JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal from a judgment and decree passed by Shri K. K. Bose, Subordinate judge, Midnapore, dated 8. 7. 72 in title Appeal No. 314 of 1970 reversing those of dated 28th May, 1970 passed by shri S. D. Bhattacharya, Munsif, 3rd court, Tamluk in Title Suit No. 2 ( (9 of 1969. The defendant No. 1 is the appellant in this Court. The plaintiff brought a suit for declaration of his title and permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from interfering with his possession. The plaintiff's case may shortly be stated as follows :- The plaintiff took Bandabasta of the 'ka' schedule land from the zamindar upon payment of Rs. 70/-as selami at an annual rent of rs. 82 on 11th Chaitra, 1357 B. S. Subsequently, the plaintiff executed a registered kobuliyat on 23rd falgoon, 1358 B. S. in favour of the said Zamindar. The said land has been duly recorded in the plaintiff's name. The 'kha' schedule land belonged to the pro-defendant No. 2 from whom the plaintiff purchased by a registered deed on 5th Agrahayan, 1357 B. S. The plaintiff's permanent residence is at a distant place and defendant no. 1 used to stay near the suit land. So, the plaintiff appointed defendant No. 1 as tadarakdar in respect of the suit land. It was settled between the parties that the defendant No. 1 would makes the suit land fit for cultivation after reclaiming the same at the cost of the plaintiff. The defendant No. 1 made a false representation to the government claiming that he is a bargadar in respect of the suit land under the plaintiff and further alleged that the plaintiff was unduly trying to evict him. When the plaintiff enquired of the defendant no. 1 as to the said move, the latter on the 12th September, 1969 declared that he is a bhag-chasi in respect of the suit land. Because of such declaration on the part of the defendant No. 1, the plaintiff started the present action. 2. DEFENDANT No. 1 alleges that the plaintiff inducted him as bhagidar on 15th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. and that it was settled that the plaintiff would get half share of the crops and the defendant would remit the sale proceeds of plaintiff's share to the plaintiff at Calcutta. 2. DEFENDANT No. 1 alleges that the plaintiff inducted him as bhagidar on 15th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. and that it was settled that the plaintiff would get half share of the crops and the defendant would remit the sale proceeds of plaintiff's share to the plaintiff at Calcutta. The defendant No. 1 reclaimed the suit land, made it arable and had teen cultivating the suit land as bargadar of the plaintiff since 1370 B. S. and delivered bhag crops to the plaintiff without any receipt. In the additional written statement the defendant stated that the plaintiff inducted him as bargadar on 15th Baisakh, 1370 B. S. on condition that the defendant would make the suit land fit for cultivation and for that he would not give anything to the plaintiff for first three years. Thereafter, the plaintiff would get half share of the paddy crops and 1/4th share of rabi crops or its sale proceeds. On 15th of Aswin, 1373 B. S. there was an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in pursuance whereof the defendant paid the plaintiff Rs. 100/- in Chaitra in each of the years 1373 and 1374 B. S. and rs. 150/- in Chaitra, 1375 B. S. being his share of the bhag produce. The defendant has been living on the suit land by erecting a chala thereon. The plaintiff wanted to sell the suit land and asked the defendant to vacate and as the defendant No. 1 refused to do so, the plaintiff has brought the suit under false allegations. The learned Munsif held that the defendant No. 1 was not a tadarakdar in respect of the suit land but a bargadar having been inducted by the plaintiff himself and accordingly he decreed the suit in part declaring the plaintiff's title to the suit land. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the District judge. The appeal was heard by the learned Subordinate Judge who reversed the findings of the learned Munsif and found that the defendant No. 1 is a tadarakdar under the plaintiff in respect of the suit land for the purpose of looking after the cultivation and not a bargadar as claimed by him. That being his finding, the learned subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in full. The defendant No. 1 was permanently restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's possession in the suit land. That being his finding, the learned subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in full. The defendant No. 1 was permanently restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's possession in the suit land. Being aggrieved, the defendant No. 1 has come up to this Court. Mr. Narottam Chatterji, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, takes up two points. In the first place, it is contended that in view of the provisions of Section 21 (3) of the Land Reforms Act, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. The matter in dispute ought to have been decided by the competent authority mentioned in the Act and this court should set aside the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below and should refer the matter to the officer or authority mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 18 for decision. In the second place, it is contended that the judgment of the court of appeal below is not a proper judgment of reversal as the court of appeal below did not properly consider the entire evidence on record and the conclusion arrived at by the court cannot be said to be just and proper. 