Lal Bihari Prasad And Another v. State Of Bihar — 1978 DIGILAW 250 (PAT)

Judgment NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J. 1. On a petition of complaint filed by the Additional Collector, Patna, these petitioners have been summoned to stand trial for offences under Ss. 468, 371, 193 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna. The said petition of complaint was filed because it was discovered that during the hearing of a mutation appeal before the Additional Collector, these petitioners had filed forged and fabricated carbon copy of Jamabandi. According to the petitioners, the Additional Collector while hearing a mutation proceeding will not be deemed to be a Court within the meaning of Sec.340 or sub-s. (3) of Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), and, as such, he had no jurisdiction to initiate a proceeding for the prosecution of the petitioners as contemplated by the aforesaid sections. 2. It appears that these petitioners had filed a petition before the Deputy Collector, In charge Land Reforms, Patna, for grant of rent receipts in respect of certain lands, details whereof were mentioned in that petition. One Manju Sinha filed an objection to that petition saying that the entries in Register II have been wrongly made in favour of these petitioners and that they should be corrected. The Deputy Collector, In charge Land Reforms, heard both the parties and by his order dated 12-12-1972 ordered for correction of Register II in favour of the said Manju Sinha, rejecting the application for grant of receipt filed on behalf of the petitioners. Being aggrieved by that order, these petitioners filed an appeal before the Additional Collector, Patna. The Additional Collector, however allowed the said appeal by his order dated 27-7-1973. In support of their claim, the petitioners had produced a carbon copy of the Jamabandi before the Additional Collector. The aforesaid Manju Sinha filed a revision before the Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna. By his order dated 21-5-1974, while allowing the revision application and setting aside the order of the Additional Collector, the Additional Commissioner, Patna, recorded a finding that one of the petitioners had filed a false affidavit and these petitioners had filed a forged carbon copy of Jamabandi before the Additional Collector to support their case, and, as such, they were liable to be prosecuted. The Additional Commissioner, however, directed the Additional Collector, Patna, to Initiate prosecution against these petitioners. The Additional Commissioner, however, directed the Additional Collector, Patna, to Initiate prosecution against these petitioners. ln view of this order, the complaint in question was filed and the petitioners have been summoned to stand trial for having committed an offence referred to in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 195 of the Code. 3. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, if it is held that the Additional Collector while hearing a dispute in respect of mutation and correction of Register II is not a Court within the meaning of Ss. 340 and 195 of the Code, then the filing of the complaint and the criminal prosecution initiated against the petitioners is wholly without jurisdiction and amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. 4. On several occasions this question has arisen as to whether a particular authority exercising a quasi-judicial power is a court or not. In recent years, apart from the regular courts Civil, Revenue and Criminal - many authorities have been vested under different enactments the power to decide disputes affecting the rights of citizens. While doing so, they are expected to act judicially, although they are not full-fledged court in the sense of the term. Sometimes they have only trappings of a Court. In this situation, the first question to consider before a prosecution could proceed on a complaint, filed by such authorities, is as to whether they are court within the meaning of the aforesaid sections. In the case of Cooper V/s. Wilson, 1937 2 KB 309, this question was considered as to whether the administrative tribunals or authorities constituted under different Acts can be held to be a Court if they fulfil certain requirements. In the case of Cooper V/s. Wilson, 1937 2 KB 309, this question was considered as to whether the administrative tribunals or authorities constituted under different Acts can be held to be a Court if they fulfil certain requirements. In that connection it was observed : "A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites : (1) the prosecution (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law". In the case of Brajnandan Sinha V/s. Jyoti Narain ( AIR 1956 SC 66 ), reference was made to the aforesaid case of Cooper V/s. Wilson with approval and it was pointed out that one of the tests for holding such quasi-judicial authority to be a court is as to whether the pronouncement of such body is binding in nature. In this connection reference may be made to a passage from Halsburys Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 8, page 576, which has been referred to in many of the judgments. In this connection reference may be made to a passage from Halsburys Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 8, page 576, which has been referred to in many of the judgments. It is as follows :- "Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as assessment committees, guardians committees, the Court references constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Act