JUDGMENT - M.P. KANADE, J.:---The petitioner had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 647 of 1968 for a declaration that he was a tenant in respect of a room bearing No. 16, in the misses known as Jammu Bagh situated at Shivaji Chowk, Kalyan. He also asked for possession of the said room. One Mule was the tenant in respect of the said room. The said Mule wanted to surrender his tenancy rights in favour of the landlord. The petitioner Natwarlal Thakkar and the said Mule had been to the landlord on July 14, 1968. At that time, Mule passed a writing surrending his tenancy rights in favour of the landlords Nos. 1 and 2. Muley had already paid the rent for the month of July 1968. There was a talk between the landlords and the petitioner and the landlords agreed to let out the said premisses in favour of the petitioner and in token of completed contract of tenancy the rent-receipt (Exhibit 41) was passed showing the commencement of the tenancy with effect from August 1, 1968. The rent-receipt was passed on July 15, 1968. According to the petitioner, he took possession of the said room on the same day, i.e. on July 15, 1968. On July 18, 1968 when the petitioner went to the room to keep the articles, he found two locks on the room and an additional bolt was fixed to the door. He also received a notice on July 18, 1986 from the landlords, which was dated July 16, 1968, stating that landlord did not desire to give the premises on rent. Se he filed a suit on July 20, 1968 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kalyan, for declaration of his tenancy rights and possession of the suit premises. The respondents resisted the said suit and contended that it was a contigent contract. It was agreed that the original defendant No. 3 in case did not like to have the suit premises for his business, the same would be given to the petitioner. It was further contended that the suit as filed by the petitioner was not maintainable and that there was no completed contract of tenancy. 2. The petitioner also filed another suit, being Civil Suit no. It was further contended that the suit as filed by the petitioner was not maintainable and that there was no completed contract of tenancy. 2. The petitioner also filed another suit, being Civil Suit no. 622 of 1968, against respondents under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act on the ground that he was dispossessed within the period of 6 months and that he should be restored to possession. Both the suits were heard together. 3. The learned trial judge after framing the necessary issues and recording the evidence adduced by the parties and after hearing the arguments of both the sides, held by his judgment and order dated November 28, 1972, that the Regular civil Suit No. 622 of 1968 stands dismissed for all the reliefs. It was held that the plaintiff was not put in possession on July 15, 1968. However, Regular Civil Suit No. 647 of 1968 was decreed for all the reliefs. It is declared that the plaintiff is a lawful monthly tenant of the suit tenement and he has right to posses the same. The respondents were directed to give vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff within two months from the date of the decree. The trial Court also directed to make an injury into the future mesne profits from the date of the suit till delivery of possessions. 4. All the three respondents, feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial court submitted an appeal, bearing civil Appeal No. 34 of 1973 in the Direct court at Thane. The said appeal was heard by the learned Extra Assistant judge, Thane, who was pleased to allow the said appeal with costs. While setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on March 14, 1974. Against the said judgment and order passed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Thane, on March 14, 1974, that the present Special Civil Application has been filed challenging the legality and the correctness of the said order. 5. Mr. S.C. Rajani, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in holding that there was merely an agreement of lease and it was not a completed agreement. 5. Mr. S.C. Rajani, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in holding that there was merely an agreement of lease and it was not a completed agreement. He submitted that the petitioner, original plaintiff, has proved the contract of tenancy and in pursuance of the said contract of tenancy, the rent-receipt has also been passed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. If the petitioner is not put in possession by virtue of contract of tenancy, he would be entitled of a decree for possession of the suit tenement. Mr. C.R. Dalvi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that at best, it can be an oral agreement of lease and that the present suit, as filed by the petitioner plaintiff, would not be maintainable for a declaration that he is a tenant, and that it was merely an agreement of lease and the only remedy that could be, in the circumstances, available was to file a suit for specific performance of the contract. 