Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to revise the order of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Madurai, functioning as the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority ordered the eviction of the respondent from the premises in question on the application tiled by the petitioners. While ordering eviction, the Rent Controller gave three months time to the respondent herein to vacate the premises. When an appeal was preferred by the respondent-tenant, while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the appellate authority gave one years time to vacate and surrender possession to the petitioners herein. It is this grant of one years time that is challenged in the present civil revision petition by the landlords. 2. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the authorities functioning under the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 had no jurisdiction to grant more than three months time in the aggregate to a tenant to vacate and surrender possession of the property. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the second proviso to S. 10 (3)(a) of the Act, which provides that the maximum time which the Rent Controller may give to a tenant for vacating the premises is only three months. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is countered by the learned counsel for the respondent putting forward two contentions. The first contention is that the second proviso to S. 10) (3)(e) has no application to any order except an order of eviction passed under S. 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The second is that the order of eviction in the present case has been passed under S. 14(1)(b) and to such an order the second proviso to S. 10(3) (e) has no application. 3. As far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is concerned, I have no hesitation in rejecting the same. S. 10(3)(e) with the two provisos read as follows— “JO (3) (e). 3. As far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is concerned, I have no hesitation in rejecting the same. S. 10(3)(e) with the two provisos read as follows— “JO (3) (e). The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide , make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller, and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application; Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c), the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord; Provided further that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the land-lord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed these months in the aggregate”. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that because the first proviso refers to clause (c), the second proviso must be taken to be the proviso to the first proviso, and that therefore, that proviso also will apply only to an order of eviction passed under S. 10 (3)(c). I am unable to accept this contention. In the first place, the first proviso to S. 10(3)(e) deals only with rejection of the application and does not deal with the allowing of an application, and therefore, the question of giving time to the tenant does not arise. Secondly, the presence of the words “provided further” occurring in the second proviso makes it clear that the said proviso is a proviso to S. 10(3)(e) itself and not a proviso to the first proviso to S. 10(3)(e). Hence there is no substance in the first contention. 4. The second contention, as I have pointed out already, is based on the language contained in S. 14 (1)(b) of the Act. The order of eviction in the present case has been passed by the appellate authority under S. 14 (1)(b) of the Act. Hence there is no substance in the first contention. 4. The second contention, as I have pointed out already, is based on the language contained in S. 14 (1)(b) of the Act. The order of eviction in the present case has been passed by the appellate authority under S. 14 (1)(b) of the Act. That is a provision under which a landlord is entitled to obtain possession of the building from the occupation of the tenant on the ground that the landlord requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction. S. 14(1) (b) states— “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Ss. 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.” 5. There is no proviso to S. 14(1)(b) corresponding to the second proviso to S. 10 (3)(a). It is in view of this alone that the learned counsel for the respondent contended that there is no limitation whatever on the length of the time that can be given by the Rent Controller, when an order of eviction is passed under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. As against this, the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that to construe the provisions in such a way will defeat the very purpose of the order passed by the Rent Controller, because S. 14(1)(b) itself contemplates the landlord requiring the building for the immediate purpose of demolition. When such immediate purpose is accepted by the Rent Controller and the Rent Controller while ordering eviction gives an unduly long time the very immediate purpose of demolition for which alone the order for eviction is passed will be defeated. 1 find that there is considerable substance in this contention. When such immediate purpose is accepted by the Rent Controller and the Rent Controller while ordering eviction gives an unduly long time the very immediate purpose of demolition for which alone the order for eviction is passed will be defeated. 1 find that there is considerable substance in this contention. If I am to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent the position will be that there is no limitation whatever on the length of time that may be given by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority in relation to an order for eviction passed under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. But, that could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Certainly, when the Legislature is silent with reference to a matter, the court cannot add anything to it. At the same time the court has an obligation to construe a statutory provision reasonably consistent with its object. If the object for which eviction is ordered under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act is taken into account, the only conclusion the Court can come to is that in order to alleviate any hardship or suffering to which the tenant may be subjected, the Rent Controller is entitled to give a reasonable time to him and that reasonable time can be fixed as three months in the aggregate on the analogy of the second proviso to S. 10 (3) (e) of the Act. If the various grounds mentioned in S. 10(3) are taken into account along with the second proviso to S. 10(3)(e) there appears to be no justification for providing for a longer time, when an order for eviction is passed under S. 14(1)(b). Therefore, after considering the scheme of the Act as well as the purpose for which an order for eviction is prayed for and granted under S. 14 (1) (b) of the Act, and taking into account the second proviso to S. 10(3)(e) in the context of the grounds on which eviction can be ordered under S. 10 (3), I am of the opinion that it is reasonable and fair to construe that even when an order for eviction is passed under S. 14(1)(b) the aggregate time which the Rent Controller can give is only three months. If so, the appellate authority cannot grant any time like one year in the present case. 6. If so, the appellate authority cannot grant any time like one year in the present case. 6. Hence, the civil revision petition is allowed, and the direction of the appellate authority granting one year time to the respondent herein for vacating the premises in question will stand set aside. There will be no order as to costs. 7. Since three months time from the date of the order of the appellate authority has already expired, the learned counsel for the respondent prays for one more months time and the learned counsel for the petitioners has no objection to give one months time. Accordingly the respondent will have one months time from this date to vacate the premises in question.