Judgment Vishwanath Mishra, J. 1. Criminal Miscellaneous No.153 of 1978 was filed by the petitioners (21 in number) for quashing a proceeding under section 10; of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called "the New code") and also for quashing an order passed under sub-section (3) of section 116 of the New Code requiring the petitioners to execute interim bonds during the pendency of the proceeding. At the time of admission on 19.1.1978 the case was admitted in respect of only the execution of the interim bonds and the operation thereof was stayed. The aforesaid petitioners as also one Ram Gulam Kumar, therefore, filed criminal Miscellaneous No.667 of 1978 for quashing the proceeding under section 107 of the New Code again on 7.2.1978 which was admitted on 8.3.1978 and further proceedings in the court below were stayed pending disposal of the application. Both these cases were ordered to be heard together on 21.11.1978. 2. The case relates to Balia Police Station of the district of Begusarai. Balia P. S. Case No.8 (10) 77 has been instituted in which the allegation was that petitioners 1 to 7 and 9 to 11 of Criminal Miscellaneous No.153 of 1978 had relieved one Kamo Singh of his money. On 14.10.1977 Chowkidar Lakhan paswan lodged a station diary entry no.264 to say that the petitioners (party of Dina Kumar) on the one hand and the party of Kamo Singh, on the other hand were variously armed and were ready for a clash. On that very day he submitted a report to the Subdivisional Officer in which he also made a reference of the earlier case 8.10.78 and requested for action under section 107 of the New Code against both the parties. In the report he also said that the members of the 2nd party (namely the petitioners here) had unlicensed arms and they could commit murder of any person at any time. It was also said therein that one Sachchidanand Kumar who had recently been released from jail after serving some sentence was also in the party. In the report he also said that the members of the 2nd party (namely the petitioners here) had unlicensed arms and they could commit murder of any person at any time. It was also said therein that one Sachchidanand Kumar who had recently been released from jail after serving some sentence was also in the party. On 20 10.197 7 the Subdivisional magistrate, Begusarai, drew up a proceeding under section 107 of the New Code asainst both the parties asking them to appear and show cause as to why they should not execute bonds of Rs.2,000 each, with two sureties of the like amount each, for keeping peace for a period of one year. 3. The petitioners appeared in the case and showed cause on 26.11.1977. The initiation of this proceeding has baen challenged on certain grounds which will be discussed later on. Cr. Misc.153/78 : 4. In the meantime on 23.10.1977 Narain Singh, brother of Kamo Singh, lodged in Balia Police Station a station diary entry no.408, against some of the petitioners here, alleging that they had asked him to withdraw the criminal case against them subject-matter of Balia P. S. Case No.8 (10) 77) failing which he and his brother Kamo Singh be killed or their property might be looted. On the basis of this entry on 25.10.1977 the Balia Police submitted another report to the Sub-divisional Magistrate for asking the petitioners to execute interim bonds under section 116 (3) of the New Code. On 5.12.1977 the petitioners showed cause as to why they should not be asked to execute bonds. On 20.12.1977 the parties were heard in respect of the show cause filed. On 26.12.1977 the Sub-divisional Magistrate passed an order asking the 21 persons against whom the report had been submitted by the Police on 23.10.1977 to execut ad interim bonds of Rs 2,000 each with one surety for maintaining peace during the pendency of the proceeding. Out of the 22 petitioners two were present in the court and the rest had prayed for being represented through lawyers. Those who were present, namely, Binod Kumar and Dina Kumar were forced to execute interim bonds and as against the rest non-bailable warrants of arrest were issued, on 29.12.1977 the remaining 19 persons also executed interim bonds and non-bailable warrants of arrest issued against them were recalled. Those who were present, namely, Binod Kumar and Dina Kumar were forced to execute interim bonds and as against the rest non-bailable warrants of arrest were issued, on 29.12.1977 the remaining 19 persons also executed interim bonds and non-bailable warrants of arrest issued against them were recalled. All the 21 persons who have executed interim bonds have challenged the legality thereof on the grounds which will be discussed hereafter. 5. I shall first take up the subject-matter of Criminal Miscellaneous No.667 of 1978 i. e. the proceeding under section 107 of the Code. The first grievance of the petitioners is that the order initiating the proceeding passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate on 20.10.1977, is not in accordance with law and as such it should be quashed. I have examined the order dated 20.10.1977 and i must say that it is most cryptic. It does not at all mention in what manner the petitioners were likely to commit a breach of the peace or were likely to do a wrongful act which might occasion a breach of the peace. The order only shows that the learned Magistrate has perused the Police report and he felt satisfied from the perusal thereof that there was serious apprehension of the breach of peace at the hands of the parties and so it was necessary to start a proceeding under section 107 of the Code