Judgment S.K. Mal Lodha, J.-These are eight writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and can be conveniently disposed of by a s ingle judgment as they have been heard together and the questions involved in all of them are the same. 2. It will suffice to state the facts in Writ Petition No. 1961 of 1970. The petitioner in connection with its business of manufacture of Aluminium Conductor Steel Reinforced and all Aluminium Conductors imported Electrolytic Grade Aluminium Wire Rods which were not extruded from outside India. One such consignment was imported under Bill of Entry No. 2431, dated July 7, 1965. The consignment consisted of 9.165 M. T. of Electrolytic Grade Aluminium Wire of 90% to 99.5% purity and 3” diameter. These goods were cleared from the Customs at Bombay and at the time of clearance, the Assistant Collector (Principal Appraiser) Customs, Bombay levied duties as under- Customs Duty 16 1/2% Countervailing Duty Rs. 396 per M.T. 3. The petitioner paid the above duties. The petitioner has no grievance so far as the payment of customs duty at 16% on the above consignment is concerned but according to the petitioner, the countervailing duty at Rs. 396 per M.T. was levied and collected by the Assistant Collector (Principal Appraiser) Customs, Bombay on a mistaken impression that it was leviable under Section 2A of the Indian Tariff Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’) in respect of these goods and this being a bilateral mistake, neither the department nor the petitioner disputed this levy. The petitioner has submitted Bill of Entry dated July 7, 1965 with the writ petition and that has been marked Exhibit 1. The petitioner further states that the Collector of Customs issued a public notice No. 170/67, dated October 15, 1967 containing the decision of the Central Board of Excise and Customs with regard to the levy of countervailing duty on Electrolytic Grade Aluminium Wire Rods and clarified that Electcolytic Grade Aluminium Wire Rods other than extruded are not covered by any of the items in the Central Excise Tariff and as such, they are not on import, leviable to additional duty under Section 2A of the Act. The public notice relied upon by the petitioner runs as follows: -“Public Notice No. 170/67:-Sub : No. 3 countervailing duty-E.C. Grade Aluminium wire rods, other than extruded levy of additional duty under Section 2A of the Indian Tariff Act. The decision of the Central Board of Excise and Customs on the above subject is reproduced below for information of Importer, Clearing Agents and the Public: -“E. C. Grade Aluminium Wire Rods, other than extruded are not covered by any of the items in the Central Excise Tariff and accordingly they are not, on import, liable to additional duty under Section 2A of the Indian Tariff Act.” [Letter No. F. 16/16/67-Cus. l(pt) dated 15th September, 1967 from Central Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi.] Sd/- B. Sen Collector of Customs. C. 11/402/67-A Customs House Madras dated 15-10-67 Sd/- K.J. Raman Assistant Collector of Customs.” 4. As soon as, and immediately after the petitioner became aware of the aforesaid public notice, it preferred its claim on December 25, 1967 before the Principal Appraiser of Customs for the refund of the countervailing duty at Rs. 396/-per-M.T. in respect of 9-165 M.T. which was collected by the Assistant Collector (Principal Appraiser) Customs, Bombay and paid by the petitioner under a mistake as no such duty was leviable in law. The Principal Appraiser of Customs considered the claim of the petitioner and by his order dated January 30, 1968, despatched on January 31, 1968 and received by the petitioner on February 3, 1968 rejected the claim holding that the application for the refund of duty was time barred under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short, ‘the Customs Act’) as the same was not received within six months from the date of payment i.e. July7, 1965. The order of the Principal Appraiser of Customs has been submitted by the petitioner along with the writ petition and has been marked Exhibit 2. It bears the endorsement “Copy forwarded for information to M/s. Prem Cables Private Limited, Post Office Pipalia Kalan via Beawar, Rajasthan with reference to their letter No. PCPL PIP (84)167/2915, dated 25-12-67 with nil enclosures”. This order was received at Pipalia Kalan, District Pali, Rajasthan, on February 3, 1968. After the receipt of the order of Principal Appraiser of Customs, the petitioner preferred an appeal against that order before the Appellate Collector of Customs on April 2, 1968. This order was received at Pipalia Kalan, District Pali, Rajasthan, on February 3, 1968. After the receipt of the order of Principal Appraiser of Customs, the petitioner preferred an appeal against that order before the Appellate Collector of Customs on April 2, 1968. The Appellate Collector, Customs, Bombay (respondent No. 2) rejected the appeal holding that the provisions of Section 27(1) of the Customs Act are mandatory and could not be relaxed and in this view of the matter, he confirmed the order of the Principal Appraiser of Customs and rejected the appeal on April 26, 1968. The copy of the order of the Appellate Collector, Customs, Bombay has been placed on record by the petitioner and has been marked Exhibit “3. The copy of the order was forwarded for information to the petitioner at Pipalia Kalan via Beawar, Rajasthan, which was received on May 4, 1968. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision application against the order of the Appellate Collector, Customs, Bombay before the Joint Secretary to the Government, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi. By a consolidated order dated November 28, 1969 reproduced in Schedule A appended to the writ petition, the Government of India rejected the revision application. As the issue involved in the five revision applications preferred by the petitioner was the same, it was mentioned that the levy of Rs. 360/-or 396/-per M.T. does not represent any countervailing duty but was, in fact, part of the basic customs duty in terms of the exempt notifications mentioned in the order. In this view of the matter, it was observed that the petitioner’ s grievance was misconceived and no refund is due to the petitioner even on merits. It may be stated here that specific finding in regard to the objection that the application for refund was time-barred was not given. The copy of the order passed in revision was also forwarded to the petitioner at Pipalia Kalan via Beawar, Rajasthan. The petitioner has challenged the orders Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3 and the order reproduced in Schedule ‘A’ on the ground that the orders suffered from error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the duty of Rs. 396/-per M.T. levied is only a countervailing duty under Section 2-A of the Act and it is not basic duty as held by the Commissioner, Revision Applications, Government of India. 396/-per M.T. levied is only a countervailing duty under Section 2-A of the Act and it is not basic duty as held by the Commissioner, Revision Applications, Government of India. According to the petitioner, this statement is erroneous and not based on the correct legal position as none of the notifications relied on by the Revisional Authority lends support to the conclusion to which the Revisional Authority has arrived at inasmuch as neither of these notifications provide that the duty of Rs. 396/-per M.T. is a basic duty nor is there any exemption provided in respect of the duty leviable under Section 2-A of the Act. As regards the question of limitation, the contention of the petitioner is that Section 27 of the Customs Act has no application to its case, for, the levy and recovery of duty of Rs. 396/-per M.T. was not under the provisions of any Act and as such, it was illegal and the Customs authorities were not entitled to retain illegal collection. The bar of making a claim for refund within six months from the date of collection is not applicable in this case The case of the petitioner further is that Section 27 of the Customs Act is ultra vires of the provisions of Article 19(f) of the Constitution of India. 5. Inthese circumstances, the petitioner has prayed that an order direction or writ including the writ in the nature of certiorari or mandamus be issued and the orders of (i) Principal Appraiser of Customs, Bombay dated January 30, 1968 (Exhibit2) (ii) the Appellate Collector of Customs, dated April 4, 1968 (Exhibit 3) and (iii) the Commissioner, (Revision Applications), Government of India, dated November 28, 1969 (reproduced in Schedule ‘A’) be quashed and the respondents be ordered to allow the claim of the petitioner In the alternative, it has been prayed that respondent No. 3 be directed to determine the question of limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act and thereafter to decide the revision application preferred by the petitioner afresh This writ petition was presented in this Court on July 14, 1970. 6. The respondents have contested this writ petition by filing a reply to it, the copy of of which was delivered to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on January 10, 1978. It was denied that any countervailing duty (S Rs 3 96/-per M.T. was charged from the petitioner. 6. The respondents have contested this writ petition by filing a reply to it, the copy of of which was delivered to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on January 10, 1978. It was denied that any countervailing duty (S Rs 3 96/-per M.T. was charged from the petitioner. The following customs duty was levied by the Assistant Collector on the consignment of Elctrolytic Grade Aluminium Wire consisting of 9.165 M.Ts. :-16i%(15%+10% ad valorem) 10% regulaiory duty and Rs. 396 (Rs. 360+10% of Rs. 360 i.e. Rs. 36 per M.T.). Thus, the aforesaid entire amount charged was Customs duty and not countervailing duty. Section 2A of the Act was not invoked in the levy of Customs duty on the aforesaid consignment. Reliance was placed on Notification No. 89-Customs, dated July 7, 1962, No. 82-Customs, dated March 1, 1963, No. 171-Customs, dated July 27, 1963 and No. 136-Customs dated October 3, 1964. In the said Notifications so amended, Aluminium’ Rods Electrolytic Aluminium Wires and Electroltyic Aluminium Ingots were imported’ for the manufacture of Aluminium Conductors, Steel Reinforced or hard drawn Standard Aluminium Conductors for overhead power transmission purposes are exempt from the payment of so much of the Customs duty levied thereon under the Act as in excess of 15% ad valorem and Rs. 360 per M.T Besides this the goods were further chargeable to regulatory duty of 10% then in force levied under Section 77 of the Finance Act, 1965. The duty @ Rs. 360 per M.T. was levied by the Central Government in exercise of the powers under Section 25 of the Customs Act as Customs duty. The respondent denied that the provisions of Section 27 of the Customs Act are ultra vires of the provisions of Article 19(f) of the Constitution of India. It was contended that the provisions of Section 27 of the Customs Act are mandatory and the claim petition which the petitioner had filed with the Principal Appraiser of Customs, Bombay, was barred by time and it was rightly rejected by the authorities concerned. In the additional pleas four grounds were taken by the respondents. It was contended that the provisions of Section 27 of the Customs Act are mandatory and the claim petition which the petitioner had filed with the