JUDGMENT 1. THESE two appeals arise out of two suits filed by two sets of plaintiffs against the Hindusthan Steel ltd. The plaintiffs are the employees of the Central Sales Organisation, a unit under Hindusthan Steel Ltd. They filed the two suits for a declaration that they are entitled to get seniority from the date of their joining service under the Hindusthan Steel Ltd. The plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 748 of 1972 joined the Durgapur Unit of the Hindusthan steel Ltd. and the plaintiffs in Title suit No. 758 of 1972 joined the Rourkela Steel Plant and Coal Washery project under the Hindusthan Steel ltd. They alleged that their seniority should be counted from the date on which they joined their service in the respective units under the Hindusthan steel Ltd. and not from the date on which they joined on transfer, the Central Sales Organisation, which is also another unit under the Hindusthan steel Ltd. The plaintiff's also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining their employer the Hindusthan Steel Ltd from ignoring their seniority and also for a mandatory injunction directing the Hindusthan Steel Ltd. to give effect to the said seniority of the plaintiffs. 2. THE plaintiffs in the two suits made similar allegations in their respective plaints. The allegations made by the plaintiffs are as follows : Hindusthan Steel Ltd. is a Government of India undertaking having its Head Office at Ranchi and it consists of Steel Plants at Durgapur, Bhilai and Rourkela with one Alloy Steel Plant, one fertilizer plant and Coal Washery. It has also its office, namely, Central Sales Organisation at Calcutta. It was alleged that each plant has one General Manager at its Head and he is the Supreme Administrative Authority. According to the rules of the Hindusthan Steel Ltd. the employees are inter changeable or transferable. The plaintiffs in one case were appointed at the Durgapur unit on different dates at a certain scale of pay and the plaintiffs in the other suit were appointed at the Rourkela Steel Plant cm different dates at a certain scale of pay. The plaintiffs worked satisfactorily in their respective places of appointment and their seniority was recorded in the respective units from time to time. The plaintiffs worked satisfactorily in their respective places of appointment and their seniority was recorded in the respective units from time to time. By a circular dated 29th December, 1969, under the signature of P. C. Koar for Personnel Manager, Durgapur plant, intimation was given that the administrative officer, Hindusthan steel Ltd. Sales Office, invited applications from Assistants (Typists), assistants (S/t), for parallel transfer initially to be posted at the Central Sales organisation at Calcutta, but subsequently they may be posted at the branch office of the Organisation. The plaintiffs and other employees applied for parallel transfer to the Central sales Organisation in Calcutta. About 28 employees including the plaintiffs were selected from the Durgapur Steel plaint. The Personnel Manager, Durgapur Steel Plant unilaterally and arbitrarily imposed certain illegal and oppressive terms of transfer, which were not contemplated before, at the time of issuing the circular. The said terms are that the employees shall be treated as on transfer for their purposes but their eligibility for their seniority in the Sales Office will be considered only with reference to the date they join the sales Office. It was alleged that the plaintiffs were forced to submit to this illegal and malafide position. It was further alleged that plaintiffs believed that the defendant would eventually relax the above mentioned arbitrary condition and their seniority would be counted from the date of their initial appointment under the Hindusthan steel Ltd. The defendant however stuck to the above mentioned arbitrary and illegal condition and hence the plaintiffs were compelled to file the suit. The plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 748 of 1972 who were initially appointed in the Durgapur Steel Plant were given to understand before joining the central Sales Organisation at Calcutta that the eligibility for the purpose of promotion would be considered with reference to their date of joining the calcutta office. The plaintiffs in Title suit No. 758 of 1972 were not however given to understand the aforesaid fact expressly before they joined the Central Sales Organisation at Calcutta. In both the suits the plaintiffs however made the same grievance and contended that their seniority for the purpose of promotion should be calculated from the date of their original appointment under the Hindusthan Steel Ltd. at any one of its units, and not from the date of their joining the Central Sales Organisation on transfer. 3. In both the suits the plaintiffs however made the same grievance and contended that their seniority for the purpose of promotion should be calculated from the date of their original appointment under the Hindusthan Steel Ltd. at any one of its units, and not from the date of their joining the Central Sales Organisation on transfer. 3. THE defence of the Hindusthan steel Ltd. in both the suits is similar. It was contended that the suits were not maintainable as framed. It was contended that the seniority of an employee at the Central Sales Organisation was to be counted from the date of his joining the said office and not from any earlier date. It was contended that the different units of Hindusthan Steel ltd. are independent units and each unit maintains its own seniority list. There is no common seniority list of all the employees under the Hindusthan steel Ltd. The defendant alleged that the suits were barred under the provisions of Specific Relief Act, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to any declaration or injunction as prayed for. 4. BOTH the suits were tried together and were disposed of by a common judgment. The trial court found that the dispute involved in the present case was an Industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further