ORDER P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The High Court issued notice in this case to the accused to show cause why the sentences awarded in S.T. No. 10 of 1977 by the Additional Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Kozhikode should not be enhanced. It came to the notice of this court that in a series of cases of prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the sentences passed against the accused were contrary to proviso to S.16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Prior to the amendment by Act 34 of 1976 that proviso specified the period of imprisonment of six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000 as minimum and any imposition of sentence below the minimum could be only on the court being satisfied that there were adequate and special reasons, and such reasons had to be mentioned in the judgment. Without indicating any special reason sentences below the minimum have been imposed in several cases. Subsequent to the amendment by Act 34 of 1976, even if adequate and special reasons are shown the sentence of imprisonment shall not be less than three months and there is no discretion therefore to sentence below that minimum. The case here is one where the commission of the offence was subsequent to the amendment of S.16 by Act 34 of 1976. Therefore, even if adequate and special reasons had been shown, the court had no option to sentence the accused to a term of imprisonment of less than three months. But in this and in other similar cases in respect of which also similar revisions have been taken up by this court under S.401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the court is seen to have imposed lesser sentence. The sentence in this case is one of imprisonment till the rising of the court and payment of tine of Rs. 500 and in default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for six months. 2. There are three accused in the case. The complainant before the Chief Judicial Magistrate was the Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation. He is said to have purchased 750 gms., of rice from the stock kept for sale in the business premises of second accused, a firm by name "General Trading Company". 2. There are three accused in the case. The complainant before the Chief Judicial Magistrate was the Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation. He is said to have purchased 750 gms., of rice from the stock kept for sale in the business premises of second accused, a firm by name "General Trading Company". The first accused who is the managing partner of the firm is said to have sold the said rice to the Food Inspector, On the information that the said rice had been purchased by the second accused firm from M/s Maghjee Malsee Private Limited of which the third accused is said to be a Director the third accused has been made a party. The rice so purchased was sampled in accordance with the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration and Rules in the presence of the first accused and witnesses. The sample was sent for analysis and on such analysis it was found that it was adulterated. Hence complaint was lodged for prosecuting the accused under the provisions of the Act. The accused were sought to be made liable under S.16(1)(a)(i) and S.7(i) read with S.14 and 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It appears that the case was posted to 1st April 1977. On 31st March 1977 the Advocate for the accused moved an application to advance the case for hearing to that day and since all the accused were present before court and they were willing to admit the offence, the case was advanced to 31st March 1977 and taken up for disposal that day itself. When the learned Magistrate read out the substance of the charge to the accused they pleaded guilty and prayed for pardon. The learned Magistrate convicted the accused and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. Apparently the accused had no grievance against this. 3. Under the proviso to S.16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the court would be justified in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months in this case only for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment. Even so the sentence of imprisonment shall not be less than three months and fine shall not be less than Rs. 500. What is awarded is below this minimum. Even so the sentence of imprisonment shall not be less than three months and fine shall not be less than Rs. 500. What is awarded is below this minimum. Even for imposing the said minimum reasons which are special and adequate have to be shown and those have not been shown in this case. In Crl. R.P. 8 of 1977 this court had occasion to consider the scope of the term special and adequate reasons. This court said: "11. The purpose of making an exception to the normal rule of punishment under the Road Traffic Act in England is more or less similar to the purpose of the provision in the proviso to S.16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Considering the nature of the Act, the object of the provision imposing punishment and the scope of the exception clause in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, I think the decisions adverted to earlier speaking on the scope of the term 'special reasons' may furnish material guidance in understanding the scope of that term as used in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. That the punishment should be severe and deterrent in view of the very serious evil consequences on the public by the practice of adulteration is evident from the scheme of the Act as also its background. The court is given a range from which to choose the sentence and judicial discretion calls for exercise within that range. Therefore when the court feels that there are mitigating circumstances there is ample scope for exercise of discretion within the permitted range. Mere projection of mitigating circumstances should not by itself, persuade the court to accept it as special reason and to sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment or fine less than the minimum. That should be only on the court finding that special reasons which are also adequate reasons to exist in a case. The guidelines may be stated thus: 1. reason must be special to the offence and not to the offender; 2. 