Order.-This appeal raises a point of jurisdiction of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, following the amendment of section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 2. By Amendment Act No. 100 of 1956, Parliament introduced a set or provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 for establishing separate Tribunals and separate procedure for enquiry into motor accidents in the context of claims for compensation for personal injury caused by such accidents, Under this Amending Act the State Government were to constitute Claims Tribunals for the purpose of: “adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles.” 3. Subsequently, Parliament brought in two further amendments, under Act LVI of 1969. One amendment, introduced in section 96 (2) of the Act, enacted that policies of insurance covering third party risks shall also cover a liability, up to a limit of the thousand rupees, in respect of damage to any property of a third party. The other amendment, which was made in section 110, enlarged the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunals to adjudicate upon claims for compensation so as to cover also “damages to any property of a third party so arising”. These amendments came into force on 2nd March, 1970. 4. This case arose out of an accident which occurred on 9th February, 1971. In that accident, a motor lorry, MDT 6043 was hit by another lorry. The owner of MDT 6043 filed a claim for compensation for damage to that lorry. The claim was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims’ Tribunal, Ramanathapuram. The Tribunal was inclined to hold that the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the other vehicle. For there was, practically no defence to the lorry-owner’s claim on the merits. But the respondent, the owner of the offending vehicle, contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the question of damage to property and it had no power to award any compensation for any damage to property. Reliance was placed on G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) dated 28th June, 1961 which established the Tribunal and invested it with jurisdiction under the Act. Reliance was placed on G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) dated 28th June, 1961 which established the Tribunal and invested it with jurisdiction under the Act. Under the terms of this order of the State Government the Tribunal was empowered “to adjudicate upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involved in the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles”, 5. The Tribunal sustained the preliminary objection and held that under the terms of the Government Notification, it had jurisdiction to go into or award any compensation for damage to property. 6. In the present appeal, brought by the owner of the damaged lorry, his learned counsel, Mr. Pandi, urges that the Tribunal had proceeded on a too literal construction of the notification. He said that such a contruction was not warranted in the conditions created by the enlargement of the Claims’ Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the recent amendment to section 110. 7. I am inclined to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel. Learned counsel is also supported by the authority of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Banwari Lal v. Vishnunarayan 1 , which he cited in the course of his argument. In that case, an accident happened on 20th January, 1971, subsequent to the coming into force of the amendment to section 110 by Central Act LVI of 1969. The claim before the Tribunal was for compensation arising out of the damage caused to a vehicle by another vehicle in a collision. The Tribunal took the view that, on the terms of the notification constituting it, damage to property and award of compensation therefor were not within it adjudicatory power. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, however, observed that such a narrow construction of the notification was not called for. According to the learned Judges, the notification by itself by no means defined and delimited the powers to be exercised by the Tribunals, the purpose of the notification was only to constitute the Tribunals. The Tribunal’s powers were derived, directly, from section 110 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and neither the notification nor the language in which the notification was couched was decisive. In that view, the learned Judges sent the case back to the Tribunal for a determination on the merits. 8. The Tribunal’s powers were derived, directly, from section 110 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and neither the notification nor the language in which the notification was couched was decisive. In that view, the learned Judges sent the case back to the Tribunal for a determination on the merits. 8. With respect, I agree with the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In my view, when once the Accident Claims Tribunals had been constituted by notification by the Government, as provided under the Act, the ambit of their jurisdiction is really determined by the terms of the statute. So, when in 1969. Parliament amended the enabling provisions of section 110, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction stood enlarged so as to cover the subjects added by the amendment. It may be that if one goes to the language of the notification G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) dated 28th June, 1961, word by word, the Tribunal may be regarded as having no other jurisdiction than what was specified therein. But, even as a literal construction of the notification, that would hold good only till so long as the enabling section remained unamended. But, the moment the statute itself was amended and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal got enlarged, it would be a mistake to hark back on the limited terminology of the notification which, although it faithfully adopted the language of the statute as it originally stood, became out of date with the passing of the Amendment Act. 9. Mr. Pandi brought to my notice a further notification of the State Government, G.O. Ms. No. 1969 dated 7th August, 1974. This later notification amended the original notification G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) dated 28th June. 1961. Under this amendment, the Tribunals constituted under the earlier notification were declared as having been constituted also for the purpose of adjudicating upon damages to any property of a third party. The appellant’s counsel submitted that by some mischance, this amending notification hearing the date 7th August. 1974, was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal when it heard this case. But, I am not quite sure that the Tribunal would have been persuaded to exercise its jurisdiction in this case, if it had been made aware of the amended notification. For even now, before me an argument was addressed from the other side that the amended notification did not apply to the instant case. But, I am not quite sure that the Tribunal would have been persuaded to exercise its jurisdiction in this case, if it had been made aware of the amended notification. For even now, before me an argument was addressed from the other side that the amended notification did not apply to the instant case. The respondents’ learned counsel pointed out that the accident in this case had occurred on 9th February, 1971, prior to the date when the amended notification was issued. An answer to this submission is found in the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court to which I had earlier referred. There the learned Judges had laid down that the ambit of jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be determined with reference to the time when it proceeded to exercise it, and not otherwise. It is, however, unnecessary for me to go into this aspect finally in the view I take that even without any amendment to the notification in G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) dated 28th June, 1961 fresh powers have been added unto the Tribunal by the mere force of the amendment of section 110 brought about by Act LVI of 1969. In this view, if any significance is to be attached to the amended notification G.O. Ms. No. 1969 dated 7th August, 1974 at all, that can only be to regard it as clarificatory of the powers of the Tribunal in the conditions created by the amendment of the parent provision in the statute. 10. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in rejecting the appellant’s claim application before it as not entertainable. The Tribunal’s award is, accordingly, set aside. M.A.C.O.P. No. 33 of 1971 is restored to the Tribunal’s file. The Tribunal is directed to hear and determine that petition on the merits and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.