JUDGMENT G.S. Sial, M. - The main point around which the controversy resolves in this case is that the plaintiff-revisionists Kedar and Hare Ram's name are recorded in the Khasra of 1356 F. as Qabiz in the remarks column but there is no other entry in his fovour in the years thereafter or even before 1356 F. On the other hand the name of the opposite parties Sheodas and others is recorded in the main tenants column all along. 2. The learned counsel for the revisionists stated that when the record operations started in this village, he made an objection in respect of plot No. 108 against the omission of his name in the revenue records. But his objection was rejected on the Ground that the objection was not accompanied with a copy of the extracts from the Khatauni and further that the question involved is one of title and, therefore, the objector was directed to file a regular suit. Thereupon he filed an appeal before the R.O. who also upheld the order of the A.R.O. A revision was filed before the learned Commissioner and he also took the same view and hence this revision before the Board. The learned counsel submitted that the record operations took place under Chapter IV of the Land Revenue Act and Section 54(3) of Land Revenue Act provides that in such cases where a dispute of title is involved, the A.R.O. shall decide the same after a summary inquiry. He, therefore, submitted that the rejection of his objection by the courts below is a wrong exercise of jurisdiction of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in them. He submitted that sub-section (3) was added by U.P. Act 35 of 1970 and therefore this mandatory provision of law has to be observed by the courts below. He further submitted that the proceedings fall under sub-section(3) of section 54 of the Land Revenue Act and are covered by Para 395(2) of the Revenue Court Manual and hence the objection need not have been accompanied with a copy of the Khautanui. 3. He further submitted that the proceedings fall under sub-section(3) of section 54 of the Land Revenue Act and are covered by Para 395(2) of the Revenue Court Manual and hence the objection need not have been accompanied with a copy of the Khautanui. 3. The learned counsel for the opposite party in reply stated that the decision of the A.R.O. is dated June 12, 1970 and the notification referred to by the learned counsel for the revisionist is of a subsequent date i.e. December 29, 1970 and, therefore, sub-section(3) was not applicable on the date the order of the A.R.O. was passed. The order of the A.R.O. was therefore correct and legal and has rightly been upheld by the Record Officer and the Board would not be correct in interfering with these orders. He further submitted that when there is substantive change of law then the court need not take cognizance of the amendment of the law. Only in procedural change of law the court should take notice of the amendment in the laws. 4. I have considered the arguments and gone through the record of the case. It is established that sub-section (3) was added by U.P. Act 35 of 1970 and made effective from December 29, 1970 that Assistant Record Officer should decide the question of title also during record operation. The amendment, therefore, through not applicable on the date the A.R.O. decided the case, was certainly applicable when the Record Officer passed the orders on March 16, 1971. Since the appeal is continuation of the suit, the amendment of the law, which confers substantive right to the litigant public of getting the case pertaining to title also decided during the record operations cannot be described as being of a merely procedural nature, as has been sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the opposite party and the provisions of the law have to be complied with. Accordingly the orders of the courts below are set aside and the A.R.O. is directed to decided the dispute afresh on merits according to law even if it raises a question of title.