Judgment Nageadra Prasad Singh, J. 1. The petitioner in this revision application has been convhtel under section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful possession) Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and has bsen sentenced to undergo regorous imprisonment for a period of one year. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 12-4-1971 at about 8 p. m. the informant (P. W.1), who was the Head Rakshak of the Railway Protection force and was on duty at Gate No.6 of the Jamalpur Railway Workshop, noticed the petitioner coming out of the said workshop. Hs got suspicions on the movement of the petitioner, an.1, as such, be accosted him. After some interrogation and search it was discovered that the petitioner was taking out a brass-cum-bronze material belonging to the railway from the workshop having concealed in his clothes. The petitioner was immediately arrested and case was lodged against him. The search and seizure has bsen made in presence of witnesses. On the relevant date the petitioner was a railway employee employed in the said workshop. After investigation on enquiry report was submitted and in du-3 course the petitioner was put on trial for an offence under section 3 of the Act. The petitioner was initially tried by a magistrate at Bhagalpur who had been designated as Special Railway magistrate. He had the jurisdiction to try offences which have been committed not only in the Bhagalpur district but as well as in the district of Monghyr and others. In the instant case, although the offence was committed within the district of Monghyr, the trial of the petitioner was taken up by the said railway Magistate of Bhagalpur. On 12-9-1972 charge under section 3 of the act was framed by that Magistrate. It is said that witnesses were also examined by him. However, on 23-8-1974 learned Sessions Judge of Monghyr passed an order transferring the case in question from the court of that Railway magistrate to the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Monghyr. On 12-9-1972 charge under section 3 of the act was framed by that Magistrate. It is said that witnesses were also examined by him. However, on 23-8-1974 learned Sessions Judge of Monghyr passed an order transferring the case in question from the court of that Railway magistrate to the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Monghyr. After transfer, the records were put up before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, monghyr, Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Monghyr examined the petitioner under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the old Code) and, thereafter, heard the arguments and ultimately by his judgment dated 25-7-1975 he held tlu petitioner guilty under section 3 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, as already stated above. Being aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, monghyr which was heard by learned III Additional Sessions Judge, who, on a consideration of the materials on record, affirmed the finding of trial court and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. The present revision application is directed against that judgment. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner questioned the legality of the conviction and sentence passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, monghyr on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to convict and sentence the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, for trying offence under section 3 of the Act the only competent court was the Railway Magistrate at bhagalpur and the Sessions Judge, Monghyr hud no authority in law to withdraw the said case from the file of the aforesaid Railway Magistrate and to transfer the same to the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moghyr. According to him, the conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner is vitiated. 4. It appears that there is no provision under the Act for establishment of anyspecial court for trying of offence under section 3 of the Act and in absence of any such provision, an offence under that section can be tried by any criminal court of competent jurisdiction. However, from time to time magistrate have been posted in different districts of the State of Bihar to try accused persons who have been charged for having committed offence under section 3 ot the Act. However, from time to time magistrate have been posted in different districts of the State of Bihar to try accused persons who have been charged for having committed offence under section 3 ot the Act. Such Magistrates try cases even relating to the district other than the district in which they are posted. During the relevant period the Magistrate who had been posted at Bhagalpur and known as special Railway Magistrate used to try offences even arising in the district of Monghyr. As to who will be appointed as such a Magistrate, the High Court used to issue notifications from time to time. On the eve of coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under section 13 (1) of that Code, appointed Special Judicial Magistrate of Second Class for a period of one year for different districts and also indicated the headquarters where such Magistrate shall hold court and try cases under the Indian Railway Act, 1890. After such an appointment even Magistrate of second Class could have tried ati offence under section 3 of the Act. Perhaps, this procedure was adopted because otherwise the offence under section 3 of the act being punishable upto a period of five years could have been tried only by a Court of Session or a Magistrate of the First Class in accordance with Schedule II of the Code. 5. Now the question which has fallen for consideration is as to whether the transfer of the case of the petitioner from the Court of such Railway Magistrate to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Monghyr has visited the trial of the other petitioner, the