JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is at the instance of the defendants and it arises out of a suit for ejectment. 2. THE plaintiff's case was that the defendant no. 1 M/s. B. P. Khemka (Pvt.) Ltd. was a tenant in respect of the suit premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 550/- payable according to the english Calendar month. Prior to the present suit, the plaintiff instituted another suit being Title Suit No. 79 of 1963 of the Second Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore against the defendant no. 2 B. P. Khemka, on the ground of default in payment of rent. In that suit, the defendant no. 2 denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and alleged that M/s. B. P. Khemka (Pvt.) Ltd. was the tenant in respect of the suit premises. The plaintiff had withdrawn the said suit and instituted the instant suit for ejectment against the said M/s. B. P. Khemka (Pvt.) Ltd., the defendant no. 1 and also against the said B. P. Khemka, the defendant no. 2, on the ground of default in payment of rent for the months of March 1965 to July 1966, after determining the tenancy of the defendants by a notice to quit dated June 26, 1966. The suit was contested by the defendants by a joint written statement. They denied that they were defaulters in payment of rent, as alleged. They also denied the service of the ejectment notice. It was alleged by them that the defendant no. 1 was the sole tenant, and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2. 3. ON May 5, 1967 the defendants filed an application under section 17 (2)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, 1956 denying that they were defaulters in payment of rent for the aforesaid months and thereby raised a dispute as to the amount of rent. During the pendency of the said application, on August 26, 1967, the West bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1967 (West Bengal ordinance No. VI of 1967) was promulgated. By section 2 of the ordinance sub-section (2a) and (2b) of section 17 were inserted. Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that the amendments made by section 2 would apply to pending suits and appeals. 4. By section 2 of the ordinance sub-section (2a) and (2b) of section 17 were inserted. Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that the amendments made by section 2 would apply to pending suits and appeals. 4. AFTER the promulgation of the ordinance, the defendants gave a go-by to their application under section 17 (2)and filed an application on September 22, 1967 under section 17 (2a) (b). In the said application, they admitted the defaults committed by them for the aforesaid months and prayed for deposit of the arrears of rent by instalments as provided in clause (b) of sub-section (2a) of section 17. On March 16, 1968, the trial court by its order no. 39 calculated the amount of arrears of rent to be Rs. 13,602/- and directed the defendants to deposit the same by three equal instalments, each instalment being of the sum of Rs. 4,534/ -. The defendants, however, did not comply with the said order no. 39 by making any deposit. On April 17, 1968, they filed an application for review of order no. 39 alleging that the court had committed an error in calculating the arrears of rent due by the defendants to the plaintiff. During the pendency of the said application, the plaintiff filed an application under section 17 (3) of the Act praying for striking out the defence of tine defendants against delivery of possession as they had failed to comply with the said order no. 39. By order no. 95 dated March 14, 1970, the trial court struck out the defence of the defendants against delivery of possession. The review application of the defendants were taken up for hearing on June 28, 1969 and by its order no. 72 of the same date, the trial court came be the finding that there was an error in calculating the amount of arrears of rent and, accordingly, reduced the same from Rs. 13,602/- to Rs. 9,772/ -. The trial court, however, disallowed the prayer of the defendants that they should be permitted to deposit the rents for the months of March 1968 and September 1968 in respect of which the defendants had committed defaults in the meantime. It appears that the defendants made another application praying for instalments to deposit the said sum of Rs. 9,772/ -. The trial court, however, disallowed the prayer of the defendants that they should be permitted to deposit the rents for the months of March 1968 and September 1968 in respect of which the defendants had committed defaults in the meantime. It appears that the defendants made another application praying for instalments to deposit the said sum of Rs. 9,752/- which the trial court had found as the amount of arrears of rent due from the defendants to the plaintiff. By order no. 88 dated January 3, 1970, the trial court granted three instalments within which the said sum should be deposited by the defendants as specified in the said order. 5. AS the defence of the defendants against delivery of possession was struck out, the trial court heard the suit exparte and passed a decree for ejectment against the defendants. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendants preferred an appeal, but the same was dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal. 6. MR. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendants-appellants has urged that the suit was not maintainable as it included the defendant no. 2 who was not a tenant. In support of his content tion, he has placed reliance on a Bench decision ot this Court in Parekh Brothers vs. Kartic Chandra Saha and others, a. I. R. 1968 Cal. 532. In that case, it was stated in the plaint that there were three landlords while it was proved that there was only one landlord, who was one of the plaintiffs. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the name of the other two plaintiffs ought to be treated as surplusage and that the plaintiff who was admitted by the defendant to be the landlord could alone succeed on such admission. It was held that the said plaintiff could not succeed, for the contract that was pleaded was different from the one that was proved in evidence. In our view, this decision has no application to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Even assuming that the defendant no. 2 was not a tenant that would not, in our opinion affect the maintainability of the suit. In these circumstances, this contention is rejected. In our view, this decision has no application to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Even assuming that the defendant no. 2 was not a tenant that would not, in our opinion affect the maintainability of the suit. In these circumstances, this contention is rejected. It is next contended on behalf of the appellants that in disposing of the application for review, the trial court should have in order no. 72 dated June 28, 1969, included within the amount of arrears of rent calculated by it, the rents for the months of March and September, 1968 in terms of the proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (2a) of section 17. A similar contention was made by the appellants before the lower Appellate Court, but the Lower appellate Court negatived the same. We are also unable to accept this contention. By order no. 72 dated June 28, 1969, the trial court reviewed its order no. 39 dated March 16, 1968 and, as stated already, it reduced the arrears of rent to Rs. 9,752/ -. The original order no. 39 was passed in accordance with the proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (2a) of section 17 inasmuch as the sum directed to be deposited on account of arrears of rent included all amounts calculated at the rate of rent for the period of default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the order was made, that is the month of February 1968. The order which the trial court could not pass on the application under section 37 (2a) (b), we are afraid, it had no jurisdiction to pass such an order on the application for review. 