JUDGMENT M. P. Saxena, J. 1. THIS is a tenant's petition arising out of proceedings under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter called the Act. 2. ISHWAR Saran, opposite party No. 3, is the owner of house No. 18 Saket in the town of Meerut. A portion of this house consisting of drawing room, bed room with attached bath room, dining room, kitchen and enclosed open space on the east was let out to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. The remaining portion of this house was in the occupation of the landlord opposite party. The latter moved an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the tenanted accommodation on the ground that he bonafide required it for his own use as marriages of his sons were to be solemnised and his grand children were to receive education in Meerut and the present accommodation in his possession was not sufficient to meet his requirements. He also claimed the benefit of Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act as it existed at that time. The petitioner contested that application, inter alia, on the grounds that the landlord had no bonafide need for the disputed accommodation and the application was moved with a view to enhance rent ; that Explanation (iv) was not applicable to this case ; that he never gave any undertaking to vacate the house and that greater hardship would be caused to him if the application was allowed than would be caused to the landlord by the rejection of the application. 3. THE Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that Explanation (iv) to Sec. 21 (1) (a) of the Act was applicable to this case because the tenant was living in a portion of the building the remaining portion whereof was in possession of the landlord for residential purpose. In view of this finding he did not feel the necessity of comparing the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant and allowed the release application on 22-3-1974. 4. THE tenant filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act and the learned District Judge also came to the same conclusion and dismissed the appeal on 27-11-1976. In view of this finding he did not feel the necessity of comparing the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant and allowed the release application on 22-3-1974. 4. THE tenant filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act and the learned District Judge also came to the same conclusion and dismissed the appeal on 27-11-1976. According to him also, comparison of relative hardships was not necessary as Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was applicable. Hence this writ petition for quashing the order passed by the learned District Judge. The first question that arises for consideration is whether Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) (a) as it stood prior to the amendment, was applicable to this case. This Explanation read, as follows ; "The fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bonafide required by the landlord." It was deleted by the U. P. Act 28 of 1976 with effect from 5-7-1976, i. e., after the release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and during the pendency of the appeal in the court of the District Judge. The question for consideration obviously arises as to when a building under tenancy of the tenant shall be deemed to be a part of the building remaining part whereof is in occupation of the landlord for his residential purposes. This question has been the subject-matter of decision in several cases and it will suffice if reference is made to two of them. In Chhunno Lal v. Second Additional District Judge, 1975 AWC 390 a single Judge of this Court held that if a superstructure or a part thereof is an independent residential unit and a part of that independent unit is in the tenancy of a person then Explanation (iv) will be attracted. It will not be attracted in case the two portions of superstructure are independently fit for residential purposes and are allotable as such under the Act. This view was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, 1977 AWC 300. It will not be attracted in case the two portions of superstructure are independently fit for residential purposes and are allotable as such under the Act. This view was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, 1977 AWC 300. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the object of the legislature clearly was that where there is a single unit of accommodation of which a part has been let out to a tenant the landlord who is in occupation of the remaining part should be entitled to recover possession of the part let out to the tenant. If this test is applied to the instant case there will be no difficulty in holding that the tenant is in possession of the building the remaining part whereof is in occupation of the landlord for residential purposes. In para. 17 of the counter affidavit the landlord opposite party has stated that both the portions are connected with each other and are inseparable. He has also stated that amenities such as entrance, open terrace, platform, gallery, electric connection and water connection etc. are commonly shared. In the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has made a vague denial of the same. Both the lower authorities have, therefore, held that the portions in possession of the tenant and the landlord are one unit and not two separate allotable units and Explanation (iv) applies. 5. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that Explanation (iv) is not applicable because a part of the same building was formerly let out to Mahendra Singh and is now occupied by Dr. Y. Singh as a tenant. An application is said to have been moved on 17-3-1974 bringing this fact to the notice of the Prescribed Authority. It is urged that according to the established law if an accommodation is in possession of more than one tenant Explanation (iv) will not apply. THEre is no force in this contention because hearing before the Prescribed Authority had concluded on 27-9-1973. No notice of the application dated 17-3-1974 was given to the landlord. It was not even supported by any affidavit nor it was entered in the Index which shows that the application was not before the Prescribed Authority at the time he decided the application. No notice of the application dated 17-3-1974 was given to the landlord. It was not even supported by any affidavit nor it was entered in the Index which shows that the application was not before the Prescribed Authority at the time he decided the application. It is for this reason that he did not discuss is and it was not reiterated before the learned District Judge. Be that as it may there is no convincing material on the basis of which it may be said that Mahendra Singh also occupied southern portion of this building and it is now in occupation of Dr. Y. Singh. I am, therefore, in judgment that the building under tenancy of the petitioner is part of the building the remaining part whereof is in occupation of the landlord-opposite party for residential purposes. Hence Explanation (iv) will be attracted. 