Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, a teacher in a Public School at Gwalior, seeks to revise an order passed by the Addl. Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Ernakulam, awarding maintenance to his wife, first, respondent, at the rate of Rs. 150/- per mensem and to their minor daughter, the second respondent, at the rate of Rs. 90/- per mensem. The parties are Roman Catholics. The marriage between the petitioner and the first respondent were solemnized according to the religious rites at Lourdes Catholic Church at Trichur in the year 1967. After the marriage the petitioner took the first respondent to Gwalior and they were staying there together as husband and :wife for about 6 months. While so the first respondent became pregnant and she came to the house of her parents at Trichur along with a family Which was coming from Gwalior to Trichur. Shortly thereafter the first respondent gave birth to the second respondent. According to the first respondent, the petitioner was very cruel towards her and she was being ill-treated and manhandled at Gwalior. It is also the ease of the first respondent that the petitioner was leading an adulterous life keeping another woman by name Mariyamma Varghese as his mistress. Ever since the first respondent came to Trichur, except sending Rs. 75/- on two occasions, the petitioner has not sent any amount to the respondents towards their maintenance and he was neglecting them, as a result of which the respondents were finding it difficult to make both ends meet. 2. The revision petitioner resisted the prayer for maintenance on the grounds that the court at Ernakulam has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, that he is prepared to maintain the respondents if they went and stayed with him at Gwalior, and that the first respondent has independent income to maintain herself. 3. Pw.1, the first respondent, pw. 2, her father, and pw. 3, a family friend and a distant relative residing at Chottanikkara, were examined and Exts. PI to P7 were marked in support of the application for maintenance. 4. C. Pw.1, an eighteen year old brother of the revision petitioner, has been examined and Ex. D1 to D4 marked in support of the contentions of, the petitioner. 5. 3, a family friend and a distant relative residing at Chottanikkara, were examined and Exts. PI to P7 were marked in support of the application for maintenance. 4. C. Pw.1, an eighteen year old brother of the revision petitioner, has been examined and Ex. D1 to D4 marked in support of the contentions of, the petitioner. 5. Rejecting the contentions raised on behalf of the revision petitioner, the learned Magistrate found that she has jurisdiction to try the case, that the revision petitioner ill-treated the first respondent, that he was leading an adulterous life and that the first respondent has sufficient reason to refuse to go and live with him. It was also found that although the first respondent owned some properties which were given to her by her mother, she sold away the same in the year 1970, that she has no income of her own to maintain herself and her child and that the revision petitioner has sufficient means to maintain respondents 1 and 2. On these findings, the first respondent was awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150/- and the second respondent Rs. 90/-per mensem. The amounts were ordered to be payable from the date of the petition. 6. This order was strongly assailed by the counsel appearing for the revision petitioner mainly on the following grounds: (i) The court at Ernakulam has no jurisdiction to try the case in question. (ii) The court below ought to have held that the revision petitioner made a bona fide offer to take back the respondents to Gwalior and maintain them. 7. I shall deal with the points raised by the counsel one by one. It was argued by the counsel that the residence of the first respondent at Chottanikkara with pw. 3 for a few days will not confer any jurisdiction on the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Ernakulam, to entertain her application and dispose of the same. No doubt, a casual or a flying -Visit to a place is not what is contemplated by 'residence' in S.126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is something more than a brief visit of casual residence at a place for a temporary purpose. S.126 (1) Cr. P. C. reads: "126. (1) Proceedings under. No doubt, a casual or a flying -Visit to a place is not what is contemplated by 'residence' in S.126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is something more than a brief visit of casual residence at a place for a temporary purpose. S.126 (1) Cr. P. C. reads: "126. (1) Proceedings under. S.125 may be taken against any person in any district (a) where he is, or (b) where he or his wife resides, or (c) where he last resided with his wife; or as the case may be, with the mother of the illegitimate child." There is considerable change brought out in S.126 (1) which corresponds to S.488 (8) of the Old Code, which only stated that proceedings under that section may be taken against any person in any district where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife, or as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child. The words "where he resides or is" appearing in S.488(8) of the Old Code have been now replaced by the words "where he or his wife resides" in sub-section (I) of S.126. This change is quite significant and has been introduced with a purpose. Under the Old Code a neglected or discarded wife could file an application for maintenance only in the district where her husband resided or where he is or where he last resided with his wife. This has caused great hardship and untold misery to a neglected and ill-treated wife who has been driven to the necessity of seeking the benefits of this section just to save herself from starvation and poverty. It is clear from the section that a proceeding under S.125 can be taken against any person in any district where he is or where he or his wife resides. The question then for consideration is what is the meaning of the word "residence" whether what is meant is permanent residence or temporary residence or only a casual residence. The word "residence" has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure; and therefore, we have to go by the ordinary dictionary meaning. There is nothing in the section spelling out or indicating that by the word "residence" what is meant or contemplated is permanent residence. The word 'resides' no doubt includes temporary residence also. In Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh (AIR. 1963 SC. There is nothing in the section spelling out or indicating that by the word "residence" what is meant or contemplated is permanent residence. The word 'resides' no doubt includes temporary residence also. In Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh (AIR. 1963 SC. 1521) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope and meaning of the expression "resides or is" appearing in S.488 of the Old Code. After having considered the material provisions in the section and decisions on the point by various High Courts, the Supreme Court held as follows: 'Having regard to the object sought to be achieved, the meaning implicit in the words used, and the construction placed by decided cases thereon we would define the word 'resides' thus: a person resides in a place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently or even temporarily; whether a person has chosen to make a particular place his abode depends upon the facts of each case." It was also held that the proceedings under S.488 are in the nature of civil proceedings, that the remedies are summary ones and that the person seeking that remedy is ordinarily a helpless person and therefore the word should be liberally construed without doing violence to the language. The same meaning should be given to the word "resides" and the word "resided." The word "resided" includes temporary as well as permanent 'residence. The use of the past tense indicates that it has reference to any type of residence, namely permanent or temporary. The test is whether a party had animus manendi or an intention to stay at one place for a period, the length of the period depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. But the word 'is' issued in the sub-section in a much wider sense than the word 'resides' and is not limited by the animus manendi of the person or the duration or nature of his stay. My learned brother Khalid J. in Raman v. Vasumathi (1972 KLT. 501) relying on the decision of the Supreme Court and other decisions also held that the word 'resides' appearing in S.488(8) of the Old Code has a wider connotation and that the court should be very liberal in considering the question of jurisdiction under S.488 favourably to the women. My learned brother Khalid J. in Raman v. Vasumathi (1972 KLT. 501) relying on the decision of the Supreme Court and other decisions also held that the word 'resides' appearing in S.488(8) of the Old Code has a wider connotation and that the court should be very liberal in considering the question of jurisdiction under S.488 favourably to the women. Realising the trials and tribulations of the neglected and discarded women, the learned judge in the said decision expressed his opinion that an amendment to S.488(8) is necessary giving jurisdiction to courts in S.488 matters where the woman resides and not where the husband resides. Now under S.126 of the New Code what was desired by this Court has been achieved 8. There is the evidence of pw.1 corroborated by the evidence of pws. 2 and 3 that pw. I, the first respondent, was residing along with pw. 3 at Chottanikkara during the year 1975-76 and that even at the time of filing this petition she was residing there. For a period of 13 months she was employed as a helper on daily wages in the Civil Supplies Corporation at Ernakulam and also at Trichur. Ex. P6 dated 6-10-1975 is the appointment order and that shows that she was appointed as a helper at Pallimukku at Ernakulam. Ex. P5 dated 9-11-76 is the order terminating her services from 3-11-1976. It is seen from Ex. P6, the order of appointment, that the first respondent was residing with one Mathai, pw. 3, at Chottanikara. PW.1 has sworn to the ill-treatment and also to the adulterous living of the revision petitioner. The evidence of pw. 1 in this regard is corroborated by the evidence of Pws. 2 and 3. There is no evidence contra on these points. The revision petitioner did not choose to get into the witness-box : and deny the allegations made by the first respondent. The evidence" of C. pw. I, his younger brother, who admitted that he has no direct knowledge of the facts he has deposed to during chief-examination. His evidence is of no use to the revision petitioner. After the first respondent gave birth to the second respondent, the revision petitioner filed a petition before the District Court, Gwalior for restitution of conjugal rights. This was resisted by the first respondent mainly on the ground that the petitioner was leading an immoral life keeping one Mariyamma Varghese. His evidence is of no use to the revision petitioner. After the first respondent gave birth to the second respondent, the revision petitioner filed a petition before the District Court, Gwalior for restitution of conjugal rights. This was resisted by the first respondent mainly on the ground that the petitioner was leading an immoral life keeping one Mariyamma Varghese. Upholding the contention of the first respondent this petition was dismissed by the District Court as evidenced by Ext. P1, the certified copy of the order in the said case. There is no evidence that except sending Rs. 75/- on two occasions,: the revision petitioner sent any amount to the respondents or thereafter made any enquiries about their welfare and well-being. That the offer made in the counter that, if the respondents are prepared to go to Gwalior and stay with him, he is prepared to maintain them, is without any bona fides, is clear from his conduct towards the respondents borne out by the evidence in the case. The evidence of pws.1 to 3 disclose that the first respondent has just and sufficient grounds to refuse to go and stay with the revision petitioner at Gwalior. Except the income she was, getting from the Civil Supplies Corporation during the period she was in employment, there is no evidence that she was getting any other income. 9. None of the grounds taken by the revision petitioner is sustainable in law or on the facts and circumstances proved in the case. Considering all the facts and circumstances proved in the case, I do not think, the quantum of maintenance awarded is in any way excessive or disproportionate to the means and capacity of the revision petitioner. This revision petition therefore fails and it is dismissed. Dismissed.