Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are seasonal workers working as Watchers under the respondents. The respondents are: (1) the Executive Engineer, Public Health Division, Alleppey and (2) the Chief Engineer, P.H.E.D Trivandrum. The first petitioner was working as a Watcher from 6 21973 and the 2nd petitioner was working, according to the petition, from 6121972 (This appears to be a mistake and the correct date of bis entry is 18 10 1973). The petitioners were retrenched as per Exts. P-2 and P-3. These orders are under challenge in this writ petition. 2. The main contention raised by the petitioners in this case is that before 8 71975 when Exts. P-2 and P-3 orders were passed, they had to their credit 240 days continuous service as contemplated in S.25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and hence they could not be sent out except in compliance with the requirements laid down in S.25F of the Act. In Exts. P-2 and P-3, it is stated that the petitioners will be kept out of employment till vacancies arise. The petitioners have raised the plea that their juniors were kept in service when they were sent out and this action amounts to discrimination violative of Art.16 (1) of the Constitution. I am not concerned about this aspect of the case in this writ petition 3. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that the seasonal workers like the petitioners are engaged according to necessity of work, purely on casual basis and they were not continuously engaged throughout the year from the respective dates of their joining the service. In para 5 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the petitioners are not workmen falling under the Industrial Disputes Act, that they were only engaged for works of a casual nature and that they were kept out when the work ceased. It is further stated that the petitioners have not worked for 240 days during the 12 months preceding 20 31973 as required by Ext. RI G.O. 4. The question for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of S.25F of the Act. It is further stated that the petitioners have not worked for 240 days during the 12 months preceding 20 31973 as required by Ext. RI G.O. 4. The question for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of S.25F of the Act. Incidentally, a contention was raised by the respondents' counsel that the Public Health wing of the Public Health (Engineering) Department cannot be said to be an industry coming within the meaning of the Act, and for this reason also the petition has to fail. 5. I shall first consider the effect of Ext. RI G O. It is true that Ext. RI G.O. stipulates the absorption of seasonal workers like the petitioners into N.M.R. if they have to their credit service for 240 days prior to 20 31973. It cannot be disputed that in this case neither the first petitioner nor the 2nd petitioner satisfies this condition. But Ext. RI cannot override the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, if the petitioners are workers under that Act. 6. Petitioners have averred in para 6 of the petition that they are workmen falling under the Act, that they have completed 240 days and that notice under S.25F for one month should have been given to them before a Valid retrenchment. The averment in para 6 means that they had to their credit 240 days of service on the day they were retrenched. This averment in the petition has not been pointedly denied in the counter-affidavit. The Government Pleader would contend that there is no specific averment in the petition that the petitioners had to their credit 240 days continuous service 12 months prior to 8 71975, when Exts. P-2 and P-3 orders were passed. According to him, the averments in para 6 of the petition can only spell out a case of the petitioners having 240 days service prior to Exts, P-2 & P3. The denial contained in para 5 of the counter-affidavit is that "the petitioners have not worked 240 days during the 12 months in the year preceding 20-3-1973 as required by G. O. quoted earlier." Reference in this sentence is obviously to Ext. P1 G.O I, therefore, hold that on the pleadings in the petition, the petitioners have the necessary service to entitle them to the benefit contained under S.25F of the Act. 7. P1 G.O I, therefore, hold that on the pleadings in the petition, the petitioners have the necessary service to entitle them to the benefit contained under S.25F of the Act. 7. But before granting relief to the petitioners, the further question raised at the Bar, though not specifically pleaded, has to be answered. The question so raised is that the Public Health wing of the Public Health Engineering Department under the State Government cannot be said to be an'industry' coming within the meaning of the Act After the historic judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa (1978 (I) LLJ. 349), in which the concept of the expression 'industry has undergone a revolutionary change and the horizons of the expression'industry' have been put on a very wide canvas, those who contend that a particular establishment is not an industry, should satisfy the Court conclusively and indubitably that the said establishment falls outside the limits prescribed by the Supreme Court in the above decision. Though there are three separate judgments, the main judgment is by Justice Krishna Iyer. The sum and substance of the discussion, to put in one sentence, is that an establishment can be taken out of the pale of industry only if it can be said to exercise sovereign or regal functions, or to use the expression of the learned judge "sovereign functions strictly understood". 8. Mr. Cyriac Joseph, appearing for the respondents, sought to rely upon Para.17 and 18 of the judgment by the learned Chief Justice. It has to be understood that the learned Chief Justice concurred with Krishna Iyer J. Of course, he did not feel happy with the expression 'sovereign' function. According to him, a more accurate expression would have been "governmental functions". Even so, the learned Chief Justice had his own misgivings, since Government also entered largely into the fields of industry. In Para.18, he observed: "I am impressed by the argument that certain public utility services which are carried out by governmental agencies or Corporations are treated by the Act itself as within the sphere of industry." In my view, Para.17 and 18, on which reliance was sought to be placed upon by the learned Government Pleader, do not help him. 9. 9. The guidelines for ascertaining whether a particular establishment is an'industry' or not are contained in Para.39, 46, 58 and 131 of the main judgment rendered by Krishna Iyer J. I do not think it necessary to extract them in detail except to refer to Para.131 (IV) (b) and (c), which reads as follows: "(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly understood, alone qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by Government or statutory bodies. (c) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within S.20)". There is an exhaustive discussion by the learned judge as to how even philanthropic institutions can enter into economic adventures and can be brought within the reach of the expression 'industry' under the Act. Simply because an establishment is run by the Government, it cannot escape from the features laid down by the Act. Establishments which even remotely engage themselves in economic adventures but which do not exercise solely sovereign or regal functions, have to be brought within the ken of the expression 'industry'. Law of the land has thus been laid down by the judgment of the Supreme Court and I have no hesitation to hold that the Public Health wing of the Public Health Engineering Department, with which we are concerned in this case, comes within the expression 'industry' as has been laid down by the judgment above referred to. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the Public Health wing of the Public Health Engineering Department under the State Government is exercising sovereign functions strictly understood when alone the said establishment can qualify for exemption. 10. The learned Government Pleader raised an alternative plea that this writ petition should abate since the petitioners have a statutory remedy to get the dispute referred to adjudication. I do not think that this plea can be sustained. Reference to adjudication is not a remedy available to a party as of right. It is within the discretion of the Government to either refer a particular dispute for adjudication or not. This question has been settled by this Court in its judgment reported in 1978-11 LLJ 254. This contention also fails. 11. Reference to adjudication is not a remedy available to a party as of right. It is within the discretion of the Government to either refer a particular dispute for adjudication or not. This question has been settled by this Court in its judgment reported in 1978-11 LLJ 254. This contention also fails. 11. I therefore hold that the Public Health Wing of the Public Health Engineering Department is an industry and that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of S.25F of the Act. I quash Exts. P-2 and P-3, in so far as they relate to the petitioners and allow this writ petition. I direct the parties to bear their costs. Allowed.