Judgement JUDGEMENT :- This second appeal is directed against the decree passed by the Assistant District Judge No. 2, at Gauhati in Title Appeal No. 33 of 1975 affirming the ex parte decree passed by the Munsiff No. II, at Gauhati in favour of the Respondent No. 1 Shri Golok Nath Kakati (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) in Title Suit No. 24 of 1975, which was initially registered as Title Suit No. 136 of 1972. The respondent who was an employee of the Tax Department of the Government of Assam filed the aforementioned suit for a declaration that he was born on the first day of October, 1923. His case was that his age was wrongly recorded in the Matriculation Certificate issued by the Calcutta University in 1940, as 19 years 5 months on the first of March of 1940 in place of 16 years and 5 months. The mistake in recording the age in his Matriculation Certificate was detected by him on 21-6-72 while he was scrutinising his service record. The plaintiff, thereafter, wrote to the Registrar of the Calcutta University for correction of his age in the Matriculation Certificate but to no effect. He accordingly filed the suit against the Registrar of the Calcutta University for a declaration that he was born on the 1st day of October, 1923. The suit was initially filed against the Registrar of the Calcutta University alone; subsequently the appellant i.e. the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam was impleaded as defendant No. 2, as the plaintiff is an employee under him without any notice under Section 80, C.P.C. 2. The Registrar of the Calcutta University entered appearance and filed a written statement raising various objections, but he did not come to contest the suit. The appellant also entered appearance and took time to file written statement but ultimately he did not file any written statement nor did he contest the suit. The suit was accordingly heard and decreed ex parte. 3. Being aggrieved by the decree, the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam, the appellant herein, filed an appeal before the Assistant District Judge, at Gauhati. That appeal having been dismissed he has now come up with the present second appeal. 4. Mr. J.N. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the decree of the lower Appellate Court on several grounds. Being aggrieved by the decree, the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam, the appellant herein, filed an appeal before the Assistant District Judge, at Gauhati. That appeal having been dismissed he has now come up with the present second appeal. 4. Mr. J.N. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the decree of the lower Appellate Court on several grounds. His first contention is that the suit against the appellant was bad for want of notice under Section 80, C.P.C. It was submitted by him that Section 80, C.P.C. applies to all suits in which a Government officer, in his official capacity, is made a defendant and the provisions thereunder cannot be relaxed, in any such case, even when a Government officer is impleaded as a pro forma defendant. In the instant case Mr. Sarma submits that the appellant was one of the principal defendants and as such the Court below committed an error in law in holding that the suit was not bad for want of notice. In support of this contention he relied on the decision in Baldeo Prasad v. Sukhi Singh, AIR 1938 Pat 127 and Madras Province v. Maharaja of Jeypore, AIR 1943 Mad 284 . 5. Mr. P. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that in the instant case the respondent did not institute the suit against the appellant in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity, the respondent made no allegation whatsoever against the appellant in his plaint nor has he claimed any relief against him in the plaint. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Choudhury S.80, C.P.C. is not attracted at all. Mr. Choudhury further submitted that even if any notice was necessary, the appellant must be deemed to have waived such notice, as he neither filed any written statement nor contested the suit in the trial Court. In support of this contention he relied on the decisions in Gaja v. Dasa Koeri, AIR 1964 All 471 ; Lalchand v. Union of India, AIR 1960 Cal 270 ; State of Rajasthan v. Girdharilal, AIR 1959 Raj 126 (FB) and Dhian Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274 . 6. I am unable to agree with Mr. Choudhury that no notice under S.80, C.P.C. is necessary in the instant case. 6. I am unable to agree with Mr. Choudhury that no notice under S.80, C.P.C. is necessary in the instant case. The alleged cause of action for the suit, according to the plaintiff, arose when he detected the mistake in regard to his age while scrutinising his service record prepared in the office of his employer Commissioner of Taxes. It is evident from the facts and circumstances of the case that the plaintiff wants to get his age corrected in the office of the defendant-appellant, on the basis of the declaration prayed for. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the respondent has not filed the suit against the appellant for anything done in his official capacity. Though the plaintiff has not prayed for any relief, expressly, against the defendant No. 2 (Appellant) in the plaint, the declaration if made, will be binding on the appellant in view of the provisions of S.35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides that a declaration made under Chap. VI of the Act, is binding on the parties to the suit. In view of these facts and circumstances I am unable to agree with Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, that S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not at all attracted and no notice was necessary. 7. It is now a settled law that the Government or its officer, as the case may be, who is sued, can waive the notice under S.80, C.P.C. If any authority is needed on this point reference may be made to the decisions reported in AIR 1958 SC 274 , AIR 1959 Raj 126 (FB); AIR 1960 Cal 270 . Let me, therefore, proceed to examine if it can be held that the appellant waived such notice. 8. In Gaja v. Dasa Koeri, AIR 1964 All 471 which has been relied on by Mr. Choudhury, it was held that if the State Government could be said to have waived its objection regarding want of notice by not taking a plea to that effect in the written statement filed by it, it can be said with equal reason that the State Government waived it by filing no written statement at all. Relying on this decision Mr. Relying on this decision Mr. Choudhuri submits that when the appellant did not file any written statement in the suit despite the fact that he once took time to file the same, it must be deemed that he had waived the notice. 9. With great respect, I am unable to agree with the above decision. If the view taken in the above decision is accepted as correct law, perhaps in no case a defendant against whom a suit ia decreed ex parte, will be able to challenge the same in appeal, on merit, except on ground of jurisdiction of the Court, as jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, if there was none. But there is no bar in law for a defendant to challenge an ex parte decree on merit. If the defendant does not take any objection as to notice in his written statement and does not join issue with the plaintiff on that score during the trial, it can he inferred that he waived the notice. But such an inference will not be reasonable in a case where no written statement was filed and the suit was decreed ex parte. The question as to whether or not notice under S.80, C.P.C. was waived is to be judged from the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case the appellant took time to file his written statement but for whatever reason it might be, he did not file any written statement and consequently the suit was decreed against him, ex parte. He took an appeal against the ex parte decree before the Assistant District Judge and there he resisted the decree on the ground of want of notice. Here in the second appeal also, the appellant has taken the same objection. In these circumstances, I am unable to hold that the appellant waived the notice under S.80, C.P.C. 10. The next contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the suit is barred by limitation and the learned Courts below should have dismissed the suit on that ground, if not on the ground of want of notice. Mr. In these circumstances, I am unable to hold that the appellant waived the notice under S.80, C.P.C. 10. The next contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the suit is barred by limitation and the learned Courts below should have dismissed the suit on that ground, if not on the ground of want of notice. Mr. Choudhury resists this contention saying that the appellant, not having taken this ground either in the first appeal or in the Memo of appeal in this court, is not entitled to urge the question of limitation now, as the question of limitation is not purely a question of law but a mixed question of law and facts. 11. If new facts have not to be found and the question of limitation can be decided on the materials already on record, waiver or omissions to take such a plea earlier, cannot debar the appellate Court from deciding the question. Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act casts a duty on the court to dismiss any matter, which is barred by limitation, even though no plea is taken by the defendant with regard to limitation. 12. The present suit being a pure declaratory suit is governed by Art.58 of the first schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes three years limitation for such a suit from the time when the right to sue accrued. 13. Accrual of the right to sue means accrual of the cause of action for the suit. In the instant case the respondent has stated in para 6 of his plaint that the cause of action for the suit arose on 27-6-40 when the Matriculation Certificate was issued and on 21-6-72 when he wrote to the Registrar, Calcutta University for correction of the age and on all other dates thereafter. 