Principal Appraiser of Customs, Bombay, was barred by time and it was rightly rejected by the authorities concerned. In the additional pleas four grounds were taken by the respondents. They are, (1) that the petitioner has claimed the refund of the additional Customs duty at Rs 396 per MTin regard to the goods imported by it from outside and received by it at Bombay The aforesaid duty was levied vide Exhibit 1 by the Principal Appraiser of Customs Bombay, and as such, the cause of action, if any, arose in favour of the petitioner at Bombay and for that reason, the Bombay High Court can only entertain and decide the matter involved in this writ petition. In other words, the case of the respondents is that no cause of action of any kind whatsoever in the present matter arose within the jurisdiction of this Court and hence, this Court has got no jurisdiction to hear and decide the present writ petition; (2) that the petitioner paid the Customs duty of Rs. 3629.34 on the goods imported by it to the Customs Department at Bombay in regard to which, he preferred the refund claim on July 7, 1965. The present writ petition was submitted on July 14, 1970 (the amended writ petition was filed on January 11,1971) when the limitation for claiming the refund under the ordinary law of limitation had expired. Thus, on this ground also, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed; (3) that the petitioner has challenged the vires of the provisions of Section 27 of the Customs Act. Since the Act is a central law and under the amended provisions of the Constitution, it is only the Supreme Court which is empowered to hear and decide such matters, therefore, the writ petition for this reason is not maintainable in this Court; and (4) that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of suit for claiming the refund. If he is aggrieved by the decisions of the Customs Authorities, he should have pursued his remedy by instituting a suit. It was, therefore, prayed that the writ petition should be dismissed. .7. Mr. If he is aggrieved by the decisions of the Customs Authorities, he should have pursued his remedy by instituting a suit. It was, therefore, prayed that the writ petition should be dismissed. .7. Mr. R.N. Munshi learned Counsel for the respondents, in the first instance, argued that no cause of action on any count in this case arose within the territory of Rajasthan and hence, this Court has got no jurisdiction to hear and decide the writ petition. His contention is that duty was paid by the petitioner at Bombay and that the application for refund was also submitted at Bombay and, therefore, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that any part of cause of action has arisen in Rajasthan. He referred to the prayer made by the petitioner in the writ petition to the effect that the orders’of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 be quashed, that the respondents may be ordered to allow the claim in respect of the refund of the petitioner and argued that in view of the two reliefs which have been prayed for by the petitioner, the writ petition cannot be heard and decided by this Court. He also submitted that the mere use of Electrolytic Grade Aluminium Rods at Pipalia Kalan in Rajasthan, which were imported from outside India could not give rise to any part of cause of action within Rajasthan as averred by the petitioner in para 12 of the writ petition. He supported the aforesoid preliminary objection by referring to the decision in Dr. Surjuprasad Gumasta & Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1959 Bombay 122, wherein the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to issue writs is confined to the issuing writs on those persons and authorities which are within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. It may be mentioned here that this decision was given prior to the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. He further invited our attention to Lt. Col. It may be mentioned here that this decision was given prior to the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. He further invited our attention to Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 532 , in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that Articles 226 as-it stood then, did not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending upon the place where the cause of action accrued being within its territorial jurisdiction. It was further observed that the proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and live powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and that these special powers have to be exercised with the limits set for them. In these circumstances, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the High Court cannot issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories. This decision was also rendered prior to the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, Mr. Munshi also supported the preliminary objection by referring to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Hukam Chand Jagan Nath vs. Union of India & Ors., ILR (1968) 2 P & H 456, wherein a question arose as to whether an order of confiscation made by the Collector, Howrah can be challenged in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The learned Single Judge took the view that the action of the Collector, Howrah cannot be challenged in the proceedings before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, as, according to him, if the goods are seized at Howrah and were taken possession of by the Collector, the export of foodgrains alone having taken place from the State of Haryana, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had no jurisdiction to .quash the orders of confiscation made by the Collector of Howrah. Mr. Munshi