JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a tenant's petition arising out of proceedings under section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. 2. Smt. Pushpa Devi, opposite party No. 2 is the owner of building situate at J.P. Road in the city of Pilibbit. The ground floor is in occupation of the husband and eldest son of opposite party No. 2. On the first floor there is a shop constructed in 1964 which was let out to the petitioner on 15-8-1966 at Rs. 32/- per month. The landlady applied for release of this shop on the ground that her husband is a medical practitioner and carries on his work on the ground floor. Her eldest son, Anil Kumar, has started business as a druggist and chemist. The shop on the ground floor does not have sufficient space for storing medicines and the disputed shop is bona fide and genuinely required for that purpose. It was also asserted that her husband is an eye specialist and requires dark room. This purpose cannot be fulfilled by the accommodation on the ground floor. 3. The tenant contested that application, inter alia, on the grounds that the landlady has no genuine need, that there is sufficient accommodation on the ground floor for various purposes alleged by her and that he will suffer greater hardship if the application for release is allowed than will be caused to the landlord by the rejection of his application. 4. After going through the material on the record the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the landlady has no need. Therefore, without going into the question of relative hardship be rejected the application for release. 5. The landlady filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act and the learned Second Additional District Judge, Pilibhit, came to the conclusion that her need is genuine and allowed the application for release by his order dated 19-10-1976. 6. The tenant has filed this petition on a number of grounds. In the first place it is urged that the landlady failed to establish bona fide need for release of the disputed building and the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in holding that she has bona fide need. 6. The tenant has filed this petition on a number of grounds. In the first place it is urged that the landlady failed to establish bona fide need for release of the disputed building and the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in holding that she has bona fide need. I have looked into the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge and I find that he has discussed the material on the record in support of the conclusion that the landlady's need for disputed shop is genuine. It is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed in writ jurisdiction. 7. In the second place it is urged that the learned Additional District Judge did not award any compensation as required by section 21 second proviso. It has also no force because no compensation was claimed by the petitioner in his written statement. The plea of compensation was not even canvassed before the learned Additional District Judge. As held in the case of Khusdil Prasad v. Sewa Ram Jain and others, 1976 (U.P) R.C.C. 346, if the plea regarding two years rent as compensation is not raised before the Prescribed Authority it cannot be raised in writ petition. 8. Lastly it is urged that the learned Additional District Judge did not compare the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant and his judgment is vitiated by manifest error of law. There is force in this contention because while disposing of an application under section 21 of the new Act the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court are required to dispose of two important- matters. Firstly, about bona fide need of the landlord and, secondly whether rejection of the application will cause greater hardship to the landlord than is likely to be caused to the tenant if the application is allowed. In the instant case the learned Additional District Judge has given a clear finding on the first point but he has erred in not comparing the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant. The only discussion that appears in his judgment in this connection is : "No doubt the opposite party-respondent has flourishing tailoring shop in which a number of persons work. It is obvious that the hardship would he caused if he is ejected. It has to be remembered that the right of the respondent is an inferior right. The only discussion that appears in his judgment in this connection is : "No doubt the opposite party-respondent has flourishing tailoring shop in which a number of persons work. It is obvious that the hardship would he caused if he is ejected. It has to be remembered that the right of the respondent is an inferior right. At best it can be said that in case he is ejected from the shop in question, he will have to take on rent another shop at a higher rate of rent. There is no dearth of shops in the town. The mere fact that the respondent will have to pay a higher rate of rent is no ground for rejecting the petition". While summing up the case he held : "The applicant's need is genuine and not luxurious. The applicant naturally is anxious to settle her son as a chemist and druggist. The only hardship that would be caused to the respondent would be that he would be able to get another shop on a higher rate of rent. I think if the respondent will make efforts he will be get a suitable shop." Obviously the aforesaid discussion does not contain a word about the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant. The learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the tenant will suffer great inconvenience inasmuch as he will have to shift from the shop and arrange another accommodation. There is nothing on record to show on what basis he observed that there is no dearth of shops in the town and the tenant will be able to get one though at a higher rent. Unless there was some material on the record this conclusion should not have been arrived at. There is nothing in the judgment to show as to what hardship will be caused to the landlady if her application is rejected and whether in that event her hardship will be greater than the hardship of the tenant. Unless there was some material on the record this conclusion should not have been arrived at. There is nothing in the judgment to show as to what hardship will be caused to the landlady if her application is rejected and whether in that event her hardship will be greater than the hardship of the tenant. It is needless to say that fourth proviso to section 21(1) clearly lays down that the Prescribed Authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship of the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed file building in dispute being non-residential the factors given in rule 16(2) should have been taken into consideration but in the instant case the learned Additional District Judge has not at all applied his mind to the same. His order suffers from manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. 9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 19.10.1976 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Pilibhit, is quashed. He is directed to dispose of the appeal afresh expeditiously according to law keeping in mind the observations made above. Costs on parties.