against them and accordingly he asked them to show cause why they should not execute necessary bonds. Times without number this court has impressed upon the Magistrates the requirements of initiating a proceeding under section 107 of the New Code or even of the old Code. The Magistrates still do not seem to pay any heed to it. A magistrate should realise that he is asking somebody to show cause as to why he should not be bound down. Until and unless the person required to show cause is given the grounds of the allegation it cannot be possible for him to show any cause, whatsoever. I fail to understand why a Magistrate should not be able to inform himself of the requirements by reference to the section itself, if not by reference to the rulings by this Court. Until and unless the person required to show cause is given the grounds of the allegation it cannot be possible for him to show any cause, whatsoever. I fail to understand why a Magistrate should not be able to inform himself of the requirements by reference to the section itself, if not by reference to the rulings by this Court. Any way, for the present, I need not dilate more on this aspect of the case, as I am going to show that this defect has not caused any prejudice to the petitioners in the instant case. Admittedly, the petitioners have appeared and shown cause. I need not discuss it at this stage, but suffice it to say, that the cause shown relates to all the allegations made in the police report. I may with advantage refer to the case of Hasibuddin and 39 others v. State of Bihar, reported in 1971 PLJR 193. It has been observed therein that if the substance of accusition or substance of the information received from the police has not been given in the notice, then it will be seen whether prejudice has been caused to the paity concerned or there has been a failure of justice. In that case also the party had accepted a vague notice but it had filed its show cause. It also allowed the Magistrate to proceed with the case and decide it. In the circumstances it was held that the party could not be allowed to raise the ground of jurisdiction thereafter of course, in this case no decision has yet been given because the proceeding has been stayed by this Court, but all the same, this much is clear that the notice, howsoever vague it may be, has not caused any prejudice to the petitioners. A. N. Mukherjee, J. while discussing the case of hasibuddin and others (supra) has also discussed a number of authorities on the point which I need not repeat. 6. The only other ground of attack is that the Police report itself did not justify the initiation of a proceeding under section 107 of the New Code. A. N. Mukherjee, J. while discussing the case of hasibuddin and others (supra) has also discussed a number of authorities on the point which I need not repeat. 6. The only other ground of attack is that the Police report itself did not justify the initiation of a proceeding under section 107 of the New Code. I have examined the Police report dated 16.10.1977 which is there in the lower court records, giving a reference to the report lodged by Chowkidar Lakhan paswan, saying that the party of the petitioners and Kamo Singh were armed with dangerous weapons and they could commit breach of peace. It was also said in it that the A. S. I. who submitted the report went to the village with some constables and found much truth in the information giving by the Chowkidar. Reference to the earlier case in which the money of Kamo Singh was allegedly senatched has also been made and perhaps that was the root cause of all the trouble. It has been said in the report that the parties have created havoc in the locality and have adopted aggressive attitude. It has also been said that on 14.10.1977 if villagers had not intervened some serious occurrence might have taken place. It has been argued that a proceeding under section 107 of the New Code on such vague allegations should not have been started. I am afraid the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable. If a certain overt act is committed then there can be no question of preventing that. The offence may come under one or the other section of the Indian penal Code and the offender may be tried for that. Sec.107 of the New code is meant for preventing a breach of the peace, and as such if the magistrate believes on the basis of a police report that there is likelihood of the breach of peace, on account of the parties being variously armed and on account of the tension between them, which may have a reasonable basis, I do not think the Magistrates action can be questioned. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to in which cases or on what allegations a proceeding under section 107 can or should be started. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to in which cases or on what allegations a proceeding under section 107 can or should be started. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case I am of the opinion that the Magistrate was quite justified in initiating a proceeding against both the parties including the petitioners. The vagueness of the notice, however, has not caused any prejudice to the petitioners as they have tried to meet in their show almost all the allegations made by the Police against them. 7. The last point taken was that more than a year has passed since the proceeding was instituted and there has been absolutely no breach of peace during this period, and this should be taken as a circumstan:e for quashing the proceeding. In support of this argument reliance was placed on the case of Ram n arain Singh V/s. The State of Bihar, reported in 1974 BLJR 79 decided by the supreme Court. In that case the intervening period was about 13 years and, therefore, there can be no comparison between that case and the instant case. There is, thus, nothing to interfere with the impugned order in Criminal miscellaneous Case No.667 of 1978. 