JUDGMENT 1. THE Opposite party, the pre-emptor, by his deed of purchase dated April 12, 1972 became a co-sharer with one Sanat Kumar of the holding No. 407, of P. S. Haripal, mouja Prasadpur District Hooghly. Sanat by a kobala dated February 20, 1973 sold his undivided share to the petitioner herein, the pre-emptee. On the allegation that notice of the sale was fraudulently not served on him nor had he any knowledge of the sale earlier than December 16, 1974, the premptor filed an application on January 21, 1975 before the learned Munsif, Second court, Chandannagore for transfer of the said share to him on deposit of the consideration money and compensation under Section 8 of the West Bengal land Reforms Act, 1955. The application was opposed by the pre-emptee on the ground of limitation, as the application was not filed within the statutory period of three months from the service of notice under Section 5 (5) and no fraud was committed in regard to service of notice. Further the pre-emptee claimed that he had made substantial improvements in the land by digging a tank in a portion thereof and making, it suitable for cultivation with the earth therefrom while providing for irrigation incurring expenses of Rs. 2000/- only. These facts were known the pre-emptor who had come up long after the statutory period to grab the property since made valuable and the application in the circumstances should be dismissed. 2. DURING trial, it transpired that the pre-emptee had taken all steps for service of notices at the time of registration of his kobala as required under section 5 (4) filing requisite notices giving particulars of the transfer with process fees mentioning the name of the pre-emptor as the co-sharer of the holding in his purchase deed. The trial court found that there was no fraud on the part of the pre-emptee in respect of notice and all steps as required under section 5 (4) were taken by him. As there was a presumption of regularity of official acts, the pre-emptor having taken no steps to rebut the presumption about fraud in matter of service of notice and affixation of notice, he was not entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act. The application was accordingly dismissed. As there was a presumption of regularity of official acts, the pre-emptor having taken no steps to rebut the presumption about fraud in matter of service of notice and affixation of notice, he was not entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act. The application was accordingly dismissed. On appeal it was held that there could be no presumption of service on the applicant on the evidence of the pre-emptor that no notice was served on him and in the absence of the production of the orders of the Registrar for service of notice with further endorsement that such notice had been served. It was held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied, so that the application was not barred by limitation which is three years from the date the right to apply accrues. The appeal accordingly succeeded and the pre-emption was accordingly allowed. This rule is directed against this order. It is now settled law that the limitation for any application in court under any Act, not otherwise provided for, is governed by Article 137 of the limitation Act 1963 which provides for three years time from the date of accrual of the right to apply. Accordingly for a non-notified co-sharer the limitation for an application in Court, if there was no service of sale of a portion of the holding; on the other co-sharers as required in law for any reason whatsoever, will be three years from the date of completion of such sale. If therefore the pre-emptor's case about non-service of notice of sale is proved the application would not be barred by limitation 3. WE have seen that the pre-emptee took all steps to requisite for service of notice under section 5 (4)along with the registration of the document. These provisions are similar to those contained in sections 12 and 13 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 in respect of notices of transfer, voluntary or in execution of a decree, on the landlord. The Privy Council in Jitendra nath v. Monmohun, 34 C. W. N. 821 had no hesitation in presuming, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the procedure laid down by sections 12 and 13 of the Act was duly followed, and that proper statutory notice was given of various incumbrances and execution sales on the landlords concerned. Mr. The Privy Council in Jitendra nath v. Monmohun, 34 C. W. N. 821 had no hesitation in presuming, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the procedure laid down by sections 12 and 13 of the Act was duly followed, and that proper statutory notice was given of various incumbrances and execution sales on the landlords concerned. Mr. Baksi learned Counsel for the pre-emptee, strongly relied on this case in contending that the trial court was entitled to presume due service of statutory notice on the co-sharer of the holding and mere oral statement would be insufficient to rebut such presumption. 4. THE Court is entitled to presume official acts being duly performed in absence of evidence to the contrary. In this case we have the categorical denial of the service by the pre-emptor and such denial is obviously within his personal knowledge. Accordingly it is permissible in law to hold that the presumption has been rebutted by the pre-emptor so that it will not be legal to proceed on the basis of presumption which would otherwise be sustainable as when, for example, there was some postal endorsement. As has been contended by Mr. Das Gupta appearing for the pre-emptor, it is not possible for the pre-emptor in this case to prove a negative presumption while it appears, the pre-emptee being in possession of relevant papers can take out sub-poena calling for the relevant records to establish his case of service of notice on the pre-emptor in the usual course of official work. If there was any official endorsement of service it would be on the pre-emptor to call for relevant records as also serving person to disprove service which is not the case here. Mr. Baksi referred to section 5 (4) of the Land Reforms Act providing for the different modes of service of notice of transfer, namely (i) personal service on co-sharers, (ii) affixing a copy thereof in the office of the registering office or the court or the office of the Revenue Officer as well as (iii)affixation of a copy of notice on the holding. The different modes of service in Clause (ii) seem to be alternative but mode of service must take place according to all the modes (i), (ii) and (iii) as cited above. Mr. The different modes of service in Clause (ii) seem to be alternative but mode of service must take place according to all the modes (i), (ii) and (iii) as cited above. Mr. Baksi submitted that it will be easy for any pre-emptor to deny service of notice in respect of any of the three modes laying all burden on the pre-emptee to establish his case. It, however, does not appear that the pre-emptor will be in a position to deny modes (ii) and (iii) from his personal knowledge so that there is no apprehension of any unnecessary burden of onus on the pre-emptee. 