( 1 ) THIS appeal is instituted by original d,efendant-l and is directed against the judgment and decree datted 12-12-1972 passed by the Civil Judge, mandya, in R. A. No. 24/1972, on his file, allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the trial Court with a direction to refer the issue about the tenancy to the Land Tribunal, await the decision of the Tribunal and then dispose of the suit in accordance with law. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff instituted a suit before the Munsiff, Mandya, in OS. No. 1219/1968 for declaration of his title as a tenant and for injunction. Subsequently, he amended the plaint seeking for possession as, according to him he was dispossessed on 18-11-68 since the interim injunction order was not issued in the suit. Defendant-1 resisted the suit by his written statement. According to him, the plaintiff was not a tenant. He denied that the plantiff was dispossessed after institution of the suit. The suit, according to him, was not tenable. The other defendants also resisted thei suit. On these pleadings, the learned Munsiff raised the following issues as arising from the pleadings : (1) Whether plaintiff proves that he is the tenant of the suit land as alleged? (2) Whether plaintiff is entitled for the, declaration sought for? (3) Whether plaintiff proves that he was in possession of the suit land on the date of the suit as alleged? (4) Whether plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction prayed for? (5) Whether the valuation made is not proper and the court fee paid is not sufficient? (6) To what other reliefs, if any, plaintiff is entitled to? ( 3 ) AFTER the plaint was amended, the additional issue 'whether this suit is maintainable?' was raised, in addition to the issue regarding possession. ( 4 ) THE learned Munsiff, appreciating the evidence adduced before him, held on the issue whether the suit was maintainable, against the plaintiff. According to him, the Court had no jurisdiction to try the plaintiff's suit for declaration under the Mysore Land Reforms Act. S. 7 of the said Act disabled the Civil Court from awarding possession. Hence, he dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 7-2-1972. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff went up in appeal before the learned Civil judge who held that the, suit was maintainable. S. 7 of the said Act disabled the Civil Court from awarding possession. Hence, he dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 7-2-1972. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff went up in appeal before the learned Civil judge who held that the, suit was maintainable. He however held that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the issue on tenancy. Thus, after allowing the appeal, he remitted the matter back to the learned Munsiff with a direction that the issue should be referred to the Tribunal and after receipt of the decision, the suit should be disposed of in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, defendant-1 has come up in appeal before this Court. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant-1, submitted that the learned Civil Judge was not correct in remanding the matter to the trial court. According to him, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to award possession of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff even if the Tribunal holds that the plaintiff is a tenant. As such, he submitted that there was nothing for the Civil Court to try and decide. Thus, he submitted that the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge should be set aside and the suit be dismissed. ( 6 ) AS against that, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-plaintiff contended that there was no bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to award possession in favour of a tenant. Hence, he submitted that, if the plaintiff is declared to be a tenant by the Tribunal, his suit for possession could certainly be decreed by the Court of the Munsiff. ( 7 ) THE sole point, therefore, that apises for my consideration in this appeal is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to award possession of the suit land in case the Tribunal comes to the conclusion, on reference, that the plaintiff is the tenant of the suit land. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant first invited my attention to s. 7 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), which speaks of restoration of possession to tenants dispossessed in certain circumstances. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant first invited my attention to s. 7 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), which speaks of restoration of possession to tenants dispossessed in certain circumstances. That Section makes it clear that it applies to a person who or whose predecessor in title held any land as a tenant before the tenth day of September, 1957 and who after that date and bofore the appointed day, has been dispossessed. Therefore, it is obvious that s. 7 of the Act does not apply to the facts of this case, Here, the dispossession alleged is on 18-11-1968. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel next referred me to S. 41 of the Act. S. 41 (2) of the Act states :"a tenant or an agricultural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house or site under any of the provisions of this Act or as a result of eviction in contravention of sub-sec. (2) may apply in writing for such possession to the Tahsildar. The application shall be made in such form as may be prescribed and within a period of two years from the date on which the light to obtain possession of the land, dwelling house or site is ac deemed to have accrued to the tenant. agricultural labourer or artisan, as the case may be. " ( 10 ) RELYING on this Section and Section 132 of the Act, the learned counsel submitted that the Civil Court loses its jurisdiction to award possession in favour of a tenant. S. 132 of the Act speaks of bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. It states : " (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide, or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Revenue Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control. ( 11 ) IT is true, therefore. that if a particular matter is to be agitated before and settled by the Tribunal or the Tahsildar, that shall be the sole forum. The Civil Court loses its jurisdiction. ( 11 ) IT is true, therefore. that if a particular matter is to be agitated before and settled by the Tribunal or the Tahsildar, that shall be the sole forum. The Civil Court loses its jurisdiction. ( 12 ) BUT, in the instant case, as rightly pointed out by the leaned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, S. 41 of the Act is only an enabling provision in favour of the tenant for a, summary remedy in case he is evicted. That is why the Section provides for a limitation of two years. Further, he invited my attention to the fact that the Section says that the tenant may apply. That being so, he submitted that the remedy to approach the Civil Court under the General Law is not taken away by S. 41 of the act. ( 13 ) IN this context, it is necessary to remember that the entire Act is meant for conferring certain benefits on the tenants. Whenever there occurs any doubt in the interpretation of any clause or section, it shall normally be resolved in favour of the tenants. That being so, the mere fact that an additional enabling remedy is given to the tenant, it cannot be inferred to his detriment that his normal remedy to approach the Civil Court under the general Law of the Land is barred. If the Section was mandatory, it should have been entirely different. That would have created a special forum under the Special Act and impliedly the jurisdiction of the Civil Court should have been barred. Now, all that S. 41 of the Act provides is that it gives an additional remedy by way of summary relief to the tenant by enabling him to apply to the Tahsildar for summary eviction of the landlord and obtain possession within two years. That by no stretch of inference, takes away the general jurisdiction of the Civil Court conferred under S. 9 of the code of Civil Procedure. That being so, I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel that S. 41 read with S. 132 of the Act takes away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in awarding possessoin to a tenant who is entitled to possession: In that view of the matter, it is obvious that the Civil Court can award possession if the plaintiff is held to be a tenant by the Tribunal. Hence, it cannot be said that the suit itself is not tenable ( 14 ) THE learned Civil Judge has rightly directed that the plaintiff shall be referred to get a declaration before the Tribunal about his status as a tenant by referring Issue No. 1 to the Tribunal. That order is perfectly valid. ( 15 ) IN the result, therefore, I hold that this appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. I dismiss the same. No costs. --- *** --- .