Judgment Shivanugrah Narain. J. 1. -this application by the former husband is directed against an order of the Judicial Magistrate, Godda, allowing in part an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called the new Code), and directing the petitioner to pay to his former wife Bibi Majida Khatoon (opposite party in this Court) Rs.75/~ per month for her maintenance. 2. Admittedly, the opposite party, Bibi Majida Khatoon, was the legally married wife of the petitioner. The petitioner has three children from her. It is not in dispute that the petitioner divorced the opposite party and the application for maintenance was filed by the former wife after the divorce. It is also not in dispute that the children of the marriage are residing with and are being maintained by the petitioner. According to the former wife, the petitioner took a second wife, started mal-treating her and her children and when she made demands for maintenance for herself and her children, the petitioner divorced her and refused to maintain her though he had sufficient means for the same. The defence of the petitioner was that the opposite party had been divorced in March 1976 and was at liberty to marry elsewhere ; as she was no longer his wife, she was not entitled to any maintenance. The allegations of negligence and refusal to maintain prior to divorce were denied by the petitioner who alleged that he was compelled to divorce her as she had left the village with a man without the consent of the members of his family. 3. The learned Magistrate held that the petitioner had divorced his former wife without cogent reasons and that he has married again and there was no material to show that the former wife was living in adultery and, therefore, she was entitled to maintenance. The learned Magistrate, however, held that she was entitled to maintenance only at the rate of Rs.75/- per month and not at the rate of Rs.300/- per mouth as claimed by her. 4. The main argument advanced by Shri Deveshwar Pd. The learned Magistrate, however, held that she was entitled to maintenance only at the rate of Rs.75/- per month and not at the rate of Rs.300/- per mouth as claimed by her. 4. The main argument advanced by Shri Deveshwar Pd. Jha, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that as, admittedly, the opposite party had been divorced in March 1976 and the period of iddat had expired on 6.7.76, when the application for maintenance was filed by the former wife, the application for maintenance was not maintainable at her instance as a divorced Muslim wife is, under the Mohammedan law, not entitled to any maintenance after the expiry of the period of iddat. It is true that under the personal law applicable to muslims, in a case where the wife has been informed of the divorce, the wife is entitled to maintenance during the period of iddat only. But the question whether a person is entitled to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the new Code has to be answered with reference to the provisions of section 125. In Nanak Cland V/s. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 446), sikri, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Supreme Court, rejected the argument that in view of the provisions of Chapter III of the Hindu Adoptions and maintenance Act, 1956, no order for maintenance under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter called the old Code) could be made and observed as follows :- "the scope of the two laws is different. Sec.488 provides a summary remedy and is applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. " (at page 448 of the Report)On a parity of reasoning, it must he held that section 125 of the new Code is applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. 5. Sub-section (1) of section 123 which empowers the Magistrate to make an order for maintenance of wife and certain other relations who are unable to maintain themselves, has an explanation appended to it. Explanation (b) thereof runs thus: "for the purposes of this Chapter,- (b) wife includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. Explanation (b) thereof runs thus: "for the purposes of this Chapter,- (b) wife includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. " The argument that a wife who has been divorced by her husband is not entitled to any maintenance, even though it is not shown that she has remarried, is, therefore in the teeth of Explanation (b) which in clear express and unambiguous terms by a statutory fiction makes a woman, who has been divorced or has obtained a divorce from husband and has not remarried, a wife for the purposes of riant to maintenance under section 125 of the new Code. The argument that as the Muslim law entitles the divorced wife to maintenance only till the end of the period of Iddat, and therefore, she has no right of maintenance after the expiry of the period of the Iddat even under section 125 of the new Code, must therefore, be rejected. Mullas Principles of Mohammedan Law (18th edition page 303) contains the following statement: "even if Muslim law entitles a divorced wife to maintenance only till the end of the period of Iddat, section 125 Criminal Procedure code (1974) entitled her to maintenance so long as she does not marry again. " In support of this statement of law, reference is made to the decision in K. Raza khan V/s. Mumtaza Khatoon, (1976) 1 Andh. W. R.1. That Report is not available but about the correctness of the statement of law there can be no doubt. 6 Shri Deveshwar Pd. Jha, in support of his contention, placed reliance on the decisions leported in AIR 1967 Patna 344 (Enamul Haque V/s. Bibi taimunissa) AIR 1961 Bombay 121 ; Chandbi Ex-w/o Badesha Mujawar V/s. Bandesha AIR 1955 Hyderabad 144 ; Mohd. Shammddin V/s. Noor Jahan Begum, and 1976 PLJR 365; Sherkh Jalil V/s. Bibi Sarfunnissa. 6 Shri Deveshwar Pd. Jha, in support of his contention, placed reliance on the decisions leported in AIR 1967 Patna 344 (Enamul Haque V/s. Bibi taimunissa) AIR 1961 Bombay 121 ; Chandbi Ex-w/o Badesha Mujawar V/s. Bandesha AIR 1955 Hyderabad 144 ; Mohd. Shammddin V/s. Noor Jahan Begum, and 1976 PLJR 365; Sherkh Jalil V/s. Bibi Sarfunnissa. In all these cases it was held that a Muslim wife who has been divorced was entitled to maintenance under the provisions of section 488 of the old Code only till the expiry of the period of ladat at These decisions, however, were given under the old Code which did not contain the inclusive definition of wife contained in Explanation (b) to sub-section (1)of section 125 of the new Code Under the old Code, only a wife was entitled to maintenance and, in the absence of any definition of the expression wife the existence of the relationship of husband and wife had to be determined with reference to the personal law of the party ; and applying the personal law of the Muslims, it was held that though there had been a divorce, for the purposes of maintenance, as under the Muslim law, maintenance was payable to a former wife even after the divorce during the period of Iddat the marriage tie itself should be deemed to have been extended for the period of iddat, vide a Bench decision of the Hyderabad High Court in 33 Deccan L. R.134 referred to in the decision reported in AIR 1955 Hyderabad 144. Now, by virtue of explanation (b) to sub-section (1) of section 125 of the new Code a woman who has been divorced has to be, for the purposes of section 125 (1), regarded as a wife and in view of this express stautory mandate the Court cannot repudiate her claim for maintenance although according to the personal law applicable she is no longer a wife. The decisions relied upon by Shri Jha are, therefore, of no avail. 7. Shri Jha next contended that payment of the dower debt of Rs.1000/-due to the former wife having been made by the petitioner on the 4th August, 1978, the order for maintenance must be set aside. The payment was made after the passing of the order in question. The correctness of the order cannot be impugned on that ground. 7. Shri Jha next contended that payment of the dower debt of Rs.1000/-due to the former wife having been made by the petitioner on the 4th August, 1978, the order for maintenance must be set aside. The payment was made after the passing of the order in question. The correctness of the order cannot be impugned on that ground. I am also not convinced that the ends of justice would require that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction should take into consideration this fact and modify the order passed in view of the subsequent development. Interference in revision is discretionary. Under section 127 (3) (b) of the new Code, the Magistrate who passed the order for maintenance is empowered to cancel the order for maintenace if he is satisfied that the divorced wife has received the whole of the sum which under the customary or personal law was payable to her on such divorce. The petitioner has this specific statutory remedy available to him. It is not possible for this Court to investigate whether the amount of Rs.1000/- has or has not been received or whether that was the sum which was payable to the divorced wife under the personal law applicable to the parties It is open to the petitioner to approach the learned Magistrate for an order in terms of section 127 (3) (b) of the new code. This contention must, therefore, also fail. I would, accordingly, dismiss the application. Application dismissed.