3. I take up the first point raised by Mr. Chatterji. Mr. Chatterji refers to the provisions of S. 21 (3) of the Land reforms Act which is to the following effect :-"if any question as to whether a person is or is not a bargadar arises in court of any proceeding before any Civil or Criminal Court, the Court shall refer it to the officer or authority mentioned in sub-section (1) of sec. 18 for decision. " mr. Chatterji contends that such being the position, this Court should hold that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute and should refer the matter to the officer or authority mentioned in the Act. 4. MR. Syama Charan Mitter, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, contends that Sec. 21 (3) was introduced by Amendment Act XXXIII of 1974 and the amendment came into force on 21st June, 1974. On the date when the above Amendment Act came into force, the appeal was pending in this court. Mr. 4. MR. Syama Charan Mitter, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, contends that Sec. 21 (3) was introduced by Amendment Act XXXIII of 1974 and the amendment came into force on 21st June, 1974. On the date when the above Amendment Act came into force, the appeal was pending in this court. Mr. Mitter contends that the Court referred to in Sec. 21 (3) is any Civil or Criminal Court and as such civil Court cannot include High Court and that being so, the matter having already been disposed of by the Courts below on the date when the amendment came into force, there is absolutely no reason why this Court will set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below and refer the matter to the proper authority. Mr. Chatterji in support of his contention submits that the appeal which is pending in this court is a continuation of the suit and that being so, it must be said that the matter is pending and as such the provisions of S. 21 (3) will apply to the pending proceeding. Mr. Chatterji in support of his contention that S. 21 (3) applies in pending Proceeding relies on a decision reported in 1975 (2) C. L. J. 447 (Chapala Bala adhikary vs. Monoronjan Das). In this case, it has been held "sub-section (3)of sec. 21 by necessary implication is applicable not only to suits and proceedings which might be commenced after the enactment of the Amending Act, of 1974, but also to suits and proceedings pending at the date of the commencement of the said amending Act". Mr. Chatterji also relies on the Special bench decision reported in 1977 (2) (II)CLJ 1. Raich Ali Khan v. Hazi Sadak ali Sk. which has approved the view taken in the decision referred to earlier. It is now settled that sec. 21 (3) applies to pending proceedings. But the question that awaits decision in this case is where the decisions of the courts below have been made before the amendment came into force and an appeal is pending in this Court whether sec. 21 (3) applies. Mr. Chatterji has also relied on several decisions, namely, 77 C. W. N. 940; 69 CWN 908; 67 CWN 129 and 68 cwn 112. 21 (3) applies. Mr. Chatterji has also relied on several decisions, namely, 77 C. W. N. 940; 69 CWN 908; 67 CWN 129 and 68 cwn 112. But the principles laid down in these cases do not apply to the facts of the present case. Mr. Matter, on the other hand, very much relies on a bench decision of this court reported in 80 CWN 250 Jnanendra Nath Bose v. Sushil Kumar Safui, where a similar question arose, namely whether Civil court includes High Court. This was a case under the West Bengal Estates acquisition Act. In this case an application was filed in the appeal pending in high Court on September, 29, 1975 praying for recording an order of abatement of the appeal and the suit out of which the appeal arises in view of clauses (B) and (C) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 57b as inserted in the Act by the west Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973. Their lordships relying on the full Bench decision reported in AIR 1939 Calcutta 435 Narsingh Das Tengu Das v. Chhegimal and also on a Special Bench decision reported in AIR 1939 Calcutta 599 khirode Ch. Ghosh v. Narendra Nath sanyal held that the word Civil Court in sec. 57b sub-sec. (2) of the West bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 as inserted by the West Bengal Estates acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 does not include the High Court; and an appeal which was pending in the High Court on the date when the said amendment came into force did not abate. In the present case, as has already been stated, the amendment came into force when the appeal was pending in this court and if the word Civil Court mentioned in sec. 21 (3) of the Act does not include the High Court, then it cannot be said that the provisions of see. 21 (3) will apply in the present case, as the matter has been disposed of by the courts below long before the amendment came into force. Relying on this bench decision I have no hesitation to say that the Civil Court does not include High Court and as such the provisions of sec. 21 (3) which came into force on 21. 