JUDGMENT P. Janaki Amma, J. 1. The 2nd defendant in a money suit is the appellant. The suit was filed by a minor aged 6 years through his mother as next friend. The plaintiff is the son of the 4th defendant and the grandson of the 3rd defendant. There was a partition in the family of the parties on 9th July 1960. As per Ext. P2 partition deed, the 4th defendant got himself separate from his father and other members of his family. The plaintiff was born subsequently. On 5th January 1968, the 4th defendant both for himself and as guardian of the plaintiff executed Ext. A1 sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule property which he obtained in partition for a consideration of Rs. 30,000. The major portion of the consideration was reserved for payment of debts due from the family. Rs. 1,000 had been received by the 4th defendant prior to the execution of the deed. Rs. 2,282.27 was paid at the time of registration. The balance Rs. 5,000 was reserved with the vendee to be paid on the receipt of the minor on his attaining majority. Till the minor attains majority, the interest at 7 per cent on the said amount is to be paid on the receipt of the minor's mother. According to the plaintiff, interest was paid only till 5th of January, 1969. The suit was filed for the interest due till the 5th of January, 1970. In the meanwhile, the 2nd defendant filed O.S. No. 39 of 1969 on the file of the Sub Judge, Kasaragod, against defendants 3 and 4 for recovery of certain amounts due under a promissory note. The suit was decreed in due course. In execution of the decree, the 2nd defendant attached the amount reserved with the 1st defendant vendee under the sale deed, Ext. A1. The plaintiff claimed that the amount reserved in his favour was not liable to be attached in execution of the decree as the same belonged to him and neither the 3rd defendant nor the 4th defendant had any right in respect of it. The 1st defendant in his written statement admitted his liability to pay the amount. Defendants 3 and 4 were ex parte. The 2nd defendant who is the decree holder in O. S.39 of 1969 alone contested. The 1st defendant in his written statement admitted his liability to pay the amount. Defendants 3 and 4 were ex parte. The 2nd defendant who is the decree holder in O. S.39 of 1969 alone contested. He contended that the sale deed in favour of the 1st defendant is hit by S.53 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even if the sale is valid, the amount reserved does not belong exclusively to the minor but is liable for the debt of defendants 3 and 4. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Subordinate Judge Kasaragod, who allowed the appeal and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff holding that the amount was not liable to be attached in execution of the decree in O. S.39 of 1969. The second appeal is preferred challenging the appellate decision. 2. The contention put forward on behalf of the appellant is that the amount of Rs. 5,000 reserved under Ext. A1 still belongs to the joint family of the plaintiff and the 4th defendant. The decree in O. S.39 of 1969 is in respect of a debt binding on the joint family and as such the amount is liable to attachment in execution of the decree. Even otherwise, since the debt was not incurred for illegal or immoral purposes, it is binding on the plaintiff who is none other than the son of the 4th defendant based on the principle of pious obligation and, therefore, the minor plaintiff is not entitled to challenge the attachment. The minor respondent on the other hand, would contend, that Ext. A1 sale deed effected a severance in status between himself and his father and, therefore, a decree obtained against the father alone subsequent to the sale deed is not binding on him. 3. It has come out in evidence that O. S.39 of 1969 was obtained on the basis of a promissory note executed by the 4th defendant on 16th April 1967 prior to the execution of Ext. A1 sale deed on 5th January 1968. Therefore the debt is ordinarily binding on the plaintiff minor, either on the ground that it was incurred for the purpose of joint family or on the ground of pious obligation, unless it is made out that it was incurred for some illegal or immoral purpose. A1 sale deed on 5th January 1968. Therefore the debt is ordinarily binding on the plaintiff minor, either on the ground that it was incurred for the purpose of joint family or on the ground of pious obligation, unless it is made out that it was incurred for some illegal or immoral purpose. There is no case and there is no evidence that the debt was incurred for any immoral purpose. 4. The main question involved is whether Ext. A1, the sale deed effected a severance in status between the plaintiff and his father, the 4th defendant. The recitals is the document do not justify such an inference. Ext. A1 is termed a sale deed and it was executed by the 4th defendant for and on behalf of himself and as the guardian of the minor son and in his capacity as the ejman and manager of his branch family. There is a recital in the document that since the income available from the properties was inadequate to meet family necessities including maintenance of the members, debts had been incurred. Amounts are seen reserved for discharge of specified debts. The document then proceeds to say that if the property is retained, it would be lost to the family and himself and the minor would be put to considerable hardship. It was, therefore, thought that the best course was to sell the property, discharge the debts and use the balance consideration for the maintenance of himself and the minor. The debts to be discharged and for which amounts were reserved are then enumerated. The recitals in the document