held that the suits were barred under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The trial court, therefore, dismissed the suits as not maintainable although on merits the trial court found in favour of the plaintiffs. Against the decision of the trial court the plaintiffs in the two suits have preferred these two appeals. Mr. Bhunia, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellants has elaborately argued the appeals contending that the view taken by the trial court is erroneous. He has contended that in the present case the ordinary law of master and servant will not be applicable in view of the nature of the appointment of the plaintiffs. Accordingly to him, Section 34 of the specific Relief Act, 1963, comes to his aid and he is entitled to get the declaration prayed for. He contended further that Section 14 which precludes the court from granting a decree for specific performance in cases of certain contracts would have no application in the present case. Accordingly to him, Section 34 of the specific Relief Act, 1963, comes to his aid and he is entitled to get the declaration prayed for. He contended further that Section 14 which precludes the court from granting a decree for specific performance in cases of certain contracts would have no application in the present case. His argument is that his clients are industrial workers within the meaning of Industrial Disputes act, 1947 and, therefore, they have a legal character as such, in respect of which the court is competent to make a declaration. He has referred to Annexure 'a' to the plaint in Title Suit No. 748 of 1972 which is letter of appointment dated 16th January, 1963, from the deputy General Manager (Personnel)Durgapur Steel Plant to one of the plaintiffs. That letter in clear terms states that the employees will be treated as industrial workers and leave, holiday etc. will be guided by standing orders. Relying on this letter learned advocate has contended that his clients are industrial employees. 5. MR. Chakraborty, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent, has on the other hand, argued that if the plaintiffs are workmen within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and if the present dispute is an industrial dispute the plaintiffs are free to agitate their grievance before the Industrial tribunal set up under the Industrial disputes Art. but they cannot come to the Civil Court to agitate their grievance. 6. THE plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 748 of 1972 have stated in paragraph 9 of the plaint that they along with other transferred employees were permanent employees under the Hindusthan Steel ltd. and their conditions of service such as salary, seniority etc. could not be affected to their prejudice by their transfer to any other department of the organisation. On transfer from one permanent post to another they would be entitled to hold substantively the permanent post to which they were transferred and this would bring along with them the seniority which they had in the post from which they were transferred. A reference was made to a letter dated September 24, 1969, addressed to the General Secretary, association of Hindusthan Steel Employees by Mr. Ramakrishnan, the Administrative Officer. A reference was made to a letter dated September 24, 1969, addressed to the General Secretary, association of Hindusthan Steel Employees by Mr. Ramakrishnan, the Administrative Officer. It was alleged in the plaint that the administration subsequently succumbed to the pressure and threat of the Association and had to change the procedure regarding the seniority and accepted the Association's terms that seniority of the transferred employees of other units to the Central sales organisation at Calcutta, would be determined from the date of their pining the Calcutta office. It is clear from this averment in the plaint that the plaintiffs made a grievance regarding their loss of seniority subsequent to their joining the Central Sales Organisation which is a unit, under the hindusthan Steel Ltd. According to the plaintiffs they were industrial workers and as such they fulfilled a legal character in respect of which the civil court is competent to grant a declaration. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Chakraborty contended that the defendants do not controvert the plaintiffs' claim that they are industrial workers and. therefore, there is no occasion for granting such a declaration. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the dispute in the present case is between employer and employees namely, the Hindusthan steel and some of its workmen namely, the plaintiffs. He accordingly contended that the dispute is in connection with the terms of the employment of the plaintiffs at the Central Sales Office, and, therefore, such a dispute is an industrial dispute and it is to be adjudicated by a competent tribunal contemplated under Chapter II of the industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Chakraborty further contended that the provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil procedure is impliedly barred in view of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection he referred to paragraph 5 of the Ext. D and contended that pursuant to some discussion held on 20th January, 1972, with the representative of the Association of the Hindusthan Steel Ltd. and the director (Commercial), it was settled that "the Plant employees who are transferred during 1969 in response to open advertisement issued by the Sales office and those who joined on compassionate grounds will be allowed seniority as above (seniority on transfer from plant units etc.) on the basis of requirement of the office will be reckoned from the date of such employees joining. Association confirms that the employees concerned are also agreeable to this arrangement. " Mr. Chakraborty contended that Exhibit D is in substance a memorandum of settlement as defined in section 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, According to him whether Exhibit D is in compliance with the conditions or terms as defined in section 2 (p) cannot be considered by a civil court. Mr. Bhunia, on the other hand, contended that Exhibit D is not strictly in accordance with section 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes act and therefore jurisdiction of Uncivil court is not barred. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamalakar Santana Wadke and others, AIR 1975 S. C. 2238. In that case the Supreme Court while discussing the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit of a Civil nature has observed that even if a statute has expressly provided for a particular form in which a remedy could be had a suit in a civil court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is expressly or by necessary implication made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act, but in violation of its provisions. In the present case the appellants did not approach a competent tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, they are neither challenging the order of the tribunal on the ground that the tribunal has abused its power or has not acted in accordance with provisions of the Act. The appellants have come straight to a civil court to ask for reliefs which the tribunal set up under the Industrial Disputes act can grant them. The observations of the Supreme Court relied on by Mr. Bhunia in support of his contention does not therefore, in the facts of the present case, help him. The appellants have come straight to a civil court to ask for reliefs which the tribunal set up under the Industrial Disputes act can grant them. The observations of the Supreme Court relied on by Mr. Bhunia in support of his contention does not therefore, in the facts of the present case, help him. The plaintiffs in the present suit have prayed in prayer (a) of the plaint "that the plaintiffs may be awarded a decree for declaration that they are entitled to get seniority from the dale of joining their respective post in the Durgapur Unit of the defendant company and not from the date of their joining office at the Central Sales Organisation at Calcutta and the imposition of terms to the contrary are illegal ultra vires malafide arbitrary and oppressive and is not binding on them " section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963, empowers a court to grant a declaration of status or right in the discretion of the court. Before a plaintiff is entitled to get a declaratory decree he must be personally entitled to a legal character or to any right to any property. In the present case no declaratory decree has been prayed for in respect of any property. The declaration sought for is that the seniority of the plaintiffs should be counted from a particular date. Such a declaration cannot be said to be a declaration as to a legal character of the plaintiffs. The right claimed here flows from contract and not from any legal character of the plaintiffs. If the right originates in or flows from a contract such cannot form the subject matter of a declaration under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The legal character contemplated under section 34 must be attributed to the plaintiffs by law as distinguished from a contract. It is well established that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced except in certain limited cases. These exceptions are : (i) where a public servant who has been dismissed in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution; (ii) reinstatement of dismissed employee under Industrial law or by Labour or Industrial tribunal; and (iii) a statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation under the statute. These exceptions are : (i) where a public servant who has been dismissed in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution; (ii) reinstatement of dismissed employee under Industrial law or by Labour or Industrial tribunal; and (iii) a statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation under the statute. Except in the cases mentioned above the remedy for wrongful dismissal or for breach of conditions of service would be a suit for damages. In Executive Committee of U. P. State warehousing Corporation vs. Chandrakiran tyagi, AIR 1970 S. C. 1244, the Supreme Court while dealing with this aspect of the case reviewed a number of English decisions as well as of Supreme Court and held : "the law relating to master and servant is clear. A contract for personal service will not be enforced by an order of specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the repudiation of contract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. This is the normal rule. But when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the service of such an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a roaster terminating the services of a servant. " 7. THE plaintiffs in the present cases are employees of the Hindusthan steel Ltd. which is a Government of india undertaking and is a company registered under the Indian Companies act, 1956. The plaintiffs are not government servants nor are they servants of a corporation or a body set up under a particular statute. They are employees under a company although the entire share holding of that company belongs to the Government of India, In heavy Engineering Majdoor Union state of Bihar arid others, AIR 1970 s. C. 82, the Supreme Court has pointed out: "the question whether a corporation is an agent of a State must depend on the facts of the each case. Where a Statute setting up a corporation so provides, such a corporation can easily be identified as an agent of the State. In the absence of a statutory provision, however, a commercial corporation acting on its own behalf, even though it is controlled wholly or partially by a government department, will be ordinarily presumed not to be a servant or agent of the State. The fact that a minister appoints the members or directors of a corporation and he is entitled to call for information, to give directions which are binding on the directors and to supervise over the conduct of the business of the