'special reason' is one which is special to the facts of the particular case, that is, special to the facts which constitute the offence; 3. it must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance; 4. it must in law not amount to a defence to the charge; 5. it must be directly connected with the commission of the offence; and 6. 'special reason' is one which is special to the facts of the particular case, that is, special to the facts which constitute the offence; 3. it must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance; 4. it must in law not amount to a defence to the charge; 5. it must be directly connected with the commission of the offence; and 6. the matter is one which the court ought properly to take into consideration when imposing punishment. 12. There may be special reason shown in a case and the court may be satisfied that it is so But that again does not by itself justify application of the proviso to S.16(1) of the Act. While the reason may be good as a special reason it may not be adequate. The expression adequate means sufficient to meet the requirement. Therefore merely because a special reason is shown and that is relevant the punishment cannot be reduced applying the proviso. Whether it is adequate or not must ultimately depend on the assessment by the court taking into account the nature of the reasons urged and the attendant circumstances." 4. It is contended for the accused in this case that when this court seeks to exercise the revisional power under S.401 of the Code it may exercise the power of a court of appeal under S.386 and that power, in a case where the appeal is for enhancement of sentence, includes power to acquit or discharge the accused. Hence it is said that it is open to the accused in this case to plead for acquittal. The accused have been heard on such plea. 5. All the three accused pleaded guilty. In the case of the third accused despite the plea there appears to be no scope for conviction. S.17 of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act deals with offences by Companies. For the purpose of that section a Company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals. This is the provision in explanation (a) to sub-s.(4) of S.17. S.17 of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act deals with offences by Companies. For the purpose of that section a Company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals. This is the provision in explanation (a) to sub-s.(4) of S.17. S.17(1) provides that where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company the person, if any, who has been nominated under sub-s.(2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Where no person has been so nominated, every person, who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company is liable and in addition the company is also liable. In this case the firm is not shown to have nominated any person under sub-s.(2) of S.17. Every person who, at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and responsible to the company must be found to be guilty. The third accused is a Director of the firm Maghjee Malsee Private Limited. If the 3rd accused is to be liable as the person in charge of the company Maghjee Malsee Private Limited that must be indicated in the charge. It is strange that the complaint does not even indicate the name of the person who is sought to be made liable as person in charge. It must be remembered that the punishment to be imposed on a person in charge of a company in case he is found guilty is one of imprisonment and fine and there cannot be a sentence of imprisonment of a person described only as "a director" of a company without indicating further who that person is. There may be many Directors in Maghjee Malsee Private Limited and a person described as Director of Maghjee Malsee Private Limited cannot be sentenced to imprisonment. In other words, the complaint suffers from the very fundamental infirmity that the name of the 3rd accused necessary to identify him as the accused has not been shown. 6. There may be many Directors in Maghjee Malsee Private Limited and a person described as Director of Maghjee Malsee Private Limited cannot be sentenced to imprisonment. In other words, the complaint suffers from the very fundamental infirmity that the name of the 3rd accused necessary to identify him as the accused has not been shown. 6. Equally relevant is the fact that the complaint does not disclose any offence against the 3rd accused The only mention that is found in regard to the 3rd accused is "A-3 is the name furnished by A-1" under S.14A. Merely because a name was furnished by the first accused and that happens to be the name of the 3rd accused (as I stated earlier it is not even a name) the 3rd accused cannot be made liable. Even if all averments in the charge are admitted there would be no offence as against the 3rd accused. Pleading guilty will not, under such circumstances, render a person liable to punishment. Therefore as against the 3rd accused there is no scope for conviction. In this view such conviction and sentence are set aside 7. In the case of accused 1 and 2 there is no scope for going into the merits of the case so long as the plea of guilty stands. The circumstances under which a court will be