VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed against the order of Venkataswami, J: in W. P- no. 270 of 1972 dismissing the said petition. The appellants and respondents 5 and 6 were members of the managing committee of Yellapur Taluka Agricultural Produce Coo-operative marketing Society Ltd. , Respondent-1 herein and respondent-4 was its chairman. Respondents 2 and, 3 were members of respondent 1 Society. At the meeting of the managing committee held on 1-11-1968 which was attended by the appellants and respondents 4 to 6 a resolution was passed sanctioning a loan of Rs. 32,000 to respondent-2. One Ganesh thimmiah Hegde and Narayana Mahabala Bhat, respondent-3 herein, stood as sureties for the said loan. Respondent-3 is the father of respondent-2, an extent of 1 acre 3 guntas of forest land belonging to respondent -3 was also given as security for the loan. The purpose of the loan was stated to be the development of the said lapd. The loan had to be repaid in five equal annual instalments. After the said loan, was advanced, only a sum of Rs. 600 has been paid, towards the discharge of the loan. The entire balance is still outstanding. ( 2 ) SOMETIME after the above loan was advanced, the managing committee of the society was superseded and an administrator was appointed to manage its affairs. When the administrator examined the books of account, he noticed that the loan referred to above had been advanced by the managing committee contrary to Bye-law No. 41 of the Society which authorised a loan to be advanced only against the pledge of agricultural produce or other goods and upto 75 per cent of their value. The committee had no power to advance a loan by accepting sureties or on the security of immovable property. As the loan had been advanced to respondent-2 contrary to the bye-laws, the administrator raised, a dispute against the appellants, respondents 2 to 6 and one S. M. Bhal, the ex-manager of the Society, under S. 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The cage was referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator passed an award against the appellants, respondents 2 to 6 and S. M. Bhat directing them- to payres- pondent-1 Society Rs. 31,400 with interest of Rs. 3,209-66 upto the date of filing of the arbitration case. The cage was referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator passed an award against the appellants, respondents 2 to 6 and S. M. Bhat directing them- to payres- pondent-1 Society Rs. 31,400 with interest of Rs. 3,209-66 upto the date of filing of the arbitration case. Against the award, the appellants and respondents 5 arid, 6 filed an, appeal before the Karnataka Co-operative appellate Tribunal. Similarly others also filed appeals against the award. The Tribunal Allowed only the appeal of S. M. Bhat, the ex-manager and dismissed the other appeals. Against the decision of the, Tribunal, the appellants and respondents 5 and 6 filed W. P. No. 270 to 1972 on the file of this Court. Respondent^ filed W. P. No. 734 of 1972. Both the Writ Petitions were dismissed by the learned single, Judge by his common order dated 22-11-1973. The appellants have preferred this appeal against the order in W|p. No. 270 of 1972. ( 3 ) SRI B. V. Krishnaswami Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants, has raised two grounds in support of the appeal: (1) that the proceedings under S. 70 of the Act were without jurisdiction; and (2) that the Society should have proceeded against the appellants and respondents 5 and 6 only after exhausting its remedies against respondents 2 and 3 the first contention is bajsed on S. 69 of the Act which rear! on the relevant date as follows: -"69. Surcharge. (1) If, in the course of an audit, inquiry, inspection or the winding up of a co-operative society, it is found that any person, who is or was entrusted with the organisation or management of such Society or who is, or has at any time been an, officer or an employee of the society, has made any payment contrary to this Act, the rules or the bye-laws or has caused, any deficiency in the assess of the society by breach of trust or wilful negligence or has mil- appropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property belonging to such society, the Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of the Committee, Liquidator or any creditor, inquire himself or direct any person authorised by him, by an order in writing in this behalf, to inquire into the conduct of such person. (2) Where an inquiry is made under sub-sec. (2) Where an inquiry is made under sub-sec. (1) the Registrar may, after giving the persons concerned an opportunity of being heard, make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part there;-of, with interest at siuch, rate, or to pay contribution and costs or compensation to such extent, as the Registrar may consider just and equitable. "it is contended that the Society should have instituted proceedings against the appellants and respondents 5 and 6 under the above section which provided, for a special machinery for recovering money or property belonging to a society which had been mis-appropriated or fraudulently retained by any person in management of a, society or which had been paid or delivered, by such pe,rson contrary to the