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1978 DIGILAW 257 (RAJ)

Balkar Singh S/o Bachan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan

1978-08-29

K.S.SIDHU

body1978
JUDGMENT 1. - Balkar Singh, the appellant, and one Kala Singh were jointly tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Bundi, for the offence under section 392 read with section 397 I.P.C. By his judgment dated February 2, 1978, the learned Sessions Judge found both of them guilty of the charges framed against them. Consequently, he convicted the appellant under section 392/397 I.P.C. and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of Rs. 250/- or in default, to further rigorous imprisonment for three months. 2. The case of the prosecution, which resulted in the conviction and sentence of the appellant, as aforementioned, is that nearly a month and a half, before December 3, 1973, when the case against the appellant and the co-accused Kala Singh was registered, the appellant and the co-accused had waylaid P.Ws. Bheru, Uda, Rajmal and Omkar in the area of village Adila, P. S. Keshavraipatan, at about 7 00 p.m. and robbed them of their ornaments and even clothings. P. W. Bheru, who lodged the first information report on December 3, 1973, told the police that he and his companions had gone to village Arnetha on the invitation to dinner by his relatives in that village nearly a month and a half before the lodging of the report. He further told the police that they were robbed by Balkar Singh and Kala Singh on their way back from that village. He mentioned in the first information report that the culprits had themselves proclaimed their names in the course of the commission of the crime. 3. During the investigation, the appellant was put up for test-identification on December 10, 1973. It is alleged that Bheru and Rajmal correctly identified him in that identification parade. P.Ws. Uda and Omkar were not called upon by the investigating officer to participate in the identification of the appellant at the said parade. 4. The Investigating Officer also claims to have recovered some stolen property at the instance of the appellant. 5. The learned trial Judge has held that the prosecution could not prove the recovery of any stolen property at the instance of the appellant. Relying on the statements of P.Ws. 4. The Investigating Officer also claims to have recovered some stolen property at the instance of the appellant. 5. The learned trial Judge has held that the prosecution could not prove the recovery of any stolen property at the instance of the appellant. Relying on the statements of P.Ws. Bheru, Rajmal, Omkar and Uda, he came to the conclusion that they bad seen the appellant closely enough at the time of the occurrence to be able to identify him subsequently at the test identification on December 10, 1973 and there after in the trial. He has further held that since Rajmal and Bheru had correctly identified the appellant, both at the test identification as well as in the trial and since the other two witnesses, namely, Uda and Omkar, had correctly held that the appellant was the culprit who had given out his name as Balkar Singh at the time of the occurrence and who had robbed Bheru of his ornaments and Rajmal of his bush shirt by threatening them and their companions with sword. The learned trial Judge has, consequently, convicted the appellant under section 392/397 I.P.C. and awarded him the maximum sentence under law. 6. It will be seen from the order of sentence pronounced by the learned trial Judge on February 2, 1978, that he found the appellant guilty and awarded him the maximum sentence, not so much, because he was satisfied on the evidence on record that the appellant was guilty of the offence with which he was charged, but because of a strong prejudice in the mind of the learned Judge resulting from the conviction of the appellant-in two other cases. By the same judge, a few days before the impugned order was announced. This is, in my opinion, a case in which there was hardly any evidence connecting the appellant with the offence charged against him. 7. It transpires on the record that the appellant was in police custody in November 1973. The recovery memo Ex. P. 1, relating to some other case and testified to in the instant case by P. W. Rang Lal, would show that as on November 19, 1973, the appellant was being held in police custody. 7. It transpires on the record that the appellant was in police custody in November 1973. The recovery memo Ex. P. 1, relating to some other case and testified to in the instant case by P. W. Rang Lal, would show that as on November 19, 1973, the appellant was being held in police custody. The Investigating Officer was not aware of the present occurrence at that time, for, the complainant Bheru had not approached the police till December 3, 1973, with the first information report in the present case. If Bheru is to be believed, the present occurrence is said to have taken place some where in the second-half of October, 1973. The appellant was in police custody in November, 1973. The present case was registered on December 3, 1973, The sequence by itself is quite suggestive. It would not, in the circumstances be unreasonable to hold that after getting information about the alleged complicity of the appellant in the present crime from other sources, the investigating officer invited, the complainant Bheru on December 3, 1973 and recorded the first information report that day. The so-called identification parade held on December 10, 1973, cannot, therefore, carry much weight. 8. The evidence given by P. Ws. Uda, Omkar, Bheru and Rajmal also does not inspire much confidence. They would have us believe that both the culprits who robbed them, including the appellant had proclaimed their names to them at the time of the occurrence. They have not given any reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay in lodging the first information report. 9. In these premises, it would not be safe to record a conviction against the appellant on the testimony of these witnesses. The appellant deserves the benefit of doubt. 10. I would, accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence against the appellant and instead acquit him. He shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case. *******