justified in acting upon such a plea are considered by this court in Crl. R. P. 306 of 1977. In that context this court said thus: "S.251 of the Code provides that when, in a summons case, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which be is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge. It is agreed by both sides that it is S.251 that is applicable to the facts of the case here. S.252 provides that if the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. Evidently the conviction of an accused on a plea of guilty is not automatic and does not follow merely because such plea is made. S.252 provides that if the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. Evidently the conviction of an accused on a plea of guilty is not automatic and does not follow merely because such plea is made. Despite the plea the court has to judicially consider whether the conviction would be warranted and that is where there is scope for exercise of the discretion of the Magistrate. Various factors may have bearing on whether, despite the plea by the accused that he is guilty, he has to be convicted or whether the case has to be tried and disposed of on the evidence that may be taken at the trial. The duty cast upon a court to decide whether the plea by the accused that he is guilty should be the sole basis for conviction is a solemn duty, the exercise of which calls for due care and caution. If the Magistrate has reason to feel that the plea entered by the accused is not voluntary he has to probe further into the matter and he is to act upon such plea only if he is fully convinced that the accused pleaded guilty of his own free will. Equally relevant is the case where a court has reason to feel that the accused may not have understood the charge fully, the facts as well as the inference drawn from the facts stated in the charge. It is possible that the accused may not be properly advised because of the situation in which he is placed. May be he entered plea of guilty assuming that the consequence may not be serious. In short, except in a case where the court feels that the plea of guilty made by the accused was made under the circumstances where he was well advised as to what he was pleading and was well aware of the consequences of his plea, the court may not be justified in acting upon such plea and convicting the accused without any evidence. It is only when there is a genuine plea of guilty made freely and voluntarily that the bar under S.375 of the Code would apply. There may be instances where the facts averred or pleaded by the prosecution do not amount to an offence. It is only when there is a genuine plea of guilty made freely and voluntarily that the bar under S.375 of the Code would apply. There may be instances where the facts averred or pleaded by the prosecution do not amount to an offence. Pleading by the accused that he is guilty does not preclude him from filing an appeal against the conviction. That is because his plea may amount only to the admission of facts averred by the prosecution which, even if true may not be sufficient to constitute an offence." Whether a plea is found to have been made voluntarily or not will depend upon an assessment of relevant circumstances and factors. Whether the accused had opportunity to understand the charge, its implications and the consequences in law of pleading guilty are relevant. If the accused assumed that by pleading guilty he would get a lighter sentence that may not by itself be sufficient to go back upon the plea of guilty. The accused in this case are evidently wordly-wise businessmen who must be taken to be familiar with the fact that objectionable adulteration, if proved, will result in punishment including sentence of imprisonment. They are represented by counsel in court, They moved to have the case advanced and heard. They voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charge. Possibly knowing of the practice of the court in other similar cases of awarding light sentences the accused desired an early disposal and therefore, moved for advancing the case. Even assuming that to be the case here I will not be justified in reopening the plea of guilty and ordering a trial as pleaded by counsel for accused 1 and 2. It is said that the charge is not sufficiently clear. The trial was summary and the charge was read over to the accused. There is no case that they misunderstood the charge when they pleaded guilty. I do not think there was any irregularity which has resulted in substantial failure of justice. There is no case that the charge was not understood properly or was misunderstood. Hence the conviction has to stand. In these circumstances, I am constrained to enhance the sentence. I have already indicated that no adequate or special reasons have been shown to impose a sentence below the normal minimum. There is no case that the charge was not understood properly or was misunderstood. Hence the conviction has to stand. In these circumstances, I am constrained to enhance the sentence. I have already indicated that no adequate or special reasons have been shown to impose a sentence below the normal minimum. Taking into account the circumstance that the case has been taken up in suo motu revision sometime after the judgment of the trial Magistrate I think a lenient view may be taken; but such leniency must be shown not by reducing the sentence to that below the minimum provided under law but choosing the minimum within the permitted range. Accordingly the sentence of the first accused is enhanced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 1000. In default of payment of fine the first accused will undergo simple imprisonment for a further term of one month. As against the second accused which is a firm the sentence will be only one of fine and such fine shall be Rs. 1000.