to decide claims made on the insurance funds, the benchers of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the General Medical Council, when considering question affecting the position of a medical man." In the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi V/s. State of Punjab ( AIR 1956 SC 153 ) a question had arisen as to whether the Returning Officer under the Representation of the People Act is a Court. It was held that he was not a court because there was no lis in which persons with opposite claims are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner. It was pointed out that he was holding simply an inquiry under the provisions of the Act aforesaid and was exercising a quasi-judicial power. In the case of Jagannath Prasad V/s. State of U. P. ( AIR 1963 SC 416 ), the Supreme Court had to consider whether a Sales Tax Officer while exercising power under the Sales Tax Act was a Court within the meaning of S. 195 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held that no doubt Sales Tax Officers have certain powers which are similar to the powers exercised by Courts, but still they are not Courts. In that connection it was observed :- "The Sales Tax Officers are the instrumentalities of the State for collection of certain taxes. Under the Act and the Rules made thereunder certain Officers are appointed as Sales Tax Officers who have certain duties assigned to them for the imposition and collection of taxes and in the process they have to perform many duties which are of a quasi-judicial nature and certain other duties which are administrative duties. Under the Act and the Rules made thereunder certain Officers are appointed as Sales Tax Officers who have certain duties assigned to them for the imposition and collection of taxes and in the process they have to perform many duties which are of a quasi-judicial nature and certain other duties which are administrative duties. Merely because certain instrumentalities of State employed for the purpose of taxation have, in the discharge of their duties, to perform certain quasi-judicial functions they are not converted into courts thereby." Similar view had been expressed in the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai V/s. State of U. P., AIR 1962 SC 1621 in respect of Sales Tax Officers. In the case of Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. V/s. Federal Commr. of Taxation, 1931 0 AC 275, it was observed that "authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power." 5. This Court also in the case of Dr. Nitya Nand Singh V/s. Sita Ram Prasad (1976 BBCJ (HC) 541) had to consider as to whether an Assistant Settlement Officer discharging the functions under Sec.103A of the Bihar Tenancy Act was a Court. It was held that decision arrived at by the Revenue Officer under that Section, after hearing the Tanaza during the revisional survey, was not finally determining the rights of the parties, and as such, an Assistant Settlement Officer was not acting as a Revenue Court and the provisions of Sec.340 of the Code along with Sec.195 (2) are not applicable. 6. Broadly speaking, it appears that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definite judgment. 7. I may, however, point out certain cases where authorities who exercise quasi-judicial power under the respective Acts have been held to be court. In the case of Lalji Haridas V/s. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1964 SC 1154 ), an Income-tax Officer was held to be a Court within the meaning of Sec.195 (1) (b). This view was taken because of the specific provision contained in Sec.37 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In the case of Lalji Haridas V/s. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1964 SC 1154 ), an Income-tax Officer was held to be a Court within the meaning of Sec.195 (1) (b). This view was taken because of the specific provision contained in Sec.37 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Similarly, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore V/s. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd ( AIR 1967 SC 1494 ), it was held that a Registrar exercising powers under Sec. 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act was a Court because he was discharging the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary Civil and Revenue Courts. In support of this finding, reference was made to the different provisions of the Act which required him to decide the dispute judicially and his finding was final in nature. This Court in Chandra Kishore Jha V/s. State of Bihar (1975 BBCJ (HC) 656), held that a Compensation Officer appointed under the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a Court while deciding disputes relating to compensation. But in all these cases, the tests laid down for determining as to whether an authority was a Court or not were found to have been fulfilled. 