do not make out that the 4th defendant had any intention to effect a severance in status between himself and his minor son. On the other hand, there is a recital in the document that the plaint item and other items stood charged for a loan to a bank, thus indicating that the joint family of the executant possessed other items. At any rate, excepting the direction that Rs. 5,000 reserved should be paid to the minor on his attaining majority, there is no indication in the document which goes to show that there was severance in status between the minor and his father, the 4th defendant. This direction with nothing more does not exhibit an intention on the part of the father to get divided from his minor son. This direction with nothing more does not exhibit an intention on the part of the father to get divided from his minor son. It must have been included in the document to safeguard the rights of the alience who suffered the risk of the sale being challenged on a future date at the instance of the minor or for and on his behalf. 5. Reference may in this connection be made to a decision of the Chief Court of Cochin in Narayana Ayyar v. Krishna Ayyar (27 Cochin Law Reports 576 (FB)). In that case, the sale deed executed by the father and manager of a joint Hindu family reserved an amount of Rs. 2,500 with the vendee for payment as and when his minor sons mentioned in the sale deed attained majority. It was held that the reservation made was to safeguard the interest of the vendee and not to effect a severance in status between the father and sons. The above decision was followed by the Cochin High Court in Krishnamoorthy Chettiar v. Chinnappa Chettiar (32 Cochin Law Reports 200). In that case also the question arose as to whether an amount reserved in the sale deed relating to joint family properties continued to be an asset of the joint family or whether it represented the share of a minor coparcener in the joint family properties. The Court held that the amount continued to be an asset of the joint family. 6. The evidence of PW 1 the maternal uncle of the plaintiff provides sufficient materials which belie the case of partition. Although PW 1 would say that there is strained relationship between the 4th defendant and his wife and children, he does not speak to a case of partition. On the other hand, it has been brought out in cross examination that besides the minor plaintiff, the 4th defendant has another daughter. Though Hindu Law does not recognise a share to a daughter in case of partition, she has got a right to be maintained out of joint family property. Her marriage expenses are to be met out of joint family assets. There is no reference to the daughter in Ext. A1 which again shows that the document was not intended to be a deed of partition. 7. Her marriage expenses are to be met out of joint family assets. There is no reference to the daughter in Ext. A1 which again shows that the document was not intended to be a deed of partition. 7. If there has been no partition, the amount continues to be an asset of the joint family and is liable to be proceeded against in execution of a decree binding on the joint family. In a case where the joint family consists of father and sons, the assets of the family are also liable for the debts of the father not tainted with immorality, based on the principle of pious obligation. The law on the point is express in the following passage of the Supreme Court in Pannalal v. Mt. Naraini ( AIR 1952 SC 170 ). "It can now be taken to be fairly well settled that the pious liability of the son to pay the debts of his father exists whether the father is alive or dead, vide Brij Narain v. Mangala Prasad (51. Ind. Appeals 129 P.C. Thus it is open to the father, during his life time, to effect a transfer of any joint family property including the interests of his sons in the same to pay off an antecedent debt not incurred for family necessity or benefit, provided it is not tainted with immorality. It is equally open to the creditor to obtain a decree against the father and in execution of the same put up to sale not merely the father's but also the son's interest in the joint estate. The creditor can make the sons parties to such suit and obtain an adjudication from the Court that the debt was a proper debt payable by the sons. But even if the sons are not made parties, they cannot resist the sale unless they succeed in establishing that the debts were contracted for immoral purposes." Even in cases where the father and sons divide, the liability on the sons based on the principle of pious obligation extends to the discharge of the pre partition debts of the father which are not tainted with immorality. See S. M. Jakathi v. S. M. Boakar ( AIR 1959 SC 282 ). In the instant case, the debt which was the subject matter of O.S. 39 of 1969 was incurred prior to the sale deed, Ext. A1 (See Ext. See S. M. Jakathi v. S. M. Boakar ( AIR 1959 SC 282 ). In the instant case, the debt which was the subject matter of O.S. 39 of 1969 was incurred prior to the sale deed, Ext. A1 (See Ext. B2 judgment). There is no case for the next friend of the Plaintiff that the debt was incurred for any illegal or immoral purposes. Therefore, even if Ext. A1 is to be interpreted as a partition deed, being a pre partition debt, the decree is binding on the minor. In that view also, the minor is not entitled to object to the attachment. 8. The decision of the Subordinate Judge setting aside the decree of the Trial Court is, therefore, unsustainable on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is, therefore, set aside. The decree passed by the Munsiff will stand restored and the suit will stand dismissed. The next friend of the minor will pay the costs of the appellant.