JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application under section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by which order dated 4.1.77 passed by the Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Neem-ka-thana in Criminal Case No. 16 of 1977 is sought to be quashed by the accused- petitioners. 2. The facts in brief are that an incident took place on 5.4.76. Two counter reports of the incident were lodged. Nathu lodged a report at police station, Neem-ka-thana on 5-4-76 at 7. p. m. mentioning that when he prevented Noonda from taking camel-cart through his field, accused persons were called by Noonda who came armed with lathis etc., and they caused injuries to 10 persons from the side of the accused Nathu, Bhura and others. After investigation, a challan was submitted against 16 persons under sections 147, 148, 149, 447, 323 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The other side lodged a report through Ganpat mentioning that when his father was taking the camel-cart, Mst. Ramli and Jamna came with lathis and began to beat his father. It was alleged that other accused also came and gave beating to Noonda. The police registered a case under sections 147, 323 and 146 I. P. C. There was investigation and re-investigation but ultimately final report was submitted on 29-10-76 in the court of the learned Addl. Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Neem-ka-thana. This was objected to by other side. The learned Magistrate rejected the final report and took cognizance under section 190 Cr. P. C. This order of rejecting the final report is being challenged in this court on the ground that the view of the learned Magistrate that the police was incompetent to consider the question of right of private defence is erroneous in law. The learned Magistrate has said that this can be decided only by a competent court and not by the police. Mr. Tibrewal appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that when a report of the police enquiry and investigation is received by the Magistrate, the Magistrate is competent to accept the plea of self defence and thereby to accept the final report. He has cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatreya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar and another, AIR 1960 S.C. 1113 . In this case it was held that a Magistrate who directs an inquiry under S. 202 Cr. He has cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatreya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar and another, AIR 1960 S.C. 1113 . In this case it was held that a Magistrate who directs an inquiry under S. 202 Cr. P. C., for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of a complaint and receives a report from the enquiring officer supporting a plea of self-defence made by the person complained against, it is open to him to hold that the plea is correct on the basis of the report and the statements of witnesses recorded by the enquiring officer. It is further held that it is not obligatory on the Magistrate, as a matter of law, to issue process in such a case and leave the person complained against to establish his plea of self-defence at the trial. 4. Mr. Kejriwal appearing on behalf of the complainant submitted that no interference should be made by this Court because the learned Magistrate was correct in holding that the police cannot decide the question of right of private defence. Mr. Kejriwal could not cite any authority in support of this preposition of law. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the Magistrate while deciding the question of acceptance of final report is competent to consider the evidence produced by the parties before the police and the report of the police based on it and then decide whether the view of the police in respect of the right of private defence of the party is correct or not. In this view of the matter, the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance in this case in spite of the final report simply on the ground that the police had no jurisdiction to consider the question of right of private defence and it should be left to ultimately decide by the court later on. In the very nature of things, a Magistrate is competent to accept or reject the final report and, therefore the police report which was submitted in this case mentioning that right of private defence was established and on that count the accused had not committed any offence, should have been considered by the Magistrate on merits. In the very nature of things, a Magistrate is competent to accept or reject the final report and, therefore the police report which was submitted in this case mentioning that right of private defence was established and on that count the accused had not committed any offence, should have been considered by the Magistrate on merits. Instead of doing that, the Magistrate has rejected the police report on the erroneous ground that the police authorities were not competent to consider the question of right of private defence and submit the final report on that basis. I am of the opinion that the police authorities are competent to consider all questions in respect of the facts and circumstances of the case to come to a finding whether an offence is made out or not. When they do so, they cannot ignore and forget the various exceptions contained under the provisions of sections 97 to 103 dealing with the right of private defence of person and property. Similarly in case of various other offence if the police finds that they are covered by an exception on account of which they cease to be offence, it is the duty of the police authorities to supply their mind to find out whether exceptions are proved or sat. In the present case the police authorities have only considered the applicability of the exceptions contained under section 97 to 103 I. P. C. regarding the right of private defence and they were not only justified in doing so but it was their duty to consider them before deciding the question whether an offence warranting a trial is made out or not. That being so, the view of the learned Magistrate on the point that the investigating agency cannot consider the right of private defence, is certainly erroneous in law. 6. In view of the above, judgment of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. Mr. Kejriwal then pointed out that in the last but one para of the judgement, the learned Magistrate has written that on a perusal of the evidence, he is of the opinion that offence of sections 147 and 323 I. P. C. are prima facie made out. It is true that this general and sweeping observation is there but it has been made in the background of rejection of the final report on an erroneous view of law as mentioned above. 7. It is true that this general and sweeping observation is there but it has been made in the background of rejection of the final report on an erroneous view of law as mentioned above. 7. This application under section 482 Cr. P. C. is, therefore, accepted. The judgment of the learned Munsif Magistrate dated 14-1-77 taking cognizance of the offence under sections 147 and 323 I. P. C. is quashed. However the case and the record is sent back to the learned Magistrate for fresh consideration of the police investigation papers and the reports to find out whether the final report of the police holding that the accused have not committed any offence as they are covered by the exception regarding right of private defence is correct or not. In case the Magistrate finds that the conclusions of the investigating agency are not correct on the basis of the evidence recorded by the police, the Magistrate would be competent enough to take cognizance of the offence again by rejecting the final report. Contrary to it in case the learned Magistrate concurs with the view of the police authorities about the assessment of the evidence recorded during investigation for holding that the right of private defence is proved than he would accept the final report of the police. 8. Mr. Kejriwal then pointed out that the complainant has filed a private complaint also and that is pending in this case. This judgment would in no way restrict the right of the learned Magistrate from passing any order on this complaint according to law. 9. Record of the trial court which has been called here should now be sent back to the learned Magistrate so that he can proceed further and pass an appropriate order, keeping in view the directions given above.Appeal accepted. *******