Order.-These two civil revision petitions have been preferred against the common judgment of the learned Chief Judge (Appellate Authority), Court of Small Causes at Madras, dismissing the ejectment appeals filed before him and granting a further period of thirty six months from the date of his order, viz., 30th April, 1975, for payment of the compensation due to the landlord fixed by the trial Court. By a judgment dated 17th July, 1972, the trial Court which directed the landlord to sell the sites in the occupation of the tenants to the latter at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per ground, further permitted the tenants to pay the value in three years, spread in equal monthly instalments, with interest thereon. This period of three years would have come to an end on 16th July, 1975. However, the learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes who heard the appeals preferred against the common judgment passed by. the learned Second Judge of Court of Small Causes as trial Judge, extended the time for payment by a further period of three years from 30th April, 1975, vis., the date on which he delivered the judgment. Though the word ‘extended’ is not used by the appellate Judge, the effect of his order granting a further period of three years from the date of the judgment is to extend the time granted by the trial Court. 2. The question to be considered in these revision petitions is whether the appellate Court had the jurisdiction to extend the time for payment beyond the period of three years from the date of the order of the trial Court which it confirmed. I am of the opinion that it cannot. 3. Section 9 (1) (b) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act lays down: "On such application, the Court shall first decide the minimum extent of the land which may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment by the tenant. The Court shall then fix the price of the minimum extent of the land decided as aforesaid, or of the extent of the land specified in the application under clause (a) whichever is less. The price aforesaid shall be the average market value of the three years immediately proceeding the date of the order. The Court shall then fix the price of the minimum extent of the land decided as aforesaid, or of the extent of the land specified in the application under clause (a) whichever is less. The price aforesaid shall be the average market value of the three years immediately proceeding the date of the order. The Court shall order that within a period to be determined by the Court, not being less than three months and not more than three years from the date of the order, the tenant shall pay into Court or otherwise as directed the price so fixed in one or more instalments with or without interest ." It appears to me that the Court can grant time to a tenant for the payment of the price fixed upto a period of three years, and not beyond. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that this date is to be computed from the date of not only the order of the Court of first instance, but also of the order or judgment of the appellate Court as well as the revisional Court. If this argument is accepted, there would be no outer limit for payment by a tenant. Suppose, the trial Court grants a period of three years in the first instance, and an appeal is filed from the order of the trial Court and is pending for a period of five years, and the appellate Court, at the end of it, pronounces the judgment confirming the order of the trial Court and in doing so grants a further period of three years for payment, what would follow? The tenant would gain 5 + 3, eight years. A revision may be filed against that order and it may be pending for another period of five years, and if the revisional Court grants a further period of three years, the tenant would gain 5 + 5 + 3, thirteen years. In certain circumstances, there may be an appeal to the Supreme Court also and if the period is to be extended further, what would follows? These are the consequences that have to be visualised if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is to be accepted and it is held that the date of the order contemplated in section 9 (1) (b) is the date of the final order of the ultimate authority. These are the consequences that have to be visualised if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is to be accepted and it is held that the date of the order contemplated in section 9 (1) (b) is the date of the final order of the ultimate authority. That would indeed be the tenant’s paradise! However, I am unable to stretch the words of section 9 (1) (b) to mean what the learned counsel for the respondents contend that they mean. 4. In Panchapakesan v. Swaminathan1, Ramaprasada Rao, J., has observed with reference to the first time the entitlement of the tenant to claim the benefits under the Act was given a judicial recognition, that: "It is his specificity in the event that is pressed into service by Mr. Sundaram Iyer when he says that it is only that date, when the rights of the tenants under the Act are affirmed which enters into the computation for purposes of fixing the price of the land to which the tenant would be entitled in accordance with the provisions of the Act and that date alone has to be taken into account. If the argument of Mr. Balasubrahmaniam is accepted it would be difficult to find any other alternative specific date for the ascertainment of such price. It may be that appeals or other proceedings before the higher hierarchy may be filed by the landlord opposing the conferment of such a statutory benefit on the tenant and the appellate Court or the Court of revision might take some time before deciding whether the tenant is entitled to such benefits or not." The learned Judge has further laid down that: "Such ambulatory and indefinite methods of fixation of price of land to be allotted to a tenant in view of his entitlement under the provisions of the Act has to be necessarily avoided if a definite date is available for such fixation. Such a date for fixation of the price, in my view, would reasonably be the date on which the tenant’s entitlement to compensation is first recognised by a competent Court which hears the matter and decides on it. Of course, if at any time another competent Court in the higher hierarchy sets aside the directive of the Courts below that the tenant is not entitled to such an entitlement, then the matter is closed. Of course, if at any time another competent Court in the higher hierarchy sets aside the directive of the Courts below that the tenant is not entitled to such an entitlement, then the matter is closed. But if the judgments of the higher Courts are judgments of affirmance then such orders or judgments obviously relate back to the date of the order of the first competent Court which decided on the entitlement of the tenant under the Act. As a specific definite and unambiguous date is available for valuation of the land to be purchased by the tenant pursuant to his entitlement under the Act, I am of the view that the date for fixation of such price should relate back to the date when the Court, in the first instance, recognizes and confers such a right on the tenant and cannot be relegated to any other uncertain, ambulatory and ambiguous date." 5. No doubt, this decision turned upon the question regarding the date that should determine the fixation of the price. But the ratio of this case is applicable also to the date of the order referred to in section 9 (1) (b) as the date from which the period of three years referred to therein is to be reckoned. 6. In fact, this has been made clear by Ramaprasada Rao, J., himself in C.R. P. Nos. 607 and 608 of 1975 (disposed of on 20th January, 1976) Varadan v. Pappammal1, wherein the learned Judge has observed that: "Under section 9 (1) (b) Courts are powerless to grant time to tenants for the payment of the price fixed by them beyond the period of three years, from the date of the order in which they so fix the price as well as delineate the minimum extent of the land which should be allotted to the tenant to enable him to purchase the same. This outer limit is unalterable. This outer limit is unalterable. That this is the true intent and import of this period fixed under section 9 (1) (b) of the Act is also clear from a fair reading of section 9 (2), under which the Court is no doubt empowered to excuse the delay in payment of the instalments as directed by the Court, but the legislature has taken the precaution of reiterating that, when the Court excuses such delay and passes any order consequent thereupon, it should not extend the time for payment "beyond the three years abovementioned". The phrase "abovementioned" has a relation to the time-limit prescribed by section 9 (1) (b) which fixes the outer limit of not more than three years from the date of the order made under section 9 (1) (b).Section 9 (2) read in conjunction with section 9(1) (b) would not obviously entitle the civil Court seized in such matters to excuse the delay in the payment of the price as fixed by the Court beyond the period of three years from the date of the order." 7. Following the ratio of the decision cited above, I am of the opinion that the period of three years within which the tenant should pay into Court the market value fixed by the Court should be commuted from the date of the order of entitlement, viz., the order of the trial Court in the instant case. Therefore, the judgment of the learned Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, is modified, and the respondents herein are granted three years’ time from the 17th of July, 1972 for payment of the market value, which lias been fixed by the Courts below. If the amount has not already been paid the respondents will not be entitled to have a sale deed executed in their favour by the revision petitioner. 8. The revision petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.