6. NOW arises the most crucial point for consideration, viz., whether deletion of Explanation (iv) was retrospective or prospective. It is necessary to consider this question in detail because there have been some conflicting decisions. Before entering into its merit, reference may be made to two cases decided before 5-7-1976 when the U. P. Amending Act 28 of 1976 came into force. One of them is the case of Mohd. Daud v. Smt. Qamar jahan, 1975 AWC 26 decided on 5-12- 1974. It was held that Section 21 (1) (a) read with Explanation (iv) merely provides that where a tenant and a landlord are residing in the same house the bonafide need of the landlord may be presumed. A landlord cannot succeed merely by showing his bonafide need. Even in cases governed by Explanation (iv) to Sec. 21 (1) the need of the landlord and the tenant will be compared and the landlord can be permitted to eject his tenant only if his need is found to be greater. Another case is of Gorakhnath Yagnik v. State of U. P., 1975 AWC 276 decided by a Division Bench on 1-4-1975. In this case it was held that clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 21 which is in the nature of a rule of evidence does not suffer from vice of unconstitutionality. Another case is of Gorakhnath Yagnik v. State of U. P., 1975 AWC 276 decided by a Division Bench on 1-4-1975. In this case it was held that clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 21 which is in the nature of a rule of evidence does not suffer from vice of unconstitutionality. But the rule 16 (1) insofar it precludes the enquiry by the Prescribed Authority in cases covered by clause (iv) of the Explanation is not in accordance with the principles and consequently it should be struck down to the extent ultra vires of the power conferred on the State Government. Reference may now be made to the cases decided on 5-7-1976. They are being analysed in the chronological order. The case of Kamlesh Kumar Gupta v. Chandra Kumar Parothia, 1976 UP RCC 66 was decided on 10-8-1976. In this case the Prescribed Authority had held that since the landlord was living in a portion of the house the provisions of Explanation (iv) to Section 21 were attracted and it was not necessary to compare the relative hardships of the parties. The appellate court agreed with this view but inspite of it compared the hardship of the landlord and the tenant and came to the conclusion that the landlord's need was greater than that of the tenant and it was essential to release the building in his favour. It further held that the tenant's wife was possessed of an alternative accommodation which could mitigate his hardship, if any. The appeal was dismissed on 28-5-1976, the tenant filed a writ petition and during its pendency the Amending Act 28 of 1976 came into force and clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to Section 21 (1) were deleted. This Court held that as a result of the amendment it became necessary to compare the needs of the parties in a case of ejectment from a building except in those cases provided for by Explanations (i) and (iii). Since relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant were already considered by the Appellate Authority the writ petition was dismissed, in this case there was no discussion about the effect of the deletion of Explanation (iv). 7. IN Harbilas Sharma v. First Additional District Judge, Mathura, AIR 1976 Alld. Since relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant were already considered by the Appellate Authority the writ petition was dismissed, in this case there was no discussion about the effect of the deletion of Explanation (iv). 7. IN Harbilas Sharma v. First Additional District Judge, Mathura, AIR 1976 Alld. 555 decided on 13-10- 1976 it was held that the word 'Explanation' in the newly added proviso to Section 21 by Section 14 of the U. P. Act 28 of 1976 refers to only Explanations (i) and (iii) and not Explanations (ii) and (iv) which were simultaneously omitted by the same section by which the aforesaid proviso was inserted. Therefore, in view of the proviso which is retrospective in its operation the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application has to be considered by the Prescribed Authority. Explanation (iv) was not applicable to that case and the question whether Its deletion is prospective or retrospective did not come up for consideration. 8. GASES of Munnoo Babu v. Smt. Vidyawatt Devi, 1976 UPRCC 90 decided on 20-8-1976 and Chokhey Ram v. Smt. Katlaswati, 1976 UPRGG decided on 16-9-1976 have also been cited at the Bar but in both of them the question considered was whether the fourth proviso added by U. P. Act 28 of 1976 is retrospective in operation. The effect of deletion of Explanation (iv) was not at all involved and they offer no guidance for the proposition under consideration. The case of Goptnath Goel v. The First Addl. District Judge, 1977 AWC 192 decided on 25-3-1977 is directly on this point. Single Judge of this Court referred three questions for decision to a larger Bench. One of them was whether Section 14(2) of the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 deleting Explanations (ii) and (iv) retrospective in operation ? The Division Bench held : "The second question referred by the learned Single Judge does not present any difficulty because sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Amending Act which provides that clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to Section 21(1) of the Act shall be omitted does not say that the omission should have retrospective effect nor is there anything in this context to imply that such omission has retrospective effect. Hence the omission of those two clauses operates only prospectively and not retrospectively." 