7. IN our view, the application under section 17 (2a) (b) was not also maintainable. It is true that section 17 (2a) was made applicable to pending suits by the Ordinance. But such applicability will be subject to the limitation imposed by sub-section (2b) of section 17, namely, that an application under sub-section (2a) (b) has to be made before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1) of section 17 for the deposit or payment of the amount due on account of default in payment of rent. But such applicability will be subject to the limitation imposed by sub-section (2b) of section 17, namely, that an application under sub-section (2a) (b) has to be made before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1) of section 17 for the deposit or payment of the amount due on account of default in payment of rent. Under sub-section (1)of section 17 the time specified is one month from the service of the writ of summons on the defendant or where he appears in the suit or proceeding without the writ of summons being served on him, within one month of his appearance. In the instant case, the summons was served on the defendants on April 6, 1967. The application under section 17 (2a) (b) having been filed on September 22, 1967, it was barred by limitation. 8. IT is, however, contended by mr. Banerjee that as the Ordinance had not come into existence within one month of the service of the summons on the defendants, it was impossible for them to make such an application, and so they had made the application within one month of the date on which the ordinance was promulgated. In our view, after the expiry of one month of the service of summons on the defendants, they had no right to avail themselves of the provision of section 17 (2a). Sub-section (2b) of section 17 having prescribed a time limit for an application under sub-section (2a), no other period of limitation can be substituted for the purpose of making an application for instalments. It is true that the act is a remedial statute but that fact does not give the Court jurisdiction to alter the period of limitation as prescribed by the statute for the purpose of giving relief to the tenant. If the legislature had intended that the tenant in a pending suit would be entitled to make an application under section 17 (2a) within one month of the date of promulgation of the Ordinance, it would have expressly provided for the same as it has done in other cases covered by section 17b and 17d. Mr. Banerjee has placed reliance on certain decisions of this court which will be stated presently. Tarak Nath Gupta Vs. Lt. Col. Mr. Banerjee has placed reliance on certain decisions of this court which will be stated presently. Tarak Nath Gupta Vs. Lt. Col. Karuna kumar Chatterjee., 62 C. W. N. 830, was a case before the amendment of section 17 (2) of the Act by the West bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1959. Before such amendment there was no time limit for making an application under that section. So it was held in Tarak Nath Gupta's case that the time limit of one month prescribed by section 17 (1) of the Act for making deposits did not apply to cases where a dispute was raised under section 17 (2)and that dispute had to be determined. In another case in Gujrat Printing press Vs. Naraindas Jewraj, 64 C. W. N. 157, it was held that in the construction of section 17 (2) the reasonable time theory could be legitimately applied as otherwise, that is, in the absence of any time limit whatsoever for the requisite deposit or payment of the arrears, the very purpose of the statute would be frustrated. So the above two decisions are inapplicable to the instance case, for by the said amendment Act Section 17 (2) has been amended and the tenant is required to deposit the admitted amount along with the application under section 17 (2) within the time specified in section 17 (1). 9. IN Gour Dev Mukherjee Vs. Purnima Devi, 72 C. W. N. 155, it was held that the tenant having complied with the provision of section 17 (2) of the Act, he was entitled to the benefit of the proviso to section 17 (4) of the act which was amended with retrospective effect by the said Ordinance. Before such amendment the tenant was not entitled to the relief under section 17 (4) if he was a defaulter in payment of rent for four months within a period of twelve months, even though he had complied with the provision of section 17 (1) or section 17 (2) of the Act. Sub-sections (2a) and (2b) of section 17, though inserted in the Act by the Ordinance with retrospective effect, the condition imposed by sub-section (2b), namely, the time limit for making an application under sub-section (2a), must be fulfilled. Sub-sections (2a) and (2b) of section 17, though inserted in the Act by the Ordinance with retrospective effect, the condition imposed by sub-section (2b), namely, the time limit for making an application under sub-section (2a), must be fulfilled. In Gour Dev Mukherjee's case referred to above, the tenant having already made the application under section 17 (2) within the time limit prescribed therefor and also having complied with the order passed on the said application, it was held that he was entitled to the benefit of the alteration made to the proviso to section 17 (4)with retrospective effect. This case, therefore, does not lend any support to the contention of the appellants before us. 10. IN Gouri Bose Vs. Sukumar ghosh, 75 C. W. N. 342, it has been held that section 5 of the Indian Limitation act applies to applications under subsections (2) and (2a) of section 17, and that the Court can in the exercise of its inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure condone the delay in making the deposit for cogent reason. This case has no manner of application to the instant case, for we are not concerned with the questions that came up for consideration in than case. The case of Maliram Agarwala Vs. Bhudarmal Agarwala, 78 C. W. N. 901, is also inapplicable to the instant case, for in that case, the question was whether the Court could extend time for the deposit of any amount under section 17 (2a). It was held that the Court could extend such time. Thus the above decisions are of no assistance to the appellants. The application of the defendant under section 17 (2a) (b)was, therefore, not maintainable and the defendants not having deposited the arrears of rent within one month of the service pf the summons on them the trial court was perfectly justified in striking out their defence against the delivery of possession onther point has been argued in this appeal in the result appeal is dismissed but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs. Let the operation of this judgment remain stayed for two months from date as prayed for by the learned advocate for the appellants.