8. Now, so far as the present case is concerned, it has to be examined as to whether the Additional Collector while hearing the mutation appeal was a Court or not. I may mention at the outset that mutations are made in the records of the State Government not under any enactment, but in accordance with the Bihar Government Estates (Khas Mahal) Manual. It prescribes the procedure how an application for mutation shall be made and how it is to be heard and disposed of. Whenever any such application is made, parties concerned have to be heard and in that sense the Deputy Collector, Incharge Land Reforms, or the Additional Collector, as the case may be, has to act in a quasi-judicial manner by observing all principles of natural justice. But that is not all what is required. According to me, they do not decide the dispute between the parties finally in the sense that any finding recorded by them is not of a binding nature, the sole object of such proceedings being as to from whom the State shall realise rent. But that is not all what is required. According to me, they do not decide the dispute between the parties finally in the sense that any finding recorded by them is not of a binding nature, the sole object of such proceedings being as to from whom the State shall realise rent. About the nature of the mutation proceeding, the Privy Council in Nirman Singh V/s. Rudra Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1926 PC 100 observed:- "The perusal by their Lordships of the judgment of the court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, at p. 482 of the record leads their Lordships to think that its judgment is to a great degree based on the mischievous but persistent error that the proceedings for the mutation of names is a judicial proceeding, in which the title to and the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined. They are nothing of the kind as has been pointed out times innumerable by the Judicial Committee. They are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid." Orders passed in such mutation cases are, no doubt, produced in support of the claim made by the party concerned before the Civil or the Criminal Court whenever a dispute arises, but it is well-known that any such order is not binding in nature and such court before which such orders are produced has to adjudicate the rights of the parties to the dispute. While doing so, it may take into account or may not place reliance on such mutation orders. 9 Learned counsel appearing for the State has drawn our attention to a decision of a learned single Judge of the Oudh Court in the case of Lachhman Prasad V/s. Emperor, AIR 1930 Oudh 58, where it was held that a mutation proceeding was a judicial proceeding and the authority which was hearing mutation proceeding was a Court. It is difficult to accept the view expressed in the aforesaid judgment because it runs counter to the aforesaid observation made by the Privy Council. It is difficult to accept the view expressed in the aforesaid judgment because it runs counter to the aforesaid observation made by the Privy Council. I am unable to appreciate as to how the learned Judge took the aforesaid view even after the aforesaid pronouncement by the Privy Council. A Bench of this Court in the case of Bhola Singh V/s. Chandrabansh Choubey (1966 BLJR 759) has also held that mutation proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding, but primarily administrative in nature. As such, even if it is held that the authorities deciding mutation dispute decide a dispute between the parties, and for that purpose, they have power to take evidence and they act in a quasi-judicial manner, still as the orders passed by them are not binding in nature, it has to be held that all the conditions required for designating them as courts are not fulfilled. Similar was the view expressed by a Bench of this Court in the case of R. S. Murthy V/s. R. K. Naug (1976 BBCJ (HC) 283) in respect of an Industrial Court where it was pointed out that although the Labour Tribunals have to decide disputes and while doing so have to act judicially, in view of Sec.17 (2) and Sec.17A (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, enforceability of an award given by such a Tribunal is subject to the exercise of the power by the appropriate Government or the Central Government, as the case may be. They may declare that the said award shall not become enforceable, as such, it was difficult to hold that awards given by such tribunals were final and binding in nature, which is a pre-requisite for holding them as Courts. The case of the authorities while deciding a mutation dispute cannot be higher than the Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act because there most of the orders are enforceable and binding except those where the appropriate Government under certain contingency makes their awards ineffective and unenforceable. In such a situation the irresistible conclusion is that the Deputy Collector, In charge Land Reforms, or the Additional Collector, or even the Additional Commissioner, while hearing a mutation dispute, will not be deemed to be a Court within the meaning of Sec.340 and Sec.195 (1) (b) of the Code so as to attract the provisions of the aforesaid sections. In such a situation the irresistible conclusion is that the Deputy Collector, In charge Land Reforms, or the Additional Collector, or even the Additional Commissioner, while hearing a mutation dispute, will not be deemed to be a Court within the meaning of Sec.340 and Sec.195 (1) (b) of the Code so as to attract the provisions of the aforesaid sections. The result will be that the Additional Collector could not have filed the petition of complaint as a Court for the alleged offences having been committed in that Court. Once it is held that the Additional Collector was not a Court, then the cognizance taken of the offences for prosecuting the petitioners for having produced a forged copy of the Jamabandi during the hearing of the mutation appeal, has to be quashed. 10. Accordingly, the application is allowed and the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioners is quashed. P.S.SAHAY, J. 11 I agree.