result whereof will be that the conviction and sentence passed against him is a nullity. From time to time whenever after conviction and sentence a question has arisen as to whether the conviction and sentence passed by a particular court is without jurisdiction, it has to be examined as to whether there is lack of jurisdiction or the defect is such which is curable under the provisions of Chapter XLV of the old Code, specially under section 531. flthere is inherent lack of jurisdiction then consent cannot vest that jurisdiction in that court. flthere is inherent lack of jurisdiction then consent cannot vest that jurisdiction in that court. On the other hand, if the defect is not such which goes to the root of the whole matter then the person concerned having not challenged the jurisdiction of such court at the stage of when the trial commenced before such court, cannot agitate that matter before this Court while bearing a revision against such order, because in that situation, he has to satisfy this Court that because of this illegal or irregular procedure, prejudice has been caused to him. If the Court of the Railway Magistrate is held to be a court of exclusive jurisdiction inasmuch as the offence under section 3 of the Act has to be tried by that court and no other court, then, perhaps, the Chief Judicial Magistrate could to have passed the conviction and sentence against the petitioner. On the other hand, if the case was being heard at Bhagalpur by the Railway Magistrate concerned without being a court of exclusive jurisdiction, then there is no question of judgment being void ab initio. In my opinion, merely because same Magistrates of Second Class power have been vested with the power under section 13 of the new Code or the parallel provision under the old Code, and have been designated as Special Judicial Magistrate, they cannot be held to be court of exclusive jurisdiction so as to oust the jurisdiction of other courts to try offences under section 3 of the Act. 6. In view of the above finding, the only question that can be urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the Session Judge could not have withdrawn the case pending before a Magistrate in the district of Bhagalpur and transfer the same to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Monghyr. It is not known as to how the Sessions Judge of Monghyr was exercising the jurisdiction over the cases pending before the Railway Magistrate at Bhagalpur. May be, because he was trying even the cases relating to the district of Monghyr. But, for purpose of argument in this case, I shall proceed on the assumption that the case should not have been withdrawn by the Session Judge of Monghyr. May be, because he was trying even the cases relating to the district of Monghyr. But, for purpose of argument in this case, I shall proceed on the assumption that the case should not have been withdrawn by the Session Judge of Monghyr. Even then, the petitioner having not taken any objection before the learned chief Judicial Magistrate, Monghyr or before the court of appeal below, in my opinion, he cannot take that objection for the purpose of setting aside the conviction and sentence passed against him, while invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, unless he shows that it has occasioned failure of justice. Sec.531 of the old Code is as follows: - "no finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice". In view of this section, a sentence, or order of any Criminal Court shall not be set aside on the ground that trial took place in a wrong sessions division. I have already pointed out that even if it is assumed that the Sessions Judge of monghyr could not have transferred the case, in net result it only amounted to the trial of the petitioner having taken place at Monghyr instead of at Bhagalpur before the Railway Magistrate concerned. The Cheif Judicial Magistrate of monghyr had the jurisdiction to try this offence, there being no bar. 7. In the case of Nasiruddin Khan V/s. State of Bihar (A. I. R 1973 SC 186)a personnel of Bihar Military Police had deserted in Kashmir, and, as such, had committed an offence there. He was, however tried at Patna. A question arose whether the Patna Court had jurisdiction to try him because the offence was committed in Kashmir. 7. In the case of Nasiruddin Khan V/s. State of Bihar (A. I. R 1973 SC 186)a personnel of Bihar Military Police had deserted in Kashmir, and, as such, had committed an offence there. He was, however tried at Patna. A question arose whether the Patna Court had jurisdiction to try him because the offence was committed in Kashmir. It was pointed out that section 177 of the Code no doubt says that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed, but then a reference was made to section 531 of the old Code and it was observed: - "the appellants learned counsel before us has, already observed, relied on section 177, Criminal Procedure Code in support of the argument that the appellants trial and conviction by the Criminal Court at Patna was wholly without jurisdiction. This objection was not raised either in the commiting court or in the Court of Assistant sessions Judge which tried and convicted the appellant. In the high Court this objection was raised for the first time and according to that court, in view of section 531 of the Code the order of the criminal court c mvicting the appellant could not be set aside merely on the ground of the trial having taken place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area unless such error had occasioned failure of justice. There being no allegation of failure of justice on account of trial having been conducted in Patna this objection was held to be unmeritorious. Before us nothing now has been urged. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision of the Code which would show that some other Court had exclusive jurisdiction to try this offence". In the case of Ram Chandra Prasad V/s. State of Bihar ( AIR 1961 SC 1629 )a case for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act had been forwarded to the Special Judge at Patna in view of section 10 of the Criminal Law amendment Act, 1952. The Special Judge, Manbhum should have tried the accused having jurisdiction over that case. The trial was, however, held at Patna, and the legality whereof was challenged before Supreme Court. The Special Judge, Manbhum should have tried the accused having jurisdiction over that case. The trial was, however, held at Patna, and the legality whereof was challenged before Supreme Court. The mere omission of a formal forwarding of the case to the Special Judge, Manbhum and of a formal order of the High Court to transfer it to the court of the Special Judge at Patna had not prejudiced the accused in any way. It was further observed that section 10 of the aforesaid Amendment Act did not make section 531 of the Code inapplicable and in view of section 31, the conviction and sentence passed against the accused cannot be set aside In the case of Purshottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1961 SC 1589 ) it was observed:- "it is true that the legislature treats with importance the jurisdictions of courts for the trial of offences Jurisdiction of courts is of two kinds. One type of jurisdiction deals with respect to the power of the Courts to try particular kinds of offences. That is a jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter and if a Court not empowered to try a particular offence does try it, the entire trial is void. The other jurisdiction is what may be called territorial jurisdiction. Similar importance is uot attached to it. This is clear from the provisions of sections 178, 188, 197 (2) and 531 cr. P. C. " I have already pointed out that but for the appointment of the Railway magistrate at Bhagalpur, to try even the offence under section 3 of the Act which have been committed even in the district of Monghyr, there was no question of creating an exclusive jurisdiction for trial of such offences. This court has also considered the scope of section 531 of the old Code in the cases acharaja Singh and another V/s. Emperor (AIR 1936 Patna 410) Abdul Ghaffar V/s. Bibi Hafizan Khatoon (AIR 1968 Patna 307) and Mohammad Amin V/s. Bibi rasoolan (1972 BDR 852) and has rejected the prayer of the petitioner of those cases to set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the ground that the trial has taken place before courts which would not have ordinarily tried those cases. 8 Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn our attention to a recent Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Radha Devi V/s. Mani Prasad Singh and another (1978 Bihar Bar Council Journal 626) where it has been held that proceeding under section 145 which had been initiated under the old Code have to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the old Code by the courts which could have disposed of those proceedings. It was also pointed out that such proceedings should be continued by Magistrate of the First Class. In my opinion, the aforesaid decision has no bearing on the question involved in this application. There was no question of application of section 531 of the old Code because those cases were covered by clause (j)of section 530 of old Code which says that if any Magistrate not being empowered by law makes an order under Chapter XII, which will include even a proceeding under section 145, the proceeding shall be void. This aspect has been pointed out in paragraph 13 of the Full Bench judgment and on that basis final order passed by the Executive Magistrate were held to be void. In my opinion, the conviction and sentence passjd against the petitioner cannot be set aside merely because the conviction and sentence against him was passed by the Chief judicial Magistrate, Monghyr instead of by the Railway Magistrate, Bhagalpur before whom the case was pending. Learned counsel could not point out as to how the petitioner has been prejudiced. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner then submitted that on merit it has not been established that the brass-cum-bronze material was railway property. From the judgments of the two courts below it appears that they have fully examined this aspect of the matter and have considered the submissions made in respect thereof. They have recorded findings that the prosecution has been able to prove that the brass-cum-bronze material (Ext.1) was being carried by this petitioner from the workshop aforesaid and that it was a railway property within the meaning of the Act. In my opinion, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction it is not opento this Court to re-appraise the evidence for the purpose of holding whether the finding has been correctly recorded or not. 10. Lastly, it was submitted that the sentence passed against the petitioner is severe. In my opinion, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction it is not opento this Court to re-appraise the evidence for the purpose of holding whether the finding has been correctly recorded or not. 10. Lastly, it was submitted that the sentence passed against the petitioner is severe. In that connection it was pointed out that according to the prosecution case itself the value of the brass material in question was about Rs.20. It was further pointed out that the petitioner has been sufficiently harassed due to long pendency of the case since 1971 and is likely to be dismissed from the service because of the conviction and sentence passed against him. We are informed that he has met with some accident with fire as well. I think that taking all the circumstances into consideration, there are adequate reasons to reduce the sentence passed against the petitioner from one year to a period of six months rigorous imprisonment. With this modification in the sentence, the revision application is dismissed. Revision dismissed.