14. Evidently, the cause of action, if any, arose in June, 1940 when the Matriculation Certificate of the respondent was issued. It is not the case of the respondent that he had no occasion to deal with the certificate and he was not aware of the age recorded in his certificate. In para 3 of the plaint he has stated that through oversight and ignorance he could not take steps earlier, to correct his age in the certificate. Oversight and ignorance cannot extend the period of limitation. In para 3 of the plaint he has stated that through oversight and ignorance he could not take steps earlier, to correct his age in the certificate. Oversight and ignorance cannot extend the period of limitation. The fact that the respondent wrote a letter to the Registrar of the Calcutta University on 21-6-72 is also of no consequence, so far as limitation is concerned. Merely by writing such a letter the respondent cannot prolong the period of limitation. In Asad Ali v. Tahir Ali, ILR (1956) 8 Assam 252, the Court observed as below : "A suit for declaration may be instituted within six years under Art.120 of the Limitation Act from the date when the cause of action accrues. If the plaintiff is in possession, he may ignore a particular invasion on his title. He may wait for a second one. But if he by his own acts can create a fresh invasion, e.g., by applying for a correction of the entry again, then he may repeat the process a number of times and thus prolong the period of limitation for a declaratory suit, indefinitely. This would defeat the provisions contained in Art.120. The situation then will be that a person in possession could institute a suit for declaration at any time and at his pleasure. The view does not seem to give full effect to Art.120 as it stands and we hesitate to go to this extreme." 15. It is thus clear that the letter of the respondent written to the Registrar, Calcutta University in June, 1972, cannot go to give him a fresh lease of limitation, which expired long ago. 16. Mr. Choudhury drew my attention to the provisions of the note under Subsidiary Rule 8, which reads as under : "No alteration in the date of birth of a Government servant should be allowed except in very rare cases. ... ... ... In no case request for change in the date of birth of a Government servant made on a date within three years of the date of his actual superannuation should be entertained." 17. Relying on the above provision it was argued by Mr. ... ... ... In no case request for change in the date of birth of a Government servant made on a date within three years of the date of his actual superannuation should be entertained." 17. Relying on the above provision it was argued by Mr. Choudhury that when Government entertains objection in regard to age till three years before superannuation of a Government servant, under S.R. 8, the suit of the respondent which was filed before three years of the date of his superannuation, cannot be held to be barred by limitation. 18. This argument is without any substance. Executive instructions contained in the note under S.R. 8 cannot override the provisions of the Limitation Act. 19. Mr. Sarma, the learned counsel for the appellant challenged the decree of the lower appellate Court on yet another ground, namely, that the suit filed against the Registrar of the Calcutta University is not maintainable. Mr. Sarma further submits that although this plea was not earlier taken on behalf of the appellant before any of the Courts below, he is entitled to take this plea for the first time in second appeal as it is a legal plea. In support of this contention he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2018 where it was held that the plea of non-maintainability of a suit is a legal plea and can be accepted although no specific plea was taken or precise issue framed and that if the suit on the face of it is not maintainable, the fact that no specific was taken or no specific issues were farmed is of little consequence. 20. That being the legal position, the appellant cannot be debarred from taking the plea of non-maintainability of the suit in this appeal, despite the fact that such a plea was not earlier taken by him in any of the Courts below and more particularly when on the face of the record it is evident that the suit is not maintainable. Sub-Sec. (2) of S.3 of the Calcutta University Act, 1951 provides that the University shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued by the name of the University of Calcutta. The present suit was filed against the Registrar of the Calcutta University and not against the Calcutta University. Sub-Sec. (2) of S.3 of the Calcutta University Act, 1951 provides that the University shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued by the name of the University of Calcutta. The present suit was filed against the Registrar of the Calcutta University and not against the Calcutta University. The Registrar of the Calcutta University is not a legal entity to sue or be sued. If authorised by rule, or otherwise, he may be competent to sign the pleadings on behalf of the Calcutta University but he cannot sue or be sued as Registrar. The relief sought for by the Respondent is evidently against the Calcutta University. By the declaration prayed for the respondent wants to get the alleged mistake committed by the University in recording his age, corrected. Such a declaration cannot be given when the University is not a party to the suit. 21. As a result of the foregoing discussions, it is seen that there is sufficient force in the appeal. The respondents suit was bad for want of statutory notice under S.80, C.P.C., barred by limitation under Art.58 of the limitation Act, 1963 and was not maintainable against the principal defendant No. 1, viz. the Registrar of the Calcutta University. The decree appealed against must, therefore, be set aside and I do accordingly. The plaintiff respondents suit is dismissed. The appeal is allowed. I however leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.