8. I now take up the subject-matter of Criminal Miscellaneous No.153 of 1978, namely, the interim bond required from the petitioners therefor under Sec.116 (3) of the Code. Order dated 18.111977 shows that the report of the police had been received for taking steps under section 116 (3) of the New Code against the petitioners. The date in this case was 17.11.1977 but as the court was closed on that day the case had been taken up on 18.11,1977. The report dated 25.10.1977. The parties were present either in person or through lawyers. It was ordered that the matter relating to interim bond would be heard on 26.11.1977 and in the meantime if the party wanted it could file show cause petition. The order-sheet of 26.11.1977 shows that the petitioners showed cause thought they made a grievance that no notice had been issued to them. This grievance was, however, turned down and 5.1 -M 977 was fixed for hearing the parties in the matter. The order-sheet of 26.11.1977 shows that the petitioners showed cause thought they made a grievance that no notice had been issued to them. This grievance was, however, turned down and 5.1 -M 977 was fixed for hearing the parties in the matter. After some adjournments the matter was actually heard on 20.12.197 and the order was passed on 26.12.1977 asking the 21 petitioners to execute interim bonds of Rs.2,000 each with one surety pledging to maintain peace during the pendency of the proceeding, as the Magistrate felt satisfied that immediate measures were necessary in order to prevent further breach of peace. The order is a sufficiently reasoned order but it suffers from order inherent defects. 9. The first defect is, as I am going to show, the proper stage for passing the impugned order had not reached as contemplated by law. In order to show this reference has to be made to sections 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115 and 116 of the New Code. For appreciating the point I may refer only to the relevant portion of the sections. Shortly put, it is under section 107 that the Magistrate after receiving information decides to initiate the proceeding and asks the person proceeded against to show rause why he should not be ordered to execute bond for keeping peace. Under section 111, the Magistrate records an order in writing setting forth the substance of the information received and the amount of bond and certain conditions thereof. If the person in respect of whom such order is made is present in the court, the order has to be read over to him and its substance has to be explained as required under section 112 of the New code. Sec.113 of the New Code empowers the Magistrate to issue necessary process for procuring the presence of the said person if he is not in court. Sec.114 of the New Code only requires copv of order to be sent along with the processes. Sec.115 empowers the Magistrate to dispense with personal attendance in certain cases. Then comes section 116 which is the most relevant section for our purpose here. This section is divided into several subsections, but we are concerned most with the first three sub-sections. Sec.114 of the New Code only requires copv of order to be sent along with the processes. Sec.115 empowers the Magistrate to dispense with personal attendance in certain cases. Then comes section 116 which is the most relevant section for our purpose here. This section is divided into several subsections, but we are concerned most with the first three sub-sections. Omitting the proviso of sub-section (3) which has no relevancy in the instant case, I would better quote sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 116 which run as follows:- "116. (1) When an order under section 111 has been read or explained under section 112 to a person present in court, or when any person appears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with or in execution of a summons or warrant, issued under section 113, the magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary. (2) Such inquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in summons cases. (3) After the commencement, and before the completion of the inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquility or the commission of any offence or for the public safety, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the person in respect of whom the order under section 111 has been made to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until, the conclusion of the inquiry, and may detain him in custody until such bond is executed or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is concluded. " It would appear from sub-section (1) that after an order under section 111 has been read or explained or when the person being proceeded against has appeared, the Magistrate proceeds to enquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary. It is important to remember that this is the stage where the inquiry begins. It is important to remember that this is the stage where the inquiry begins. For the method of the inquiry we have to proceed to sub-section (2)quoted above, wherein it has been prescribed that the inquiry would be made as nearly as practicable in the manner prescribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in a summons case. We have, therefore, to find out as to what is the procedure for trial and recording of substance in the summons case. For this we have to turn to Chapter XX of the New Code (trial of summons cases by Magistrate ). The first section in this Chapter is section 251. According the Magistrate the particulars of the offence has to be stated to him. Applying this to a proceeding under section 107 of the New Code, when the person being proceeded against is brought before a Magistrate he will have to be given the particulars of the case against him. The course to be taken thereafter, will depend upon his reply to the question. 