6. 74 when the appeal was pending in this court has no application in the present case. Mr. Relying on this bench decision I have no hesitation to say that the Civil Court does not include High Court and as such the provisions of sec. 21 (3) which came into force on 21. 6. 74 when the appeal was pending in this court has no application in the present case. Mr. Chatterji next draws my attention to the West Bengal land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977. By sec. 5 of the said Act, a new section to the original Act, viz., sec. 21b has been added. Sec. 21b is to the effect that a person cultivating land of another person is to be presumed to be a bargadar in certain cases and the burden of proof that such person is not a bargadar or that the land is in his personal cultivation shall be on the person who alleges that the person cultivating the land is not a bargadar in respect of such land. Mr. Chatterji submits that the suit land is being lawfully cultivated by the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff has hopelessly failed to discharge the onus that the defendant is not a bargadar. Mr. Mitter submits that by sec. 21b the onus has been shifted on the person who alleges that another person is not his bargadar. But here two things are necessary. It must be proved that the suit land is under cultivation of the person who claims to be a bargadar and only in that case it has to be further proved by the person who asserts that the other person cultivating is not a bargadar. Evidence has been adduced by both the parties and two courts have taken different views an such evidence and that being so, it is now necessary for me to take up the second point raised by Mr. Chatterji, namely, whether the judgment of the appellate court below is a proper judgment of reversal. The learned court of appeal below noticed that the defendant by filing additional written statement made out an inconsistent story from the one which he made in the original written statement. The Appellate Court below also considered the defendant no. 1's petition before the local S. D. O. which is Ext. 9 where also he made inconsistent averments. The court of appeal below has also considered that upon reading of the petition (Ext. The Appellate Court below also considered the defendant no. 1's petition before the local S. D. O. which is Ext. 9 where also he made inconsistent averments. The court of appeal below has also considered that upon reading of the petition (Ext. G)it would appear that the plaintiff used to grant bhag receipts to the defendant, bat in the written statement as well as in the additional written statement and for that matter in the written objection the defence contention is that there was no system of granting bhag receipt to the defendant. Thus, the story of plaintiff's granting receipts and taking them away is idle and false. The court also noticed the other inconsistencies regarding the year of induction, payment of fixed amount and non-payment of anything for first 3 years. The learned court has also taken into consideration the dakhilas (Ext. 1 series) which except Exts. 1 (d) and 1 (e) show payment of khajna in respect of the suit land through the defendant No. 1. The court of appeal below has also relied on the three tetters written by the plaintiff to the defendant which are Exts. A, A (1)and A (2). On a reading of the contents of the letters the court of appeal below has came to the finding that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and the defendant was looking after the land on his behalf. The learned court of appeal below has also discussed the oral evidence adduced by both the parties in details and has, in conclusion, come to the finding that it has been proved to the bilt that defendant No. 1 is a tadarakdar under the plaintiff in respect of the suit land for the purpose of looking after the cultivation of the plaintiff's land and he is not a bargadar as claimed by him. The court of appeal below which is the final court of facts has taken into consideration all aspects of the matter carefully and has considered the entire evidence on record both oral and documentary and I do not think that the conclusion arrived at by the court of appeal below can be said to be perverse. I also do not think that the conclusion which has been drawn by the court of appeal below cannot be drawn on the evidence in record. I also do not think that the conclusion which has been drawn by the court of appeal below cannot be drawn on the evidence in record. That being so, I do not think that the judgment passed by the court of appeal below is not a proper judgment of reversal. Both the points raised by Mr. Chatterji fail and consequently, the appeal fails. In the result, the appeal is dismissed on contest. The judgment passed by the court of appeal below are hereby affirmed. There will, however, be no order for cost. Appeal dismissed.