( 1 ) THIS revision petition under section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is instituted by the original landlord and is directed against the judgment dated 22-7-1974. passed by the learned. Second additional District Judge, Dharwar in H. R. C. Appeal No. 95 of 1973 on his file confirming the order of dismissal of the petition for eviction instituted by the landlord passed by the learned Munsiff on 5-4-1973 in HRC 26 of 1970. on his file. ( 2 ) THE landlord instituted action for eviction of the tenant under clauses (h) and (p) of the proviso to section 21 (1) of the Act. He averred in the petition that the tenant had secured another building in which he was running his hotel and so he was liable for eviction under clause (p) of section 21 (1) of the Act. He further averred that he required the suit premises bona fide and reasonably for his personal occupation. His family was growing and he wanted to accommodate one of his sons in business in the suit premises. The tenant however, resisted the requirements of the landlord. ( 3 ) THE learned Munsiff, appreciating the evidence on record, held that the claim made out under clause (p) of section 21 (1) of the Act by the landlord was established. But even so, he dismissed the petition taking the view that the lease was for a fixed period of 15 years and the period was not over and so the landlord was not entitled to approach the Rent Control Court for eviction of the tenant. The landlord took the matter in appeal before the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge, as stated above, has confirmed the order of the learned munsiff by his order dated 22-7-1974. The learned District Judge has not, however, considered the matter on merits. He has affirmed the findings of the learned Munsiff that the lease period was not over and as such the landlord was not entitled to recover possession from the tenant. Aggrieved, by the order of the learned District Judge, the present revision petition is filed under section 50 of the Act. ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of the revision petition, the landlord died and his legal heirs are brought on record. Aggrieved, by the order of the learned District Judge, the present revision petition is filed under section 50 of the Act. ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of the revision petition, the landlord died and his legal heirs are brought on record. ( 5 ) SRI V. Tarakaram, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, vehemently contended that though the period of lease was not over when the matter came up before the learned Munsiff and the learned District Judge, the said period was now over by efflux of time. The lease commenced from 1-9-1962. It was for 15 years. Therefore, the lease expired by efflux of time on 1-9-1977. We are now in September, 1978. Therefore, it is evident that even the period of lease is over and the tenant is only continuing as statutory tenant. The learned counsel strenuously argued that this factor has to be taken into consideration while considering the merits of this case The learned counsel for the respondent, no doubt resisted the arguments advanced by Sri Tarakaram. ( 6 ) THE only point therefore that arises for my consideration in this revision petition is:"whether this Court is competent to take into consideration the subsequent event viz. , that the period of lease has run out and the tenant continues as a statutory tenant from 1 9-1977 ?" ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioner invited my attention to a decision in the case of Ranvijaya Shahi v. Bala Prasvd Motani (1), wherein a division Bench of the High Court has, after reviewing several decisions on this point has come to the conclusion that the Court is bound to take subsequent event viz. , that the lease has run out by efflux of time, into consideration. Paras 18 and isa of the judgment deal with this aspect. No possible defence could be raised against the admitted fact that the lease runs out by efflux of the time on 1-9-1977. That is what has happened in the case cited above. It is observed at para 18 in the Patna Case thus :"the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent has drawn our attention to some decisions on the point. In the case of Gajadhar v. Khas Mahatdih Colliery Co. That is what has happened in the case cited above. It is observed at para 18 in the Patna Case thus :"the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent has drawn our attention to some decisions on the point. In the case of Gajadhar v. Khas Mahatdih Colliery Co. 1959 BLJR 376 ( AIR 1959 Pat 562 ) an imperfect title had been perfected during the pendency of the suit, and it was taken int6 consideration. The learned judge has followed an earlier decision in the case of Ram Nurain Das v. Governor General in Council, AIR 1947 Pat 263. The Supreme Court took notice of a probate granted subsequent to the filing of the suit and acted on that basis in the case of Surindar Kumar v. Gian chand AIR 1975 SC 875. In case of Laxi and Co. v. Dr, A. R. Deshpande (1975)1 SCJ 641 ( AIR 1973 SC 171 ) the learned judges of the Supreme Court have indicated the circumstances in which a Court can take notice of subsequent events. In the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Abdul Khan AIR 1970 pat 338 , a Bench decision of this Court it was held that even subsequent rights or new cause of action can be taken into consideration at the time of final adjudication provided that there should be no valid defence. Reliance was placed therein on some of the decisions which have been mentioned earlier. This was a case very near to the facts of the present case, almost on all fours. It was a case of termination of lease with a renewal clause. The learned judges found that the opinion for renewal had not been exercised and there was thus no possible defence to ejectment on the ground of the termination of the lease by efflux of time. We respectfully agree with the principle of law laid down therein. "that being so, I have no hesitation to hold that this C ourt can certainly take into consideration the subsequent event that the lease in the present case has expired by efflux of time on 1-9-1977 and that the tenant continues as a statutory tenant in order to effectively adjudicate the proceedings between the parties and to do substantial justice between them (vide P. Venkatesaralu v. The Motor and General traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 . ( 8 ) IT was mainly on the ground that the lease had not expired that the courts below had dismissed the petition of the landlord for eviction of the tenant. In fact my attention was drawn to the fact that the learned Mu siff has given a finding in favour of the landlord under clause (p) of sec 21 (1) of the Act. The learned District Judge, however, in appeal has not considered this aspect, as he thought that he could dispose of the matter on the other point namely, that the lease was not terminated. That being so, now that I have held that the lease is by now determined by efflux of time, it would be necessary to send back the case to the learned District Judge to consider the matter on merits and dispose of the appeal in the light of the observations made above. ( 9 ) IN the result, the revision petition is allowed. The case is remitted back to the learned District Judge Dharwar with a direction that he should now take the case on file and after giving notice to the concerned parties, dispose of the same on merits viz. , whether the landlord is entitled to possession of the suit premises under clause (h) or (p) or under both of Section 21 (1) of the Act. No costs. --- *** --- .