corporation does not render the corporation an agent of the Government. Such an inference that the corporation is the agent of the government may be drawn were it is performing in substance governmental and not commercial functions. " 8. THE Hindusthan Steel Ltd. can by no stretch of imagination be said to have been set up for performing any governmental function. It is a purely commercial venture carried on by a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, although the entire share-holding belongs to the Central government. An incorporated Company has a separate existence and in law it is a juristic person. This new personality emerges from the incorporation of the company. The plaintiffs being employees under such a company are no bett:er than employees under a private employer. Vide Subodh Ranjan Ghosh v. Sindhri Fertiliser and Chemical Ltd. AIR 1957 Patna 10; Sukdeo Singh v. Bhagatram. AIR 1975 SC 1331 ; Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, samli v. Lakshmi Narayan, AIR 1976 sc 888 ; United Commercial Bank and another v. V. J. T. Vyas, 77 (1) CLJ 498 and Indian Airlines v. Sukdeo Rai, air 1971 SC 1828 . Several other authorities were also cited before us on behalf of the respondents on this point. But it is not necessary for us to enumerate all these decisions. It follows from what have been stated above that the relationship between the parties in the present case is that of pure master and servant Realising the difficulty created by the decisions mentioned above Mr. Bhunia, learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that in the present case there is an element of public. It follows from what have been stated above that the relationship between the parties in the present case is that of pure master and servant Realising the difficulty created by the decisions mentioned above Mr. Bhunia, learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that in the present case there is an element of public. employment in the very nature of the employment of the appellants under the respondents and, therefore, this court should "pierce the veil of corporate entity and examine the reality beneath. " In support of this branch of his submission learned Advocate for the appellants referred to us to certain passages occurring at page 216 of the principles of Modern Company Law, 3rd Edition, by Gower. There the author has expressed the opinion that : "judicial inroads into the corporate entity principles are few compared with the examples of its application. But inroads there have been. It would be idle to pretend that they can be reduced to any consistent principles, but the following tantative conclusion may, perhaps, be drawn. " 9. THEREAFTER the author proceeds to enumerate the different types of cases where the courts have ignored the corporate entity in order to determine the real state of things. The instances cited by the author mostly relate to different matters such as where the corporate personality is being blatantly used as a cloak for fraud and improper conduct, or where the courts have ignored corporate entity in the interests of the third parties. Mr. Bhunia also drew our attention to Pennington's company Law, 3rd Edition, page 45 where the author discusses the exception to the rule of separate legal personality and states as follows : "four inroads have been made by the law on the principles of separate legal personality of companies. By far the most extensive of these has been made by legislation imposing taxation The government, naturally enough, does not willingly suffer schemes for the avoidance of taxation which depend for their success on the employment of the principle of separate legal personality, and in fact legislature has gone so far that in certain circumstances taxation can be heavier if companies are employed by the tax payer in an attempt to minimize his tax liability than if he uses other means to give effect to his wishes. " 10. " 10. AT page 50 of the said book the author discusses the instances where the corporate entity has been ignored and the veil has been lifted to ascertain the reality beneath. These are instances of evasion of obligation imposed by law. Mr. Bhunia also relied upon a passage occurring in Contracts of Employment by Dix, 5th Edition page 157 where the author discusses about equitable remedies and instances were the such remedies have been made available by courts. The passage relied on by Mr. Bhunia is as follows : "in Hill v. C. A. Persons and Co. Ltd. an injunction was granted to an employee in a very unusual circumstances. As a result of pressure brought upon the employer by a Trade Union which was attempting to establish a closed shop. Mr. Hill was given one month's notice by his employer to terminate his employment. He held a senior position with the company which, said the majority of court of appeal, entitled him to reasonable notice of at least 6 months. The length of notice was of crucial significance for if the employee had been given six month's notice by the time it expired the provisions of the new repealed Industrial Relations Act, 1971 would have been in force. The court, by a majority, granted Mr. Hill the injunction restraining his employer from acting on dismissal. " In the same book the author has expressed the view that the courts have recently shown a far greater inclination than in the past to grant judicial declarations and it may be that in the future the declaration will play an important role in employment of law. Mr. Bhunia has accordingly argued that the modern tendency being to extend the scope of declaratory relief, the court below was wrong in restricting it. But this argument is not available to Mr. Bhunia because of the decisions already mentioned, where it has been held that no declaratory relief can be given to the plaintiff in cases similar to the present one. It must, therefore, be held that the trial court was right in holding that the suit was not maintainable. These appeals, are, therefore, dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs. Sudhamay Basu, J. : i agree. Appeals dismissed.