further submitted that the matter came to be considered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Shiv Shankar Lal Gupta vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay & Ors., AIR 1968 Delhi 295. Mr. Munshi further submitted that the matter came to be considered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Shiv Shankar Lal Gupta vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay & Ors., AIR 1968 Delhi 295. In that case, cause of action arose in Bombay which is outside jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court where the writ was asked for. The learned Judges took the view that even appropriation of seized money towards tax in Delhi did not give jurisdiction to Delhi High Court. Mr. Munshi drew our attention to Samrendra Nath Roy vs. State of West Bengal, (1968) 71 Cal. W.N. 592. Para 24 of the report as under:-“But even though the concept of ‘cause of action’ has been adopted by the Amendment of 1963, notwithstanding that the Government or authority is located outside the territories of the State, I am of the opinion that the amendment has not done away with the first limitation enunciated in the Election Commission case and has not done away with the inherent limitation of the writ that it cannot be enforced against a person or authority who is not amenable to its jurisdiction-not being physically present within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court....” 8. For the purpose of showing whether there has been change in respect of the territorial jurisdiction after the amendment of Article 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, learned Counsel for the respondents referred to Shankar Jayaram & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 Bern. 295 wherein it was held that the High Court of Bombay could not grant any claim against the State of Madhya Pradesh even after the amendment of Article 226 by Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act inasmuch as no cause of action to claim increase given by M.P. State arose in any part of State of Maharashtra. 8A. Mr. Parakh, on the other hand, submitted that the respondents should not be permitted to take the objection regarding the jurisdiction inasmuch as the respondents have raised their objection after a period of 7 years. The writ petition was filed on July 14, 1970; the respondents were served in 1971 arid the reply to the writ petition in which the objection regarding the jurisdiction has been taken, was filed in January, 1978. The writ petition was filed on July 14, 1970; the respondents were served in 1971 arid the reply to the writ petition in which the objection regarding the jurisdiction has been taken, was filed in January, 1978. They may be deemed to have acquiesced and as the objection was not taken at the earliest possible opportunity and there is no allegation of consequent failure ofjustice, the objection is inconsequential. He placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in Champalal vs. Saligram, 1962 RLW 513, wherein while considering the provisions of Section 21, CPC, it was held that the objection regarding jurisdiction should be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and if there is no consequent failure of justice, mere taking of objection is inconsequential. Our attention was drawn to Surjit Singh Atwel vs. Union of India, AIR 1965 Cal. 181, in which it was held that invalid contract cannot be relied upon as constituting part of cause of action. Reference was also made by Mr. Parakh to Shree Biharji Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India through the General Manager etc, AIR 1965 Patna 53, where the provisions of Section 20, Civil Procedure Code, came up for consideration. It was held therein that the cause of action in that case arose in the district S and no part of cause of action with respect to the stolen bags and bags from which certain quantities were pilfered arose within the jurisdiction of the Court at P. In these circumstances, the learned Judges concluded that the Court at P had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the Purtabpore Co. Ltd. vs. Cane Commissioner, Bihar, AIR 1969 Allahabad 105, considered the expression, ‘cause of action, wholly or in part, arises’ used in Article 226(1A) of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that under Article 226 (1A) of the Constitution of India, a High Court is competent to issue a writ, direction or order against any government, authority or person situated or residing outside its territorial jurisdiction provided it is established before it that cause of action for the relief claimed arose wholly or partly within its territorial jurisdiction. In that case, it was found that no part of the cause of action for the reliefs claimed arose within the territories of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, the Allahabad High Court could not entertain the petition. It was also contended before the learned Single Judge that the communication of the order to the petitioner in that case in U.P. gave rise to a part of cause of action for setting aside that order. In that connection, it was observed that even assuming that the commupication of the order in U.P. gave rise to a part of cause of action for setting aside that order, no cause of action in relation to the order passed in favour of R arose in U.P. and even if the order superseding the earlier one is set aside, the order in favour of R would remain in operation and in these circumstances, that by itself would constitute modification of the earlier order and without setting aside the order passed in favour of R, no effective relief could he granted to the petitioner. .9. Article 226 of the Constitution was amended by Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. Material portion of amended Article 226 runs as under, - "the power conferred by Clause (1) to issue certain writs to any Government, authority or person, may be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises....” While considering the provisions of Section 20, CPC, the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Borakar Engineering and Foundry Works vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Cal. 513, held that payment of tax by cheque constitutes a cause of action for a suit for the refund of the same, and that the Court of the place .where the payment by cheque was made has jurisdiction to try the suit for refund, though under the Statute, the payment to be valid payment has to be made elsewhere by some other mode. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that in that case there was no reason as to why the plaintiff could not invoke the applicability of the doctrine of part of the cause of action. Mr. Parakh submitted that Samrendra Nath Roy’s case, (1968) 71 Cal. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that in that case there was no reason as to why the plaintiff could not invoke the applicability of the doctrine of part of the cause of action. Mr. Parakh submitted that Samrendra Nath Roy’s case, (1968) 71 Cal. W.N. 592 was overruled on appeal in F.M. A. 497 and 363 of 1967 by a Bench decision dated April 30, 1970 of the Calcutta High Court. It was held in Serajuddin & Co. vs. The State of Orissa & Ors., AIR 1971 Cal. 414 , that where the orders as to grant and revocation of a mining lease were served within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court and a part of cause of action arose within its jurisdiction that High Court would have writ jurisdiction with respect to the order (sic) revocation even though the authority revoking the lease and the authority communicating revocation were beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court Mr. Parakh on the basis of the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court reported in S.S. Light Rly. Co. Ltd. vs. The Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1971 Delhi 69, also argued that when the orders under challenge were served on the petitioner at Pipalia Kalan, in Rajasthan, a part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition. In the Delhi case, some of the hearings of the Industrial Tribunal at Lucknow, on reference made at Delhi, took place in Delhi, and a number of workmen concerned were working in Delhi suburb and the Tribunal’s award enforceable by the Central Government was published in Delhi. Itwas held that a part of cause of action arose in Delhi and as such, the writ petition in the Delhi High Court against that award was maintainable. In doing so, the learned Single Judge relied on the decision reported in W.W. Joshi & Ors. vs. State of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1959 Bom. 363 , and Damimal Kausomal Raisighani vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1967 Bom. 355 . Learned Counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to the decision in Dr. P.S. Rao vs. The Union Government & Ors., AIR 1974 Mys. vs. State of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1959 Bom. 363 , and Damimal Kausomal Raisighani vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1967 Bom. 355 . Learned Counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to the decision in Dr. P.S. Rao vs. The Union Government & Ors., AIR 1974 Mys. 39, and submitted that cause of action means a bundle of essential facts, which it is necessary for the party seeking relief to prove if traversed by the opposite party, in order to secure the relief prayed for and, therefore, if the petitioner is able to show that at least one of such essential facts required to be proved to secure an order in his favour has arisen within the territory of this Court, it will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In the Mysore case, AIR 1974 Mys. 39, the petitioner was required to prove in order to secure relief in the writ petition that he was holding the post of Head of Utilisation Research at the Forest Research Laboratory, Bangalore, which was an essential fact, and, therefore, it was held that the cause of action has partly arisen within the territory in respect of which that High Court exercises jurisdiction. The prayer of the petitioner in that case was for a direction to the Union Government to promote him to the post of Director of Biological Research. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Union of India regarding the mantainability of the writ petition in Mysore High Court on the ground that that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition for issuing any direction to the Union Government as the cause of action has not arisen wholly or in part within the territories in relation to which that High Court exercises jurisdiction. 10. The expression ‘cause of action’ came to be considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal etc., AIR 1976 SC 331 , while considering paras 7 and 14 of the Union Provinces High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. 10. The expression ‘cause of action’ came to be considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal etc., AIR 1976 SC 331 , while considering paras 7 and 14 of the Union Provinces High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Para 36 of the judgment of their Lordships reads as under,“...the expression ‘cause of action’ in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose.because of the appellate order of the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression ‘cause of action’ is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum Covenantes. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of ca