JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a tenant's petition arising out of the proceedings under section 21 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, herein-after called the Act. 2. Mishri Lal, opposite party No. 3, is the owner of house No. 584/A, Mutthi Ganj in the town of Allahabad. A portion of this house was in the tenancy of Basant Lal, petitioner, and the remaining portion was alleged to be in the occupation of opposite party No. 3 for residential purposes. He moved an application for release of the portion in possession of the tenant- petitioner on the ground that he bona fide required it for residential purposes as well as for carrying on grain business. He also gave out that Basant Lal had no concern with the disputed building but had placed it in possession of his brother in order to make illegal gains. According to him", Basant Lal was doing business in Kydganj and was living in a house in Sunderganj. He was also in possession of one more building. 'therefore, he had no need for the disputed building. On the other hand, he asserted his need to be bona tide and pressing. The benefit of Explanation (iv) of Section 21(l) of the Act also appears to have been claimed. 3. Basant Lal contested that application, inter alia, on the grounds that he himself is doing parchun business in the disputed building and it is the only source of his livelihood. He denied that his brother is carrying on business in it. As regards the other premises in his possession, he admitted that his family resides in Kydganj but on account of increase in the number of members of the family, he had to take one more small house. He further stated that the building in dispute is being used for business purposes and Explanation (iv) is not applicable. 4. The Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the need of the landlord is genuine and Explanation (iv) being applicable to this case, it was not necessary to compare the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant. He further held that Basant Lal has got other alternative accommodation to meet his requirement. Accordingly, the application was allowed but the tenant was awarded an amount equal to two years' rent. 5. He further held that Basant Lal has got other alternative accommodation to meet his requirement. Accordingly, the application was allowed but the tenant was awarded an amount equal to two years' rent. 5. The tenant filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act and the learned Additional District Judge agreeing with the findings given by the Prescribed Authority dismissed it on 28-5-1975. Hence this petition for quashing the orders passed by the lower authorities. 6. The first question obviously for consideration is whether Explanation (iv) to section 21(1) of the Act as it stood prior to its deletion was attracted to the facts of this case. The Prescribed Authority held that Explanation (iv) was applicable but the learned appellate court did not go into the merit of this question at all. The landlord-opposite party claimed the benefit of this Explanation also. In this connection it was necessary for the learned Additional District Judge, who decided the appeal, to consider for what purpose the disputed building was let out to the petitioner-whether for residential purpose or for business purpose. If it was let out for both purposes, then the dominant purpose of letting out/should have been determined. This enquiry was necessary because Explanation (iv) is applicable only to those buildings a part of which is let out to the tenant for residential purposes and the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for the same purpose. 7. Secondly, in order to decide whether Explanation (iv) is applicable or not he had also to consider whether the two portions constituted one unit or two separate allotable units. The test for deciding it was laid down in Chunnu Lal v. Second Additional District Judge, 1975 A.W.C. 390. It was held that if a super-structure or a portion thereof is an independent residential unit and a part of that independent unit is in the tenancy of a person then Explanation (iv) will be attracted. It will not be attracted in case the two portions of the superstructure are independently fit for residential purposes and are allotable as such under the Act. This view was approved in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 836. It will thus be clear that no relevant, point regarding the applicability of Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1) had heed considered by the learned Additional District Judge. This view was approved in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 836. It will thus be clear that no relevant, point regarding the applicability of Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1) had heed considered by the learned Additional District Judge. There are two other points to which the learned Additional District Judge has not at all applied his mind. According to the petitioner, the landlord is possessed of another house and has no bonafide need for the disputed accommodation. The learned Additional District Judge has not specifically adverted to this point. 8. Lastly, hardships of the landlord and the tenant have not at all been compared in the manner prescribed. If the disputed building is let out for residential purposes, the consideration given in rule 16(1) should have weighed with the Additional District Judge. If it was let out for business purposes, then he should have taken into consideration the points given in rule 16(2). Sub-clause (a) of it states that greater the period since when the tenant or the original tenant whose heir he is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application. The petitioner claims to be in possession of the building for the last 30 years. According to him, he is carrying on parchun shop and has earned certain good-will. The learned Additional District Judge has not at all applied his mind to this question. 9. The learned Additional District Judge appears to have been swayed by the consideration that the tenant is possessed of other accommodation and has no need for the disputed building. He should not have come to this conclusion without considering rule 16(2)(b) which says : "where the tenant has available with him a suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application." In the instant case the learned Additional District Judge has nowhere said that the accommodations available to the tenant are suitable for shifting his business to that place. There is also no finding that it can be done without substantial loss. The order of the learned District Judge, therefore, suffers from manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. 10. There is also no finding that it can be done without substantial loss. The order of the learned District Judge, therefore, suffers from manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. 10. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 29-5-1975 passed by the VIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad, is quashed. He is directed to dispose of the appeal afresh according to law keeping in mind the observations made above. As the case has become old, he will dispose it of positively in three months hereof. Costs on parties.