Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the 1st defendant in a suit for redemption. The plaintiff instituted the suit as a junior member for and on behalf of his tarwad since the karnavan who is impleaded as the 2nd defendant failed to redeem the mortgage notwithstanding the alienation effected by the mortgagee in favour of the Ist defendant. 2. The mortgage (Ext. Al) was executed by Padmanabha Pillai Kesava Pillai on 27-9-1113 M. E. (1944) in favour of Kesavan Nambudiri in respect of 17 cents of paddy land for a total consideration of Rs. 100/-. Nambudiri assigned the mortgage right in favour of the Ist defendant. 3. The plaintiff's suit is resisted by the 1st defendant only, the 2nd defendant having remained ex parte throughout. It is contended on behalf of the 1st defendant that the plaintiff was not competent to institute the suit. In support of that contention, various points were urged. It was pointed out that the suit property did not belong to the family, but it was the separate property of Kesava Pillai who executed Ext. Al It was further pointed out that the family had been disrupted long before Ext. Al under Ext. Al partition of 1116 and the suit on behalf of the family was therefore unsustainable. Both these contentions were rejected by the courts below. It was concurrently found that the suit property was family property and that Ext. A4 partition did not include the suit property. Interpreting Ext; A4 the courts held that the suit property which was a service inam was specifically mentioned in that document for exclusion from partition. The document stated that the property was to be maintained as a service inam for the benefit of all the members of the family. Consequently the character of the suit property as family property remained unaffected by Ext. A4. In the light of the concurrent findings, it is unnecessary for me to embark upon an examination of those two points in regard to which counsel has not succeeded in showing that any substantial question of law arises. I therefore confirm the finding on the above points. 4. However, in the course of the proceedings before the lower appellate court an additional ground was allowed to be urged. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976) came into force with effect from 1-12-1976. I therefore confirm the finding on the above points. 4. However, in the course of the proceedings before the lower appellate court an additional ground was allowed to be urged. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976) came into force with effect from 1-12-1976. The defendant was therefore allowed to amend the pleading to raise the contention that in view of the said Act, the family which had ceased to exist pendente lite could no longer be represented by the plaintiff. This contention was rejected by the lower appellate court stating that on the date of the institution of the suit as well as on the date of passing of the decree by the trial court, the family was intact insofar as the suit property was concerned and the subsequent change in the status of the family did not affect the maintainability of the suit. 5. Counsel for the appellant Shri Sivarajan ably contends before me that the undivided family having gone out of existence by operation of the statute, albeit pendente lite, a suit for redemption by a member cannot be continued in appeal without the other persons having an interest in the mortgage being on the party array. To continue the appeal, counsel points out, would be contrary to the provisions of 0.34 Rule I CPC. Counsel further contends that subsequent events have to be taken note of by the court and relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders (AIR. 1975 SC. 1409). 6. Shri Vyasan Poti appearing for the Ist respondent rightly points put that Act 30 of 1976 is not retrospective and it operates only prospectively. The family represented by the plaintiff was in tact on the date of the suit and continued to be so until the decree of the trial court was obtained. He further points out that, even after the abolition of the joint family system, the plaintiff being one of the co-mortgagors is perfectly entitled to prosecute the appeal for and on behalf of the other co-mortgagors. 7. Act 30 of 1976 is a short enactment having only 7 sections. Two of the sections, viz., S.5 and 6, give clear indication against retroactivity. 7. Act 30 of 1976 is a short enactment having only 7 sections. Two of the sections, viz., S.5 and 6, give clear indication against retroactivity. S.5 preserves the right of a creditor to proceed against a son under the rule of pious obligation in respect of a debt contracted before the commencement of the Act. S.6 provides that the liability of the members of a joint Hindu family for debts contracted before the commencement of the Act shall remain unaffected by any provisions of the Act. These two sections thus preserve certain pre-existing liabilities. There is nothing in the Act to suggest that its operation is projected backwards to take away rights which accrued in the past. S.4 shows that, as from the date on which the Act cams into force, a joint tenancy is converted into a tenancy in common, as a result of which the members of the undivided family became tenants-in-common as if a partition had taken place among them. 8. The plaintiff who was a junior member of the family on the date of the institution of the suit became on the abolition of the joint family system one of the tenants-in-coromon, the others being the remaining members of the old family. In respect of the property which was mortgaged for and on behalf of the family, the plaintiff with the other tenants-in-common is a co-mortgagor. 9. The question whether a co-mortgagor can sue for redemption without impleading the other co-mortgagors was considered in Ramesh Chandra v. Tulsi Das (AIR. 1974 Allahabad 88). Holding that a co-mortgagor was perfectly competent to sue for redemption, the Court observed as follows: 'But where the integrity of the mortgage is intact and one of the co-mortgagors wants to redeem the entire mortgaged property, the other co-mortgagors, should be impleaded as proper parties, but their non-impleadment is not fatal to the suit. All the controversial matters between the mortgagee and the mortgagor can be effectively decided between the parties who are before the Court within the meaning of Order I R.9-ef- the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a case the defect of non joinder of other co-mortgagors will not be fatal." In Govindan v. Kunjan,1964 KLT. All the controversial matters between the mortgagee and the mortgagor can be effectively decided between the parties who are before the Court within the meaning of Order I R.9-ef- the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a case the defect of non joinder of other co-mortgagors will not be fatal." In Govindan v. Kunjan,1964 KLT. 836, this Court held :that one of the fractional owners of the equity of redemption was entitled to redeem the whole mortgage and the suit was not liable to :be dismissed for non joinder of the other co-mortgagors. The relevant test was whether the rights of the parties on the record could be determined in the absence of the other co-mortgagors without affecting the rights of the latter. 10. The abolition of the joint family system did not create any equity in favour of the mortgagee. The absence of the other co-mortgrgors does not in any manner prejudice the interests of the mortgagee. It is of course true that upon redemption, the redeeming mortgagor is accountable to the co-mortgagors in respect of the property redeemed. That is an equity which arises in favour of the co-mortgagors, and it is of no concern to the mortgagee whose accounts are settled in full upon redemption. The other mortgagors, though undoubtedly proper parties, are, however, not necessary parties in a suit for redemption, and their absence cannot vitiate the decree. This is clear from S.99 C. P. C. which says: "No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any mis joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case of the jurisdiction of the Court." The absence of the co-mortgagors does not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. Subject to the equity which arises in favour of the co-mortgagors, the suit is perfectly maintainable and the decree is undoubtedly valid. 11. It is true as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders (AIR. 1975 S. C. 1409), that subsequent events in certain circumstances can be taken note of by the court. That was a case which arose from proceedings for eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It is true as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders (AIR. 1975 S. C. 1409), that subsequent events in certain circumstances can be taken note of by the court. That was a case which arose from proceedings for eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The Court pointed out that the fact that the landlord came into possession of another building during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction had to be taken note of before ordering eviction. In that case the equity arose pendente lite in favour of the defendant. The purpose of the legislation was to prevent eviction except in certain specified cases. During the proceedings for eviction, the landlord became disqualified to seek eviction. It was with reference to such cases that the principle was referred to by the Supreme Court. That decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 12. In the circumstances the appeal fails. It is dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their respective costs. Dismissed.