Act, Rules made thereunder or bye-laws of the Society. It is further contended, that the special law contained, in S. 69 excluded the application of the general law under s. 70. Reliance is placed by the appellants on the decision of this Court in k. Ranga v. Katpadi Service Co-operative Society (W. P. 2155|72 dt. 5-11-74. ). There is no merit in this contention of the appellants. S. 69 is; attracted only when in the course of an audit, inquiry, inspection or the winding up of a, co-operative society it is found out that a person in charge of the management of the affairs of the society, has mis-spent or misappropriated thes money belonging to it. The said section does not apply to other case,? or disputes which con- legitimately be raised, under S. 70 of the Act. The dispute in question clearly falls under S. 70 (1) (c) of the Act in so far as the appellants and respondents 5 and 6 are concerned. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in, Pentakota Sriramulu v. Co-operative Marketing society Ltd. , Anakapaliy ( AIR 1965 SC. 621 ). In that case Ss. 49 and 51 of the madras, Co-operative, Societies Act (6 of 1932 which corresipondend respectively to Ss. 69 and 70 of the Act) arose for consideration before the supreme Court. Rejecting a contention similar to the one raised, in this case, the Supreme Court observed thus: "in this connection learned Counsel relied on a decision of the madras High Court in Sundaram Iyer v. Deputy Registrar of Cooperative societies ILR (1957) Mad. 371. 69 and 70 of the Act) arose for consideration before the supreme Court. Rejecting a contention similar to the one raised, in this case, the Supreme Court observed thus: "in this connection learned Counsel relied on a decision of the madras High Court in Sundaram Iyer v. Deputy Registrar of Cooperative societies ILR (1957) Mad. 371. There it was held that it was only in cases where the provisions of S. 49 were inapplicable that recourse, could be had to S. 51. In cases where a matter fell both within Ss. 49 and 51, the two provisions were not intended, to opera,te on parallel lines. As S. 51 excluded the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, it must be strictly construed and for that reason, in cases where S. 49 was applicable, S. 51 would be excluded. Further it was held S. 51 was of a general nature providing for a variety df matters and was almost exhaustive of the parties between whom a,s well as the disputes that could arise in co-operative societies. S. 49 on the other hand dealt with special types of disputes which arise in exceptional circumstances, segregated out of the larger group dealt with under s. 51. When there was thus an overlapping of the terms; of both the sections, the provisions of S. 49 alone it was held would be applicable. ( 4 ) BASED on this line of reasoning, the submission of learned counsel was that the claim in the present case was one "against a person in management of the Society" and "for the fraudulent retention of money or other property of the Society" and, therefore, it was completely covered by S. 49 and that in consequence the Registrar had no jurisdiction to direct an enquiry by the Deputy Registrar under S. 51 of the Act. This argument, however, proceeds on ignoring one further essential requisite for the application of S. 49 (1 ). Besides the two factors to which learned counsel referred and which we have just set out, there is also another condition which has to be satisfied before s. 49 (1) could be attracted. The facts giving rise to the charge have to be disclosed in the course of a,n audit under S. 37 or an enquiry under S. 38 or an inspection under S. 39 or on the winding up of the society. . . " ss. The facts giving rise to the charge have to be disclosed in the course of a,n audit under S. 37 or an enquiry under S. 38 or an inspection under S. 39 or on the winding up of the society. . . " ss. 63, 64 and 65 of the Act provide for an audit, inquiry and inspection of a co-operative Society. They correspond to Ss. 37 to 39 of the madras Act referred to in the decision of the Supreme Court. The irregularity committed by the appellants and respondents 5 and 6 was not found out in any such proceeding under Ss- 63 to 65 of the Act or in the course of the winding up of respondent-1 Society. The decision in ranga's case (1) is of no avail to the appellants as that was a case where the irregularity had been noticed in the course of audit. Hence, the contention based on S. 69 of the Act has to fail. ( 5 ) THERE is no substance in the second contention also. When the appellants have advanced the amount contrary to the bye-law they can be proceeded a gainst along with the debtor and the sureties. There is no rule or bye-law which requires the society to exhaust its remedies against the debtor and the sureties before proceeding against the members of the committee who have advanced the; loan contrary to the bye-laws. It is open to the appellants and respondents 5 and 6 to proceed against respondents 2 and 3 in the event of the amount being reco-vered from them. There is however no infirmity in the award, which is impugned in these proceedings. ( 6 ) THE learned single Judge was, therefore, right in dismissing the Writ petition. The Appeal fails and is dismissed. No Costs. --- *** --- .