Judgment :- 1. In an application filed under S.80B of Kerala Act I of 1964, for purchase of a kudikidappu and the land adjoining thereto, the revision petitioner (person in possession of the land) contended that the applicant was possessed of other lands exceeding ten cents. The applicant's status as a kudikidappukaran was thus questioned. But no evidence was adduced to establish this plea, and therefore the Land Tribunal allowed the purchase. In appeal before the Appellate Authority also, the same process was repeated i.e. the plea was raised, but without evidence in support. Naturally, that Authority dismissed the appeal. Hence this revision. 2. In this Court, two documents have been produced, along with C.M.P. No. 10955/ 76 These show that the applicant/kudikidappukaran bad obtained 15 cents of land under the will of his father, registered in 1969. There is no indication as to when the father died and when the son became entitled to the land. The two sale deeds are of the years 1975 and 1976; and between these, the entire 15 cents have been transferred away. The application before the Land Tribunal was made in 1972. The Appellate Authority's order was on 23 21976. Thus, the 1st respondent must have become the owner of the land at least when the matter was pending before the Appellate Authority. 3. Relying on the decision in Purushan v. Prakasan (1977 KLT.10), ii is urged by the revision petitioner that the acquisition of 15 cents is sufficient to disqualify the applicant, and to hold that he is disentitled to an order of purchase. The above case had also arisen from a purchase application under Sec 80 B. The kudikidappukaran and his wife had acquired 85 cents of land while the purchase application was pending before the Land Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application notwithstanding evidence of the above acquisition, but the Appellate Authority reversed the order. This decision of the Appellate Authority was confirmed by my learned brother Balagangadharan Nair J. on the ground that a supervening event, altogether destroying the applicant's character as a kudikidappukaran, can be taken note of even by the appellate or revisional court. The Tribunal allowed the application notwithstanding evidence of the above acquisition, but the Appellate Authority reversed the order. This decision of the Appellate Authority was confirmed by my learned brother Balagangadharan Nair J. on the ground that a supervening event, altogether destroying the applicant's character as a kudikidappukaran, can be taken note of even by the appellate or revisional court. But before so confirming, the learned judge adverted to the provisions of S.75 (1) (iv) of the Act and recorded the finding: "The type, extent and distance of the land acquired by the petitioner satisfy these tests, which means that he has incurred the liability to eviction." In the present case, however, similar facts are not established. It is not shown that the 15 cents which the first respondent got under the will "is fit for erecting a homestead". Nor is it shown that the land is within five kilometres from the kudikidappu. 4. In Cannanore Dist. Motor Transport Employees Co-operative Society Ltd v Malabar Public Conveyance (1962 KLT. 446), a Full Bench of this Court had observed: "An appeal, no doubt, is in the nature of a rehearing. But that does not mean that it is in the nature of a fresh trial, with freedom to the parties to press into service every event that has occurred since the decision under appeal. All that an appellate power spells is a power to consider on the merits the decision of a lower court or tribunal. There is of course a type of subsequent event which a court of appeal has to take into account in moulding the relief to be granted: the death of a party, a change of law (AIR. 1941 F. C. 5), a judgment in rem (AIR. 1957 SC 875 .This is a restricted category 5. Purushan's case turned mainly on the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders (AIR 1975 SC. 1409). There a landlord had applied for eviction of a tenant under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 on the ground that he required the premises for his automobile spares business. While the matter was pending in revision, certain "material events of fatal import to the maintainability of the eviction proceedings" came to the notice of the court: the landlord had come into possession of another shop. While the matter was pending in revision, certain "material events of fatal import to the maintainability of the eviction proceedings" came to the notice of the court: the landlord had come into possession of another shop. The court held that the pre-requisite for the entitlement of the landlord to institute and continue the eviction proceedings bad ceased to exist; and this view was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Krishna Iyer J. who spoke for the court said. "first about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a. fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." Note the cautious approach. The right to relief must normally be judged with reference to the date of instituting the proceedings; and the supervening event, if any, has to be brought to the notice of the court diligently. The right to relief must normally be judged with reference to the date of instituting the proceedings; and the supervening event, if any, has to be brought to the notice of the court diligently. Equity may justify departure from the normal rule in certain cases, for promoting sustan-tial justice. Other disentitling factors or just circumstances have to be kept in mind, and special circumstances "repelling resort to that course in law or justice" have also to be taken note of. Even then, only cautious cognisance of such events can be taken, and that too, to ensure that the remedy or right is "in accord with the current realities". The decision does not lay down a universal rule that subsequent events of "fatal import" must always be taken into account, irrespective of the circumstances. As the Supreme Court itself has often observed, there are no absolutes in law, because life, which it serves, is relative 6. That leads to an examination of the facts available here. The subsequent event has not been brought to the notice of the court with due diligence. The applicant could have obtained the 15 cents any time between 1969 and 1975. The petitioner was urging before both the authorities below that the kudikidappukaran was possessed of other lands; but he could adduce evidence in support of it only in 1976, and that too, before this Court. There is nothing to show that the applicant was aware of the legacy and was pretending ignorance about it. None could be sure of a bequest till the testator's death; and the applicant was not the only legatee also His conduct could not therefore be frowned upon in equity. And by the time the subsequent acquisition is brought to the court's notice, he has also parted with the land. The current reality is that he will be left without a homestead, if his application were to be dismissed. That will not amount to promoting substantial justice. That will not also make the remedy just and meaningful. The problem of finding a homestead for the applicant, which the legislature wanted to solve, will only revive thereby; and I cannot merely decree its non-existence. That will not amount to promoting substantial justice. That will not also make the remedy just and meaningful. The problem of finding a homestead for the applicant, which the legislature wanted to solve, will only revive thereby; and I cannot merely decree its non-existence. Unlike Purushan's, the present is not a case where the applicant has purchased a substantial extent of land with his own means The legacy might have been a windfall Again, the land obtained by him is no longer available. Its location, type and suitability, in the context of S.75(1)(iv), have also not been established. On the facts, therefore, the case is distinguishable. 7. In my view, the circumstances are not sufficient to "bend"' the normal rule, when cautious cognisance is taken of the subsequent event. I would therefore adhere to the normal rule and dismiss the C.R.P., but without costs. Dismissed.