9. THIS view would have obviously held the ground but it was followed by certain decisions of the Supreme Court which opened a venue for the argument that deletion of Explanation (iv) is retrospective. In the case of Smt. Smiriti Marthand v. District Judge of Kumaon, Nainital, AIR 1977 SC 1483 : "Comparative hardship of landlord and tenant must be taken into account notwithstanding the fact that the case fell under Explanatien (iv) to S. 21." 10. IT gave an impression that effect of deletion of Explanation (iv) came up for consideration before their Lordships. On the same day (i.e. 20-9- 1976) case of Purushottam Das v. The VIII Additional District fudge, Allahabad, AIR 1977 SC 1520 was decided. In that case it was urged on behalf of the appellant that Explanation (iv) was not attracted. He also contended that apart altogether from the question as to whether Explanation (iv) was on iti terms applicable this explanation did not fall for consideration since it was repealed by S. 14 (i) (c) (2) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Amendment Act 1976. Their Lordships observed : "This contention would have required some consideration but it was conceded on behalf of respondent no. 3 that in view of its omission by the Amending Act Explanation (iv) was out of the way and it was not necessary to consider whether it had any application in the present case." It would thus be clear that in this case there was no decision on merit on this point. 11. ANOTHER case on this point is of Mohammad Shaft v. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, 1977. AWC 300 decided on 16-12-1976. In this case two questions were involveds Firstly, whether Explanation (iv) wad applicable to the facts of that case and secondly whether Explanation (iv) i. deleted retrospectively or prospectively Their Lordships of the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of the District Judge, Allahabad with the direction that he will at first examine the question as to whether Explanation (iv) is attracted on the facts of the case and then he will also consider whether the omission of this explanation is prospective or retrospective. 12. 12. IN view of the aforesaid circumtances it was urged before me that the view expressed in the case of Smirlti Marthand v. The District Judge Kumaun (supra) be followed. As the correct position could not be detected the contention weighed with me and the cases of C. B. Mathew v. IV Additional District Judge, 1977 UPRCC 538, Kedar Nath Gupta v. Smt. Basanti Devi, 1977 UPRCC 628, Smt Shanti Devi v. L. P. Shukla, 1977 UPRCC 671 and Mahesh Prasad Kanodia v. District Judge, 1977 UPRCC 657 were decided on its basis. Since the question is of vital importance and is involved in a large number of cases the necessity has arisen to examine it again in detail. I sent for the record of the case of Smiriti Marthand v. Distt. Judge, Kumaon (Supra) in order to ascertain whether the effect of omission of Explanation (iv) at all came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. From a perusal of the record I find that the petitioners in that case had moved an application for release of a building on the ground of bona fide need. Benefit of Explanation (iv) was also claimed. The Prescribed Authority held that bona fide requirement of the landlords was not established and rejected the application. The landlords filed an appeal and the learned District Judge reversed that finding by holding that the bona fide requirement of the landlords was established. He further held that in any event by reason of Explanation (iv) to Section 21 it must be conclusively presumed that the landlords bona fide required the premises for their own use. Comparison of hardships was not done as rule 16(1) was held to be not applicable. The release application was allowed. The tenant filed a writ petition and this court held that the landlord's need was genuine and bona fide. It was further held that explanation (iv) Was not attracted to the facts of that case. As regards comparison of hardship it was said that it was not necessary because rule 16(1) was held to be ultra vires the Act by the Full Bench in the case of Chandra Kumar Shah v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1976 AWC 50 . The writ petition was accordingly rejected. As regards comparison of hardship it was said that it was not necessary because rule 16(1) was held to be ultra vires the Act by the Full Bench in the case of Chandra Kumar Shah v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1976 AWC 50 . The writ petition was accordingly rejected. The tenant approached the Supreme Court by special leave and their Lordships accepting the view of this Court that Explanation (iv) was not applicable, laid down that since the Act was amended and a new proviso was added with retrospective effect comparison was necessary. The case was remanded to the District Judge for the same purpose. It would thus be clear that in that case Explanation (iv) to Sec. 21(1) was held to be not applicable and the question whether its deletion is prospective or retrospective did not arise for consideration. The head note of the case was obviously misleading. Now the question is as to what is the correct position. It is needless to say that Explanation (iv) enacts a rule of evidence to the effect that if the landlord is residing in the remaining part of the building in the other part of which the tenant is living it will be conclusive that his need is bonafide. It finds support from the cases of Gorakh nath Yagnik v. State of U. P., (supra), Gopinath Goel v. First Additional District Judge (supra) and Raj Narain Jain v, IV Additional District Judge, CMW No. 5603 of 1974 deckled on 21-5-1976. The resume of the cases given above will make it clear that so far as this Court is concerned the Division Bench has already held in the case of Gopinath Goel v. First Additional Judge (supra) that omission of Explanation (iv) operates only prospectively and not retrospectively. The Supreme Court also appears to be inclined to the same view as will be evident from the following observations made in para 5 of the judgment in the case of Mohd. The Supreme Court also appears to be inclined to the same view as will be evident from the following observations made in para 5 of the judgment in the case of Mohd. Shaft v. Additional District Judge Allahabad (supra) : "Now it may be pointed out straightway that if Explanation (iv) to Sec. 21 (1) of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 is applicable in the present case the question of comparing the relative hardship of the appellant and respondent No. 3 would not arise and respondent No. 3 would straightway be entitled to an order of eviction as soon as she shows that the conditions specified in the explanation are satisfied". 