JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal by the tenant-defendant (hereinafter called the defendant) against a decree of eviction passed in Ejectment suit No. 1302 of 1968 of the City Civil court, Calcutta. 2. THE suit relates to one room and a cooking space in premises No. 162/1, Bipin Behari Ganguli Street. The defendant is living there as a tenant under the plaintiff at a rental of Rs. 18/-per month payable according to Bengali calendar. There is no dispute with regard to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. There is also no dispute with regard to the month of tenancy or the rate of rent. The case of the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter called plaintiff) in the suit was briefly this :- Plaintiffs are the owners of the suit premises. The plaintiffs formerly used to reside in a portion of the premises while the husband of plaintiff No. 1 was alive. After his death in January 1967 she moved to her father's place for temporary shelter. The plaintiffs are finding it increasingly inconvenient to continue to live at her father's residence. They require the suit premises for their own use and occupation the tenancy of the defendant has been determined by the service of a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act along with Section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act. The defendant contested the suit. He denied the service of notice and also challenged the legality thereof. The plea of reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs for their own use and occupation has also been denied. The positive case of the defendant is that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the suit premises and that the suit has been instituted because the defendant did not agree to enhancement of rent. On these pleadings the following issues were settled : - (1) Has the notice to quit been served on the defendant ? Is it legal, valid and sufficient ? (2) Do the plaintiffs reasonably require the premises in suit for her own use and occupation ? (3) Are the plaintiffs entitled to a decree for ejectment and khas possession against the defendant ? (4) Are the plaintiffs entitled to a decree for mesne profits ? (5) To what other relief or reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled under law and equity ? 3. (3) Are the plaintiffs entitled to a decree for ejectment and khas possession against the defendant ? (4) Are the plaintiffs entitled to a decree for mesne profits ? (5) To what other relief or reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled under law and equity ? 3. THE learned Judge found upon a consideration of the evidence that the plaintiff was living with her father and that the accommodation available there in the plaintiff's father's family was inadequate. The requirement of the plaintiff to occupy this disputed premises for their own use and occupation was found to be reasonable. Service of notice to quit was not disputed at the trial. The notice was found to be valid and sufficient. 4. A point was taken by the defendant that the plaintiffs were not the owners of the disputed premises in, as much as they are thika tenants in respect of the lands on which the structure stands. The disputed building was found to belong to the husband of the plaintiff No. 1. The learned Judge did not accept the defence contention that the plaintiffs ceased to be owners of the premises solely because they were thika tenants in respect of the land an which the structure stands. It transpired in evidence that one room was let out at a rental of Rs. 45/- per month after the death of the husband of plaintiff No. 1. The learned Judge was not inclined to accept the defence contention from this circumstance alone that the real object of the plaintiffs was to relet the suit room in the occupation of the defendant at a higher rate of rent. It was further suggested during the trial that the disputed house being a bustee area it was not possible for the plaintiffs to reside there. This contention too was overruled on a finding that the plaintiffs were in fact residing in the same building prior to the death of the husband of plaintiff No. 1. Having come to the finding that the plaintiffs were the owners and that they required the suit premises for their own use and occupation and that the defendant's tenancy had been determined by the service of a valid notice to quit, the learned Judge decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, directing the defendant to quit and vacate within three months from the date of the decree. 5. 5. THE defendant has preferred this appeal. In view of the decision in the case of B. Banerjee vs. Anita Pan a. I. R. 1975 SC page 1146 the plaintiffs filed an application for amendment of the plaint praying for incorporating an averment in the plaint that the plaintiffs were not possessed of any other reasonably suitable accommodation. The prayer was allowed by this court and the defendant appellant was given opportunity to file additional written statements. The defendant however did not prefer to file any. Thereafter an additional issue to the following effect was framed :- "are the plaintiffs landlords in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation ?" parties adduced further evidence on the issue thus framed. 