Judgment :- The concurrent finding that the respondents 1 to 10 are tenants within the meaning of S.4A(1)(b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, as amended by Act 35 of 1969, is unassailable. The finding has therefore to be confirmed, and I do so. 2. The only two contentions which are now seriously urged before me by the appellants' counsel Shri Govinda Warrier are: (I) the lower appellate court wrongly held that the arrears of prepped had been discharged for the period upto 1- 5 -1963, and (ii) damages for the destruction of trees for the period prior to 1 - 1 -1970 were not payable 3. This Court has in K. P. Muhammad v Maya Devi, 197] KLT. 284 F.B, held that the status of a mortgagee is transmuted to that of a tenant only with effect from the date on which S.4A which is a deeming provision came into effect. All the rights and liabilities which arose prior to that date remained unaffected. The obligation of the respondents to account for the rent payable by them and for the damage committed by them in the period anterior to the date on which, by means of a fiction, they became tenants, although mortgagees, is unaffected by the transmutation in status. In my view the lower appellate court wrongly held that for the period prior to 1-1-1970, S.73 of the Act had any application to mortgagees who fell within the meaning of S.4A with effect from 1-1-1970. Likewise I am of the view that if damages were payable by a mortgagee on account of the destruction of the trees or any other tortuous act, such amounts for the period prior to 1-1-1970 were payable by him notwithstanding S.4A. 4. In the present case both the courts found that damage to trees had been committed by the respondent-;. But they wrongly held that the claim for damages was time-barred. Having found that the defendants were liable to account for the destruction of the trees at the time of the surrender of possession, I do not see how the courts could have held that a suit which was filed in time for redemption was out of time for the purpose of claiming damages which have been found to arise from the destruction of trees. The mere fact that redemption bad become impossible of enforcement on account of the intervening legislation, viz., coming into force of S.4A, would not, as this Court held, take away or destroy the liability of the respondents to account for the damage committed by them in the period prior to 1-1-1970. The lower appellate court in confirming the finding of the trial court that claim for damages was barred by limitation remarked as follows: "If it were to be held that the plaintiffs are entitled to get damages, the quantum of the same can be fixed at Rs. 871.25 at determined by the commissioner in his account, Ext. CI." The damages payable having been thus ascertained by the lower appellate court, I hold that the said sum of Rs. 871.25 is payable by the respondents to the appellants as damages. As regards the payment of prepped for the anterior period, I am of the view that the respondents are liable to pay the appellants purappad for the period ending on 1-1-1970 at the rate specified in the decree for purappad. For this purpose the decree has adopted the contract rent of Rs. 20/-per annum. I hold that purappad is payable up till 1-1-1970 at that rate. To this limited extent and subject to what I have slated above, the appeal is allowed. The parties will bear Seer respective costs.