JUDGMENT This Rule was issued on the opposite party to show cause why the application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act filed along with the memo of appeal should not be allowed. While issuing the Rule Chittatosh Mukherjee J. issued an Ad-interim order of stay which was made effective till the hearing of the present application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. A condition was imposed upon the petitioner and that condition, I learn from the learned Advocate for the petitioner has been complied with. 2. Now, the question is whether the ad-interim order of stay should be continued till the admission of the second appeal. The learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party submits that under the amended Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of order 41 rule 3A. I have no power to grant stay of execution of the decree so long as the matter is not heard out under order 41 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as there is an express prohibition in the Code itself, rule 3A of Order 41. It is true that reading the provisions of order 41 rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure the procedure to be adopted is that stay of execution of the decree against which the appeal is filed should not be granted until the appeal itself is admitted under order 41 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Would this provision of the Code limit my powers u/s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant ad-interim stay if the facts and circumstances of a particular case necessitate for ends of justice ? 3. Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the opposite party has placed several decisions before me to substantiate his contention that when there is any express provision in the Code. I cannot exercise my inherent power under section 151 of the code contrary to that provision. Reference may be made in this connection to the case (1) Nainsingh v. Noonwar AIR 1970 SC 997 at page 999. Therein it has been held that the court cannot make use of section 151 CPC where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and neglected to avail himself of the same. Reference may be made in this connection to the case (1) Nainsingh v. Noonwar AIR 1970 SC 997 at page 999. Therein it has been held that the court cannot make use of section 151 CPC where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and neglected to avail himself of the same. In the facts and circumstances of that case where a remedy was available to the party by way of appeal under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that remedy being not availed of by the party concerned the inherent power could not be exercised. 4. The next case is (2) Union of India v. Ram Charan (deceased) through his legal representatives, AIR 1964 SC 215 . There also the power under section 151 was sought to be exercised where the remedy was by way of an application under Order 22 rules 4 and 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that the power under section 151 could not be exercised when there is a specific provision in the Code itself for getting the remedy. The third case relied upon is (3) Mrs. Nomita Dhar v. Dr. Amalendu Sen, Calcutta High Notes, 1977 P. 87. In this case the plaintiff opposite party instituted a money suit against the defendant petitioner. The petitioner had filed a written statement. Thereafter on the application of the opposite party the court directed the petitioner to make discovery of documents and the petitioner made the discovery. Upon another application made by the opposite party for further discovery the court directed the petitioner to make further discovery. The petitioner filed to comply with this direction. Thereupon the court rejected the written statement suo motu and fixed the suit for ex-parte hearing. The petitioner filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure for review of the order rejecting the written statement. This application was rejected and the petitioner obtained a rule against the said order of rejection. As the impugned order is appealable, the order could not be challenged under section 151 of the Code and hence under order 11 rule 21 no revisional application could be preferred against it. In that case the petitioner did not come up to the High Court after the order striking out the written statement was made. As the impugned order is appealable, the order could not be challenged under section 151 of the Code and hence under order 11 rule 21 no revisional application could be preferred against it. In that case the petitioner did not come up to the High Court after the order striking out the written statement was made. He filed an application under section 151 of the Code which was held to be completely misconceived and it was held that the court could not exercise inherent power to give remedy to the petitioner in that case. 5. In the case (4) Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal AIR 1962 SC 527 , it has been held that since section 151 of the Code itself provides that nothing in the Code shall he deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice." In the face of such a clear statement it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the court; it is a power inherent in the court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognises the existence of the inherent power of the court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limit of the Code. Now as the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation between the parties and consequently for providing the procedure for them. Therefore, where there is no provision or remedy provided in the Code itself to do justice, the inherent power can be exercised. In this case it is true that there is prohibition under order 41 rule 3A C.P.C. but then that prohibition, cannot be construed as an absolute prohibition, because cases may arise where it will be doing injustice to deny the stay of the execution of the decree appealed against. In this case it is true that there is prohibition under order 41 rule 3A C.P.C. but then that prohibition, cannot be construed as an absolute prohibition, because cases may arise where it will be doing injustice to deny the stay of the execution of the decree appealed against. In the instant case I find that the delay in filing the appeal has been property explained and moreover execution proceedings being Title Execution Case No. 17 of 1977 have been started and unless stay is granted of that execution case, the appeal will become infructuous and opportunity will be denied to the petitioner to avail of the remedy to which he has a right under the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, I condone the delay in filing the appeal and order that the memo of appeal be registered if it is otherwise in form and in the meantime until it is heard under Order 41 of Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stay is granted of the Title Execution Cases No. 17 of 1977. The Rule is accordingly made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.