6. FROM the evidence recorded in the trial court it appears that the husband of plaintiff No. 1 Abani Das and his elder brother inherited two houses, one at 162/1, Bipin Behari Ganguly street (suit premises) and the other at gokul Baral Street and that by a partition between the brothers, the house at bipin Behari Ganguly Street fell to the share of Abani Das. A deed of partition Ext. 5 was produced in support of the case. Mr. Panda appearing for the defendant did not contest the fact that the structure belonged to Abani Das. He however resisted the plaintiffs' claim for khas possession on two fold grounds namely, that the plaintiffs do not reasonably require the premises and that they were not the owners of the premises and thus not entitled to a decree for khas possession on the ground of reasonable requirement for their own use and occupation. The positive case sought to be made out by Mr. Panda by way of cross-examination of plaintiff No. 1 rekha Das is that a room a fairly big one with a varandha, which had earlier been let out to one Ramsundar Barik has since been vacated by Ram Sundar and that the plaintiffs are in actual possession of the same though it is temporarily kept under lock and key. This at once takes us to a consideration of the additional issue and the additional evidence that has been adduced in this Court. It was suggested to Rekha Das plaintiff No. 1 that the middle room of the structure was let out to one Ram Sundar Barik after she had left the premises after her husband's death. This at once takes us to a consideration of the additional issue and the additional evidence that has been adduced in this Court. It was suggested to Rekha Das plaintiff No. 1 that the middle room of the structure was let out to one Ram Sundar Barik after she had left the premises after her husband's death. She admitted the suggestion and it was next put to her that she recovered possession of that room about 3 or 4 years ago which she denied. The room is lying under lock and key and admittedly the plaintiffs are not getting any rent in respect of the same. She denied the suggestion that she had purposely kept the room under lock and key. On the contrary her evidence is that the room has been kept under lock and key by the son of Ramsundar at the instance of the defendant himself. The defendant also has been examined and he has said that the middle room vacated by Ram Sundar is now in the occupation of the plaintiff who has kept it under lock and key. Mr. Panda also drew our attention to a question put to rekha Das in cross-examination; it was asked if she had any witness to prove that the middle room is not in her occupation. She said "yes" but did not examine any witness. Mr. Panda wanted to contend therefore, that she was afraid to adduce evidence on the point. We are not however impressed with this contention. It was not possible for the plaintiff to adduce affirmative evidence to prove a negative fact namely that she was not in possession. It was for the defendant appellant to prove the fact if he wanted to. The suggestion that Ram Sundar has vacated and that the key is with the plaintiffs appears to be improbable and an after thought. If it was really so one would reasonably expect the defendant to come up with the story at the earliest opportunity. What is relevant for consideration of the question whether the plaintiffs reasonably require the premises or not is the state of things as existing at the time of hearing. If the defence suggestions were true then the defendant should have stated on his own that the plaintiffs have in the meantime come into possession of a big room and that their requirement would be adequately met thereby. If the defence suggestions were true then the defendant should have stated on his own that the plaintiffs have in the meantime come into possession of a big room and that their requirement would be adequately met thereby. He did not. What is more, even after the amendment of the plaint in this behalf, the defendant though offered an opportunity to file an additional written statement did not do so. The plea that the plaintiffs are in actual possession of the middle room cannot be accepted. We therefore find the additional issue framed in this Court in favour of the plaintiffs. 7. MR. Panda conceded however that she having been compelled to reside in her maternal grand-mother's house after her husband's death, requirement for own use and occupation could not be said to be unreasonable. We find upon a consideration of the evidence adduced in the trial Court read with the evidence here that the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises for their own use and occupation. 8. BUT the more important point on which Mr. Panda resisted the claim is the plea that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the premises. In view of the amended provisions of Section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, a plaintiff in order to be entitled to a decree for eviction against a tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement must also show that he is the owner thereof. The appellant's contention is that the plaintiffs' predecessors were thika tenants of the land on which the structure stands and that therefore they cannot be treated as owners of the premises. P. W. 1 Rekha das has admitted in her evidence that the land was taken settlement but that they are the owners of the structures. Ext. 5 is a copy of the deed of partition between the husband of plaintiff no. 1 and his elder brother. It shows that the land on which the structure stands is a thika land. Bearing these facts in mind let us now consider the appellant's contention regarding ownership of the premises. Ext. 5 is a copy of the deed of partition between the husband of plaintiff no. 1 and his elder brother. It shows that the land on which the structure stands is a thika land. Bearing these facts in mind let us now consider the appellant's contention regarding ownership of the premises. The expression 'premises' is defined in Section 2 (f) of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act as follows :- (f) 'premises' means any building or part of a building or any hut or part of a hut let separately and includes- (i) the garden, grounds and out houses, if any, appertaining thereto, (ii). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 9. UPON a reference to this definition Mr. Panda has contended that since the plaintiffs have a limited interest in the surface land, they can not be the owners of the premises. The premises in suit, or in other words the subject-matter of the tenancy, is a portion of the building which undoubtedly belongs to the plaintiffs. This ownership of the structure is not a limited ownership. The definition of the expression "premises" makes it abundantly clear that the primary and material thing is the building itself or part thereof let separately. The reference to gardens, grounds, and outhouses relate to such frounds etc. in excess of the building itself, it there be any but appertaining to it. The ownership referred to in Section 13 (1) (ff) must be relatable to the subject matter of the tenancy. There can be no doubt that the plaintiffs are the owners of the same. Any other interpretation would amount to stretching and straining the language to an unresonable extent. It is inconceivable that there is no owner of the building. For obvious reasons the owners of the surface land can not be the owners of the building. The position might have been different if the plaintiffs were themselves trespassers and had no right to build on the land. But they had a right to build on it and therefore the ownership of the building itself must be found with them. 10. MR. The position might have been different if the plaintiffs were themselves trespassers and had no right to build on the land. But they had a right to build on it and therefore the ownership of the building itself must be found with them. 10. MR. Panda however referred to a decision in the case of Sahadev vs. Monmotho, 75 C. W. N. page 979, and contended on the authority thereof that the' plaintiffs could not be called the owners of the premises. This was a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court who found on the facts of the case and on the authority of an earlier decision in the case of Yogomaya pakhira vs. Santisudha Bose, I. L. R. (1968) 2 Cal. page 17, that the expression owner' must be given its ordinary connotation or usual meaning, that is, a person having full and absolute ownership of the disputed property and would not include a permanent lessee. It was accordingly found that the plaintiffs who were thika tenants were not entitled to a decree for eviction under Section 13 (1) (ff)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act. The case of Yogomaya Pakhira on which the learned Judge relied for the finding that the plaintiff was not the owner is however distinguishable. That, was a case where the plaintiffs suing the tenant in eviction were themselves lessees in respect of the disputed premises. It does not appear from the decision whether the plaintiff in that case was a thika tenant of the land but owner of the structure. Another case Nisikanta Roy v. Monmohan Sengupta, 77 C. W. M. page 424, was relied on by Mr. Panda. The facts of that case were entirely different. There the plaintiff himself was a tenant of the first degree in respect of two flats each consisting of two bed rooms. In terms of a decree for eviction against the plaintiff, he was required to vacate one fiat and deliver possession thereof to his landlord. Of the two rooms in the other flat, one had been let out by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff brought the suit for eviction of the defendant on the ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. Of the two rooms in the other flat, one had been let out by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff brought the suit for eviction of the defendant on the ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. It thus appears from the facts stated above that the plaintiff himself was a tenant in respect of the premises and the defendant who he was suing was a subtenant under him. There could be no question of the plaintiff being the owner of the premises in such circumstances even though the plaintiff was the landlord of the defendant. 11. BY reason of the view we have taken regarding the definition of the word 'premises' we are unable to find that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the premises in suit which admittedly belongs to the plaintiffs. With respect to the learned single Judge we are unable to accept the view expressed by him in the case of Sahadev vs. Monmotho (supra). Such a view, in our opinion does not follow from the bench decision in the case of Yogomaya Pakhira (supra) as held by him. We therefor hold that the plaintiffs are the owner of the structures and for the matter of that the disputed premises. 12. THE service of notice to qui or the validity thereof was not challenged before us We have seen the notice Ext. 1 and the postal acknowledgement. We find that the tenancy of the defendant had been duly determined. Accordingly there is nothing to resist a decree for eviction. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the Court below are hereby affirmed. The defendant appellant is given three months time to vacate the premises. Parties to bear their own costs in the appeal except as directed in the order dated 7.1.77. Anil K. Sen, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed.