, we hereby allow this writ petition. The order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue dated 15th June, 1977 is hereby quashed. The revision petition shall be deemed to have been admitted for hearing by the order dated 15th June, 1977. The revision petition shall be heard and decided on merits. 12. If in pursuance of the order dated 15th June, 1977, a receiver was Appointed and the possession of the suit lands was taken over, the receiver shall hence forth cease to function. If the receiver has already leased out the land for this harvest, then the lease shall continue for the present harvest only. 13. The amount of mesne profits, which has been deposited with receiver, shall be given to the petitioner. This order shall not in any way preclude the non-petitioner Prabhati from moving an application for appointment of receiver, or for any other equitable relief As and when such an application is moved before the competent authority, the same shall be heard and deposed of on merits. The petitioner hence forth shall not alienate, sell of dispose of any part of the suit lands. 14. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 15. The record summoned and received from the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer, shall be returned immediately. Sd/Kudal J. Sd/R.L. Gupta J. 17.8.78 Hon'ble Kudal, J.This case was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Kudal and late Hon'ble Gupta J. Soon after the conclusion of the arguments, the judgment was dictated in the open court. Before the judgment could be typed and signed Hon'ble Gupta J. expired. The transcript of the judgment dictated in the open court having been typed has now been signed by me. Before the judgment could be typed and signed Hon'ble Gupta J. expired. The transcript of the judgment dictated in the open court having been typed has now been signed by me. In pursuance of Rule 88 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, the Judgment is being placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice for a direction to the Registrar of the High Court to seal the judgment and to append a note to that effect at the end of the judgment. Sd/P.D. Kudal.The judgment was dictated and delivered in the open court by the Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.D. Kudal and the late Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.L. Gupta at Jaipur Bench of 1st August, 1978. The signature of the late Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.L. Gupta, could not be obtained on the judgment because of his sad demise of 9th August, 1978. Sd/Registrar 8-9-78 *******