5. THE next contention is in regard to improvements that may have been made on the land under pre-emption. Mr. Baksi drew our attention to section 26f (3) of the Bengal Tenancy act which empowers the court to direct the applicants for pre-emption to pay in addition to the deposit of consideration and compensation, any amount as the court thinks reasonable, paid by the pre-emptee for payment of rent or for annulling encumbrances. In Ajay kanta Vs. Sushila Sundari 47 C. W. N. 184. Henderson J. held that although there is no provision in section 26f to this effect in respect of improvements the pre-emptor is liable under the ordinary law to pay for improvements made by the purchaser since his purchase, if the purchaser can prove facts which would establish an equity in his favour. 6. MR. Baksi fairly conceded that the view taken by Henderson, J. has not been accepted by earlier as also later decisions of this Court. In Secretary of Slate Vs. Sukh Chand AIR 1934 cal. 749, M. C. Ghosh, J. observed that the court has no discretion to make an order of pre-emption on payment of the value of improvements. In Kishori mohan v. Sudhamoyee AIR 1952; Cal. 353, S. K. Sen, J. observed, applying the well known law of construction, that the express mention of one thing implies exclusion of another, and this rule applies to a case under Section 26f which excludes attraction of Section. 82 which provides for improvements payable to a tenant on the passing of an eviction decree against him. The same view was taken in Sailendra Vs. Purnender 74 C. W. N. 897 in a case for pre-emption under the West Bengal non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949. The Full Bench in Madan Mohan Vs. 82 which provides for improvements payable to a tenant on the passing of an eviction decree against him. The same view was taken in Sailendra Vs. Purnender 74 C. W. N. 897 in a case for pre-emption under the West Bengal non-agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949. The Full Bench in Madan Mohan Vs. Sishu Bala 76 C. W. N. 1058 also held that the pre-emptor was not required under Section 26f of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 to deposit amount along with application for improvements on the disputed lands. Mr. Baksi however referred to the provisions of Section 9 of the Land reforms Act which enable the pre-emptee to "prove the consideration money paid for the transfer and other sums, if any, properly paid by him in respect of the lands including any sum paid for annulling encumbrances created prior to the date of transfer, and rent, revenue, cesses or taxes for any period" and the Munsif may direct the pre-emptor to deposit such further amount before directing the transfer and vesting of the share of the holding to and in him. It was submitted that this specific provision not to be found in the Bengal tenancy Act, entitles the pre-emptee to compensation for improvements made on the land. 7. ON persual of the relevant provisions of the Land Reforms Act it appears that the "other sums" referred to therein must be sums properly paid by the pre-emptee in respect of the land including sums for annulling encumbrances, rent, cesses etc. and 'pay' means to give what is due i.e. by and large a crystalised sum due on the estate on the date of transfer except rent, taxes etc. Such sums appear to be related to or be similar to those like rent, cesses, taxes or revenue or required for annulling encumbrances or like demands on the estate while "improvement" find no mention in the Act. So that costs of improvements on lands made by the pre-emptee are not allowable to him in law in the event of preemption of such lands. 8. THE provisions also do not mean or imply any sum that may be spent by the pre-emptee for improvements on such land will be included within "sums properly paid by him in respect of the lands". 8. THE provisions also do not mean or imply any sum that may be spent by the pre-emptee for improvements on such land will be included within "sums properly paid by him in respect of the lands". Further there is no power conferred on court or procedure prescribed in respect of such expenditure to determine if they were "properly paid" by the pre-emptee apart from the question of quantum of improvement costs. In absence of any provision express or implied, it is not possible to extend the provisions of the act to sums spent by the pre-emptee for improvements in respect whereof his decision is final and not amenable to scrutiny by Court. Though there may be some inequity in bonafide cases in respect of the pre-emptee by disallowing the costs of improvements, such costs again may be so high or colossal as to defeat pre-emption altogether to which the pre-emptor may otherwise be entitled in law. This situation is contrary to the purposes of the Act. Accordingly it is obvious that a pre-emptee is not entitled to any expenditure for improvements on the lands under preemption made or effected by him. Mr. Baksi submits that if the court considers that the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act has been rebutted by the denial of the pre-emptor about the service of notice of sale, the pre-emptee should be given an opportunity to adduce evidence from the records of the connected Government Offices to establish such service. The prayer appears to be reasonable and in interest of justice. The rule accordingly is disposed of directing the trial court to allow an opportunity to the pre-emptee to establish from government records that notice of sale was duly served on the pre-emptor with like opportunity to the pre-emptor to adduced evidence in rebuttal. After such evidence is adduced by the parties the application for pre-emption will be disposed of by the learned munsif on all materials on record in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The rule is disposed of as above but there will be no order for costs in the circumstances. Order accordingly.