6. Having heard the learned Counsel on both the sides, it is clear to me that there was a completed contract on July 15, 1968. The contract of lease is defined in section 105 of the Transfer of property Act. It is defined that a lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specific occasions to the transfer or by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. .....Now, there is no dispute in the present case that Mule had surrendered his tenancy right on July 14, 1968, and there was a talk between the petitioner and the respondents. The petitioner made an offer to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 transfer the suit tenement in his favour, creating a right to enjoy the suit tenement. That offer seems to have been accepted by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Thus, the contract of tenancy was completed, and in pursuance of that completed contract, the petitioner offered rent and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 transfer the suit tenement in his favour, creating a right to enjoy the suit tenement. That offer seems to have been accepted by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Thus, the contract of tenancy was completed, and in pursuance of that completed contract, the petitioner offered rent and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 accepted that rent and passed a receipt at Exhibit 41. Now, if these facts are held around by both the courts below and if an inference is to be drawn from those facts, it can be safely concluded that there was a completed contract of tenancy between the petitioner-plaintiff and respondents Nos. 1 and 2. There is no dispute about the facts as stated above, and therefore, the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Thane, was not right in holding that there was merely an agreement of lease and not a completed contract. In paragraph 13 of the judgment the learned Appellate Judge has stated as under :--- "13. The position that emerges from the discussion above, is that at best there was an oral agreement of lease and this oral agreement is evidence by the rent receipt at Exhibit 41. The rent receipt appears to have been issued is consequence of the oral agreement. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff could have relied on this oral agreement had he been given the delivery of possession of the suit tenement. With the delivery of possession of the suit tenement, the plaintiff could have very well pleaded the creation of lease in his favour, but such is not the case here. There is no delivery of possession in favour of the plaintiff. 7. Now from this paragraph 13 of the judgment, it is very difficult to accept the finding recorded by the lower Appellate court that it was merely an agreement of tenancy and not a completed tenancy. The lower Appellate Court has held that there was oral agreement of lease. It has further held that the receipt appears to have issued in consequence of the oral agreement. The lower Appellate Court has held that there was oral agreement of lease. It has further held that the receipt appears to have issued in consequence of the oral agreement. Now, if these two observation are read together, the only possible conclusion that can be drawn from them is that a right has been created in favour of the petitioner to enjoy the suit premises for consideration and in that contingency it would be an error, apparent on the face of the record, to hold that merely an agreement of lease was created and that in the absence of delivery of possession the suit itself is not maintainable. 8. As observed above, if a right is created in favour of the petitioner for enjoyment of immoveable property, viz., the suit premises, then the present suit itself would be maintainable for a declaration of his tenancy rights and by way of consequential relief possession of the suit premises is rightly claim. In my view the present suit is maintainable and the petitioner having established his tenancy rights, a decree for possession of the suit premises has to be passed in favour of the petitioner. 9. Mr. Dalvi, argued before me that the lower Appellate Court having dismissed the petitioners suit bearing Suit No. 622 of 1962 on the ground that he was not put in possession of the premises on 14/15th July, 1968, a part of the case of the petitioner is disallowed by the lower Court and if he was not put in possession of the premises the petitioners case has also not been accepted by the lower Appellate court, and therefore, this Court will be slow to interfere with the finding recorded by the lower Appellate court while entertaining this application under Article 227 of the Constitution. There, is no substance in this submission advanced by Mr. Dalvi. As stated above a right was created in favour of the petitioner for enjoyment of the immovable property, i.e. the suit premises, for consideration, and if such a relief of declaration is granted in favour of the petitioner, then a consequently relief will have to be granted in his favour. 10. The Appellate court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record, and this Court while extertaining an application under Article 227 of the Constitutions will be justified in reversing the order passed by the Appellate Court. 10. The Appellate court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record, and this Court while extertaining an application under Article 227 of the Constitutions will be justified in reversing the order passed by the Appellate Court. As pointed out above the Appellate court itself has recorded a finding that there was an agreement of lease and in pursuance of the said agreement of lease, a rent-receipt was passed. After having held so, there was no alternative for the Appellant court but to confirm the decree passed by the trial Court. There being an error apparent on he face of the record, this court will be justified in interfering with the finding and the final order passed by the lower Appellate court. 11. Mr. Dalvi, also submitted that the suit as framed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and that the petitioner ought to have filed a suit for Specific performance of as agreement or lease. There is no substance in this submission. As observed above, there was a complete contract between the parties and thereby a right was created in favour of the plaintiff for possession of the suit premises, and therefore, he could claim possession of the suit premises. 12. In the result, the Special civil Application is allowed. 13. Rule granted by this court is made absolute with costs. -----