10. At this stage a reference to sub-section (3) quoted above would show that power under sub-section (3) (taking interim bond) is exercised only after the commencement of the said enquiry, and before the completion of the same. Further condition, however, is that the Magistrate has to consider and decide if immediate measures ara necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquility or the commission of any offence or for the public safety. Yet another duty cast upon the Magistrate by the sub-section is, that he has to record the reasons, and then direct the person proceeded against to execute a bond with or without sureties for keeping peace etc. until the conclusion of the enquiry. At the risk of repetition I may say that after commencement of the enquiry and before the completion thereof the Magistrate has to examine if it is a fit case for asking the person being proceeded against to execute interim bond, and the enquiry contemplated starts only in accordance with section 251 of the New Code. 11. Applying the above procedure to the instant case I would examine if the proper stage for passing orders for interim bond had reached. 11. Applying the above procedure to the instant case I would examine if the proper stage for passing orders for interim bond had reached. As would appear from the order sheet of 20.10-1977 the order for starting a proceeding under section 107 was passed and on 1.11.1977 a time petition for show cause was filed. On 18.11.1977 another report from the Police for taking interim bonds under section 116 (3) of the New Code was receivedand 26.11.1977 was fixed for hearing regarding the taking of interim bonds and for filing show cause. On 20.11.1977 the hearing regarding taking of interim bond was postponed to 5.12 1977. After a few adjournments it was taken up on 20.12.1977, and both the parties were only heard, regarding the show cause given in the interim bond matter, and the order was passed on 26.12.1977. It is thus clear that the enquiry contemplated under section 116 (1) of the New Code was not started in the manner prescribed under section 116 (3) of the New Code, and unless that was done, the stage for any action under section 116 (3) had not reached. I may mention here that it should have been desirable for the learned magistrate to begin the enquiry regarding the truth of the first police report and then take some evidence regarding the second Police report also, and then come to a decision whether it was a fit case for taking interim bonds or not. In taking this view I am fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhu limaye and another V/s. Ved Murtiand others, reported in AIR 1971 SC 2481 . I may with advantage quote paragraph 16 of the authority running as follows :- "16. It appears to us that the powers of the Magistrate to ask for an interim bond were not properly exercised in this case and consequently the order to the petitioners to furnish interim bond could not be made. That stage had not been reached under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate could only ask for an interim bond if he could not complete the enquiry and during the completion of the enquiry postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. That stage had not been reached under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate could only ask for an interim bond if he could not complete the enquiry and during the completion of the enquiry postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. It was not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask the petitioners to furnish a bond for good conduct. The Magistrate should have made at least some affort to get a statement from Brij Mohan or Ved Murti Bhatt or any of the witnesses named in the challan. Nothing of this kind was done. Therefore the proceedings for asking for an interim bond were completely illegal. " (Brij Mohan and Ved Murti Bhatt were the persons who had submitted reports against Madhu Limaye the latter being the Sub-Inspector of Police ). This authority has also been relied on by a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nokha Singh and others V/s. Parbati Kuer and another, reported in 1974 bbcj 460 . There is thus no doubt that the impugned order was passed before the stage for it had reached. 12 The second ground of attack relates to the appreciation of the matter by the Magistrate. I do not think it is at all necessary to enter into that in view of the very illegality of the whole order. The result, however, is that the order asking for the interim bonds, which is subject-matter of Criminal Miscellaneous no.153 of 1978, must be set aside. 13. In the result Criminal Miscellaneous No.153 of 1978 is allowed and the impugned order dated 26.12.1977 is set aside and the petitioners are discharged from the interim bonds already executed. Criminal Miscellaneous No.667 of 1978 is, however, dismissed. Pettions partly allowed.