13. SMIRITHI Marthand's case (supra) did not touch the question of prospectivity or retrospectivity of the omission of Explanation (iv) as discussed above. It is for this reason that no reference to this case was made in the case of Mohd. Shaft v. Additional District Judge, Allahabad (supra). Even if it be said that there is any conflict in the two decisions, the latter decision of the Supreme Court will have to be followed. I am supported in this view by the full Bench decision in the case of V. P. State Transport Corporation v. S. T. A., 1976 AWC 554 . 14. INDEPENDENTLY of the said cases also the position of repeal is well-established. Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act relates to effect of repeal. It states : "Where any (Uttar Pradesh) Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or thereafter to be made then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) ........................ (b) ........................ (c) ........................ (d) ...................... (e) effect any remedy or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. And any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceedings may be continued and concluded and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." Section 14 (2) of the U. P. Amending Act no where says that omission of Explanation (iv) shall have retrospective effect nor there is anything in this context to imply that such omission has retrospective effect. The petition for release in the instant case was moved when Explanation (iv) was in existence. The petition for release in the instant case was moved when Explanation (iv) was in existence. It was deleted during the continuance of the appeal. Therefore, the proceedings had to be concluded in the light of the law as it existed prior to the repeal. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed considerable reliance on the case of Lachmeshwar v. Keshwar Lal, AIR 1941 FC p. 5, in which it was held that the appellate court in competent to take into account legislative changes since the decision in appeal was given and its powers are not confined only to see whether the lower court's decision was correct according to law as it stood at the time when its decision was given. He has also alluded to certain cases to show that the same principle applies to writ proceedings. This position has also been the subject-matter of consideration in a number of cases and it will not be out of place to refer to some of them to elucidate the position. In the case of Raghuraj Singh v. Sobhaman, AIR 1951 Alld. 485, a Full Bench of this Court held that normally statutes are to be construed as referring to future events and are not to be given a retrospective it does not necessarily affect pending cases under Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897. The repeal of an enactment does not prima facie affect pending actions which are to be decided as if the repealed enactment was still in force. All these rules are subject to one condition, viz., that the legislature has not shown a contrary intention either in express words or by necessary implication. In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 it has been held : * * * * 15. THE aforesaid principle was followed in the case of Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, AIR 1956 SC. 16. IN State of Orissa v. M/s. M. A. Tulloch and Co , AIR 1964 SC 1284 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : * * * * In Nani Gopal Mittra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1636 and R.N. Bala Subramaniam v. Union of India, AIR 1975 Delhi 258 also the same view has been followed. 17. IN Rameshwar v. Jotram, AIR 1976 SC 49 It has been held that i * * * * 18. 17. IN Rameshwar v. Jotram, AIR 1976 SC 49 It has been held that i * * * * 18. THE aforesaid view is based on the maxim "non constitution futuries formam imponers debet non-practerita" a new state of law ought to affect the future not the past. In N. P. Agrawal v. S. K. Azad, 1973 ALJ 954 a Division Bench of this Court also observed that the general rule embodying in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is that an amendment of an Act of the legislature during currency of a suit is irrelevant and the rights of the parties are governed by the Act as it existed at the time when the suit was started unless a different intention is expressed in the new Act. I am, therefore, in judgment that on the basis of the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court as well as the Supreme Court and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act the omission of Explanation (iv) is prospective and not retrospective. 19. AS discussed above, the position in the instant case that the building under tenancy of the petitioner is a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes. Therefore, under Explanation (iv) it shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. Prior to the amendment no comparison of hardship was necessary if a case was covered by one of the clauses of the Explanation. After the amendment the fourth proviso makes it clear that comparison of hardship will be essential only in those cases which are not covered by any of the explanations. Therefore, in this case when Explanation (iv) applied the comparison of hardship was not necessary and the learned lower authorities were right in allowing the release application. 20. IN the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs on parties. The petitioner is granted three months hereof to vacate the disputed premises. Petition dismissed.